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A clash of doctrines is not a disaster, it is an opportunity.
A. N. Whitehead 
L’avenir, ce n’est pas ce qui va nous arriver, mais ce que nous allons faire.
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Do not abuse Time, for it is Allah (swt) Who is the Time.
Islamic Hadith, Sahih Muslim (Book 27, Hadith 5584)
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English Summary
The following thesis is an interdisciplinary investigation of architectural tran-
sitions cast as a composite of space and experience in time. Dispersed between 
philosophy, architecture and cognitive neuroscience, the thesis also attempts to 
provide an empirically plausible neuroscientific framework that best explains the 
human experience of architectural transitions. Accordingly, the thesis is neither 
a pure study of space nor of the human, but instead, an investigation of the dy-
namics that emerge between the body and space during transitions. To this end, 
a falsifiable hypothesis is derived from the framework and tested to assess the 
quality of the framework. 
Throughout thousands of years, architectural transitions have been shaped 
by human beings for various reasons—this makes this transhistorical both ar-
chitecturally and biologically attractive. Transitions extend in time and space and 
depend heavily on the human body’s capabilities to propel itself through space. 
For this reason, the emerging experience caused by transitions is analysed as a 
composite of space and time, which biologically translates to an investigation of 
action-perception. A phenomenological approach to the emergence of percep-
tion over time establishes conditions for an empirically plausible neuroscientific 
framework, which in turn provides a meaningful explanation of the dynamics 
between human experience and architectural transitions. Indeed, the following 
thesis is an attempt to synthesise phenomenological arguments with a prominent 
theory of brain activity. Active inference, as a computational approach to cogni-
tion and cortical activity, is attempted bridged with enactivism, which is a phen-
omenological and sensorimotor account of experience, to demonstrate how the 
environment emerges as an experience in the dynamics themselves. Essentially, 
transitions in the human experience, as a structure of change, are argued to be 
the genesis of experience itself—transitions become both the question and the 
answer, albeit, on different terms. 
The phenomenological framework is heavily based on the temporal nature 
in human experience and its characterisation as inherently bodily, i.e. the world 
emerges through an active experience through enactive sensory systems. If the 
dynamics of enactive biological systems are affected by architectural design, it 
implies that architectural design can affect the human experience through short-
term processes, on which the long-term processes, e.g. the psychological expec-
tation of space, are based. 
The free energy principle, i.e. active inference, is an application of Bayes’ the-
orem to investigate biological systems through computational models. Portraying 
the human body as a dynamic system that must resist environmental disorder th-
rough homeostasis, fundamental processes as action-perception can be described 
as the consequential outcome of minimising uncertainty about the environment. 
On a cellular level, the process of emergence is the outcome of dynamic self-or-
ganising systems, which is the very foundation of action-perception.
By providing a thorough analysis of the computational process, it is revealed 
 
IX
that knowing how is inherently different from knowing that, which indeed makes the 
computational approach more appealing as it aligns with the philosophical and 
enactive account of human experience. Active inference is essentially demonstra-
ted to fit an embodied, embedded, enactive and extended account of cognition, 
rather than a traditional sandwich-model account to cognition. 
In sum, the thesis may be taken as (1) an account of how architectural research 
may go beyond traditional methods and address questions that are currently not in 
the vocabulary of architects, (2) a computational neurophenomenological account 
of experience that provides a meaningful explanation of the emergence of archi-
tectural experience and (3) an answer to how do architecture impact experience 
and body on a sensory-level, from how the world is perceived. 
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Danish Summary
Sammenfattende kan denne afhandling betragtes som (1) en redegørelse for, 
hvordan arkitekturforskning kan gå ud over traditionelle metoder og adressere 
spørgsmål, der i øjeblikket ikke er i arkitekternes ordforråd, (2) en beregningsven-
lig tilgang til hjernen og fænomenologien der giver en meningsfuld forklaring på 
arkitektonisk oplevelse og (3) et svar på, hvordan arkitektur påvirker oplevelse og 
krop på et sensorisk niveau, hvorfra verden opfattes.
Afhandlingen er således en tværfaglig undersøgelse hvor oplevelsen af arkitek-
tur forståes som et fænomenologiske og neurobiologisk fænomen med arkitekto-
niske overgange som case, og dermed også af de rent neurofysiologiske/kropslige 
aspekter af oplevelsen af kontrollerede arkitektoniske/rumlige konfigurationer. 
Denne afhandling skal derfor ses som en tværdisciplinær undersøgelse arkitek-
toniske overgange set som en bevægelse i tid og rum, der inddrager såvel filosofi 
og arkitektur som kognitiv videnskab for herigennem at tilvejebringe en empirisk 
testbar model baseret på neurobiologi, der kan forklare oplevelsen af arkitektoni-
ske overgange som fænomen.
Således er afhandlingen hverken et absolut studie af rummet eller af menne-
sket, men i stedet en undersøgelse af den dynamik der opstår mellem kroppen og 
rummet under overgange. Til dette formål er en falsificerende hypotese afledt fra 
den teoretiske model og testet empirisk for at vurdere teoriens validitet. 
Overgange udgør arkitekturhistorisk et transhistorisk element der gennem 
tusinder af år er blevet brugt som arkitektonisk element med forskellige såvel 
verdslige som religiøse formål, hvilket som udgangspunkt må tages som et tegn 
på, at i hvert fald dette arkitektoniske virkemiddel har et distinkt emotionelt på-
virkning. At forstå arkitektoniske overganges oplevelsesmæssige og dermed mu-
lige neurologiske og biologiske konsekvenser kan dermed blive en indgang til en 
dybere forståelse af oplevelsen af arkitektur som sådan. Overgange strækker sig i 
tid og rum og er afhængige af menneskets evner til at bevæge sig gennem rum. Af 
denne grund analyseres den oplevelse der forårsages af overgange, som en sam-
mensætning af rum og tid, der biologisk oversættes til en undersøgelse af aktion 
og perception. En fænomenologisk tilgang til fremkomsten af  opfattelse over tid 
etablerer betingelser for en empirisk plausibel neurovidenskabelig ramme, som 
igen giver en meningsfuld forklaring af dynamikken mellem menneskelig ople-
velse og arkitektoniske overgange. Således er den følgende afhandling et forsøg 
på at syntetisere fænomenologiske argumenter med en fremtrædende teori om 
hjerneaktivitet. Active inference, som er en beregningsmæssig tilgang til kognition 
og hjerne aktivitet, der sammenholdes med enactivism, som er en fænomenologisk 
og sensorimotorisk teori om oplevelse, for at demonstrere, hvordan oplevelsen 
opstår som en oplevelse i selve dynamikken. Der argumenteres for at selve over-
gangen i den menneskelige oplevelse er selve oplevelsen. Overgangen bliver både 
spørgsmålet og svaret, omend på forskellige vilkår.
Den fænomenologiske ramme er stærkt baseret på den tidsmæssige natur i 
menneskelig oplevelse og dens karakterisering som kropslig, dvs. verden opstår 
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gennem en aktiv oplevelse gennem aktive sansesystemer. Hvis dynamikken i ak-
tive biologiske systemer påvirkes af arkitektonisk design, indebærer det, at ar-
kitektonisk design kan påvirke den menneskelige oplevelse gennem kortvarige 
processer, som de langsigtede processer, f.eks. den psykologiske forventning om 
rum, er baseret på.
Gennem anvendelse af Free energy principle, dvs. active inference, kan en matematisk 
model baseret på Bayes’ formel formuleres til at undersøge biologiske systemer 
gennem computermodeller. På celleniveau fremkommer aktion-perception som 
et resultatet af dynamiske selvorganiserende systemer. Ved at fremstille menne-
skekroppen som et dynamisk system der skal modstå miljøforstyrrelser gennem 
opretholdelse af den homeostatiske balance, her forstået som Free energy principle, 
kan aktion-perception fremstilles som en konsekvens af at minimere usikkerhed/
entropi omkring adfærd i rum/miljø.
Ved at demonstrere en grundig analyse af beregningsprocessen afsløres det, 
at vide hvordan, der i sagens natur adskiller sig fra, at vide at, gør at den bereg-
ningsmæssige tilgang stemmer overens med den filosofiske og aktive funktion af 
menneskelig oplevelse. Det demonstreres at active inference passer til en kropslig, 
situeret, aktiv og udvidet beretning om kognition snarere end en traditionel sand-
wich-model af kognition.
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Motivation
My first encounter with architecture as a study was in 2011—until then, the en-
vironment was just my apparent environment. During the first years of the study, 
I realised that an architect draws ideas into the world convinced that the design 
is used and experienced in such and such manners. Architecture has to do with 
designing the world that others live in and experience. To become a good archi-
tect, one must, to some degree, possess the ability to imagine the experience of 
the designed space. Here, architecture becomes increasingly complicated, because 
since architecture has to do with drawing for someone else, the architect must 
take wild guesses about the users’ experience. How can I know what others will 
experience? Are there generalities of experience that translate to spatial design?
Two years before graduating, everything I knew about architecture and expe-
rienced space changed. Lars Brorson Fich’s lecture on the impact of architectural 
design on bodily stress-level immediately captured my interest. It was mainly the 
anti-dualistic philosophy that Fich presented that was captivating. He suggested 
that mind and body were in fact not distinct but an interrelated outcome of neu-
rophysiological and other biological processes relative to homeostasis. With this in 
mind, some spatial configurations, it turns out, facilitates some experiences better 
than others. For instance, Fich’s experiment showed that stressing people in en-
closed spaces resulted in significantly higher levels of cortisol (stress as measured 
from saliva) as compared to open spaces. What I found interesting here, is that 
Fich never tries to explain their experience of the space, but tries to understand 
the underlying biological process by varying the architecture.
I spent the next half-year, researching how architecture impacts the body and 
experience for my master thesis, instead of working as an architect-intern. In my 
pursuit, it was clear that no architectural method was tailored for such an exam-
ination. Indeed, like Fich, it was time to turn to other disciplines that were bet-
ter suited for such questions. At this crucial time, I stumbled across Pavlov and 
his dogs. The dogs learned that every time the bell rang, food was about to be 
served. By using environmental cues like the bell, biological processes, such as 
drooling, reflected the anticipation of his dogs, although there was no perceiva-
ble food to initiate the drooling. In my attempt to translate this to architecture, I 
could not help but imagine that perhaps, the experience of a space is not based 
on that single space alone, but the complete narrative consisting of expectations 
until that space is reached. Perhaps, the architectural experience was the outcome 
of Pavlovian conditioning using sequences of spaces before that space, instead 
of sequences of bells before eating. This initiated a range of new questions; does 
that not imply that we experience what is expected? How can architecture enter 
a learning-process? The bells and dog-food were presented as auditory-visual in-
tegration, what about other senses? 
Continuing the research, I found that it was possible to synthesise Pavlovian 
conditioning with the placebo effect, which is the effect that we experience and 
act according to personal expectations, and synesthesia to allow learning  between 
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senses. At this point, an architectural placebo effect would unfold as a sequence of 
spaces, where the expectation would depend on the changes between spaces. In 
other words, architecture became to me a question of a learning-process through 
sensory anticipation. This thought was central to my research; it changed from a 
spatial and discrete understanding of experience to a more fluent and temporal 
appreciation. Instead of questioning the experience of space, I could address the 
changes between spaces, i.e. the dynamics, and argue the differences as central 
to the architectural experience. In other words, the architectural variability that 
Fich introduced could be conceived as a sequence of spaces. Reading modern 
neuroscientists, e.g. Chris Frith, Karl Friston and Ramachandran, and philoso-
phers, e.g. Andy Clark, Shaun Gallagher and Evan Thompson, I was confirmed 
that perception is largely based on expectations. The question thus became, how 
can expectations enter the realm of architectural design? 
By looking into architectural history, I discovered that transitions could be 
found throughout the history of architecture, e.g. ancient Egyptian and Babylonian 
architecture to Greek and Roman architecture, as well as modern examples like 
the architecture of Le Corbusier, Louis Kahn and Tadao Ando. For instance, 
Le Corbusier builds his promenade architecturale on the idea that the structure of 
thoughts was the outcome of bodily impact from the environment. His prome-
nade dictates that architecture facilitates the process of continuously modulating 
the sequence of thoughts. That is why architectural transitions are so attractive. 
Thinking it through, transitions are perhaps the most fundamental architectural 
element ever to exist. As soon as you create a space, you inherently also create a 
transition from the inside to the outside—and thereby, create an expectation of 
what can be found inside or outside. 
Transitions in architecture are inescapable precisely because they constitute the 
flow of experience. In other words, the structure of the environment compared 
to the structure of experience, which in turn is reflected in biological processes. In 
order for me to design expectations, I needed to analyse the biological processes 
relevant to transitions. To this end, homeostasis is central and can be described 
mathematically through the free energy principle—and by using a rework of the prin-
ciple, i.e. active inference, it was possible to demonstrate how expectations are gen-
erated from acting and perceiving in space. Here, mathematics and philosophy 
merge and elucidate architecture.
I hope to be able to highlight the immense impact the designed environment 
has on body and brain—thus, cognition. By arguing that architecture has a direct 
influence on the body and brain, I argue that architecture no longer can be thought 
of as nice to have but urge to think of it as need to have. It turns out, the environment 
is not just my apparent environment—it is a fundamental part of how I am. 
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XXV I
Reading guide
General:
It is highly advised to read the appendices as they are referred to in the main 
text. Concepts, systems and terms become elucidated through the appendices.  
Throughout the thesis, a high-school level knowledge in mathematics and 
statistics is presumed. Therefore, some concepts are unpacked accordingly either 
throughout the respective chapter or in the related appendix. 
All quotes, important terms for the theory and book titles are written in cur-
sive. Added emphasis is the regular font: “This is quoted, while this is emphasised.”
An experiencing agent is the notion used about the human experiencer. It is a 
compound of machine learning and philosophical terms, i.e. an open system that 
dynamically interacts with the environment.
Footnotes, equation numbers and figure numbers are all reset for each chapter.
Mathematical notations:
Approximating posterior probability refers to expectation propagation, which is an iter-
ative Bayesian method that approximates a target probability distribution.
Probability distributions are written as: P(x). Reward probabilites are written 
as: R(x). If conditioned by another probability z it is written as: P(x|z).
The expectation of a function f(x, y) of a variable x is written as: Ex[ f(x,y) ]. 
If conditioned by another variable z, the exptectation is written as: Ex[ f(x)|z ].
Shannon entropy, which refers to the amount of information/content, of a prob-
ability distribution P is written as: H(P) = EP(x)[ –log P(x) ].
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AN INTROUDCTION AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
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INTRODUCTION
Summary. This brief  introduction describes the transhistorical value in tran-
sitions, which makes them suitable for a thesis with the current theme. They are 
the most fundamental architectural element ever to exist, making them an an-
cient element. This is followed by an outline, aim, scope and initial questions of  
the thesis. The overarching structure of  the thesis is introduced as a merging of  
philosophy and empirical science, which enables the research question to address 
a more profound understanding. Thus, the research question unfolds as the ar-
guments accumulate throughout the thesis. The content of  each chapter is also 
brought forward to portray the line of  argumentation. 
1.1 Transhistorical element
Transitions are omnipresent in various forms. They exist both in human be-
ings and outside in space. Those within human beings coexist with those outside. 
Transitions outside serve to delineate space for varying purposes. By delineating 
spaces, they ambiguously provide entrance and exit; they act separating while 
connecting. Not only does transition exist as different kinds of transitions, but 
it also serves contradictory functions—indeed, transitions are mysterious and 
phenomenal. 
Transitions in architecture are ancient, and so is the idea to approach them 
from a scientific and mathematical aspect. The ancient architecture was about 
Introduction:
an outline of  the thesis
CHAPTER 1
“ [Thresholds] provide a preface to perception of architectural space. 
They live in the sequence of what lies in the past, present and future. This 
means: threshold spaces also live in the expectation of what is to come.” 
(Boettger, 2014, p. 10)
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transitions—although, they were not explicitly referred to as transitions but rather 
as studies of mathematical proportions and relations. Undoubtedly, transitions are 
the very first architectural element ever to exist—a mere wall would effectively 
create a transition and so would a roof, a staircase, a window or a cave. Transitions 
are consequences of spatial delineations—which are necessary for survival, e.g. a 
threshold between inside and outside.
Transitions create narrations. The passing through a threshold, i.e. a spatial 
delineation, creates a sequence of spaces, which occur in a specific temporal or-
der; a narrative emerges. By organising space in sequences, transitions transcend 
their spatial anchor by emancipating into a temporal continuity. Transitions are 
indeed a complicated element that is fundamental to architecture, which is what 
makes transitions a transhistorical element. Cultures from around the world all 
encountered the architectural problem of designing a transition. There are differ-
ent solutions; what made them different?
The historical element of transitions is a critical argument for a biological in-
vestigation; insofar, we assume that biological systems adjust to any change, or 
expected change, in the environment. Their role on an evolutionary level may have 
been essential in the development of the contemporary human being, which in 
turn may be enlightening for health and experiential reasons. The fact that space 
has an impact on the human experience is apparent when moving into a new 
space or making changes in the existing space. A new space, which brings with it 
new routines, new gestures and new habits, may be experienced as a reason for a 
complete change in self-conception. 
One might wonder whether architects always have been aware of the effect 
caused by transitions. Similar to Zeki’s opinion on artists throughout history, it is 
believed that architects may have been “[…] neurologists, studying the brain with tech-
niques	that	are	unique	to	them	and	reaching	interesting	but	unspecified	conclusions	about	the	
organization of the brain. Or, rather, that they are exploiting the characteristics of the parallel 
processing-perceptual systems of the brain to create their works, sometimes even restricting them-
selves largely or wholly to one system, as in kinetic art” (Zeki, 1998, p. 77). 
Transitions and spatial configurations are intertwined. The object belongs to 
space and quantity, while the subject is temporal and qualitative, yet, they are ev-
idently coupled. Questioning the very threshold between object and subject one 
discovers the primacy of the body. By using architecture as the study of space, 
philosophy as the study of time and biology to elucidate their relations, it may be 
possible to fill in the gap. This thesis investigates, through a study of transitions 
in architecture, a truly embodied aspect of an experience. 
1.2 The outset
The following approach reaches beyond body-inspired proportions as a scien-
tific approach to architectural transitions by synthesising arguments from fields 
as probability theory, dynamic systems theory, self-organisation, phenomeno-
logy, ecological psychology and cognitive neuroscience. As described above, the 
inspiration of natural proportions in the Western world came to determine the 
INTRODUCTION
6
transitions between spaces, i.e. the dimensional relation within and between spa-
ces. For instance, using geometric proportions, the initial space relates to the next 
by scaling up the initial space ratio by the geometric mean. Ultimately, the use of 
proportions paved the way for quantification of experience, however, proportions 
also reduce the complex nature of architectural transitions, e.g. promenade archi-
tecturale, to the respective proportional rule and constrain it to be mathematical 
and conceptual contemplations, with no direct anchor in human perception nor 
experience. The proportions are rooted in the Platonic idea of cosmological or-
der causing proper behaviour instead of the relation between human being and 
space. Proportions in that sense provide more about those natural relations than 
about the complex spatiotemporal nature of transitions.
The primary philosophical arguments of the following thesis rest on educa-
ted mathematicians that either got into philosophy or remained in the field of 
mathematics; for instance, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Henri Poincaré, 
Bernhard Riemann and Karl Popper, among others. The following thesis propo-
ses a synthesis across doctrines to answer questions that go beyond architectural 
research. Nevertheless, the approach is not much different from earlier archite-
ctural theorists; it is not the first time an architect has asked questions that other 
disciplines are better suited to answer. As the opening quote from Whitehead sug-
gests, the crossing of doctrines is here taken as an advantage and an opportunity 
to synthesise fields relevant to experience and architecture.
The span of disciplines is rather extensive. Bringing in interdisciplinary argu-
ments may appear challenging to grasp at first hand—therefore, the developed 
appendices are critical—but it is unthinkable to discuss transitions in the absence 
of philosophical consideration of space and time because they are core compo-
nents. Transitions are in their nature experienced as extended in time and only 
possible by the unfolding of action that, in turn, depends on space. It turns out, 
precisely these parameters, i.e. time/action/space, are essential for understan-
ding the underlying process within the human brain and body and its relation to 
a spatial environment. Transitions are certainly a matter of bodily and experiential 
adaption, not only so that the body is not surprised by a change in the environ-
ment, but also so that there is a continuity in perception, i.e. how the body adapts 
to and anticipates its environment is a continuous biological process, making it 
an important aspect to include. Indeed, it was the final research question, the aim 
and the scope that determined the necessary disciplines to involve.
 
1.3 Main aim and scope
There are two overarching aims. One is to develop a framework of compu-
tational neurophenomenology of architectural experience and thereby elucidate 
experience by meaningful explanation. From this framework, it is the aim to be 
able to derive numerous hypotheses for experimentation so that the theoretical 
framework undergoes adjustments that strengthen it. The second aim is to address 
the immediate event and the underlying mechanisms of expecting space. It is ai-
med to identify the fundamental mechanisms involved in creating an expectation 
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of space.
Regarding the theoretical development, it is primarily intended to answer an 
architectural question concerning transitions. Because the complexity of the ques-
tion involves other fields, it is intended to provide a synthesis regarding human 
experience as discovered during an architectural experience of transition. To avoid 
confusion between doctrines, a philosophical analysis of the human experience is 
provided by establishing an ontology and related definitions. Hereafter, an ana-
lysis of an empirical account in line with the established ontology and definitions 
is provided. This is a necessary strategy given the thesis aims to answer an archi-
tectural question through interdisciplinary methods. Ultimately, the phenomen-
ological account of experience provides a link between a philosophically sound 
position of experience to mathematical models. 
Architecturally, the aim is not to provide architects with cookbook-like prin-
ciples concerning how to design; there is no fitness. It is not about optimising 
parameters, nor to provide general design principles. Instead, this investigation 
sets out to properly understand the influences of the environment on the anima-
te human being. It is not within the scope of this thesis to unravel the biological 
underpinnings of a full-blown architectural experience, nor is it to develop ma-
thematical models that simulate such experiences. However, it is within the scope 
to elucidate phenomenological conditions of experience through mathematical 
models and to describe the relation between architectural settings and the human 
experience. 
1.4 A rolling research question
The research question of departure is vaguely stated because determining the 
question will immediately determine the answer. “The truth is that in philosophy and 
even	elsewhere	it	is	a	question	of	finding	the	problem	and	consequently	of	positing it, even more 
than of solving it” (Bergson as cited in Deleuze, 1988, p. 15; original emphasis). In 
stating the problem, a range of terms and conditions are set up, in which the an-
swers must adhere. “[…] the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the 
way in which it is stated (i.e., the condition under which it is determined as problem), and of 
the means and terms at our disposal for stating it” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 16). Setting up the 
problem will thus determine the point of departure for the answer, meaning the 
question must adhere to a set of limits and reductions to truly pose the question 
of interest. Constructing the question becomes the initial steps of constructing a 
sufficient answer. 
Therefore, instead of immediately constructing a detailed question, it is allowed 
to be a vague rolling research question that is actively articulated throughout the 
thesis; it becomes a continuously evolving parameter of the thesis, changing and 
articulating it throughout various chapters. When the research question reaches 
a level of sophistication and depth sufficient to pose it as a falsifiable hypothesis, 
it is then subjected to experimentation.
Architectural experience of transitions are complex spatiotemporal phen-
omena by nature, which makes it challenging to investigate holistically and 
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entirely—however, it is the impact that sequences of space on the human expe-
rience and body relative to the environment that is of interest. It is a question 
of interaction. Indeed, the development of the theory becomes an analysis and 
argumentation for the necessary reduction in the final research question. It is ine-
vitable to arrive at a reduced answer based on the set of limits that match the re-
search question—therefore, the final research question is the outcome of several 
comprehensive and strategic analyses and argumentations.
1.4.1 Initial questions
The initial questions serve to portray a vague impression of where the ques-
tion is directed. As the aim is to develop a computational neurophenomenologi-
cal framework, addressing experience in architectural transitions is appropriate:
• What is a threshold between spaces, and what is the role of passing it in 
the narrative? 
• How does a transition shape human experience? 
• What are the capabilities of a spatial threshold on the human experience? 
• How does a transition of experience unfold?
• What is the relation between the narrative and the human experience? 
• How does the expectation of space interfere with the experience of space? 
• What does it mean to expect a space?
• How does spatial expectation emerge, and what is its role in experience?
Indeed, these questions are vague, hardly pointing in a single direction—this 
is the advantage of not commencing by posing a clear research question. Instead, 
the question becomes more articulate before posing a final research question 
throughout the thesis; it suggests an iterative and recursive nature, where the 
accumulated theory informs the question. 
Eventually, the research question becomes more specific and is finally ad-
dressed through an empirical experiment. The current research question is the 
following: 
Can architecture impact the human experience of a transition—if so, 
is it possible to provide a meaningful explanation by identifying the un-
derlying mechanisms empirically? 
Although this question is immensely broad and begs a plethora of related ques-
tions, it addresses the relation between environment and experience and questions 
the relevant mechanisms.  
1.5 General structure of  the thesis
Ahead lays a highly interdisciplinary thesis. Indeed, the nature of experience 
enters numerous doctrines that outrun each of a meaningful explanation alone. 
Instead of restricting architectural research to methods of architects, it is expanded 
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and pursued in its true complex nature. To this end, the general approach can 
be summarised as a blending between metaphysics and science, deeply inspired 
by Bergson:
“Scientific	hypothesis	and	metaphysical	thesis	are	constantly	combined	in	Bergson	in	the	re-
constitution of complete experience.” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 118)
By dividing the thesis into a philosophical and scientific part, the central ar-
guments and positions are traced in the philosophy of experience and applied as 
conditions for an empirical account thereof. Needless to state that the philosoph-
ical conditions shape the kind of reduction in the experience, which in turn later 
reflect an appropriately reduced answer. Using conditions from philosophy allow 
commencing from a non-reduced position, namely experience itself. Indeed, this 
approach of using conditions from one discipline and applying them to another 
rests on a coherent epistemological stance. Consider here a brief outline of the 
epistemological stance and a brief outline of the chapters1.
Chapter 2, therefore, inquires: What is the epistemological position of the thesis? It 
is the first step to argue the process of scientific findings and to refine the inter-
disciplinary approach. By discussing logical reasonings and discussing the fitness 
of Peircean reasoning, Popperian falsification, Hackian foundherentism, the ap-
proach can ultimately be compiled as an abductive-Bayesian programme for the 
doctoral thesis.
1.5.1 Part I
Chapter 3 discusses: What	defines	a	transition?	By dissecting transition into a 
spatial and temporal concept, two new terms are introduced, namely, an architec-
tural transition, which is inherently spatial, and an experiential transition, which is the 
temporal transition from moment to moment. A definition of the reconciliation of 
the two kinds of transitions forms the unified and central topic, namely the archi-
tectural experience of transition. To illustrate how the architectural experience of tran-
sition can be inquired, a quandary, which involves an experiencing agent moving 
from one space to another, is provided to guide the development of the thesis.
It is clear that action cannot be eliminated from such transition, therefore, 
Chapter 4 addresses the question: What is the role of action in space and time? Bergson 
is invoked at this stage to provide a vocabulary to discuss and review the diffe-
rences between space and time, i.e. a difference in degree and kind, respectively. 
Inspired by Riemann’s multiplicity, Bergson uses the concept to explain the possibi-
lity and distinction of virtuality and reality. At this stage, experience is reduced to 
involve the immediate experience exclusively—thus, not addressing the reflected 
experience. Bergson’s framework of time and space is prolonged and concretised 
by Husserl in an explicitly phenomenological manner.
How do Bergson and Husserl comply in their philosophy, and how is Husserl relevant to 
1 The following brief  outline of  the chapter content merely demonstrate the coherency between chapters.
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the research question? Chapter 5 provides explicit parallels between the two and il-
lustrates how Husserl’s development of action and perception build on similar 
concepts as Bergson. Their understanding of time is complementary, although 
expressed differently. Bergson uses duration, while Husserl refers to a temporality. 
Their account of action is directly linked to their account of temporal develop-
ment, which leads to the next chapter.
Chapter 6 seeks to establish: How can one describe the relation between experience and 
time? By elaborating on the temporal structure of experience, conditions of experi-
ence emerge. Critical to both Husserl and Bergson is their account of perception 
being the possibility of movement, which according to Husserl involves a horizo-
nal intentionality, whereas Bergson suggests virtual actions. The concepts essentially 
describe the same underlying ideas, which amount to the list of conditions that 
Part II must account for to argue an investigation of experience.
1.5.2 Part II
Commencing in biological science, Chapter 7 attempt to answer: What is the 
point of departure of experience in biological science? This chapter provides a discussion on 
a cellular level of the relation between homeostatic balance and dynamic systems 
theory that guides the adjustments that a living organism must undergo to survive 
the environmental changes. The organisation of the body becomes a critical ques-
tion. The genesis and organisation in the body are argued to be rooted in self-or-
ganising principles, which essentially situate the primary feature of action-percep-
tion as paramount for any experience of the world. This chapter further provides 
a crucial discussion on the bidirectionality in the nervous systems and organisa-
tion thereof, situating the brain and body as essential for experiencing the world.
To this end, it becomes urgent to ask: How do the brain and body relate to the envi-
ronment? Chapter 8 provides first a link on a neuronal level by reviewing wheth-
er environmental stimuli are reflected in cortical activity, and second a link on a 
philosophical and psychological level, where the limitations of cognition are dis-
cussed. Central arguments from the extended mind hypothesis are explicitly discussed 
and defended.  This provides the theoretical framework with empirical and phil-
osophical reason to pursue cognition as coupled to the environment.
Chapter 9 questions: What are the roles of action and perception in experience and 
cognition, and are these internally represented? As the previous chapter commenced an 
empirical approximation, this chapter remains on a philosophical level and targets 
experience of architecture from a cognitive perspective. A sensorimotor contin-
gency (SMC) is introduced as a non-representational account of experience in ac-
tion-perception, which suggests that internal representations of the environment 
are unnecessary as the experience emerges from causal coupling in the transition 
of time instead. This further indicates what to look for empirically.
Before questioning what do look for, Chapter 10 questions: How does the ac-
tual process of action-perception unfold? This chapter is profoundly computational as it 
links with SMC by approaching cognition through predictive Bayesian statistics. 
The central theoretical framework is Free Energy Principle, which becomes active 
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inference when reworking the equations. It attributes a predictive power in virtual-
ity and affordance in the transitional feature of time, which in turn cause action. 
Actions, therefore, become a matter of long- and short-term predictions. Central 
terms in this chapter include Hidden Markov Models, generative model, Jensen’s 
inequality, Kullback-Leibler Divergence and action policies. 
Diving into the physiology of body and brain, Chapter 11 addresses: What 
implications—on a physiological and neuronal level—does the unfolding of action-perception 
have on human experience? A temporal scale is here provided to map the cascade of 
prediction in sensorimotor integration so that the physiological reactions and 
cognitive functions are expressed through a coupled interactive relation between 
brain, body and environment. Since the architectural transitions are experienced 
from a perspective and the experience depends on the unfolding of immediate 
predictions and action, which at this point are hypothesised to be reflected in 
neuronal activity, a falsifiable hypothesis can be established.
Chapter 12 tests the following hypothesis: If an enactive account of perception, action, 
and	cognition	is	correct,	then	it	is	expected	to	find	differences	in	cortical	responses	to	resonate 
as a function of affordances over sensory and motor areas—can this be tested? By measuring 
the cortical activity of participants transitioning from one space to another using 
a mobile brain/body imaging technique, the hypothesis is attempted to be falsi-
fied. Surprisingly, the empirical data complements the theoretical framework as 
the neuronal activity reflects the architectural affordances. 
Chapter 13 summarises, concludes and suggests the future directions that this 
computational neurophenomenological framework can take. For future research, 
the invented term architectural cognition is suggested to encompass the impact that 
architectural design has on cognitive processes.
1.5.3 Part III
The third part of the thesis is dedicated to crucial appendices, ranging from 
(A) the theory behind imaginary numbers that link to multiplicity, (B) a brief intro-
duction to neurons, the nervous systems and the workings of an electroencepha-
logram, (C) the functional integration and segregation in the brain, (D) Bayes’ 
rule, Hidden Markov Models and the darkroom problem, (E) a walkthrough of 
active inference, (F) supplementary information to the experiment, and finally 
the references. 
1.6 Final note
It is believed that quantifying architectural impact through proportions is mis-
leading. Instead, the philosophical and mathematical approach is reconsidered 
and reconnected to provide a novel approach. It is exceedingly important to note 
that the following approach seeks to unify philosophy and cognitive neurosci-
ence, which are fields each with their methods. To this end, the next chapter is 
dedicated to establishing a philosophy of science. 
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Summary. What is the epistemological position of  the thesis? An epistemological 
stance is taken to argue the process of  scientific findings. This chapter reviews 
the limitations of  deduction and induction in the context of  scientific discovery. 
Their insufficiencies in generating new knowledge due to their point of  departu-
re are solved by a Peircean abductive logic that is supported by a Popperian ap-
proach to theory and hypothesis. Furthermore, this chapter provides integration 
of  foundationalism and coherentism, i.e. foundherentism, to form the strategic 
programme of  the doctoral thesis as a whole. These positions synthesised can 
eventually be summed as an abductive-Bayesian approach to the epistemological 
position of  science, which is significantly beneficial for an interdisciplinary case 
of  architecture, philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. 
2.1 Introduction
The vigour of science is the ability to increase, or decrease, the certainty of a 
theory. Indeed, a critical attitude towards the theory is necessary to understand the 
weakness, strength and limitation of that theory. Logical reasoning usually takes 
two forms, either deductive or inductive—however, parallel to the establishment 
of pragmatism, abductive reasoning, which was concerned with the explanatory 
power and heuristic nature of the discovery of a hypothesis, reinvented the logic 
Philosophy of  science:
epistemology between architecture and brain sciences
CHAPTER 2
“The rules of deduction may seem to impose a dynamic of belief, such that we 
should believe whatever follows deductively from what we already believe, but this 
is an illusion, since we may always turn the argument around by rejecting a con-
sequence and restoring consistency by also revising some of our previous beliefs.” 
(Lipton, 2004, p. 106)
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of scientific discovery (Bacon, 2012, chap. 1). A combination of abductive rea-
soning and critical rationalism from Popper (2007, chap. 4) and even further a 
foundherentist system (Haack, 1993) integrated with a Bayesian probability ap-
proach to explanatory considerations (Okasha, 2000; Lipton, 2004, chap. 7) form 
the epistemology of the current doctoral thesis. Why is epistemology a vital topic 
to discuss? The purpose of scientific research in academia, led by research ques-
tions and methodologies, is ordinarily to produce new knowledge. At least two 
questions must be addressed to succeed in this herculean task; what is knowledge, 
and how is new knowledge produced. These questions are critical and essential 
in epistemology, and given the ambition of producing new knowledge, they are 
worth discussing.
There is no single right epistemological approach—instead, different approach-
es are serving different purposes, which emphasises the importance of being fa-
miliar with the purpose of the research, i.e. knowing the research questions, and 
the consequential limitations. Moreover, because architecture as a discipline is 
typically concern planning, drawing, projecting and building, it operates differ-
ently from, e.g. philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. To this end, it is found 
necessary to establish an epistemological approach that embraces interdisciplinary 
research questions that stretch from humanistic concerns of human experience 
to natural scientific concerns of human experience. 
This chapter argues that an abductive form of reasoning entails both deduc-
tive and inductive forms and that only abductive inference may contribute with 
knowledge that was not already known. In principle, abductive reasoning seeks to 
explain the case rather than infer a result or premise, which means that it takes seriously 
the explanatory aspect of reasoning instead of the premise or result. Abductive 
reasoning is further extended by the integration of Popper’s critical rationalism in 
testing hypotheses that are falsifiable in order to advance the theory. Essentially, 
knowledge, given by a rule or a hypothesis, never reaches absolute truth, but rather 
an approximation of the truth. For this reason, the Bayesian dynamics in reason-
ing, integrated with an explanatory consideration that is retrieved from abductive 
inference, yields an epistemology suitable for interdisciplinary research question 
stretching from philosophy and architecture to cognitive neuroscience.
It is important to note that environment, as referred to in psychological, cogni-
tive and neuroscientific circles, concerns any external stimuli beyond the brain 
and body, i.e. any stimulation of the exteroceptive senses. Quite similarly, archi-
tecture is rather inclusive than exclusive (see Quintal, 2016 for 121 definitions of 
architecture) regarding a definition. To create a delineation, the environment that 
is referred to onward is a composed spatial structure, which consequently excludes 
other people, temperature, humidity, light conditions, haptic dimension and any 
other non-visual property. Such reduction of architecture is necessary to conduct 
systematic experimentation, where the variables are as controlled as possible.
2.2 Logical inference
To infer is to conclude on a case reached through the logical composition of 
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reasoning or evidence and plays an essential role in scientific research and episte-
mology. Logical reasoning is the elimination of any doubt so that the conclusion 
necessarily follows. When the purpose is to create new knowledge, the approach 
must sustain such an objective, and for this reason, the logical inference is neces-
sary to discuss. Aristotle was the first to investigate systematically the principles 
of reasoning from which his deductive, syllogistic, reasoning emerged (Aristotle, 
1989, pp. 1–6). Logical syllogisms consist of mainly three components, namely 
a premise, a case and a result. At least two properties are essential to the type of 
logic. First, the logical validity of the inference, i.e. whether at all the inference is 
logically sound, and second, the reasoning of the result. 
2.2.1 Deductive logic
The premise, also known as a major premise (Aristotle, 1989, chap. 1), is a con-
ditional statement that must be true (Aristotle, 1989, p. 1). It may be a negation, 
as long as the premise is true in itself. A classical instance:
1. All men are mortal. (Premise)
2. Aristotle is a man. (Case)
3. Thus, Aristotle is mortal. (Result)
The case is the observed state relative to the premise and is also known as a 
minor premise. Both the premise and the case must necessarily be true to deduce 
the result. Otherwise, the deduction is incomplete: “I call it incomplete if it still needs 
either one or several additional things which are necessary because of the terms assumed, but yet 
were not taken by means of premises” (Aristotle, 1989, p. 2). Finally, the result is the 
deduction itself. A deduction is a discourse where premises necessarily gives rise 
to the result without any knowledge outside the premises—hence, a deduction 
can be distilled to a logical inference where if both the premise and case are cor-
rect, the result necessarily follows. 
In light of the generation of new knowledge, it is clear that every valid deduc-
tive proposition, i.e. premise and case, the result necessarily follow. Consequently, 
if the results already exist in the arguments, one may question the degree of nov-
elty of the inference. Concisely: “If in an inference the conclusion is not contained in the 
premise, it cannot be valid; and if the conclusion is not different from the premises, it is useless; 
but the conclusion cannot be contained in the premises and also possess novelty; hence inferenc-
es cannot be both valid and useful” (Cohen and Nagel, 1968, p. 173; emphasis added). 
This problem of inferring new knowledge from existing knowledge is referred 
to as the problem of deduction. The question at hand is whether deductive inference 
qualifies as a method of reasoning to produce new knowledge. Following Cohen 
and Nagel (1968), a brief review of novelty and contained elucidates the alleged prob-
lem of deduction. 
Regarding the novelty of deduction, the conclusion/result of an argument is 
not readily apparent upon inspecting the premise—especially when the chain of in-
ference is of considerable size. Being able to immediately infer the rearrangements 
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of a particular mathematical formula—without the stepwise calculations—then 
one does not need a widened demonstration of that particular theorem. Indeed, 
there is no logical novelty in the conclusion of a deductive argument, but the psy-
chological novelty may seem unexpected and lead to new ideas (Cohen and Nagel, 
1968, p. 174). At any rate, the logical novelty in the conclusion bears with it no 
new knowledge if the argument must be valid. In other words, the premise that 
the argument is based on contains already the conclusion, which naturally makes 
one wonder, how was the premise at all established to be true. When the conclu-
sion is said to be contained in the premise, it is not readily there to be unpacked, 
but rather to be discovered and said to be inferred. 
“Propositions imply one another, and our inferences are valid in virtue of such objecti-
ve relations of implication. We may make inferences; we do not make, but only discover, 
implications. Which of the propositions implied by a set of assumptions we do infer, is 
of course not logically determined. That depends upon our extralogical interests and our 
intellectual skill.” (Cohen and Nagel, 1968, p. 175; original emphasis)
Mainly, concerning the creation of new knowledge, it can be stated about the 
deduction that the new knowledge that seems to emerge from the conclusion/
result is already discoverable in the premise, making the premise of higher inter-
est. Although deductive reasoning may bring forward new psychological insight 
(see also Popper, 2007, pp. 7–9), it continues to suffer from an initiation problem, 
i.e. an infinite regress in questioning the validity of the major premise, e.g. can 
one deductively infer that all men are mortal? Furthermore, even after initiating 
the deductive argument, going from premise to the case to the result depends on 
extralogical interests and intellectual skills, which is hardly defined. According to 
Popper, a deduction-activist, “there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, 
or a logical reconstruction of the process. […] every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or 
‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense” (Popper, 2007, p. 8).
Concluding a deductive argument thus rests on the creative and intellectual 
skills of an individual, that which Bergson named creative intuition. Indeed, the log-
ical inference in deduction is a logically valid top-down argumentation, but the 
kind of inferred insight depends on the creative and intellectual skills.
2.2.2 Inductive logic
Turning to inductive inference, it reverses the direction of the logical inferen-
ce so that it concludes on a premise starting from an observation. This approach 
may be said to take a bottom-up approach. Induction rests on observations and 
universal truths based on experience, i.e. knowledge by experience. The classical 
instance:
1. This swan is white. (Result)
2. This swan is from the world. (Case) 
3. Thus, all swans in the world are white. (Premise)
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Inductive reasoning advances a databased premise, and by doing so creates 
absolute truths, i.e. uniformity about nature. From a particular observation of a 
white swan and the case that it is from the world, inductive reasoning allows in-
ferring that all the swans in the world are white. In other words, induction is the 
inference of the premise by way of the case and the result. The inductive inferen-
ce can never be logically justified because one has not seen all swans and thus do 
not eliminate doubt.
The problem of induction that has been addressed by philosophers such as Karl 
Popper (2007, pp. 313–316) and David Hume (2007) has roots in Hume’s critique 
regarding that the past experience is able to predict the future experience. The 
problem concerns the generalisation of a single observation to a class of objects 
assuming uniformity in nature. Hume states that “[…] there can be no demonstrative 
arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of 
which we have had experience” (1958, p. 89). To Hume, an accumulation of observa-
tion A cannot change the probability for A to happen in the future. Indeed, the 
problem of induction is essentially one of time and space, because Hume criticis-
es precisely the uniformity and continuity of time in space1 through a critique of 
experiencing cause and effect. Hume denied the ability to experience causal rela-
tionships, e.g. observing “one billiard ball striking another, […] we cannot see one cause 
the other to move, but only one movement followed by another” (Bacon, 2012, p. 36). For 
the same reason, Hume can logically be sceptical towards the proposition, the sun 
will rise tomorrow, because it is equally intelligible as its refutation, the sun will not rise 
tomorrow (Hume, 2007, p. 25). 
The assumption that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on the principle of 
uniformity of nature—hence, if no result is reliable, then the reliability is pre-
sumed. It may not be apparent, but this forms a circular argument. If, for instance, 
one states that inductive inference is valid to utilise in the future due to its effec-
tiveness in the past, the argument enters a circular argumentation, i.e. validating 
the past observations of induction is to validate the future observation of induc-
tion, ipso facto. To give a less radical example, consider a bag of beans (Peirce, 
1933, para. 2.622). Despite how many black beans one may stepwise take out of 
the bag; it will never be a logically valid conclusion to state that all the beans in 
the bag are black. The spectacular property of inductive reasoning is precisely 
that although it is logically invalid, it is probably right, despite entering a circular 
argumentation. 
Can inductive reasoning create new knowledge, is the argumentation logically 
sound, and how does the conclusion emerge? The novelty was stated to be log-
ical independence of the prior, which is the premise in deduction and the result in 
induction. Because inductive reasoning is based on observations, which in turn 
may be provided a priori, it may for the same reason as deductive reasoning fail to 
bring new knowledge, i.e. the conclusion is already in the result. The novelty that is 
brought forward is merely psychological, i.e. defining the observation differently, 
1 A critique of  the blending of  space and time is provided in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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which once again seem to dwell on creative and intellectual skills. Inductive rea-
soning is a bottom-up argumentation that, despite being an invalid logical infer-
ence, reaches an apparent truth through its circular argumentation, i.e. uniformity 
of nature. Although the conclusion is based on mere observation, the novelty once 
again depends on creative and intellectual skills.
2.2.3 Deduction and induction
The primary concern in deduction is the validity of the result based on the 
premise and the case, i.e. it dictates whether the result necessarily follows or not, 
whereas the primary concern of inductive reasoning is to establish premises of 
what is apparently, but not necessarily, true. Deduction thus serves to infer the 
result logically when given the premise and case, whereas induction serves to infer 
the premise given the case and result. The consequence is that no new knowledge 
can emerge from either inference. 
In both deduction and induction, the production of new knowledge is bound 
to the creative and intellectual skills of the operator/researcher. To this end, it is 
vital to acknowledge the fact that deduction is only logically valid because there is 
no epistemic uncertainty when all parts necessary to conclude are apparent, whe-
reas this is not true for induction. Instead, induction is concerned with making 
statements that appear true, rather than necessarily true. Nevertheless, both infe-
rences rest precisely on their potential production of knowing that, which is a type 
of knowledge that is arguable different from knowing how, knowing why, knowing who 
(Wang, 2015). It is a static propositional approach to the topic of knowing, which 
obscures the importance of the process of how knowing that came about in the first 
place. It is an important note because the process of realising how is indeed related 
to the creative and intellectual skills that both logical inferences seem to rest upon. 
To sum up, the issues with deduction are:
• The initiation problem.
• Infinite regress in the major premise.
• Not capable of producing new knowledge.
While the issues with induction are:
• The initiation problem.
• Circular validity.
• Not capable of producing new knowledge.
Peirce’s abductive logic is precisely a logical inference that embraces the pro-
gression of science, i.e. production of new knowledge, by taking the process of 
creative and intellectual skills seriously (Fann, 1970). Perhaps the structure of the 
logical inference may depend on the creative and intellectual skills of a research-
er by introducing a feedback-feedforward circulation, where the strength of the 
argument is in its circularity, i.e. the coherence of the argument is a strength. 
Foundationalism and coherentism are returned to.
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2.2.4 Abductive logic
Inspired by hermeneutics and pragmatism, the abductive logical inference 
seems to be a qualified candidate for producing new knowledge. Instead of pro-
positionally knowing that it becomes a question of practically knowing how, i.e. the 
process of approaching a practical truth is according to Peirce the only logical 
operation that may yield any new knowledge. Abductive reasoning, then, “[…] is 
the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces 
any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the 
necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis” (Peirce, 1933, para. 5.171). 
The structure of abductive logic does not differ much from deduction and in-
duction—in fact, it may be conceived as a combination of both. Deduction and 
induction infer either the premise or the result—at any rate, the case is given in 
both logical inferences. Abductive inference suggests that one may form a hy-
pothesis by taking a qualified guess, which essentially means that the inference is 
based on the creative and intellectual skill exclusively (Peirce, 1933, para. 2.623):
1. All the beans from this bag are white. (Premise)
2. These beans are white. (Result)
3. Thus, these beans are from this bag. (Case/Hypothesis) 
The genius manoeuvre behind abductive reasoning is that it merely forms 
suggestions, i.e. hypothesis that something may be true, which through a com-
bination of deduction and induction can be tested. Because abductive reasoning 
only offers suggestions, it does not matter how it came about. This kind of liberty 
in reasoning ultimately ends the initiation problem discovered in deduction and 
induction, because abductive reasoning is not a static form of reasoning, but a 
“rolling” kind. It is a form of inference to the best explanation (Lipton, 2004). 
The hypothesis that is generated is considered currently correct insofar that it ac-
counts for the premise and result. Peirce puts the logical inference as following:
“The surprising fact, C, is observed [unexpected result]; But if A [new hypo-
thesis based on unexpected result] were true, C would be a matter of course; Hence, 
there is reason to suspect that A is true.” (Peirce, 1933, para. 5.189)
This explanation demonstrates how the observed result would have come 
about if the new, creative hypothesis were true (Fann, 1970, p. 43)—it is rea-
soning through the process. This is a clear example of the abductive reasoning 
taking advantage of being able to go both top-down and bottom-up. The deduc-
tion would have dismissed the logic without suggesting a further direction, and 
inductive reasoning may not at all form an argument, however, abductive reaso-
ning has the liberty to move between and improve the validity of the premise; the 
new hypothesis becomes the new premise in a new test. The hypothesis yesterday 
could be the premise today.
How does the abductive reasoning precisely solve the initiation problem? If 
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a researcher came across a phenomenon, how does the researcher know that his 
particular phenomena have nothing to do with the position of the planets, or per-
haps the colour of the researcher’s shirt? “Think of what trillions of trillions of hypotheses 
might be made of which one only is true; and yet after two or three or at the very most a dozen 
guesses, the physicist hits pretty nearly on the correct hypothesis” (Peirce, 1933, para. 5.172). 
No matter how well one may investigate the logical problem of the production 
of a hypothesis, it will never succeed. The reasoning in the process of creating a 
hypothesis transcends the logical reasoning, and thus, as Popper mentioned, may 
rest on creative and intellectual skills. In brief, the abductive reasoning solves the 
initiation problem by assuming that a created hypothesis is true, but must undergo 
a test to withhold the title of being the closest hypothesis to the truth. In agree-
ment with Popper, Peirce makes the point regarding the instinctive generation of 
a hypothesis clear: “If you ask an investigator why he does not try this or that wild theory, 
he will say, ‘It does not seem reasonable.’ It is curious that we seldom use this word where the 
strict logic of our procedure is clearly seen. We do [not] say that a mathematical error is not rea-
sonable. We call that opinion reasonable whose only support is instinct” (Peirce, 1933, para. 
5.174; original emphasis).
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Premise
Creative skills
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Figure 2.1—The three kinds of  logical inferences. The blue circle, P, designates the premise. The yellow circle, 
C, designates the case. The red circle, R, designates the result. The black dashed circle, Cs, designates the creative 
skills in the case of  deduction and induction, but also the process of  generating a hypothesis in abductive inference. 
A deduction is a top-down inference that starts from a premise, then observing a case to infer a result. Induction 
operates the other way, namely bottom-up. It starts from having a result and a case from which it makes the gener-
alised premise. Both inferences share the fact that the case is a given. Abductive logic is concerned with generating 
what the case might be, given that it may be hidden knowledge if  only the result and the alleged premise are given. 
Starting from the premise, and observing a result, one may creatively form a hypothesis from the case, which in turn 
can be stated as a premise to test the validity.
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2 Bayes’ theorem plays a critical role in this thesis for its explanatory power when integrated with abductive 
reasoning, i.e. knowing how. 
In sum, the abductive inference consists of the following stages (Fann, 1970, 
pp. 31–32) (Fig. 2.1):
• When observing that a prediction is falsified by experimentation, a “[…] 
hypothesis then, has to be adopted, which is likely in itself, and renders the facts likely. 
This step of adopting a hypothesis as being suggested by the facts, is what I call abduc-
tion” (Peirce, 1933, para. 7.202; original emphasis).
• “[…] the	first	thing	that	will	be	done,	as	soon	as	a	hypothesis	has	been	adopted,	will	
be to trace out its necessary and probable experiential consequences. This step is de-
duction.” (Peirce, 1933, para. 7.203; original emphasis)
• “Having, then, by means of deduction, drawn from a hypothesis predictions as to what 
the results of experiment will be, we proceed to test the hypothesis by making the exper-
iments and comparing those predictions with the actual results of the experiment. […] 
This sort of inference it is, from experiments testing predictions based on a hypothesis, 
that is alone properly entitled to be called induction.” (Peirce, 1933, para. 7.206; 
original emphasis)
In sum, the abductive logic may produce new knowledge, that is, if there is in-
congruence between results and hypothesis. Nevertheless, although the novelty 
is essentially based on the creative process, the abductive inference is by nature a 
critical rational approach to scientific discovery, because it describes the process of 
discovering heuristically the knowing how and knowing why instead of the static log-
ical proposition of knowing that. The fundamental difference between knowing that 
and knowing how compares to the difference between a claim and an explanation. 
The abductive inference is inference to the best explanation through a heuristic 
process where Bayes’ theorem may explain the dynamics2 (see further; Okasha, 
2000; Lipton, 2004, chap. 7). This also makes the initiation problem obsolete as 
the hypothesis must anyhow undergo experimentation. 
Abductive inference, similar to induction, enters a circular—but coherent—
argumentation of its validity. If the hypothesis cannot be proven false, it may be 
accepted as the best explanation until further experimentation, which means that 
as long as there is no incongruence of belief in theory and no experiment has 
been able to falsify the hypothesis, it is assumed the best explanation hitherto. 
The validity of future observation is based on prior experiences, which are also 
valid because they can be successfully predicted. The genius manoeuvre is that 
abduction does not form a closed system, but an internally coherent and consist-
ent system, which welcomes any new knowledge. This is surprisingly well in line 
with foundherentism.
2.3 Foundherentism
Epistemologically, the justification of a belief within a theory according to 
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coherentists rests on how well that belief coheres with other beliefs in the to-
tal system of beliefs, i.e. the theory. A theory qualifies as coherentist if it is held 
that a belief is justified iff3 it belongs to a coherent set of beliefs (Haack, 1993, 
p. 17). Susan Haack, a British philosopher, believes that “experience and reasons 
are	both	elements	in	justification,	and	an	adequate	theory	of	justification	must	show	how	they	
work together” (Bacon, 2012, p. 149), which is in stark contrast to foundationalism. 
Foundationalism casts the validity of a belief within a theory as necessarily inde-
pendent of the support of any other belief (Haack, 1993, p. 14). The apparent con-
trast is that one builds its validity of a belief on precisely the coherency between 
the beliefs, whereas the other on its independency of other beliefs. 
Their nature of organising the beliefs may distinguish the two epistemologi-
cal philosophies, i.e. foundationalists have a serial form whereas the coherentists 
hold a circular form. According to coherentists, one may safely enter a circular 
system of beliefs, if the system is coherent to a sufficiently high degree. If a belief 
contributes to the holistic system by, for instance, creating subsets without inter-
nal inconsistencies, then it is not a false belief—au contraire, the belief system is 
justified precisely because of its holistic non-linear sense of coherency (BonJour, 
1985). Consequently, coherentism holds that there are no basic beliefs that can be 
justified because the justification emerges only from the coherency of the system 
rather than of its parts. Foundationalists hold instead that basic beliefs require no 
justification by other beliefs—hence, basic—and that these basic beliefs serve as 
the foundation for non-basic and more complex derived beliefs (Bacon, 2012, p. 
149). Such a system naturally takes the form of one-directional knowledge where 
the basic beliefs never receive justification from complex beliefs, ultimately cast-
ing the validity of a theory as parts that form a whole. 
Deduction and induction both could not resolve the issue with an infinite re-
gress, which provides the current discussion with a point of interest, i.e. how do 
coherentism and foundationalism solve the infinite regress argument?
The infinite regress argument questions the premise’s premise ad infinitum. 
Foundationalism holds that the infinite regress is finite and has an end, which is 
precisely the foundation for that argument. Foundationalism is typically linked 
to empiricism because it bases the final premise on experience, that is, justifica-
tion is granted based on experiential beliefs. The limitations of foundationalism 
are the fact that it is organised in a series of beliefs and that basic beliefs can be 
justified by experience. For instance, looking out the window and observing that 
it is raining justifies that outside is wet, but it is not necessary to experience the 
wet-ness outside to justify such a belief. Coherentists do not justify beliefs on 
experience but rather on the extended pattern of relations, which means that to 
justify that it is raining outside other beliefs regarding that belief must be met. In 
turn, it is easy to demonstrate the limitations of coherentism. It fails to establish 
a critical form of justification because “that a set of beliefs is consistent and large is no 
more a guarantee, or indication, of its truth than that it is, simply, consistent” (Haack, 1993, 
3 Iff  translates to “if, and only if ”.
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p. 26). This translates to a gathering of drunken sailors supporting one another 
by leaning back to back, which is a criticism bound on the enclosure of the co-
herent system, i.e. coherentism gives no role to experience or world in justifying 
a belief since the justification depends on the coherence (Haack, 1993, p. 27). A 
coherence view regarding justification finds its strength in the circular argument, 
essentially stating that the infinite regress discovered in deduction and induction is 
finite, but has no apparent end. The justification for a proposition is not another 
proposition, but a holistic justification of a process.
Susan Haack suggests a double-aspect theory integrating both inadequate phi-
losophies into an adequate foundherentist theory, amounting to abductive-like rea-
soning, where testing of the belief, relative to the system as a whole and the evi-
dence, is necessary to evaluate the quality of that belief. Foundherentism accepts 
that sensory experience takes a role in justifying a belief (foundationalist), while 
simultaneously stating that there is no privileged class of basic beliefs (coherentist), 
eventually taking the matter of mutual support among beliefs above the one-di-
rectional organisation of justification seriously. To this end, to justify a belief is 
a matter of reasoning stemming from well-evidenced and mutually supporting 
beliefs (Bacon, 2012, p. 150).
“How	reasonable	one’s	confidence	is	that	a	certain	entry	in	a	crossword	puzzle	is	
correct depends on: how much support is given to this entry by the clue and any interse-
cting	entries	that	have	already	been	filled	in;	how	reasonable,	independently	of	the	entry	
in	question,	one’s	confidence	is	that	those	other	already	filled-in	entries	are	correct;	and	
how	many	of	the	intersecting	entries	have	been	filled	in.”	(Haack,	1993,	p.	82)
Recall that abductive logic is an inference to the best explanation. 
Foundherentism, quite similarly, holds that the quality of the conclusion depends 
on how well a belief supports the evidence and how well each belief coheres with 
other beliefs, i.e. the system as a whole. When applying foundherentism to the 
current discussion, the belief within a system can be translated to a hypothesis 
while the system of beliefs is a theory. In this light, foundherentism suggests that 
the quality of a hypothesis depends on its coherence with the system of a whole, 
but must also enter a pragmatic turn of event to be considered justified. Such an 
approach may take advantage of Karl Popper’s approach to fallible hypotheses.
2.3.1 A Popperian approach
In foundherentism, a belief is understood as a hypothesis from a more exten-
sive theory, where its quality, i.e. validity, is determined by the apparent evidence 
and holistic coherence. It is essential to note the fallible argument in founda-
tionalism, namely the end-premise being an experience since such a thesis leads 
foundationalism into the arms of positivism; that valid knowledge is based on a 
posterior knowledge, i.e. observable, empirical and measurable evidence. This con-
sequently makes science a study of knowledge that stems from positive affirma-
tions of theories.  
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An absolute critic of positivism and the inductive reasoning is Karl Popper. 
The	Logic	of	Scientific	Discovery	(2007) was entirely dedicated to criticising positivism 
and advance a hypothetico-deductive approach to science. A primary argument 
in his criticism is that positivists verify hypotheses through induction by seeking 
for a logical justification of universal statements, although such reasoning is not 
logically valid. Indeed, a deduction is preferred over induction due to the lack of 
logical validity in the latter.
Consider here the steps in deductive testing of theories as suggested by Popper 
(2007, pp. 9–10). The first step in the Popperian approach is to test for coherency 
of the theory or hypothesis, where it was famously stated that a theory needs no 
logical structure to be initiated—however, a criterion of internal coherence and 
non-contradictive axioms must with established before testing (Popper, 2007, 
pp. 7–8). At any rate, the question of how a new idea occurs is irrelevant for the 
logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Second, one must determine whether the 
theory holds an empirical or scientific character, i.e. whether it has to do with hu-
man experience or mathematically deducing a formula. Third, it must be consid-
ered whether the generated hypothesis would constitute a scientific advancement 
given that it would survive a series of critical tests, which constitutes the fourth 
step, namely, the testing.
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive suggestion for scientific discoveries can be 
framed as a series of critical reasonings starting by what can be as abstract as im-
agination. Should the hypothesis hold true subsequent to experimentation, then 
it has for the time being passed, but is not a logically necessary truth, for it may 
be so that another test in the future may bring it down. To believe that a verifica-
tion yields universal truth is the pitfall of inductive reasoning. Popper’s approach 
puts forward that scientific reasoning is a dynamic relation among (1) theory, (2) 
logical prediction and (3) observational evidence, as opposed to positivists and 
empiricism that cast science as a discipline derived from experience, i.e. sense data. 
The hypothetico-deductive approach does not exclude experience as a meth-
od—the experience is central to the approach. Empirical science intends to 
demonstrate only one real world, of which there theoretically could be a plethora. To 
do so,  it must firstly demonstrate that the world is a possible world, i.e. non-con-
tradictive, secondly, it must also be a world of experience, i.e. non-metaphysical, 
and finally, “it must be a system distinguished in some way from other such systems as the one 
which represents our world of experience” (Popper, 2007, p. 17; original emphasis). In 
this sense, the experience becomes a distinctive method between different worlds 
that must be submitted to tests in order to evaluate the validity of the system, i.e. 
that world. Despite naming the approach deductive testing of hypothesis, Popper 
advances an approach that approximates the abductive form of reasoning. 
“A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems 
of	statements,	and	test	them	step	by	step.	In	the	field	of	the	empirical	sciences,	more	par-
ticularly, he constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them against experience 
by observation and experiment.” (Popper, 2007, p. 3)
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From a new idea that may emerge from induction and has not yet been justified 
in any way, i.e. a hypothesis or theory, conclusions are only drawn by deduction 
that hereafter is compared to other conclusions to discover potential logical re-
lations (Popper, 2007, p. 9). The critical rationalism in this line of thinking stems 
from Popper insisting that a theory cannot be verified simply because a hypoth-
esis was not falsified.
2.3.2 Falsifiability	of 	hypothesis
Verification is not possible, which is expressed in one of Popper’s most impor-
tant insights in scientific discovery, namely the falsifiable hypothesis. It builds on 
the fact that a hypothesis must be conclusive, i.e. one-sided decidable between two 
or more theories. The fact that a hypothesis is verified does not verify the theory 
as a whole, because verification of a statement has nothing to do with the system 
as a whole. It merely shows that at the time being, the hypothesis survived a test. 
Therefore, when generating a hypothesis, it must be formulated such that it may 
be falsified precisely because falsification alone brings new knowledge to science. 
If a hypothesis is verified, then the conclusion was already in the premise. In brief, 
one should attempt to falsify a theory firstly because it brings new knowledge, and 
secondly because falsification has the ability of one-sided decidability between two 
hypotheses. By using a falsifiable hypothesis, it strengthens the theory by ruling 
out more than before (Popper, 2007, pp. 17–19, 62, 66).
In a nutshell, Popper states that a hypothesis can never be verified; it can only 
be falsified. If one states that a hypothesis can be verified, one makes the mis-
take of induction, i.e. to generalise from a single occurrence, which is precisely 
Popper’s critique of the positivistic atmosphere in science. 
This position ultimately suggests that knowledge can never be truly known 
and that any verified hypothesis is but tentative until a test might bring it down. 
If brought down, the theory from which it was derived, needs to be adjusted to 
fit the experimental results. Indeed, due to technological instruments and poor 
experimental procedure, an experiment might suffer from non-reproducible re-
sults. Such non-reproducible results have no impact on science, meaning that 
anyone should be able to falsify the very same hypothesis using the very same 
procedure. Popper’s approach is admirable in the sense that it holds genuine and 
human respect towards what can be known in nature so that any theory is merely 
the most probable one. Any theory is the most probable tentative theory until a 
better explanation appears.
2.4 Abductive-Bayesian approach
A most probable tentative theory is addressed particularly by Bayesian4 abduc-
tion. Bayesians and explanationists (abductive inference) converge in numerous 
4 Both Thomas Bayes and Pierre-Simon Laplace independently formulated how prior probability given new 
evidence update posterior probability. Bayes formulated this in An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of  
Chances (1763) and Laplace in Théorie analytique des probabilités (1812). 
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ways (Okasha, 2000; Lipton, 2004, chap. 7). Bayesians hold that belief is proba-
ble and subject to change over time while accumulating new evidence, where the 
dynamics can be accounted for via Bayes’ theorem:
(2.1) 5 
(2.2) 
P(Hn|E) =
P(Hn ) P(E|Hn )
P(Hn ) P(E|Hn ) + P(¬Hn ) P(E|¬Hn ) 
posterior =
prior · likelihood
evidence
Eq. 2.1 translates to:
The product of the probability of particular evidence given a hypothesis (like-
lihood) and the probability of the hypothesis alone (prior probability) over the 
probability of the evidence, can define the probability of that hypothesis given 
that evidence (posterior). Bayes’ theorem plays a critical role in the following the-
sis in explaining the neuronal dynamics and human behaviour. It is because the 
combination of explanationism and Bayesianism subsume into an extraordinary 
explanatory model of inference (Lipton, 2004, pp. 103–104). The claim here is 
that Bayesian dynamics integrated with explanatory considerations from abduc-
tive inference and Popper’s falsifying hypothesis serve as an extraordinary strong 
philosophy of science, mainly because it takes seriously the explanation over the 
claim. Recall that the aim of abductive inference “is to not to infer the most probable 
claim, but rather the most probable of competing explanations” (Lipton, 2004, p. 110).
Given competing hypotheses, if one hypothesis’ posterior is less than the pri-
or, it is stating that the new evidence that comes in heuristically is more surprising 
than before, which eventually disconfirms the hypothesis, i.e. validity is certainty 
while surprise is an uncertainty. If the posterior is greater than the prior of one 
hypothesis, then that hypothesis is a more probable explanation to a phenome-
non compared to the other. However, how to know the other probabilities like 
probabilities of the evidence and the hypotheses? 
Lipton (2004) suggests that if one accepts that explanatory consideration, of 
which the abductive inference speaks of, are more accessible than probabilistic 
principles, then an explanationists approach to prior probability and likelihood 
serve as a useful surrogate. Essentially, “[…] the resulting transition of probabilities in 
the face of new evidence might well be just as the Bayesian says, but the process that actually 
brings about the change is explanationist” (Lipton, 2004, p. 114). The upshot in this 
Bayesian abductive integration is the compliance between the heuristic nature in 
abductive inference suggested by Peirce and Popperian philosophy of accepting 
that a theory is merely the most probable at the given time and that scientific ad-
vance must entail a falsifiable hypothesis. Furthermore, the integration operates 
on explanations rather than statements and claims.
5 The posterior probability is read as: the probability of  the hypothesis Hn given evidence E. Similarly, the 
likelihood is read as: the probability of  the evidence E given the hypothesis Hn.
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Theory Test CaseFalsifiable
hypothesis
Creative 
skills
Results
Figure 2.2—The	proposed	epistemological	approach.	The	theory	informs	the	falsifiable	hypothesis,	which	then	
is submitted to experimentation. Eventually, this yields some results from which an explanation is inferred. The 
explanation	is	linked	to	the	hypothesis	if 	it	turns	out	that	it	could	not	be	falsified—however,	if 	the	hypothesis	is	
falsified,	one	may	infer	another	explanation	that	in	turn	suggests	an	update	of 	the	theory.
2.5 Conclusion
In the following thesis, a Bayesian abductive inferential model of scientific dis-
covery is applied, keeping in mind the level of interdisciplinarity. Foundherentism 
played out the systematic strategy where the system may be based on experience 
as long as the system is internally coherent. This is firstly ensured by having both 
a top-down and bottom-up approach to the research question, i.e. from experi-
ence to theory, and from a cellular level to the human experience. Based on the 
above, a theoretical framework of experience is necessary, thus introducing phe-
nomenology. Some conditions are generated in Part I that Part II must adhere. 
The use of central conditions of experience thus ensures coherency. Secondly, 
the nature of the thesis is both empirical and mathematical, in the sense that the 
mathematical construct seeks to predict the empirical measures. Thirdly, the aim 
is to formulate the theory/hypothesis as a mathematical model enabling it to pro-
duce predictions that are comparable and thus clearly falsifiable with an experi-
mentally produced dataset.
In sum, the Part I (Chapter 3-6) must generate some conditions which Part II 
(Chapter 7-11) must adhere—and if so, the end of Part II must form a falsifia-
ble hypothesis, which then is submitted to a test (Chapter 12). If the hypothesis 
survives the test, the established theory survives this experiment and serves as a 
probable explanation, from which over time more hypotheses must be derived 
and submitted to more experimentation.
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Summary. What	defines	a	transition? This short chapter serves to investigate the 
nature of a transition itself and to highlight the fundamental issues that emerge 
in space and time. It also serves to set the stage through meditation on transiti-
ons and their underlying mechanisms. Philosophically, it is possible to distinguish 
between an architectural transition and an experiential transition. This dissection serves 
to clarify the differences only to reassemble them into an architectural experience of 
transition. An architectural transition can be defined as a sequence of space deline-
ated by an observable threshold, whereas an experiential transition does not start 
nor stop, but is a continuous unfolding of events that a conscious being experien-
ces. Further, this chapter questions the relation between world and experience by 
constructing a quandary of architectural and experiential transition, which further 
guide the upcoming questions.
3.1 Distinguishing transitions
What does transition mean in architecture? The answer to the question of 
transition proves more complicated than one might expect. Although transitions 
are transhistorical elements, one finds different definitions when investigating the 
ontology of transition. Linguistics and philosophy are briefly brought forward to 
reveal an important aspect of the nature and definition of transition. In lingui-
stics (Allan, 1980) and philosophy (Quine, 1960), nouns can be characterised at 
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in space and experience
CHAPTER 3
“The river where you set your foot just now is gone 
— those waters giving way to this, now this” 
Heraclitus
PART I :  CHAPTER 3
33
least by two distinct properties, namely count noun and mass noun, depending on 
their meaning in a sentence. Although the word transition often takes form as a 
countable noun, it exhibits mass properties. It is arguably subject to both types, 
yielding different meanings. Mass nouns are defined by their ability to be coun-
ted, e.g. car, dog, idea and giraffe, whereas count nouns can be pluralised and occur 
with quantifiers, such as each and every. Mass nouns, e.g. sugar, garbage, advice and 
knowledge, are singular and uncountable, accompanied by measure terms, such as 
most, much and some. Nouns can be both mass and count, living a dual-life serving 
both purposes (Kiss et al., 2017). Roughly put, mass nouns serve to describe a 
qualitative aspect of the given word, whereas the count noun quantifies it, allow-
ing a physical counting (Krifka, 1989). Relative to architecture, using transition 
as a count noun refers to an architectural transition, whereas using it as a mass noun 
refers to an experiential transition. For instance:
Count noun: Each transition in this building is captivating.
Mass noun: Some transitions are processes of confusion.
Regarding transition as a count noun, it refers to the spatial, built environ-
ment that facilitates a transition from one space to another, e.g. staircase, door, port 
and corner. This transition is countable, in the sense that it is possible to compare 
two buildings and state which of these includes most transitions. Mass noun is 
the experiential process where the quality within a given period is essential. It is 
non-spatial although the transition might be of physical matter, e.g. the transition 
from girl to a woman—and yet, the word transition is temporal, rather than spatial. 
Note the ambiguity and difference in meaning in stating there is a transition in ar-
chitecture. The statement makes sense both as a mass noun and as a count noun, 
because it may refer to historical events concerning a change of architectural pre-
ferences, or merely that architecture offers built transitions. The statement refers 
to both the temporal/experiential and the spatial/physical property of transition.
The justification of having a transition as a mass noun is the impossibility of 
being able to divide transitions from one another—this is because a transition is 
intrinsically related to the verb of the word, which is an action that extends con-
tinuously over time and action turns out to be indivisible. The mass noun and 
the verb are closely related, i.e. the quantification of the verb corresponds to the 
mass noun. Transitions thus contain more than a single rationale, which proves 
essential for understanding its proper nature. One is the built environment, which 
provides no qualitative content of transition, but serves instead as a physical defi-
nition that facilitates a given agent to experience a transition. Architectural transition 
henceforth invokes this physical environment. This is distinct from the interval 
experienced from one moment to another. Experiential transition henceforth invo-
kes the temporal/qualitative experience of transitions that belongs to the experi-
encing agent. This distinction proves to be important as the thesis unfolds. The 
aim of the distinction is twofold; firstly, the distinction enables and animates a 
discussion on transitions, which is a method used by Bergson (his philosophical 
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dualisms) to investigate the apparent nature of a phenomenon. Secondly, to show 
that they are inseparable because they are embedded in one another.
Despite their differences, the two kinds of transitions share the fact that they 
are transitions. What constitutes a transition? Taken in its broadest, it is a complex 
term grounded in time, space and change, and can be found in the most diver-
se building cultures and on various social dimensions and scales (Giedion, 1959; 
Gennep, 1960). Consider architectural transitions, they serve multiple purposes 
but primarily introduced when the urge to divide arise, be they spatial or functio-
nal. Not only does transitions entertain liminality between other spaces, but it is 
further linked to the idea of bidirectional crossing, transformation and change of 
place (Ferrier et al., 2018, p. 7). Change is the keyword for transitions. For instance, 
the literal definition of the mass noun in Oxford Dictionaries reads: “The process 
or a period of changing from one state or condition to another” (OED, 2018; emphasis 
added). This demonstrates the precedence of change and time. Being a process 
or period, transitions contain temporal breadth where change occurs, ultimately 
serving to separate one state or condition from another. The change itself holds 
an essential role for any transition and can occur in different manners, proving 
the phenomenon of change to be exceedingly complicated in defining the extent 
of transitions. 
3.2 Short-term, long-term and events
The experiential transition can be dissected to numerous smaller short-term 
processes that make the long-term transitioning possible, e.g. walking through a 
passage consists of first being in a space, then passing a threshold, which may be 
an extended passage or an abrupt doorway, and finally reach another space. Even 
these processes may be dissected into smaller processes, namely of firstly percei-
ving the transitional element (extended passage or doorway), then planning how 
to move the body to propel the body through space successfully. Indeed, a range 
of short-term processes constitutes the long-term processes—however, long-term 
processes also exerts context for the short-term processes (Klein, 2014), e.g. wal-
king down a narrow passage is experienced differently if one is in Aalborg’s many 
alleys compared to the sacred passage in Temple of Apollo in Didyma; although 
both constitute the experience of a narrow passage, they are experienced diffe-
rently. The long-term processes bring context to the small-term processes, which 
are always at work. The more one dissects these processes; the more one realises 
that the body is at constant change, i.e. a constant temporal transition.
A B C
Figure 3.1—Kanisza’s	cube	is	a	bistable	figure	that	allows	one	to	experience	a	change	in	perception	without	a	
change in the world, which is an important note considering transition. Despite being a two-dimensional drawing, it 
is experienced in three-dimensions in two different ways, namely A or C.
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The change itself, regarding the built environment, necessarily integrates with 
an experiential change because architecture itself cannot move about and tran-
sit, but merely facilitate it. The equivalent with Kanisza’s cube would be to state 
that the cube changes over time. When architects state that a specific space is a 
transition, they mean it serves the experiential transition—however, what kind 
of architecture serves not experiential transition? This critical note suggests that 
space have a different nature than time. Architecture is not driven by anything as 
it merely occupies space, whereas a moving body over time causing change drive 
the experiential transition. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of a transition in 
architecture, as if the temporal transition was the same as the spatial transition. 
As the term transition has been dissected and has shown to consist of a spa-
tial/quantitative and a temporal/qualitative component, it is vital to establish the 
relation between the two, i.e. to establish whether they are in fact two insepara-
ble aspects of the same concept or can be seen as separable concepts. In order 
to enable an investigation of their relation, they are separated and discussed as 
separate entities. Indeed, the issue in question is the relation between short- and 
long-term processes in architectural experience of transition, e.g. an event of a change 
in space that correlates with an experiential change. The relation between space 
and experience may be revealed at the event of the short-term change—thus, it 
is important to define what is meant when speaking of the transition as an event. 
For the transition as an event to occur, there must be an initial space and a 
subsequent space, interlinked with a transition (Fig. 3.2). The physical transition 
must have a starting threshold and an ending threshold, forming together an event 
that the experiencing agent recognises as a transition. Although transitions may 
come in various kinds, the event functions as a temporal span and spatial deline-
ation between two spaces, and this is what an architectural transition must fulfil 
conceptually before one says to have experienced a transition in architecture1. 
The link between experiential transition and architectural transition comes to de-
pend on movement. One can propel the body through experiential and architec-
tural transition so that the temporal span and spatial delineation are experienced 
through movement. Although the transition event could be a corner, a staircase, 
a ramp—it must succeed in facilitating a change from one space to another to be 
considered an architectural transition. 
The situation of transitioning from one space to another entails many short-
term layers, e.g. the approach, the actual trespassing, the intellectual reflection (re-
alisation) that the transition might have had. Although they may seem as separate 
short-term processes, they are highly interrelated. How to approach a door-open-
ing depends on the shape of the opening, the physical shape of the body, the in-
tention for passing through in the first place, and other processes. Indeed, the 
short-term layers are not separable from one another—instead, they form long-
term processes. Regarding experience, it is the experienced temporal synthesis 
1 Notably, this serious reduction of  what may be considered a transition in architecture is necessary to isolate 
the effect that transitions have on human experience as caused by spatial variability.
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2 Once again, architecture has been reduced to mere spatial configurations, excluding thermal properties, 
lighting conditions, materiality etc. This is another necessary reduction to enable a discussion on architecture 
solely as a spatial entity.
Long-term
Short-term Short-termShort-term Threshold1Space1 Space2
Event
Threshold2
Figure 3.2—The	conceptual	definition	of 	the	event	of 	a	transition.	It	is	conceptual	because	this	is	what	it	must	
be able to facilitate to be considered a transition. The event is the transition itself, which consists of  a starting 
threshold and an ending threshold, delineating two spaces temporally and spatially.
relative to architectural change, which is of interest2.
3.3 Transition in the environment
Two spaces delineated by a threshold defines an architectural transition. One 
may question what qualifies as a spatial threshold, let alone when does a space 
start and end? These complex matters are avoided by questioning not their con-
tent, as in what they consist of, but rather their origin. Seeking the origin, instead 
of the content, can reveal more about interrelations and position in other pro-
cesses, i.e. the short-term processes in long-term processes. Relating this idea to 
architectural transition, the process of changing from one space to another then 
depends on how the observer perceives the environment, and how the experien-
tial transition unfolds. Determining an architectural transition necessarily needs 
someone to have moved between two spaces before deciding that it was experi-
enced as a transition. The decision thus rests on how perception emerges during 
the process of change. Explaining the architectural experience of transition is to explain 
the agent rather than the architecture. The agent experiences the architectural and 
experiential transition through movement; movement is what causes the change 
in perception of space, even if only an eye saccade. Tentatively, it seems that th-
rough a moving body, one is able, during a continual synthesis of experience, to 
make sense of perception.
3.4 Research Question: quandary of  architectural transition
The general research question regards the relation between architectural tran-
sition and experiential transition, now termed the architectural experience of transi-
tion. Architectural transitions can consist of abstract delineations. For instance, a 
rectangular space, with a kitchen in one end and a living room in the other. The 
transition is evident in functionality, yet not in space. Likewise, change in colour, 
lights and purpose, all function as possible thresholds; even subtle changes in a 
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room or floor height can function as an architectural threshold. To decrease the 
complexity of transitions, a reduced understanding of space is used, namely that 
of forms and shapes. Following definition of architectural transitions is proposed: 
architecturally, transitions consist of a sequence of spaces, delineated by an experienced threshold.
To address the critical aspect of the architectural experience of transitions, a 
quandary has been proposed because it provides a grip onto the relation between 
space and time, as well as architecture and experience (Fig. 3.3). The quandary 
entails three space where space A, B and C are different in their spatial configura-
tion. Since the architectural transitions A → B and C → B both amounts to space 
B, there is good reason to believe that space B is experientially the same space ap-
proaching from either direction. Is the experience of space B, arriving from space 
Figure 3.3— 1. Space A to space B, compared to space C to space B. Architecturally similar, experientially 
different. 2. Space C to space B, compared to space C to space B. Architecturally similar, experientially different.
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A, identical to the experience if arriving from space C? This question is not the 
research question itself, but assists in articulating the idea behind. One may state 
since the prior space is different, space B may not be experienced identically. For 
instance, in a second quandary, given the transition from C → B is compared to 
the transition from C’ → B.
It is reasonable to believe that, if space is experienced separately and discretely, 
the current experience is independent of the prior space because one is experienc-
ing that specific space immediately. However, if time is conceived as a continu-
ous duration, it is impossible to divide the experience of the prior space from the 
immediate space, because (as elaborated in Chapter 4) the immediate experience 
retains that of the past and anticipates that of the near future. A reasonable topic 
to investigate is thus the temporal structure and internal relations of experience. 
It is fallible to assume that certain spaces can infinitely re-position an agent in 
identical experiences. Such an assumption absorbs the spatio-temporal relation be-
tween subject and object, experience and space, which is subject to investigation. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to resolve the relationship between time 
and space in human experience, but rather to form a framework that enables to 
investigate questions relative to space/architecture and time/experience. Indeed, 
architectural research relative to experiential impact must inevitably develop a 
framework that enables investigating space relative to time. 
Transitions concern an experiencing agent who must move the whole body, 
and by doing so changing the perception of space, to successfully transit from 
one space to another. The movement itself cause a range of perceivable changes 
of space, which supports the idea that the experience of space B cannot be similar 
coming from space A or space C, i.e. the order of spaces composes the narrative of 
the experiencing agent, which affects the immediate experience of the final space.
3.5 Precedence of  time in experience and movement
Given events as transition, and considering the examples above, they occupy 
both a spatial and temporal dimension, meaning one cannot grasp it in its entire-
ty at an instant. “[…] given that events are changes, they must have a temporal span. Thus, 
at any one instant in time it is impossible to see an event in its entirety” (Schwartz, 2008, 
p. 58). Time is a sophisticated ribbon of events. Any account of experience is an 
unfolding of a specific temporal structure, so that temporality can reveal aspects 
of the relation between subject and object, experience and environment. In fact, 
questions relative to subject and object ought to be investigated as a function of 
time rather than space. By questioning the origin, one enforces a temporal ap-
proach rather than a spatial approach, ultimately obtaining insights into the de-
velopment and relation rather than what they are.
In brief, there cannot be change without time, and without time, no move-
ment. Similarly, without movement, there cannot be a change to cause the archi-
tectural experience of transition, i.e. there is an apparent circularity to the struc-
ture of time. To fully grasp architectural experience of transitions, a theoretical 
framework of interrelation between time, change and movement is paramount.
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3.6 Conclusion
Space and time have been dissected into architecture and experience, respecti-
vely, to enable an investigation of transitions as events. Furthermore, since space 
differs in its nature from time, it enables discussing the spatio-temporal relation 
between architecture and experience. Eventually, both space and time are part of 
the human experience of architectural transition, i.e. architectural experience of transi-
tion, when stating that one has experienced a transition. The event of a transition 
was shown to depend on the experience of the architecture. Short-term processes 
constitute the long-term process of a transition, but also vice versa, which suggests 
that selecting short-term processes in order to answer the long-term process of 
architectural experience of transition is one of two possible approaches. 
It turns out that even the definition of the architectural transition depends 
on the experiential transition, which in turn poses a quandary. The constructed 
quandary serves to guide the research question towards a theoretical framework 
that provides an answer. The main point is that the experience is in question; the 
answer must make explicit how space and time are interrelated and form expe-
rience. In fact, it must be able to answer firstly, how space relates to experience, 
secondly, the role of the temporal order on experience, and thirdly, how the un-
folding of space during movement, causing changes in perception, relate to expe-
rience. Indeed, it is essential to address the underlying processes of the percei-
ving human and temporal unfolding of experience. Perception and the temporal 
structure of experience during transition in space might provide a unique insight 
to the origin and inner workings of the relation between object and subject du-
ring transitions in space. 
It is conjectured insofar that the environmental transition has an impact on the 
experiential transition. Yet, to wholesomely grasp this potential impact, the rela-
tionship between movement and experiential transition must also be accounted 
for, as it is this relation that is conjectured to reveal how architecture may affect 
the experience. The underlying argument is that since everything is subject to the 
constant force of time, everything changes accordingly.
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Summary. What is the role of  action in space and time? It was suggested in the prior 
chapter that space and time differ in kind, i.e. their respective nature. Therefore, 
an approach to managing differences in kind is presented with a specific focus 
on experience as it unfolds. By invoking Bergson, with various examples and 
paradoxes, a range of  concepts are introduced to guide the relationship between 
space and time, as in matter and duration, respectively. To this end, only certain as-
pects of  Bergson’s philosophy are presented, i.e. those of  ontological value. It is 
firstly demonstrated, through discrete and continuous composites, how time and 
space are different kinds, where space within itself  only differs in degree, while 
time, differs in kind. Secondly, emphasising the process of  change and differen-
tiation amounts to the Bergsonian concept multiplicity that initially was developed 
by mathematician Riemann. Multiplicity guides the unity of  durations into a single 
universal duration. Ultimately, it is argued that this temporal unity of  multiplicities 
addresses the immediate experience. 
4.1 Henri Bergson
Henri Bergson (1859-1941), trained as a mathematician, was a professor of 
philosophy who reached popularity close to a cult during his active years (Guerlac, 
2006, pp. 9–13, 42). He is conceived as a philosopher of process due to his belief 
that everything is undergoing a constant change (Mullarkey, 2000, p. 4). His first 
Indivisible time, multiplicity 
and experience
CHAPTER 4
“Metaphysics will then become experience itself; and duration will be 
revealed as it really is, —unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge of 
novelty”
Henri Bergson (2007, p. 7)
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work, Essai sur les Donnés Immédiates de la Conscience (Time and Free Will), was his 
doctoral dissertation written from 1883 to 1887, a period in history with limited 
knowledge of the inner human workings, where he argued for a free agency. It 
took approximately 100 years to understand him better and the importance of his 
concepts that are recently being acknowledged in modern times (Deleuze, 1988; 
Morris, 2005; Winkler, 2006; Moulard-Leonard, 2008). 
Notably, for Bergson, there are two kinds of consciousness, namely the re-
flective and the immediate consciousness—hence the name of his dissertation. 
Reflective consciousness is separated from immediate consciousness, as it ob-
jectifies experiences through the act of the intellect. It treats experience similar 
to how it considers objects in space, whereas immediate consciousness is the 
way something feels directly. It precedes any involvement of trying to communi-
cate or represent through tools as language, logic, mathematics or other symbols 
(Guerlac, 2006, p. 62). Here, the term and concept duration become quite com-
plicated. Duration can only be lived and this is precisely what Bergson attempts 
to reach by introducing intuition as a method. It is an attempt to bring up what 
reflective consciousness suppress because it is structurally inaccessible to post hoc 
intellect. In a nutshell, by duration, Bergson attempts to describe the immediate 
experience of the radical force of the time in becoming.
Due to the complexity in his articulation, quotes of Bergson are at times given 
in full length. Since Bergson’s philosophy has been criticised for being difficult 
to grasp, it here approached by direct readings, where quotes of his work follow 
statements and alleged claims. This chapter is confined to the following concepts: 
• False problems and composites,
• duration and multiplicity,
• hetero- and homogeneity, which closely relates to continuous and discrete 
changes and
• virtual and real action as the relation between action/perception and time/
space.
Although all the central principles of Bergson have been described elsewhere 
(Lacey, 1999), and are thus not reiterated here, the presented concepts pave the 
way for his doctrine of space and time. Bergson’s doctrine, philosophy of mind 
and concurrent conclusions prove extraordinarily essential to grasp the temporal 
nature of inner experience relative to space—particularly because he sought not 
to provide a causal explanation of inner human experience, but an explanatory 
principle in general for all life sciences. He was concerned with meaningful expla-
nations over causal explanations (Mullarkey, 2008).
4.2 Bergson’s concepts
4.2.1 False problems
By way of intuition, Bergson stated that some problems were false problems, 
due to their blending of more and less (intensity on a scale) regarding entities that 
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do not differ in degree, but in kind (Deleuze, 1988, p. 14). Using his famous dua-
listic division of composites to enable a discussion, he was able to differentiate 
between a range of kinds, e.g. space and time. The resemblance of Peirce’s ab-
ductive logical reasoning in Bergsonian intuition is palpable; certainly, intuition is 
a way of reasoning about the world.
False problems are rooted in the way they are posited. In philosophy, the 
question of finding the problem and positing is more important than solving it, 
because a speculative problem is solved the moment it is appropriately stated 
(Bergson, 2007, pp. 36–37). The solution exists and merely needs to be uncove-
red by stating the problem appropriately. However, stating the problem is not to 
uncover or discover; it is to invent and to invent consist most often in creating 
the appropriate terms in which the problem will be stated. Posing a problem and 
solving it appears close to equivalent. According to Deleuze, false problems can 
be defined as the following:
“False problems are of two sorts,  
[1]‘nonexistent	problems,’	defined	as	problems	whose	very	terms	contain	a	confusion	of	
the ‘more’ and the ‘less’;  
[2]	and	‘badly	stated’	questions,	so	defined	because	their	terms	represent	badly	analy-
zed composites” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 17)
 
It is through a vital critique of negation that Bergson demonstrates the pro-
blematics of stating a false problem, so that there is not less, but more in nonbeing 
compared to being. Similarly, there is more in disorder than in order, so that there 
is more in that which is conceived as lacking (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 17–18). In the 
concept of nonbeing, there is (1) the idea of being, (2) the logical operation of ne-
gation and (3) the psychological motive. This fact approximates that there is more 
in the possible than in the real. Inquiring why there is, rather than why there is not, 
one is mistaking the more for the less. As if being came to coordinate nonbeing. That 
which is not actualised is a multiplicity of its kind, as compared to the actualised 
unity. This human arrangement of considering things as more or less, as intensities, 
proves to be what is deceiving; they lead to wrongly stated problems.
The second type of false problems is the confusion between degree and kind. 
Poorly analysed composites are arbitrarily grouped despite being different in kind. 
Note how intensities presume a single scale as if sharing the same unit in measure-
ment. As Bergson states in his analysis of joy, sorrow and grace: 
“The aesthetic feelings offer us a still more striking example of this progressive step-
ping in of new elements, which can be detected in the fundamental emotion and which 
seem to increase its magnitude, although in reality they do nothing more than alter its 
nature” (Bergson, 2001, p. 11). 
It is to confuse quantity with quality to address the intensity of a sensation or 
affective state. They are not a matter of increasing or decreasing an intensity—they 
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differ in kind, not in degree. Perhaps even more clearly, consider happiness in 
pleasure. Is happiness a succession of pleasure? In defining the words, one might 
find that the words have nothing in common other than being desirable states 
by man; “humanity	will	have	classified	these	very	different	things	in	one	genus	because	it	found	
them of the same practical interest and reacted toward all of them the same way” (Bergson, 
2007, p. 37). Neither pleasure nor happiness are psychological facts that take up 
certain space in the body as they grow in intensity precisely because they are not 
intensities—they are qualitative alterations of the whole psychic state. They do 
not differ in degree, but in kind, because they involve different qualitative chan-
ges yielding a difference in their natural articulation (Bergson, 2001, pp. 10–11; 
Guerlac, 2006, p. 46). Arguably, the difference between mental states is based 
on experiencing change between the different kinds of qualitative states, which 
in duration is qualitative progress. Thinking in more and less when there are dif-
ferences in kind obscures the actual problem by substituting the true nature of 
1 Note that Bergson’s notion of  pure is his restoration of  the difference in kind and tendencies, and that which 
differs in kind is said to be pure (Deleuze, 1988, p. 22), i.e. pure duration, pure discontinuity, pure intellect.
the question, and thus is subject to producing false solutions to false problems. 
Accurately stating a problem, must instead be posited in terms of well-ana-
lysed composites. Bergson’s method involves analysing dualities before uniting 
them (see e.g. Table 4.1). Composites consist of natural articulations that differ 
in kind; for instance, because pure intellect is spatial, whereas pure instinct is durati-
on1, these terms form a composite (Bergson, 2007, p. 19). The intellect obscures 
the difference in kind and mistakes it for a degree so that this tendency towards 
intellect will state false problems unless unravelled by intuition. Intellect operates 
merely upon the phantom of intuition as a post hoc operation. What is particularly 
incongruent between composites is the process of change. To consider this aspect, 
Bergson introduces the concept of multiplicity, as initially developed by Riemann, 
into continuous and discontinues changes (Deleuze, 1988, p. 40).
4.2.2 Continuity and discontinuity
Because numbers have both a temporal and spatial dimension, they form 
a unique case in elucidating the relation between composites. By applying the 
Duration Space
Quality Quantity
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
Continuous Discontinuous
Virtual Actual/Real
Difference in kind Difference in degree
Instinct Intellect
Table 4.1—Bergsonian dualistic division for composite analyses that differ in their natural articulation (Deleuze, 
1988, p. 23). Bergson has other divisions, such as that of  multiplicity, which is modus of  understanding the 
composites, i.e. “continuous multiplicity”, “quantitative multiplicity”.
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composite analysis from above onto how numbers change and what makes a nu-
meric unit, it is demonstrated how time differs from space by being indivisible 
and divisible, respectively. Counting sheep demonstrates the case. 
Disregarding the individual difference between the sheep, they form a flock of 
identical sheep that are countable, i.e. they share the same unit in measurement, 
so they differ in degree. Accordingly, the process of counting should be entirely 
spatial. When the shepherd counts the sheep, it unfolds by either including them 
all into the same image or by counting them one-by-one, repeating unique sheep 
24 times in succession. Does this not make the process of counting temporal, 
i.e. counting in duration? By no means. Even by repeating them, for the number 
to increase, the succession is a question of spatially juxtaposing them in an ideal 
space, because counting them separately is always to count a single sheep at the 
time—thus, not increasing (Bergson, 2001, pp. 76–77). Counting material objects 
is to count in space, but is this also the case regarding the abstraction of numbers? 
Bergson defines abstract numbers by their numeric figure (Fig. 4.1), e.g. 
24, which is not the same as counting twenty-four or representing twenty-four 
(Bergson, 2001, p. 79). It is unnecessary to count to 12 two times, to find out that 
24 is double, and 24 is conceivable without counting to 1, 24 times. The figure 
of the abstract number seems intuitively known—however, as soon as the num-
ber (as in Fig. 4.1) must be thought of, it is necessarily spatialised. Counting to 
24 necessarily acknowledges that the successive numbers contain their preceding 
one, i.e. the previous numbers must be held onto for enabling a successful count-
ing. This is precisely only possible because the numbers are fixed to a position 
in space, e.g. the number 5 contains the numbers from 1 to 4, and after 4 always 
comes 5. The numbers are divisible by unit 1. This is not possible in time, because 
“[…] when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it, as is the case when we 
are adding up units, we are not dealing with these moments themselves, since they have vanished 
for ever, but with the lasting traces which they seem to have left in space on their passage through 
it” (Bergson, 2001, p. 79). 
One can consider any number of its own as an indivisible unity itself, e.g. the 
number 5 is precisely, indivisibly 5 despite being a collection of similar units. What 
does it mean that a number is a collection of similar units? There are two kinds 
of unit2. One is ultimate, where numbers are formed by continuous addition, and 
2 Unit is the fixed amount in sudden equi-distanced jerks. Conventional counting use unity of  1: [1, 2, 3 … ].  
Number Abstract number
241 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 4.1—Counting numbers that share the same irreducible unit (in this case 1), differs from the abstract 
number	that	is	constituted	by	the	figure	of 	the	number.
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the other is provisional, where “the number so formed […] is multiple in itself, and owes 
its unity to the simplicity of the act by which the mind perceives it” (Bergson, 2001, p. 80). 
In other words, any number is constituted by other numbers, while also consti-
tuting other numbers. 
This act of mind to conceive a number as indivisible because one thinks of 
its unity alone is opposed by the ability to objectify it in space and conceive it as 
infinitely divisible, i.e. the sum of fractional quantities. The act of mind implies 
uniqueness in a discontinuous number. Discontinuity is the discrete change and 
the lack of interval, in the sense that it is by sudden equally distanced jerks that 
one can advance from one unique number to another. As soon as the indivisible 
number escapes the (dividing) extension into space, it becomes once again fully 
continuous. The vital argument is thus: one must distinguish between the unity 
in which one thinks and the unity in which one sets it out as object after having 
thought of it. In the immediate consciousness, as the number is being built, the 
number is discontinuous, “but	as	soon	as	we	consider	number	in	its	finished	state,	we	objec-
tify it, and it then appears to be divisible to an unlimited extent” (Bergson, 2001, p. 83). In 
other words, during the subjective process of constructing the number, it appears 
indivisible, but as soon as it is objectified by space, it appears infinitely divisible 
(Bergson, 2001, p. 83). 
“[…] there is no doubt that, when we picture the units which make up number, we 
believe that we are thinking of indivisible components: this belief has a great deal to do 
with the idea that it is possible to conceive number independently of space. Nevertheless, 
by looking more closely into the matter, we shall see that all unity is the unity of a simple 
act	of	the	mind,	and	that,	as	this	is	an	act	of	unification,	there must be some mul-
tiplicity for it to unify.” (Bergson, 2001, p. 80; emphasis added)
4.2.3 Hetero- and homogeneity
Duration is understood as a continuous transition that differs in kind; “Pure 
duration offers us a succession that is purely internal, without exteriority; space, an exteriority 
without succession” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 37). Keep in mind that only duration offers a 
succession (interpenetration) of states, whereas space offer juxtaposition of sta-
tes. As soon as duration combines with space, which metaphysically is a process 
of compressing the virtual so it becomes real, the immediate experience will be 
spatialised and intellectualised by the reflective consciousness. This is precisely 
what was described above in counting numbers. There are two kinds of realiti-
es, namely heterogeneous and homogeneous; one which is sensitive to qualities, 
the other a faculty of space and abstraction, enabling clean-cut distinctions as in 
numbers (Bergson, 2001, p. 97). 
Consequently, the homogenous milieu is a reality without apparent quality. 
Time can enter this milieu—in fact, it does so as soon as one speaks or manifest 
anything else in space; it becomes a ghost of space haunting the reflective consci-
ousness (Bergson, 2001, p. 99). The significant difference between the inherent 
heterogeneity and the outer homogeneity is their nature of change, in the sense 
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that inner states interpenetrate one another making them indivisible, whereas 
spatial change is a matter of juxtaposition making it infinitely divisible. On one 
hand, heterogeneity does not accept instants because the successive nature of in-
terpenetration cannot be divided into independent instants—it is only conceived 
as lived duration. On the other hand, homogeneity accepts only abstract instants 
that are subject to infinite divisibility. 
“Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when 
our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former 
states.” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100; original emphasis)
It is palpable to answer the established quandary given the citation above. 
Pure duration is a succession of qualitative changes that permeate one another, 
without distinct outlines or any tendency to externalise themselves from any other, 
i.e. pure heterogeneity. In short, homogeneous space juxtaposes terms, while he-
terogeneous duration merges states. Hetero- and homogeneity are reoccurring 
concepts that take increasingly precise shape throughout Bergson’s philosophy. 
However, it is precisely this temporal synthesis that the immediate experience is 
found according to Bergson’s model of time and space, and thus we shall return 
to this issue (Chapter 5). As mentioned, Bergson was criticised for being too vague 
to grasp—however, the essential terms in his philosophy have been introduced. 
They are worth introducing as his analysis is an important kind. It elucidates the 
heterogeneous nature of time and the homogenous nature of space.
4.3 Multiplicity
In itself, the term multiplicity is among the most complicated terms in Bergson’s 
philosophy perhaps due to its origin in mathematics, set theory and physics (see 
Appendix A for short introduction to Riemann surfaces; see e.g. Smith, 2003 for 
a review of Badiou and Deleuze on multiplicity). In the current context of qua-
litative multiplicity, take for instance Bergson’s example: four candles lighting up a 
piece of paper. As the first, the second and third candle is put out one might be 
inclined to state that the paper remains white, despite the paper looks nothing 
like the paper from when all four candles were lit. As the candles were blown 
out, we tend to state that the colour white decreases in intensity. It becomes less 
white, less bright, because there is less light, however “[…] what you really perceive is 
not a diminished illumination of white surface, it is a layer of shadow passing over this surface 
at the moment the candle is extinguished” (Bergson, 2001, p. 53). Black is just as real 
to consciousness as white is, and so does not by nature depict void, absence or 
omission. It is a quality of its own, already acknowledged by the fact that the il-
lumination will not appear to change if it did not bring with it, or produce, a new 
quality. In other words, when the light source changes sufficiently, a new quality 
is perceived—thus, it is a question of kind rather than degree in perception, i.e. a 
continuous qualitative nuance. This is the qualitative multiplicity; that inner states 
have a sense of multiplicity of different qualities relative to the objective. It is this 
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A B C
Figure 4.2—Kanisza’s Cube, also introduced in Fig. 3.1, introduces an ambiguity in perception, demonstrating 
how a stable object introduces qualitative multiplicity. One can perceive Cube B as either Cube A or C, and so 
containing a multiplicity beyond its objective actuality.
sense of qualitative multiplicity that Bergson attributes to the inner experiences 
of consciousness (Guerlac, 2006, p. 56). The sensation is, therefore, not a physi-
cal measure but acts as an auxiliary to introduce a relation between the subjective 
experience and the objective measure. 
Likewise, there also exists a quantitative discrete multiplicity, which differs in 
degree rather than kind. From the example of the numbers above, the following 
can be said about qualitative and quantitative division: the term subjective is applied 
for that which is already known, while the term objective for that which is known 
by increasingly many impressions. The subjective is not merely indivisible, akin 
the experienced shift in colours —“rather, it is that which is divided only by changing 
in kind, that which was susceptible to measurement only by varying its metrical principle at the 
stage of the division” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 40). In contrast, the objective3 is that which 
do not change in kind when divided—as it remains in the same unit but is divi-
ded; there is more of the matter.  
Quantitative multiplicity is multiplicity in space similar to numerical multiplic-
ity, as mentioned above. Optical illusions serve as excellent examples. Aristotle 
(2006a, chap. 8) and Gestalt psychology (see Wagemans et al., 2012 for an excellent 
review) conveyed a similar message as Bergson regarding perception: the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts. However, Bergson’s notion is different from 
the tradition of such claim. Parts, in this sense, are in space, whereas the whole is 
in duration, that which is continuously changing. The immobile parts of space 
are mobilised in duration, thus given a whole (Smith, 2012, p. 264). For instance, 
reconsider how the experience in Fig. 4.2, where Cube B contains both Cube A 
and C, can be moved from one stable state to another. 
3 The objective is that which hold no virtuality because it has already been actualised. There can only be more 
in matter, but not anything of  a different kind. It denotes that which do not, in dividing, change in kind. It 
is a numerical, discrete, quantitative multiplicity. The multiplicity is rooted in its more and less unit (Deleuze, 
1988, p. 41).
The difference between the two multiplicities were already implied when ex-
amining continuous and discontinuous changes. It was stated that any object sit-
uated in space is infinitely divisible. In this sense, any quantitative multiplicity is 
conceived of as virtually possible in principle. The possible changes are already 
visible to consciousness upon perceiving it although not necessarily actualised, 
i.e. the possible percepts of Kaniza’s cube are already virtually available to the 
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perceiver, even before changing between the percept to actualise any of them. 
Bergson mean by objectivity precisely that it is “this actual, not merely virtual, apper-
ception of subdivisions in the undivided […]” (Bergson, 2001, p. 84). Objectivity holds 
nothing virtual—it is actual; it is that which is actualised from the virtual. The 
properties of space are instantaneous; they are actualised. Any change in quanti-
tative multiplicity is a matter of degree, and not in kind: “This is the same as saying 
that number has only differences in degree, or that its differences, whether realised or not, are 
always actual in it” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 41; original emphasis). This is the strict op-
posite of duration, i.e. the subjective qualitative multiplicity, which designates the 
multiplicity of the virtual.
4.4 Movement and duration
How then do these concepts apply to the experience of transition in archite-
cture? Duration is to think intuitively. The intellect operates in the static, homo-
genous, spatial reality where movement is retrospective and a matter of juxtapo-
sing immobile and fixed points in space; nothing is ever created and nothing is 
ever lost (Bergson, 2007, p. 22). In contrast, intuition conceives movement as 
immediate reality itself. Change is essential:
“Intuition, bound up to a duration which is growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted 
continuity of unforeseeable novelty; it sees, it knows that the mind draws from itself more 
than it has, that spirituality consists in just that, and that reality, impregnated with 
spirit, is creation.” (Bergson, 2007, p. 22)
In the process of becoming actualised, intuition is inseparable from the move-
ment of its actualisation; movement actualises the virtual. If an experiencing agent 
moves through the proposed quandary, the process of moving can be understood 
as a composite itself. For one, the space traversed in the process of moving forms 
an infinitely divisible, yet immobile, multiplicity, where all parts are actualised and 
differ in degree and only understood so by intelligence. Intelligence retains only 
the positions in space, i.e. the inanimate trajectory in hindsight so that movement 
can be understood as definite positions in space. It seeks out fixity, refusing in-
terpenetrated transitions so that between two fixed points, there are more fixed 
points and so on ad infinitum. On the other hand, if one skips the intelligent re-
presentation of movement, the immediate movement is just as indivisible as dura-
tion, forming a qualitative multiplicity and changes qualitatively for each division 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 47). Movement is mobility itself, and yet always understood as 
a series of fixed, immobile points in space by intelligence in hindsight.
“But	as	a	certain	space	will	have	been	crossed,	our	intelligence,	which	seeks	fixity	
everywhere, assumes after the event that movement has been exactly fitted on to this 
space (as though it, movement, could coincide with immobility!) and that the mobile 
exists in turn in each of the points of the line it is moving along.” (Bergson, 2007, p. 
5; original emphasis)
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As movements differ in kind, no two movements are the same. Raising the 
hand to vote is different from raising the hand to greet. Although the trajectory 
and space traversed are similar, the intention of the movement colours the expe-
rience differently. Upon analysing motion in mechanistic terms, it is precisely 
the mechanistic similarity in the spatial trajectory that functions as a common 
denominator allowing comparison of movements (Mullarkey, 2000, p. 13). This 
comparison reduces movement to mere spatial homogeneity differing in degree 
rather than kind—however, when considering the origin of the movement, it can-
not be homogenous. It must instead be cast as heterogeneous, unique throughout 
its process of becoming precisely due to the flow of duration—it is the process 
of reality unfolding itself, which makes the trajectory nothing but a shadow of a 
living anti-mechanistic process (Fig. 4.3).
Figure 4.3—An abstract illustration of  how the creative qualitative multiplicity in movement becomes objective in 
space. The black circle depict the movement, which depends on the process of  duration. It leaves behind it actualised 
points in space from the multiplicity of  virtuality that theoretical contains all possible realities—hence the fading 
of  colours upwards. Here, the colours, which the circle is embedded in, depicts the temporal process, where the blue 
can be considered as past, the yellow as the immediate moment and the red as the future. As illustrated, these 
cannot be divided from one another without containing one another; thus, qualitative multiplicity is considered 
indivisible.	The	trajectory	in	space	that	is	left	is	infinitely	divisible;		a	quantitative	multiplicity,	and	reflect	nothing	
but the shadow of  the creative process in motion.
Movement in time
Qualitative multiplicity
Trajectory in space
Quantitative multiplicity
This point is the radical claim in Bergson’s philosophy of movement. Movement 
is immediate in actualising novelty, and not predefined points in space as if one 
knew the movement before it had been actualised. Movement is precisely the 
process of becoming, i.e. duration and perception, and must be grasped within 
its dynamic nature. It is not simple snapshots fixed side-by-side; quite contrary, 
it is the continuity of transition within the flux of duration, forming an indivisi-
ble change. The body is the main medium between subject and object, between 
duration and space; thus, it belongs to enduring individuals and spatial situations. 
In brief, Bergson is calling for a dynamic understanding of movement and per-
ception, rather than a static conception because it generalises movement stripping 
it of any uniqueness.
What about movements that are intuitive, e.g. walking during mind wandering, 
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which is usually the case during transitioning from one space to another? Are these 
movements generalisable? 
“There is no such thing as a general type of movement; there may be a more or less 
individual movement, but none that can be perfectly general. Such actions that are less 
individual form the basis for the more homogenised levels at which we most often com-
municate and otherwise publicly interact with each other.” (Mullarkey, 2000, p. 26)
Pure movement is a transference of a state, e.g. experiential transition, rather 
than of a thing, e.g. the body (Mullarkey, 2000, p. 14). To highlight the individu-
ality and the becoming in movement, as in experiential transition, consider two 
of Zeno’s paradoxes, where it is found that movement is indivisible, conforming 
to duration and that instants or spatial points in time does not reveal the process 
of movement, but merely the current coordinate.
4.4.1 Zeno’s paradoxes
Zeno of Elea (495-425 BC), a pre-Socratic philosopher, described one of the 
Eleatic paradoxes; Achilles and the tortoise. His paradoxes have been heavily de-
bated and proven soluble, and insoluble, a plethora of times. Zeno’s paradoxes 
of space, time, and motion concern the very idea of the divisibility of space and 
time. Before presenting three solutions, including that of Bergson, consider the 
paradox as described by Zeno.
1/2 1/4
P Q R
1/8 ∞
Figure 4.4— Achilles overtaking the tortoise would mean for Achilles to reach the point where the tortoise started, 
however, since the tortoise is half  as fast, it already has travelled half  the covered distance. Following this logic, 
Achilles will never be able to overtake the tortoise, but merely approximate it. 
Imagine a race between Achilles and a tortoise (Fig. 4.4). The tortoise gets 
a head start of 100 metres because Achilles is twice as fast as the tortoise. 
Instinctively, Achilles would soon overtake the tortoise—however, here, Zeno 
raises the paradox. For Achilles to overtake the tortoise, he must at some point 
reach the starting point of the tortoise, point P. At this time, the tortoise has already 
travelled half the covered distance, point Q, given it is half as fast as Achilles, and 
thus Achilles must now reach point Q to have a chance at overtaking the tortoise. 
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Once again, whenever Achilles reaches point Q, the tortoise is then at point R, and 
so on ad infinitum. Although their distance is minimised, Achilles never passes 
the tortoise, but merely approximates it (Ray, 1991, p. 7). Mathematically, this is 
expressible as a geometric series, namely:
The real problem is the mixing of space and time, i.e. degree and kind and 
thus posing a false problem. Zeno informs that, spatially, when Achilles reaches 
halfway of his next position, so must the tortoise to his next position. Is not this 
a pure mix of space and time? If this information is correct, then the tortoise has 
either increasing speed or Achilles a decreasing one. It is not a question of loca-
tion in space, but an ideal location in time, which is only possible because they 
have initially been mixed. Achilles is never halfway in space when the tortoise is 
halfway in space—however, he is in time (Fig. 4.5A). It is assumed that the time it 
takes for Achilles to take a step is similar to that of the tortoise so that their relative 
interval remains constant, namely double, as Achilles is twice as fast. Zeno thus 
geometrically divides Achilles’ movement as explained by the tortoise’ movement, 
ultimately defining their relative spatial position to be synchronous, like that of 
two parallel lines. In short, by dividing an actor’s spatial position as a movement 
relative to that of another actor, a mixing of indivisible action that differs in kind 
rather than in degree is at stake; Achilles actions are then defined and regulated 
by the actions of the tortoise. The err is evident when considering the “movement 
in relation to the actions articulating it rather than the one form of homogeneous and immobile 
spatiality subtending it” (Mullarkey, 1995, p. 247). Then, the fact that Achilles never 
overtakes the tortoise is the mathematical outcome of approximating two different 
embedded actions; they can never be the same. Hence, Bergson states: 
“[The]	mistake	of	the	Eleatics	arises	from	their	identification	of	this	series	of	acts,	
each of which is of a definite kind and indivisible, with the homogeneous space which 
underlies them. As this space can be divided and put together again according to any 
law	whatever,	they	think	they	are	justified	in	reconstructing	Achilles’	kind	of	step,	but	
with the tortoise’s kind: in place of Achilles pursuing the tortoise they really put two 
tortoises, regulated by each other, two tortoises which agree to make the same kind of 
steps or simultaneous acts, so as to never catch one another.” (Bergson, 2001, p. 113; 
emphasis added)
Two related issues are urgent: (1) the division of movements of different actors 
due to (2) the belief that movement consists of immobile positions. Following 
Zeno’s information would amount to Achilles’ steps being a matter of dividing 
his steps, or action, into tortoise-time, as if reconstruction of actions of one actor 
is identical with that of another. Each of Achilles’ steps is believed to be infinite-
ly divisible, as they are carried out in space—however, this amounts to believing 
(4.1) =       +       +       +       ...12( ) 12 14 18 116
n = 1
n
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4 Such an account is similar to the Bergsonian argument that Lynds (2003) brought forward relative to quantum 
mechanics.
that Achilles’ movement must consist of a range of immobile positions in space; 
thus, an illusory understanding of movement stems from coinciding mobility with 
immobile points.“To tell the truth, there never is real immobility, if we understand by that 
an absence of movement” (Bergson, 2007, p. 119). Movement precisely changes, and 
change is constant, so there cannot be real immobility. Movement is unique to 
the individual and situation, whereas immobility presumes fixity. Ultimately, each 
of Achilles’ steps is incomparable to those of the tortoise. 
To emphasise the issue of dividing movement, examine the paradox by di-
viding their positions in space. One will soon find that Achilles overtakes the 
tortoise, and this reveals nothing regarding their movements, but merely their 
positions in space. 
“But one body is faster than another, not because it takes less time than the slower 
to cover the same distance, but because it covers a greater distance than the slower in the 
same interval of time.” (Paul Weiss as cited in Chappell, 1962, p. 200)
If understood as a practical problem of positions in space, given a finite in-
terval of time where movement consists of a succession of immobile positions, 
the paradox becomes soluble. Consider the actual positions during movement of 
Achilles, where the velocity is defined as the finite distance covered given a finite 
interval of time. Achilles must necessarily cover more than one position in space 
to move. In the process of moving into the next position in space, the velocity of 
the former position must be withheld, although the current position may measure 
a different covered distance, and thus by definition a different velocity. Ultimately, 
velocity consists of variable motion. Such an account fails to encompass the fallacy 
of Zeno’s division, namely that an immobile instant can be at motion; movement 
is recovered as a question of change, a process, and not immobile positions4. It is 
then true that Achilles never overtakes the tortoise, simply because the movement 
is not a question of position in space, but as their action causes them to change 
position in space—reducing the paradox to a spatial problem—one can under-
stand their spatial relation and not duration (Fig. 4.5B).
The fallacy of an immobile instant at motion is demonstrated in another para-
dox, namely Zeno’s Flying Arrow Paradox. As described by Aristotle in his Physics: 
“[Zeno] says that if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that 
which	is	in	locomotion	is	always	occupying	such	a	space	at	any	moment,	the	flying	arrow	
is therefore motionless.” (Aristotle, 2006b, p. 91 Book VI, Part 9)
At any rate, being motionless is being at rest, referring not to the fact that the 
arrow must continuously remain at rest in successive instants, but the fact that an 
instant is a motionless immobile point in space (Fig. 4.6A). Anything at an instant 
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Figure 4.5— A. Dividing the duration as a function of  the spatial position relative to each other ultimately leads 
to	a	geometric	series	only	approaching	a	finite	number.	Achilles	(blue	line)	is	thus	never	able	to	overtake	the	tortoise	
(red line). Achilles can be expressed as: f t)( = 1/ 2 t, and since the tortoise is half  as fast: g t)( = f t)(2  . Consequently, 
their relative distance remains constant: h t)( = f (t)
g(t)
 , (yellow line). B. Considering instead their spatial position, 
instead of  their relative interval (yellow lines), Achilles (blue line) soon overtakes the tortoise (red line). The yellow 
line	designates	the	geometric	series,	which	is	infinitely	divisible.	
is motionless; this is the property of an instant, it immobilises. It is true that for the 
arrow to move, it must occupy two successive positions in space, but at any given 
moment, the arrow only occupies a single position and thus must remain at rest 
(Fig. 4.6B)—hence, the paradox states external motion as impossible. Consider 
the internal movement; for any given movement, the qualitative multiplicity is al-
ways a reality, prohibiting any clear division, thus containing a mobile duration. 
Because the qualitative multiplicity is precisely the outcome of duration, motion 
becomes possible again; this demonstrates how duration solves movement. 
Real action can be divided into instant points in neither time nor space—in-
stead, it follows the nature of duration. Zeno’s paradoxes make explicit the in-
dividuality, multiplicity and continuity of each action, which are all necessary to 
comprehend to investigate the experiential transition emerging from the move-
ment from one space to another. The role of action in space and time is clear; 
one must distinguish between action as occupying immobile, fixed points in space 
from mobile, free and continuous actions. Nevertheless, are these not all merely 
metaphysical meditations on the action, i.e. an action that is evident in all parts 
of nature?
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Figure 4.6— A.	Taking	a	snapshot	of 	the	flying	arrow,	the	arrow	necessarily	only	occupies	a	limited	amount	of 	
space. B. Any motion must occupy more than a single instant in time, for it to move. 
4.4.2 Virtual to Real action
There does not exist immobility, if we understand by it the absence of mo-
vement, Bergson asserted above. Going beyond metaphysics and into biology, 
examine the emergence of a colour, e.g. green. The colour green presents itself 
through the medium of light, which holds all the frequencies of any other colour, 
i.e. all possible frequencies are everywhere and always real. The question is that 
despite there being movement everywhere, here as light-frequencies, why is green 
picked up; why is any picked up? This is the virtual action—“it is this virtual action 
which extracts from matter our real perceptions […] condensations within an instant of our 
duration of thousands, millions, trillions of event taking place in the enormously less drawn-out 
duration of things” (Bergson, 2007, p. 44).  
Even when considering the biological point of departure regarding movement, 
it is bound upon duration. Primitive organisms carry out actions upon immediate 
contact with the environment, enabling a proper reaction to either seize their prey 
or escape danger. For various organisms, including human beings, tactile percep-
tion is rarely much different from organs of movement, so that “the more immediate 
the reaction is compelled to be, the more must perception resemble a mere contact” (Bergson, 
2004, p. 22). However, not all sensory perceptions depend on necessary contact, 
e.g. visual, auditory, olfactory senses are all examples of sensory of distance in-
tegrated with perception. As the distance increase providing an extended possi-
bility of a reaction, the measure of determination and certainty decreases, as one 
is less confident of the external world. In this sense, any perception is merely an 
eventual action, which the indeterminate human may act upon and so actualise. 
The actuality of perception is in the activity of movement so that all present are 
ideo-motor (Bergson, 2004, p. 74).
Consequently, perception is not up to intellectual contemplation or specula-
tion and added to the rendering of the real, as if reconstructed from sensory or 
idea—instead, it is lived, touched and penetrated. Regardless of how rapid one 
may suppose perceptual processes to be, they must endure and take up more than 
an instant, as prior experiences are already at work in emerging any perceptual 
experience (Bergson, 2004, p. 76). Thus, perception is a master of space in the 
exact measure in which action is a master of time (Bergson, 2004, p. 23). This re-
lation between action and perception is revived in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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 The radical statement insofar is that perception is not knowledge, but even-
tual action; virtual actions5. These may, or may not, be actualised. This opposes 
both idealism and realism who believe that perception is empirical knowledge 
about the world in one way or another. For Bergson, the experienced perception 
is a mixture, hence the indeterminate position of the body and consciousness; the 
real task of the body and consciousness is resolving uncertainty about the wor-
ld. Note that highlighting idealism and realism additionally sheds light upon the 
body-mind problem as explicated by René Descartes (1596-1650). Idealists hold 
that the world, at least the representation of it, is entirely within the mind, whe-
reas realists hold that our perception occurs as a function of our brains, based on 
reactions from the sensible and empirical world (Guerlac, 2006, p. 107). 
“[…] for realist as for idealism, perceptions are ‘veridical hallucinations’, state of 
the subject, projected outside himself; and the two doctrines differ mere in this: that in 
the one these state constitute reality, in the other they are sent forth to unite with it.” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 73)
There are various accounts of realists (see for instance; McDowell, 1996; 
Strawson, 2008; Searle, 2015), and idealists (see for instance; Hegel, 1979; Gottlieb 
Fichte, 1998). Given the intuitive approach of using composites, Bergson’s stra-
tegy is evident. Instead of narrowing the problem to separate entities of mind and 
body, there is a third leg, which is the relation between the two. To Bergson, the 
human is always at an indeterminate state, and as demonstrated with his structure 
of composites, the lived nature is always a mixture rather than a pure; the pure 
is only theoretical and principal to enable investigations. By stating that a human 
body is a centre of indeterminacy, the position is neither realist nor idealist, becau-
se both idealists and realists hold that perception occurs in the service of truth. 
That propositional knowledge dissolves by approaching it with indeterminacy, 
i.e. resolving uncertainty about the world by acting in it. Essentially, the apparent 
state of the world is only relational so that neither mind nor body monopolise 
the apparent state—instead, the state is constructed dynamically in the interacti-
on between prior experiences and body. In other words, the indeterminate body 
does not rely on absolute truths, but on prior experiences from interaction with 
the environment; perception serves action—not knowledge. In other words, any 
change in the motor activity must necessarily be resolved as changes in perception. 
“Let us no longer say, then, that our perceptions depend simply upon the molecular 
movements of the cerebral mass. We must say rather that they vary with them, but that 
these movements themselves remain inseparably bound up with the rest of the material 
world.” (Bergson, 2004, p. 12; original emphasis)
5 Chapter 5 elaborates on the nature of  virtual actions. It is evoked here to distance Bergson’s philosophy 
from that of  realists and idealists; Bergson is concerned with the creative process in lived experience, which is 
arguably practical. 
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There exists a variable relation between the experiencing agent and the sur-
rounding world, where the variations reflect, as a function, the level of uncertainty 
and indeterminate state. The process of becoming certain, as reflected in percep-
tion, is shaped by virtual actions. 
J. J. Gibson (1904-1979) advanced an ecological approach that is reminiscent 
of Bergson’s account of action and perception (see for instance; Gibson, 1966, 
1972, 1977, 1986). The underlying theory is that the world contains “something 
more than, but not something different from, that which is actually given” (Bergson, 2004, p. 
78); what is perceivable is only that which is of interest to the body and actions. 
Gibson refers to this as affordances. 
“The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical 
object to which meaning is somehow added in a way that no one has been able to agree 
upon; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object. Any substance, any surface, 
any	layout	has	some	affordance	for	benefit	or	injury	to	someone.”	(Gibson,	1986,	p.	140)
As compared to virtual action:
 “Perception, understood as we understand it, measure our possible action upon 
things, and thereby, inversely, the possible action of things upon us.” (Bergson, 2004, 
p. 57)
Although there are fundamental differences in the manner each term is articu-
lated by its respective author, they share the ideology of perception serving action. 
Besides virtual action and affordances, Bergson and Gibson share another range 
of arguments, for instance space, also for Gibson, is homogenous (Gibson, 1986, 
p. 18), and affordances, just as virtual actions, are between subject and environ-
ment (object) (Gibson, 1986, p. 127). 
The common denominator for both concepts is their base on what one can do; 
actions that might unfold, directed towards the multiplicity of the virtual—how-
ever, only a single action is unfolded. This is where the two terms differ in their 
nature; Gibson held a Darwinist account of affordances so that the affordances 
of food were related to the content and not the shape of the food, e.g. the affor-
dances of a plastic carrot are not the same as the vegetable. Affordances seem to 
be biased by a semi-psychological factor that alters the perception depending on 
the animal species: “Depending on the animal species, some afford nutrition and some do 
not. A few are toxic. Fruits and berries, for example, have more food value when they are ripe, 
and	this	is	specified	by	the	color	of	the	surface” (Gibson, 1986, p. 131). Chapter eight is 
entirely dedicated to these evolutionary perspectives of affordance and environ-
ment (Gibson, 1986, chap. 8). Instead, Bergson addresses the interaction as an 
action-reaction that depend on the physical structure of the object and the body. 
Virtual actions are formed as virtual worlds; nothing prevents other worlds, cor-
responding to another choice, from existing with the current world in the same 
place and time (Bergson, 2007, p. 45). The weight of the term is on the physical 
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activity relative to an object rather than a semi-psychological factor altering ac-
tion-decisions. The difference between affordance and virtual action6 is elaborat-
ed later (Chapter 11). 
The process of virtual action is inspired by the principles in thermodynam-
ics’ second law, which to Bergson is “the most metaphysical of the laws of physics since it 
points	out	without	interposed	symbols,	without	artificial	devices	of	measurements,	the	direction	
in which the world is going” (Bergson, 1944, p. 265). The second law is that of entro-
py; the definition of entropy was shown by Boltzmann to be equivalent to that 
of statistical entropy that designates the level of uncertainty. Bergson must have 
acknowledged similarities to the idea of the indeterminate state of human nature. 
According to thermodynamics, systems that spontaneously evolve towards equi-
librium does so through a process that entails releasing free energy, which reflects 
the available energy given certain constraints in its current state—thus, the equi-
librium emerges from quite similar principles as virtual actions increase certainty 
of the indeterminate body. Notably, such an account urges the importance of the 
process of selecting from the richness of multiplicities evident in the immediate 
perception; that which is intuitive and free of intellectual processing.
“[…]	from	the	immensely	vast	field	of	our	virtual	knowledge,	we	have	selected,	in	
order to make it into actual knowledge, everything which concerns our action upon things; 
we have neglected the rest. The brain seems to have been constructed with a view to this 
work of selection.” (Bergson, 2007, p. 114)
4.5 Bergson’s principles/conditions
Several vital points from Bergson’s philosophy have proven valuable to the 
current research question. With an outset in human intuition, the philosophy of 
Bergson serves as a departure in understanding the relationship between archi-
tectural and experiential transitions. Based on mere intuition and logically valid 
axioms, the Bergsonian approach generates several conditions and remarks that 
must be accounted for in any empirical framework. Notably, a Bergsonian pro-
ject would involve a scientific understanding of metaphysical ideas, e.g. traces, 
lines, dynamism, leaps, linking and re-linking in thought (Deleuze, 1988, p. 117). 
Particular established Bergsonian principles are inevitable and must be covered if 
to shed any light upon experience: 
6 Virtual actions are not comparable to possible actions. If  virtual actions were possible actions, they would 
already exist before the real, and so the agent would simply have to choose from a given range. Only by the act 
of  the mind does the possible become the real. The possible is given in retrospect once enacted, although there 
never were any existing conscious acts considering the possibilities. It is only in light of  the real that the possible 
exists, despite the intellect presenting in retrospect that the possible was always not-impossible, and thus existed 
before the real. (Bergson, 2007, pp. 81–83). Actions unfold from virtual actions, which are continuously gene-
rated in a creative process depending on the actual situation. The real only makes itself  possible in retrospect 
as a consequence of  the intellect, so that the possible does not become the real, but from the real the possible 
is generated. It is only the virtual that can become the real (Bergson, 2007, p. 85). 
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1. Heterogeneity of duration; is the principle of immediacy, continuity and 
flow in duration as a constant change beyond discrete instants. Duration 
springs from the multiplicity put available by the physical structure of the 
body. Temporally, everything interpenetrates and occupies positions for 
both immediate-past and immediate-future. 
2. Indeterminate state of human; reflects the thermodynamic concept of 
equilibrium. This principle functions as the anchoring of the body in the 
upcoming discussions to not fall victim to the representational approach to 
cognition. The indeterminate body only becomes more determinate about 
the external world through the creative process of action-perception.
3. Dynamic relations; refers to the temporal focus in bodily processes, in-
cluding predicting virtual actions and retaining immediate experiences. It 
casts the emergence of becoming through experience as a dynamic system.
It is crucial to continuously highlight the principles as the investigation un-
folds—however, this is not to state that other introduced concepts are to be left 
and forgotten. Bergson’s principle of, for instance, the difference in kind and de-
gree proves to be an essential tool in investigating the nature of a term.  
Notice that all three principles resonate—they are interrelated, supporting 
one another as a complex system. These principles serve to guide the threshold 
between strictly a strictly scientific approach and a philosophical, e.g. any proper 
investigation of experience must account for the heterogeneity of duration.
4.6 Conclusion
Perception is how the body virtually interacts with the environment, and con-
sidering the posed quandary, a transition is only graspable by situating an indi-
vidual, i.e. an experiencing agent with a particular body, restricting and allowing 
specific manners of interaction with the environment. The physical structure of 
architectural space becomes a critical feature because the interaction between per-
ception and action, as a development from virtual to real action, determines the 
process of experiential transition. It can be concluded that the bodily functions, as 
an enduring system of creative movements, is precisely the way the indeterminate 
human becomes more determinate and experiences the world; therefore, there 
can be no answer to the quandary unless the real problem of action-perception 
is appropriately posited.
It is here clear: the process of action-perception necessarily emphasises the 
possible influences the object can inflict the subject, so that the experience of the 
environment, thus architecture, is a temporal relation as it becomes a question of 
the process of virtual action between subject and object. 
It might still not be clear why linking architecture and Bergson’s conception 
of space and time is useful. Bergson’s conception of numbers and their status as 
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spatialised time proves helpful to the process of delineating spaces so that the 
homogeneity of space is different from the heterogeneous duration, i.e. experi-
ence. Since space merely offers a difference in degree, a juxtaposing of elements 
stripped of no virtuality, there is entirely discrete division. There are no rea-
sons to believe that there exist other transitions than the experiential transition. 
Architectural transitions, as defined in the prior chapter, are an illusion, always 
created in retrospect by the intellect, to justify a sufficient change in experience, 
similar to that of a blowing out candles or acknowledge a different colour. What 
is meant by retrospect is not only post-experience but also intellectual predictions; 
some spatial configurations, e.g. a door, may attract an intuition of an architectural 
experience of transition. Such a spatial configuration may be termed a transistor 
and can be recognised before passing. 
Most importantly, not confusing space with time suggests that space A is never 
directly related to a time A, that is, an experience A, as if time and experience can 
reoccur as perceptions. Confusing space and time result in a tendency, when given 
a qualitative heterogeneity, to interpret it through a homogenous, objective medi-
um. This tendency is a reaction towards the heterogeneity that anchors experience 
(Mullarkey, 1995, p. 234). It would thus be an error to believe that specific spaces 
can evoke certain emotions, as an automaton, but instead one should understand 
the process of change, the transition of spaces as formed by the action-related 
restrictions and perception so that retention, i.e. that which remains, and virtual 
actions ultimately shape the foundation of experience. 
Regarding the importance of time relative to space, the difference between 
past and present is more important for the experiencing agent than the difference 
between spaces (Guerlac, 2006, pp. 106–107). Bergson suggests understanding the 
relation between processes rather than the outcome. This is the true Bergsonian 
embodiment; bodily processes are always in reciprocal coupling to its environment 
with content that is unique to the experiencer, and thus inaccessible to others. 
One should not attribute much value to the content and representation itself, but 
instead to the underlying processes, shedding light upon how one might influence 
it, which ultimately is the underlying temporal approach; to understand the hete-
rogeneous transition rather than the homogenised content. Therefore, according 
to Bergson, architecture, since it involves indivisible successions of movement 
animating space, is an art of experience, rather than an art of object. For this particular 
reason, Bergson stated that: “Questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction 
and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than space” (Bergson, 2004, p. 77).
Despite Bergson’s rigorous study of time, a clear structure of the immediate 
experience was not offered—instead, Bergson provided a framework for under-
standing the nature of space and time. Indeed, this chapter suggests that to un-
derstand the structure of the immediate experiential transition, a framework of 
action, perception and unfolding of time is necessary.
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Summary. How do Bergson and Husserl comply in their philosophy, and how is Husserl 
relevant to the research question? In search of  the structure of  duration and experience 
as portrayed by Bergson, his theoretical framework proved to be insufficient to 
analyse the structure of  the immediate unfolding of  experience. However, he did 
demonstrate that there could not be a discrete or instantaneous point of  experi-
ence since experience belongs to duration. By tracing parallels between Husserlian 
temporality and Bergsonian duration, an account of  temporal development con-
cerning intention and virtual actions, outline a framework suitable for empirical 
investigations of  transitions. In this respect, a phenomenological account of  per-
ception and experience are given and compared with a Bergsonian account. It is 
argued that Husserlian intentionality differs marginally from Bergsonian virtual 
action, serving a similar purpose in terms of  time, space and experience. Given 
the remarkable similarities, the developed Bergsonian principles are extended 
and unpacked by Husserl’s phenomenological account, functioning as support 
to Bergson’s principles. 
5.1 Manifold of  multiplicities
During the uprising of phenomenology in France, there was yet a Bergsonian 
dominance, and although Bergson and Husserl never met, their philosophies had 
obvious parallels (Spiegelberg, 1994, chap. VIII). Amongst the many similarities, 
Bergson and Husserl meet: 
unpacking Bergsonian ideas using Husserl
CHAPTER 5
“We are the true Bergsonians”
Edmund Husserl at a conference of phenomenology
(Spiegelberg, 1994, p. 428)
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consider the most fundamental one, namely that of multiplicities1. Both philoso-
phers derived their concept of multiplicities from the notion of manifold as coined 
and defined by Riemann in his Habilitationsschrift from 1854 (Winkler, 2006, p. 94). 
It is interesting due to Riemann’s twofold-position in philosophy and mathema-
tics since his mathematics can be understood as conceptual mathematics. Such entails 
thinking of space as a concept with complex structure, rather than as Euclidean 
geometry and sets of points (see Appendix A for elaboration). In this regard, 
geometry concerns the measure and scale of space, whereas topology, which is 
what Riemann essentially argues for, only concerns the structure of space and the 
shape of figures, understood as complex structures and concepts. Riemann aimed 
to develop a multidimensional notion of magnitude, from which he managed to 
distinguish continuous from discrete manifold. This led him to state that:
“The concepts of magnitude are only possible where there is an antecedent general 
concept which admits of different specialisations. According as there exists among these 
specialisations a continuous path from one to another or not, they form a continuous or 
discrete manifoldness [Mannigfeltikeit]; the individual specialisations are called in the 
first	case	points,	in	the	second	case	elements,	of	the	manifoldness.”	(as	cited	in	Plotnitsky,	
2006, p. 193; original emphasis) 
As stated in the previous chapter, Bergson was largely inspired by Riemann’s 
approach to space due to his disregard of points in space and insistence of un-
derstanding mathematical objects as concepts. In this sense, concepts have each 
a continuous or discrete manifold whose elements or points are related through 
a given determination, a complex structure. Riemann’s notion of manifold paves 
way for structurally conceptual mathematics, which goes beyond the algorithmic 
and formulae approaches, making continuous and discrete manifolds different 
concepts, where the former measures a number of elements in a manifold, and the 
latter the relations that act upon it (Plotnitsky, 2006, p. 194; Winkler, 2006, p. 95).
Admittedly, despite both Bergson and Husserl taking Riemann’s multiplicity 
serious, their respective philosophies had different purpose and motives, making 
their comparison difficult and limited. Bergson was occupied with durée (durati-
on), which he discovered through a rigorous investigation of change and process 
as inner continuity (Bergson, 2007, pp. 3–5), whereas Husserl focused on inve-
stigating experience through a descriptive method devoid of presuppositions about 
the world (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 66–68). Both purposes were further developed and 
changed as they kept on writing, e.g. Bergson explicitly stated that his philoso-
phy was just as subject to the change of time as any other spatio-temporal obje-
ct. Because it will continuously develop, change and expand, Bergson positioned 
himself as a process philosopher, or philosopher of change (Mullarkey, 2000, p. 5). Husserl 
can arguably be understood as an early-Husserl, developing on his significant 
contribution of intentionality, and a later-Husserl, where he enters transcendental 
1 E.g. intuition as method, philosophy as rigorous science and theory of  multiplicity (Deleuze, 1988, p. 117).
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philosophy investigating the structure of experience through intersubjectivity, 
intentionality and time (Zahavi, 2003). Nevertheless, the philosophers are argued 
to share sufficient axioms in their theories so to understand Husserl as a possible 
extension of Bergson, at least in their understanding of inner experience through 
a theory of time. 
In his paper, Winkler (2006) argues that Husserl and Bergson make use of the 
manifolds in each their system, amounting to a very similar position. To repeat, 
for Bergson, elements in space are countable and thus juxtaposed, forming infini-
tesimal divisions differing only in degree and not in kind; the manifold of space is 
that of juxtaposed elements differing in degree. In contrast, time is a continuous 
manifold where elements are not external to one another but interpenetrate by 
interconnecting in succession. For each position or point in this manifold, there 
are traces of another, creating an indivisible and indissoluble continuity. 
Although Husserl and Bergson shared a remarkably similar philosophy on 
numbers, unity and multiplicity (see e.g. Husserl, 1887), Husserl had a different 
approach. Starting in senses, Husserl notices the double relation in the unity of 
perception, namely that of seeing the environment in its forms and motions, its 
colours and sounds, its structure and size, and that of seeing the anger appearing 
in the eyes of another, the joy in a smile, the happiness in a gait (Husserl, 1997, 
pp. 8–9). In perceiving an object there belongs a manifold of discrete appearan-
ce, which Bergson coined quantitative multiplicity—however, in the unity of appe-
arance, there is a manifold of continuous manifolds, which Bergson referred to 
as qualitative multiplicity. Husserl thus, similar to Bergson, outline perception as a 
continuous experience, bringing with it both manifolds of continuous relations 
and discrete appearances, and not merely a linear deciphering of sensory datum. 
Departing from the manifold, both Bergson and Husserl hold that percepti-
on is a passage. Husserl holds that the manifolds consist of possible perception, 
understood as anticipated perceptions (Husserl, 1997, p. 252), whereas Bergson 
holds that manifolds consist of virtual states which pass into the actual. Within 
their theories, the virtual and the anticipated both take point of departure in the 
past, which, to this end, is the critical point. For both Bergson and Husserl, a fun-
damental principle of experience is the synthesis, or actualisation, into a unity of 
the indeterminate manifolds resulting in a synthesis of real experience. The antici-
pated perception and virtual actions are based on prior experiences, meaning the 
past is present even before the present—this will be clarified later. Further, both 
for Husserl and Bergson, dissociating time from space marks the fundamental 
difference between consciousness and reality (Winkler, 2006, p. 98). Given their 
apparent convergence, Husserl’s concept of temporality and intentionality provi-
de new principles to the established list in the prior chapter. The following four 
points of convergence will be highlighted:
• The relation between action and perception
• Intentionality and virtual action
• Constitution and unity of experience
• Indivisibility of time 
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Elemental attitudes in Husserlian phenomenology concerns; what is meant by 
perception is phenomenology, what constitutes it and how is it related to inten-
tionality? By addressing these questions, the emerging answers naturally synthesise 
with Bergsonian philosophy.  
5.2 Primacy of  perception
5.2.1 Perception  in phenomenology
“We must go back to the ‘things themselves’” Husserl wrote in his Logical Investigations 
(2001, p. 168), properly situating the role of perception in phenomenology. The 
primacy of perception by Merleau-Ponty (1964) follows suit. Generally, phenomen-
ologists hold that the relation with the world is original and practical, as well as 
direct and rich, as opposed to those who argue perception is intellectual know-
ledge of the world, e.g. early empiricism. The role and purpose of perception is 
an essential discussion in the given architectural context since perception may be 
misconceived as driven by intellectual knowledge, which would lead to a reduc-
tionist concept-driven mechanism of perception interrelated with symbolic and 
linguistic abilities (Fodor, 1979, 1987). In this sense, the perception of architecture 
would depend solely on the intellect and ability to recognise signs and symbols 
(Jencks, 1978). Phenomenology instead takes serious the situated and embodied 
encounter with the world, guided by practical concerns based on first-person and 
second-person perspectives, suggesting that perceiving architecture depends on 
the body, perspective and intentions of the situated experiencing agent. To per-
ceive the world is not akin to that of a thinker to an object of thought. It is not 
comparable to a proposition, because no types of intellectual interpretation, de-
ciphering or the like are performed. Instead, perception is experienced in action, 
intuitively, rather than explicitly knowing. 
To Merleau-Ponty, the relation between subject and the world involves the 
contradiction in transcendence and immanence, an aspect relatively similar to 
Husserl’s position (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, p. 13). Merleau-Ponty some-
times refers to the contradiction as a paradox, because two seemingly different 
features in perception co-exist (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, p. 16)—hence-
forth, it is referred to as asymmetry in perception. To illustrate the contradiction in 
perception, consider this example from Merleau-Ponty: 
“If we consider an object which we perceive but one of whose sides we do not see, or 
if	we	consider	objects	which	are	not	within	our	visual	field	at	this	moment	[…]—how 
should we describe the existence of these absent objects or the nonvisible parts of present 
objects? […] Should we say […] that I represent to myself the sides of this lamp 
which are not seen? If I say these sides are representations, I imply that they are not 
grasped as actually existing; because what is represented is not here before us, I do not 
actually perceive it. It is only a possible. But since the unseen sides of this lamp are not 
imaginary,	but	only	hidden	from	view	(to	see	them	it	suffices	to	move	the	lamp	a	little	
bit), I cannot say that they are representations.” (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, pp. 
13–14; original emphasis)
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It is important to emphasise that transitions are similarly a question of under-
standing what is not currently available to the visual field, and must instead be 
anticipated, i.e. the process of anticipation is inherent in perception. Anticipation 
becomes a mere supposition, a possible perception, only refutable if one moves 
according to the structure of the object, and not by intellectual inference akin to 
geometric reasoning. In that sense, perception is of practical matter as a practical 
synthesis rather than intellectual synthesis. Perception is not divisible to simple 
sensory events or parts but must be grasped in its entirety, the whole setting and 
given context because perception is not given separately from what they signify. It 
is immediate and pregnant with its form, devoid of deciphering and intermediate 
inferences of what each sign may signify, which would otherwise be necessary giv-
en the gap between signifying sense data and the signified concept (Merleau-Ponty 
and Edie, 1964, pp. 14–16). To illustrate the importance of the whole setting in 
perception, see Figure 5.1A, where the central line is equally wide in both arrows. 
Besides the fact that it is close to impossible to perceive truly the central lines as 
equally wide, they also offer different ways of practical interacting. Suppose these 
were physical structures, affording to be picked up and practically investigated. If 
so, the structures are different from one another in perception as in their practical 
syntheses, e.g. they are picked up differently. Suppose the central rods were dis-
sected from their arrows; then, the rods would be similar in their physical struc-
ture, namely plain rods of equal length. They afford to be practically investigated 
in the same manner. In Figure 5.1B, if the perception was a matter of intellectu-
al synthesis, the two blue central circles, which share the same size, ought to be 
perceived as equal size. However, this is not the case—they are in fact perceived 
as different in size, mainly due to their context (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, pp. 
106–107). The black squares in Figure 5.1C are equal in size and quadratic. The 
horizontal lines dividing the row of squares are all strictly linear, horizontal and 
parallel. If perception were an intellectual process that deciphers parts from a 
whole, each square would have been conceived as strictly quadratic and the lines 
as strictly linear. Instead, what is perceived is curved lines, almost crossing one 
another with eschewed squares. Opposite to immanence, perceiving more than 
the sum of the parts is a feature of transcendence in perception, and hence, it can 
be established that intellectual synthesis is different from perceptual synthesis. 
A B C
Figure 5.1— A. Müller-Lyer illusion. The central line is of  equal width in both cases. The perception that one is 
short/longer than the other is due to their practical use afforded by the arrows. B. Ebbinghaus-illusion. The two 
blue central circles in each group share the same size. Yet, one is perceived larger/smaller than the other, due to 
their whole setting. C. Café wall-illusion. The black squares are all quadratic, with all linear lines running strictly 
horizontally, although they appear to be eschewed lines and non-quadratic black squares.
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The intellectual synthesis is later resumed—however, in order to progress, it is 
necessary to grasp how this transcendence in perceptual synthesis is at all possible.
5.2.2 Transcendence in perception
Perceptual consciousness, i.e. consciousness of what is perceived, persistently 
transcends the perspectival profile to understand the object itself. This is what 
characterises the transcendental feature of perception; although the object escapes 
the immanent perception, there is a transcendental consciousness of the object 
itself. For this reason, it is said that immanence is in mind, while transcendence 
is outside it, i.e. the constructed impression of an appearance that is not currently 
immanent in mind is a transcendental feature (Brough, 2008).
In Husserl’s concept of horizonal intentionality, one anticipates the unseen side of 
the lamp from another standpoint given immanently. Transcendence in this sense 
is anticipatory [Vorgriff] entering the perception as something co-intended with the 
actual and immanent, bringing them into appresentation; a kind of making co-pres-
ent (Husserl, 1999, p. 146). The nature of horizonal intentionality is precisely the 
anticipatory process in perception, as it allows the experiencing agent to see more 
than she sees, and less than she sees (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, p. 108). She sees 
more in the sense that perception fulfils the objects in their entirety by anticipating 
them as a whole, a form of transcendence in perception, whereas she sees less in 
the sense that although most of the peripheral vision seems colourful, it is, in fact, 
colourless (Johnson, 1986). Although much of the environment seems given, it is 
difficult to read this page by looking at it once, closing the eyes, and read it from 
some mental representation. Indeed, there is no representation [Vergegenwärtigung] 
of the world within the subject. Husserl holds an anti-representational account 
of perception, with no intermediary between the embodied agent and the world, 
hence the primacy of perception. Instead, the world is directly perceived by acting in 
it and anticipating within the perceptual synthesis, devoid of intellect, so that the 
act of perception precedes the intellect. In this sense, there are no relevant dif-
ferences between a perception and a hallucination, since both situations offer the 
intentional object as presented in an intuitive givenness. 
The relation between intellectual and perceptual synthesis can be demon-
strated through an analogy of propositional reasoning and abductive reasoning. 
Although the Pythagorean Theorem is true now and later and although the later pro-
gress in knowledge cannot disprove the theorem, it can, however, change how 
one perceives the theorem. Further developments of the theorem may make the 
first theorem a mere draft, changing the perception of it—yet, it remains true. If 
once proven true, it cannot be proven untrue; this is the condition of numbers and 
mathematical logic. The perceptual truth of Pythagorean Theorem is not timeless, 
whereas its ideal truth is. The ideal and perceptual truth is precisely what the in-
tellectual and perceptual syntheses share; they appear to themselves as temporal, 
with a future and a past, and a future-directed openness holding the power of 
correcting what now appears false (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, pp. 20–21); 
indeed, this is an abductive form of reasoning. It holds true for both kinds of 
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syntheses that “what	is	given	is	a	route,	an	experience	which	gradually	clarifies	itself,	which	
gradually	rectifies	itself	and	proceeds	by	dialogue	with	itself	and	with	others” (Merleau-Ponty 
and Edie, 1964, p. 21). Given the syntheses share the truth-adjusting feature, both 
syntheses seem to qualify as answers to the question of perception; but is per-
ception a question of truth-value? As the route unfolds over time, what role does 
perception take relative to the intellect? Does one intellectually infer spatial forms 
through several deciphering processes of the mental image, or, is it given through 
perceptual syntheses that transcend by anticipatory feature? Based on our prior 
experiences, we can foresee a transistor; is this part of the anticipatory intuitive 
feature in transcendence or is it an intellectual inference? 
Consider now the intuitive aspect of immediate perception. The temporal as-
pect of perception in the following quote from Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion on 
the nature of perception provides a hint:  
“By these words, the ‘primacy of perception’, we mean that the experience of percep-
tion is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us; that 
perception is nascent logos; that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true 
conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and 
action.” (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, p. 25; emphasis added) 
A theorem is first perceived before it is known; perception is presence, which 
precedes the intellect. Perception emerges intuitively from the paradox, asymme-
try in perception. The asymmetry consists of a misfit between the transcendent 
(subjectively anticipative) and immanent (objectively material) perspective of the 
world. Because the asymmetry requires an anticipative feature, which is absent 
from the present immanent perspective, a pseudo-paradox emerges. It is a pseu-
do-paradox because it is not a real paradox, but only resembles a paradox2. It 
begs the question: if the transcendence of an object is co-present with the imma-
nence of the object, how is it possible to hold more than a single perspective in 
mind? Does this not attain to hold two perspectives of the world simultaneously? 
Husserl’s account of intentionality provides excellent clues to these questions of 
co-presence.
5.2.3 What is intentionality?
In any given situation, any one person is constantly phenomenally conscious 
of something, as in having a conscious experience. In phenomenology, being con-
scious of something is precisely the intentionality of consciousness (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2012, p. 123), i.e. the intention to represent the world precisely like this, 
rather than that; as Nagel put is: “something that it is like to be that organism—something 
it is like for the organism” (1974, p. 436; original emphasis). Contemporary philo-
sophy address intentionality most often as qualia, which is conscious experience. 
2 Note this pseudo-paradox as it will in this chapter only be dealt with philosophically but readdressed in 
cognitive neuroscientific terms in Chapter 8.
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Before Husserl, other philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, Aquinas and Brentano, spoke 
of intentionality as the capacity to hold in mind something as a mental state or as 
a representation. David Chalmers, whom coined qualia as the hard problem of con-
sciousness, argued that any problems relating to the causal processes of mind are 
easy problems, whereas those that deal with the content of the intentional, i.e. 
qualia, and the first-person experienced inner life address the hard problem of 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, pp. xi–xii). Chalmers questions how it is possible 
for a physical structure, such as the body and brain, to give rise to phenomenal 
experience. He then also questions the phenomenal experience itself, which is the 
specific character of conscious experience; why a particular colour is experien-
ced as this rather than that (Chalmers, 1996, p. 5). This is a critical aspect to raise 
relative to the pseudo-paradox because it addresses the core of how experience 
emerges from physical structures such as the sensory organs. Chalmers’ questi-
ons are located at the very threshold of transcendence and immanence, a positi-
on that is critical to a naturalisation of phenomenology, which is not a direct goal 
of the thesis, but an important step to address given the empirical nature of the 
research question.
Throughout history, it has been challenging to dissociate intentionality and 
mental representation, which are often used interchangeably (Brower and Brower-
Toland, 2008). To this end, the dominant debate concerns whether intentionality 
is reducible to qualia, or vice versa (see e.g. Dennett, 2015). Fodor (1987, p. 97), 
defending a representational account of mind, expressed that in naturalising inten-
tionality and being a realist, it is hard not also to be reductionist; can one exclude 
the first-person experience in investigating intentionality, by reducing it to mere 
psychophysics, so that the differences in experiencing the colour red are not qua-
litative differences (differences in kind) but differences in quantity (differences in 
degree)? If so, all experiential qualities are a matter of physical measurement, i.e. 
light intensity upon the eyes. These broad questions are not sought to be answe-
red directly—however, giving a Husserlian account of intentionality, and compa-
ring to Bergsonian virtual actions, reveals a general agreement on an alternative 
approach to qualia. Although qualia are not of main interest, it holds nonetheless 
an essential position in perception, and since architectural transitions operates 
through perception, it is necessary to investigate the nature of qualia and mental 
representation. Furthermore, intentionality and virtual action will reveal how it is 
possible to simultaneously co-present objects and experience space.
Intentionality in phenomenology studies the meaning in mental states, not 
to be confused with having a purpose in mind when acting; this is merely one 
aspect of it (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, p. 126). Unique to Husserl’s theory of 
intention is the existence-independency, which means that the intended is indepen-
dent of its actual existence. Brentano, for instance, approached instead a form of 
immanentism, where the intended held an ontological reality in mind, i.e. an actual 
representation. Husserl’s existence-independent intention is the essence of the 
anticipatory feature situated at the asymmetry because it allows anticipation to 
form as an intention without the actual perceived. To be more concise, different 
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from his other contemporaries, Husserl had a relationally structured approach to 
intentionality, so that it is impossible to understand the mind without its objective 
correlate, which is the perceived. For instance, if A causally influences B, then A 
and B must exist, however, if A intends B, only A must exist.
Similarly, it is impossible to understand the intentional object without its subje-
ctive correlate so that intentionality and perception are interrelated (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2012, p. 129). This approach is different in the sense that in dealing with 
imagined objects, any intentional object must refer to, or be about, something, i.e. 
a referent. Even if the referent does not exist, the intentional state has a reference as 
it retains certain conditions fulfilling the imagination. If it is true that the person 
reading this doctoral thesis is holding it in the hands, then both the person and 
the thesis exists. If it is true that the reader intends the doctoral thesis, then the 
doctoral thesis does not need to exist (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 20–21). The intentional, 
that which is retained in mental states, is not an object (Zahavi, 2003, p. 17), but 
an answer to the question of what a certain mental state is about:
“If the answer refers to some non-existing object, the intentional object does not 
exist. If the answer refers to some existent thing, then the intentional object is that real 
thing. So if I look at my fountain pen, then it is this real pen which is my intentional 
object, and not some mental picture, copy, or representation of the pen.” (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2012, p. 131)
By further exploring intentionality, the anticipative feature, which is of high 
interest, becomes clearer. Currently, Husserl suggests that the anticipative feature 
does not need to exist to be intended. To put it in architectural terms, to anticipate 
the subsequent space in architectural transition is intuitive, and nothing more. The 
intended space, which is arguably comparable to qualia, does not need to exist in 
space, but merely as intuitive anticipation for the experiencing agent. However, 
the anticipative feature in transcendence is not the full story. As Merleau-Ponty 
pointed out above, it takes nothing but a simple action to bring forth whether 
the intentional object meets the immanence in perception—if not, an asymmetry 
calls for adjusting the perception. Action, it seems, resolves the question posed 
in perception and intentionality.
5.2.4 Embodiment
Husserl has arguably written less on the role of the body in perception, as 
compared to Merleau-Ponty.  However, having dedicated half the lectures given 
in 1907 (Husserl, 1997) to kinaesthetic and oculomotor changes in perception 
reflects their importance in his philosophy of perception. Over time, Husserl 
provided extensive investigations of the body as he came to realise its central 
position between subjectivity and the world. The body anchors perception to a 
certain point of view, from which all that enters perception is understood only in 
its part, so that perception is a reference to the whole. It is not an act of the in-
tellect, but a totality open to a horizon of perspectives that merge and define the 
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object in question. For instance, one cannot conceive a perceptible place where 
oneself is not present providing a point of view (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, 
p. 16). There is no pure point of view, i.e. a view from nowhere. Any perception 
of the environment is thus from a spatial orientation, as it is always from here 
or there that the environment appears to the perceiver. Husserl develops in his 
theory of perception the concept of orientation, which is precisely that anything 
is given from a situated and embodied point of view, where the body continu-
ously utilise self-experience as an indexical here concerning what appears in the 
environment (Zahavi and Overgaard, 2012, p. 285). “Hence the discreteness of spa-
tial perspectives. And hence also the transcendence of objects of outer perception, for, again, on 
perceiving	the	object	from	the	front	side	its	backside	cannot	be	perceived	...	So,	given	an	infinite	
number of spatial orientations the object will always be ‘more’ than what is perceived of it from 
any side” (Winkler, 2006, p. 98). 
The early Husserl was preoccupied with the orientation provided by the body, 
whereas the later Husserl realise the body’s role for constituting a perceptual real-
ity, and thus turn to the mobility of the body. Husserl investigates the process of 
change in perception, given a mobile body (Husserl, 1997, p. 133; Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 99)—quite similar to Bergson. Here, he immediately observes the importance 
of time in movement, since the body seems to perform continuously double func-
tions in order to make sense of the perceived because, during action, perception 
is continuously under perspectival change. The co-functioning is firstly expressed 
with a kinetic experience of the body itself, which amounts to a form of bodily 
self-awareness, putting the body as both a subject and an object, and secondly 
with a continuous transition from one perception to the other (Husserl, 1997, pp. 
131–132; Zahavi, 2003, pp. 99–100). If these two conditions are not met, one is 
presented with two separable objects. Once again, a co-intentional3 process is ev-
ident in Husserl’s philosophy, one that is yet to be elaborated on. Consider the 
following practical example:
“Whereas the actually given front of the wardrobe is correlated with a particular 
bodily position, the horizon of the cointended	but	momentarily	absent	profiles	of	the	
wardrobe (its backside, bottom, and so on) is correlated with my kinaesthetic horizon, 
that is, with my capacity for possible movement.	The	absent	profiles	are	linked	
to	an	intentional	if-then	connection.	If	I	move	in	this	way,	then	this	profile	will	become	
visually or tactually accessible. The absent backside of the wardrobe is only the backside 
of the same wardrobe I am currently perceiving because it can become present through a 
specific	bodily	movement.”	(Zahavi,	2003,	p.	100;	emphasis	added)	
In this sense, the kinetic synthesis is a practical synthesis, so that one is not 
perceiving movement, but anticipating it in co-intention. Recall Bergson’s prin-
ciples, namely the importance of interacting with the environment to reduce the 
indeterminate state of the body. Furthermore, the unified process of action and 
3 Perhaps even “co-conditional”. 
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perception construct an individual world. For Husserl, at any given moment, 
perception is both correlated with a position of the body and with co-intended 
perceptions; this is precisely the aforementioned double function that credits the 
body a constitutive role in perception.
Husserl realised that the body could provide answers for questions regard-
ing the relation between subject and world, mainly because the body could be 
perceived as a subject and as an object, i.e. at the threshold of the asymmetry. 
Consider the tactile sensation when sweeping the fingers over a table. One may 
sense the table itself and its properties, but one may similarly change attention 
towards the sensing hand so that one becomes aware of the movement and pres-
sure, that are not part of the object, but the experiencing hand. From this example, 
one may differentiate between the sensing, as the hardness and smoothness of the 
table, and the sensed, as part of the embodied subject (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 102–103). 
Another example; the right-hand touching the left one. Sweeping the right-hand 
over the left-hand one senses the surface of the left hand; however, similarly, the 
left-hand senses being touched. The touching hand is not touching an object, or 
an insensible hand, since the touched senses the touch itself. This ambiguous dou-
ble-sensation is precisely the sense of self-awareness; one is experiencing oneself 
in a way that anticipates how others might experience the sensed. One enters a 
loop of self-evidencing so that the touch must come by one’s own since the touch 
correlates with both experiences—again, co-intentional. Within the experienced 
reciprocity, Husserl refers to an agreement and simultaneity between objectivating 
and subjectivating the experiences (Husserl, 1997, p. 137). There is an agreement of 
both experiences that is experienced by changing attention, which in turn explains 
the role of the body as an indexical here, since over time, the body correlates with 
any given experience situating the experiencing agent precisely there. In this sense, 
the body is not given and subsequently one investigates the world—au contrai-
re—the world is provided as bodily investigated. It is in the interaction between 
body and world that the subject becomes aware (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 103–105). In 
short, bodily actions causes a perception, which in turn causes the action.
Insofar, it is established that:
• One perceives the whole rather than the parts.
• The intention is independent of direct perception enabling co-intention 
in perception by possible action.
• Experience is constituted by simultaneity in perception and active bodily 
functions.
• There is a self-evidenced awareness of the body through double-sensation, 
where the reciprocity enables a co-intention to take place at the same time. 
It must be emphasised that these points require parallel processes of con-
sciousness and can only be valid if the experience itself is temporally widespread, 
in the sense that it does not occupy a single moment, but rather a duration. With 
this established, we are now better equipped to investigate the temporal problem 
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of co-intention, the double perception of the world and how the asymmetry be-
tween transcendence and immanence unfold.
5.3 Intentionality and experience
5.3.1 Intentional	fulfilment
As stated above, the relation between experience and world—a responsibility 
that is ascribed to intentionality—reveals the asymmetry between transcendence 
and immanence. To clarify this relation, the nature of intention must be explored. 
When intending an object, there are three distinctive alternatives; signitive (linguistic), 
imaginative (pictorial) and perceptual (direct) (Zahavi, 2003, p. 29). The lowest level an 
object may be intended is in the signitive act. In a conversation about a lost cat, 
one can refer to their specific cat, without the cat being present nor any other ap-
pearance of her. Indeed, the cat, although merely a linguistic referent, becomes 
an intentional object, devoid of any intuitive content. If, for instance, a picture of 
the cat accompanies the talk, then an appearance of the cat becomes the inten-
tional object, perceiving her now indirectly. Imaginative intention bears a certain 
resemblance to the cat as seen from the perspective offered by the picture. Only 
perceptual intention offers a direct type of intentionality which presents us with 
the object itself, in propria persona, that is, to perceive the cat herself (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2012, p. 100). The signitive act is of interest because this intentional act 
designates the existence-independent intentionality, which paved the way for the 
anticipatory feature in perception. In fact, through a process of signitive inten-
tionality and the fulfilment of it, one has acquired justified knowledge about the 
world. The cat is instantiated as a mere intention, but when found, the synthesis 
of coincidence functions as a double fulfilment. The cat differs in its givenness, 
as it is given as an intentional object and as an intuitively present object. This is 
not to be confused with two separate ontological truths, but merely a synthesis 
of coincidence between two intentions. The directedness in intentionality reflects 
the primacy of perception, the direct relation to the world, devoid of intermedi-
ate mental representations—the world and its properties are not experienced as 
re-presented as much as presented; experience is presentational of the world and 
its relative properties.
When the lost cat is found and directly perceived, the direct perception of the 
cat fulfils the intention. “Whereas	at	first	I	had	a	mere	signitive	intention,	it	is	now	being	
fulfilled	by	a	new	intention,	where	the	same	object	is	given intuitively” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
30; original emphasis). The cat was merely intended or held in mind, but when 
met with itself, it attained an intuitive fulfilment of the cat. To this end, Husserl 
reflects his Bergsonian influence, namely in that any intentional experience con-
sists of more than a single moment, making it inseparable because it necessarily 
consists of an intention that is not yet met. In other words, there is an intentional 
quality and intentional matter of the experience. The former refers to the kind of 
experience in perceiving, hoping and judging, whereas the latter refers to what-
ever the intention is directed at, e.g. a cat, a book or this doctoral thesis. In this 
sense, intentional quality is the heterogeneous dimension, whereas the intentional 
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matter is the homogeneous dimension of Bergsonian philosophy. When the cat 
was found, the direct perception fulfilled the intention with quality and matter, 
and this is the essence of the asymmetry between transcendence and immanence 
in Husserlian philosophy; how the mind and world relate through fulfilments of 
intentions, or the failure to do so. The inseparability is addressed in the tempo-
rality of experience.
Notably, although a signitive intention is fulfilled, it is rarely fulfilled perfectly 
as intended. In fact, it is the asymmetry, the lack of coincidence, between the giv-
en and the intended that characterise the acquired knowledge about the object. 
No object is perceived as intended, because of the bodily and perspectival con-
straints; because only perspectival profiles of the object are given. When intend-
ing the physical book of this doctoral thesis, one is not intending the perspectival 
given surfaces, but one transcends the given and understands the book itself from 
virtually any perspective. There will always remain perspectives that are not given 
and instead anticipated in intention. Epistemologically, the intuition is irrelevant; 
“It	is	only	when	the	intuition	serves	the	function	of	fulfilling	a	signitive	intention	that	we	acquire	
knowledge” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 33). 
Does Husserl, then, state that perception is knowledge? Not a bit. The antici-
patory feature of intentionality supports a future-directed perceptual truth so that 
perception is pragmatically anticipatory.  i.e. if one moves through a transistor, 
i.e. a spatial delineation between one space to another, what might one expect to 
see, touch, feel? If Husserl meant to link propositional knowledge to perception, 
there are no reasons to argue for the different types of evidence, emphasising that 
intuition is variational certainty regarding the evidence about the world. It depends 
on the relation between intention and the sensory that is meeting the intention 
(Zahavi, 2003, pp. 33–35).
If the intention was considered knowledge, then it naturally leads to an idealist 
trap, i.e. the intention becomes epistemologically sufficient to declare knowledge 
about the world. Indeed, the signitive intentionality is existence-independent—
however, it is fulfilled in various degrees by direct perception, where the perspec-
tival givenness of the object is based on the asymmetry. The intended object does 
not exist mind-independently but is intuitively given so that the object of knowledge 
is different from the act of knowledge.
In his criticism of psychologism, as presented in Logical investigations, Husserl 
claimed that psychologism failed to recognise the fundamental difference in the 
object of knowledge and the act of knowing—a critique that draws parallels to 
Bergson’s general critique of psychophysics and the abductive form of reasoning 
(Bergson, 2001; Zahavi, 2003, pp. 7–10). Mathematical truths hold their validity 
regardless of the world so that 2 + 1 = 3 is true independently of the world with 
actual things. It refers not to a subjective experience with a temporal duration, 
but an ideal atemporal truth. Nevertheless: “Although the principles are grasped and 
known by consciousness, we remain conscious of something ideal that is irreducible and utterly 
different from the real psychical act of knowing” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 9; original emphasis). 
In discovering a paradox between real and ideal, i.e. that objective truth is known 
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in subjective acts of knowing, Husserl suggests that an answer may be offered 
in the investigation of experiential givenness, hence his intuitive/transcendental 
approach. This argument has often been given through the observation that it 
is possible to imagine a worldless subject, whereas it is not possible to imagine a 
subjectless world. 
“The world, and more generally, every type of transcendence, is relative insofar 
as the condition for the appearance lies outside itself, namely, in the subject. In contrast 
the subject, the immanence, is absolute and autonomous since its manifestation only 
depends upon itself” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 48; original emphasis). 
Acknowledging no difference in kind between object and act of knowledge 
leads any such questions towards false problems and, more profoundly, false solu-
tions. In this regard, there is an undeniable similarity in the elemental philosophy 
between Husserl and Bergson. Their similarities strengthen when comparing their 
understanding of representation using virtual action and intentionality. 
5.3.2 Virtual action and transcendental idealism
In Matter and memory, Bergson explicitly refers to an aggregate of continuous 
inner images as fundamental for representing the world. Bergson’s use of the 
word, representation, is used in the French sense, meaning a mental picture often 
understood as perception (Bergson, 2004, p. 3). The apparent obstacle in this 
context is that Bergson seems to be a representationalist, whereas Husserl an anti, 
thus obscuring their resemblance particularly regarding representation. Both take 
the origin of representation and perception seriously, leading them to an investi-
gation of the relation between subject and world. If one can see past the choice 
of words, given both philosophers are translated from non-English, and inspect 
their postulations about the inner relations in perceptual systems concerning rep-
resentation instead, one finds that virtual action is fundamentally not much dif-
ferent from transcendental idealism. It is rather facile to show that Bergson was 
not a representationalist, but held a position approximating Husserl. 
As shown, Bergson believes that both idealists and realists confuse the role 
of perception for being absolute truth, either ideal or empirical. He held that the 
body was at an indeterminate state, using action to investigate the world, and once 
investigated, the world is given as investigated through virtual actions. Perception 
is thus not truths about the world, but rather a matter of virtual action—or to use 
Gibson’s term, affordances (Gibson, 1986, p. 140). 
“Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon bodies: it 
results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or more generally for 
our functions. […]	The	whole	difficulty	of	the	problem	that	occupies	us	comes	from	the	
fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from 
a	fixed	point	by	that	special	apparatus	which	is	called	an	organ	of	perception—a	pho-
tograph which would then be developed in the brain-matter by some unknown chemical 
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4 To believe that one may interact with spatial objects in a certain way is itself  a prediction ahead of  the 
present—one foresees that possible interaction. 
5 Recall the existence-independent feature of  an intention. The intentional relation is an elaboration of  that 
term.
and psychical process of elaboration. But is it not obvious that the photograph, if photo-
graph there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all 
the points of space?” (Bergson, 2004, pp. 30–31)
Bergson criticises the idea of photography preceding that which is given a 
priori and intuitively. He rejects any absolute truth in representation about the 
world given through perception, simply because this is not the purpose of per-
ception. World and its objects, according to Bergson, are represented by their vir-
tual action, i.e. how one might immediately act upon it, drawing deep parallels to 
Husserlian practical synthesis, and not by a photographic representation produced 
by perception organs. The temporal dimension of the anticipatory feature in vir-
tual actions must once again be emphasised; it is the ability to immediately, and 
practically, foresee that brings about the perception, which in turn makes the fore-
seeing uncertain rather than absolute, i.e. a truth-value as in realism and idealism4. 
Correspondingly, Husserl rejects both isms through a similar argument, name-
ly by targeting the role of representation and perception. For Husserl, there is a 
strict distinction between appearance as intentional or a complex of sensations 
(Husserl, 2001, pp. 89–91). In transcendental idealism, which he insists is differ-
ent from any idealism at that time, transcendent objects are not objects of con-
sciousness and are not reducible to the experience of them. “It is to speak of object 
that might always surprise us, that is, objects showing themselves differently than we ex-
pected” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 70; original emphasis). The transcendental object is tran-
scendental for the experiencing agent, given from a particular perspective with a 
particular appearance. Its existence is linked to its possibility of appearance, and 
not its appearance itself so that the experience of it is embedded in a horizon of 
experience (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 69–70). To be more concise, Husserl uses reell to 
signify anything that is immanent in consciousness, as opposed to something that 
is intentionally present. An act of perception is a real event, but whatever is per-
ceived is not reell in consciousness. In external space, the perceived has its reality, 
but the intentional content is irreal as it is perceived by consciousness but is not 
immanent (Gallagher, 1998, p. 44). 
The distinction amounts to an essential notion in Husserl’s intentionality, 
namely intentional relation5. Intentional relation is not a duplication of the external 
environment but explains the relation between sensed and intended. By stating 
that intentionality goes directly to the thing, Husserl avoids creating, and so dupli-
cating, perceptual objects as a mental phenomenon. To this end, Husserl approxi-
mates Bergson’s philosophy regarding perception by stating that perception is not 
mental representation understood as an absolute truth about the environment, 
but instead is a practical meaning so that one perceives something as something. 
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To put it differently, how one perceives transcendent objects is tightly linked to 
how virtual actions bring about perception; they depend on bodily actions. Virtual 
actions are not intellectual acts that generate a finite number of possible actions, 
but is rather acts of intuition, generating embedded and embodied virtual actions 
that are not necessarily foreseeable, e.g. some virtual actions may be acquired by 
watching others or through intellectual information. In this sense, any perception 
depends on how one intuitively and practically might gain more knowledge about 
the perceived, from which there are theoretically an infinite amount of ways. 
In Husserl’s transcendental analysis of kinetic synthesis, he designates immense 
attention to the role of belief-positing, which, once again, is a matter of fulfilling 
an intention, so that the reell content in perception is a matter of establishing phe-
nomenological evidence (Husserl, 1997, p. 14). For instance, the fixity of space 
as one move is constituted by the succession of appearances that are reinforced 
and validated through the unity of belief, i.e. we expect the space to behave in a 
certain way as we simultaneously move in a certain way, making the sensed and 
intended correlate. The fulfilment of the interpenetrating beliefs, or signitive in-
tents, are anticipative, starting within the phantasy, making the unity of experience 
not only a continuity of appearances but a presupposed fulfilment (Husserl, 1997, 
pp. 125–128). 
With Husserl’s rejection of idealism and realism through variational certainty 
in the asymmetry and intentional fulfilment, where does his philosophy situate 
him? His transcendental approach ultimately leads his form of idealism to a po-
sition alike Bergson, which is being neither a realist nor an idealist, but instead in 
a melange of the two. One could have foreseen this coincidence already by their 
acknowledgement and agreement upon the body as an indeterminate state of be-
ing, which must necessarily interact, through a self-evidencing loop of action and 
perception, with its environment to firmly grasp the world. This is a temporal 
question of consciousness, in the sense that to understand the world, one must 
attempt a practical prediction of the perception in question.
5.3.3 A question of  anticipation
Transcendence cannot be reduced to a mere range of anticipatory process—
however, it is undeniably an intrinsic part of its nature to be able to encompass 
more than a single if-then-perception of any transcendent object at once. The asym-
metry between transcendence and immanence emerges here; phenomenology 
understands perception and the relation between subject and world by inquiring 
the possibility of transcendent intention and validity in the sphere of immanence. 
A continuous perceptual belief about the world is presupposed, which is either 
met with conflicting or fulfilling immanence, and this is precisely the paradox of 
the co-existence of transcendence and immanence, i.e. immanence ensures the 
perceived is not foreign, while transcendence contains more than what is given. 
The virtual action is thus comparable to the unfulfilled intention that occupies the 
transcendental realm, waiting to be validated with phenomenological evidence. 
The world is perceived from an embedded and embodied perspective, restricting 
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the perceptual accessibilities, and yet the world is experienced transcendental-
ly offering more than what is given. This independent-dependent relation bet-
ween consciousness and the world is a central feature of transcendental idealism 
(Winkler, 2006, p. 102). From Husserl’s 1907 lectures: 
“How then further will we come to understand perceptual beliefs, which relate to the 
actual	Being	of	the	perceived	object	and	which	now	are	‘confirmed’	and	now	‘conflict,’	
now get determined more precisely and now possibly are determined in a completely novel 
way through new perceptions which bring the object to ‘ever more complete’ givenness and 
show in ever new directions ‘what the object is in actuality’?” (Husserl, 1997, p. 16)
Presupposing perceptual belief is arguably a concept in favour of idealism. 
Husserl introduces the validity of the directedness in a real-world, which is not 
mediated by any intra-mental objects. Idealism and realism seem to co-exist in a 
self-evidencing loop using a presupposed perceptual belief that is based on nor-
mality to resolve uncertainties about the world. Thus, Husserl’s transcendental 
idealism is a melange of both, celebrating the statement of Bergson regarding his 
use of composites situating realism in one end and idealism in the other.
“From this indetermination, accepted as a fact, we have been able to infer the neces-
sity of a perception, that is to say, of a variable relation between the living being and 
the	more	or	less	distant	influence	of	the	objects	which	interest	it.”	(Bergson,	2004,	p.	
24; original emphasis)
Similar to Bergson, Husserl hold that objectivity is constituted in lived expe-
rience, meaning that only at the constitution, which is at the conflict of transcen-
dence and immanence, does objectivity take place (Husserl, 1997, p. 16). 
“We have argued that in perception as such a perceived object stands there as beli-
eved	and	in	the	flesh,	that	in	uni-fold	perception,	as	we	could	name	it	(versus	mani-fold	
perception), the object indeed stands there as given, but only from ‘one side,’ and in the 
mani-fold perception as given from many sides, and that in every uni-fold perception 
(whether for itself or as a phase of a mani-fold and continuously mani-fold perception) a 
distinction is to be made between presentational contents and the moment of apprehension, 
on which are founded, in a changing way, the intentions and act-characters of a higher 
stratum, including belief.” (Husserl, 1997, p. 119)
To further explore what happens at the heart of the asymmetry, the concept 
of constituting in Husserl’s philosophy is inevitable. If one follows the temporal 
unfolding and structure of experience, where does the constitution of lived ex-
perience take place?
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5.3.4 Constituted lived experience
It is understood that Husserl insists that being and consciousness unite in transcen-
dental subjectivity. It must first be emphasised that the constituting is a process that 
permits appearance, unfolding and articulation, and so is not merely an epistemic 
relation between subject and object, as between experience and world. Such an 
account would credit constituting a spatial character when instead, it is a matter of 
process and time. It precisely constitutes by intertwining the transcendental sub-
ject with the immanent material space, so that subject and the world cannot be 
grasped separate from one another (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 72–76). 
To Bergson, change is what is real, and change is what constitutes experienced 
reality. If so, then change consequently makes the past and future essential to 
the experience. How can the past survive in the present? It cannot be an instant, 
because it was shown in the previous chapter that an immobile, numerical point 
is an abstraction of real existence. In other words, two fixed abstract points that 
touch are the same point; they are necessarily juxtaposed—thus, to construct time 
through instants and points will yield no progress, no increase, but real existence 
has a duration. Indeed: “The distinction we make between our present and past is there-
fore, if not arbitrary, at least relative to the extent of the field which our attention to life 
can embrace. The ‘present’ occupies exactly as much space as this effort” (Bergson, 2007, 
pp. 125–126, 130; emphasis added). In other words, the edge-like experience of 
presence is a unity of past and future constituted by the effort of the extent that 
attention to life can embrace. Bergson argues that unity is multiplicity united into 
an immediate consciousness, which is a temporal argument of the possibility for 
experience.
Is this in line with Husserl’s constitution? Is constituting the unfolding and unit-
ing process between subject and world due to time? To this end, Husserl pro-
vides a hint:
“This parallel problem [correlation of Ego and the surrounding world] is 
offered by the temporal environment and by the constitution of the one time in which 
temporality of the thing resides and into which its duration is integrated, just as is the 
duration of all things and thingly processes belonging to the environing things. Into this 
same time the Ego is integrated as well, not only as an Ego-Body but also according to 
its ‘psychic lived experiences.’ The time that pertains to every thing is its own time, and 
yet we have only one time.” (Husserl, 1997, p. 69)
The constitution is a temporal intersubjective process, i.e. a process where the 
subject is inseparable from the world and drawn into the constituting. Constituted 
experience is the simultaneity of the internal and external world where perception 
is the master of space (homogenous and objective) while action is the master of 
time (heterogeneous and subjective). By now, it should be clear that the experi-
ence spoken of is one that precedes any intellectual act; it is instead at the intuitive 
stage, where experience is immediate.
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5.3.5 Is the content important at all?
Given both the architectural context and the portrayed importance of time and 
process, one might come to question whether the (spatial) content of experience 
is at all important. Chalmers famously addressed the qualia issue in spatial terms, 
however, he failed to see the temporal aspect, or at least, proper attention was 
not offered. There is a difference between inquiring the content of the experience 
and the origin of the experience, i.e. the structure of the process. Is it necessary to 
naturalise the content or character of any experienced inner life/qualia, to give an 
empirically plausible model of the process of experience? Insofar, the concern is 
not to understand what a transistor is like for someone, as much as understand how 
it influences the experience. A description of an experienced inner life is unique 
to the experiencing agent, so that another experiencing agent may disagree—to 
what extent is what a transistor is like useful for architects? 
Unless the description holds a meaningful explanation on how something 
came to be experienced like that, then it seems unessential. There are no apparent 
reasons to believe that experience of spaces are generalisable or universal; this 
is the hard problem of qualia. Even when restricting architecture to geometrical 
configurations, it is far more informing for architects to understand the internal 
relations in an animated narrative. The causal and correlated are of interest, as it 
may shed light upon how space might have influenced the experience. Only if the 
experiencing agent gives an intuitive outline with outset in their own duration can 
the architect benefit from such descriptions.
Undoubtedly, describing the animate experience as it unfolds affords a differ-
ent description compared to the reflected description, i.e. the one in hindsight. 
It is unessential to discuss and compare the redness or form in the experience, 
despite it being enlightening on a phenomenological level. The content of what 
is intended is a crucial aspect and indeed, a hard problem. However, questioning 
how to influence it, instead of what it is, resolves various kinds of design questions. 
Though Chalmers may define processes as the easy problem, and qualia as the 
hard problem, it must be emphasised that the easy problem solves highly essential 
questions relative to the temporal structure, whereas the hard problem solves in 
this context meaningless and irrelevant questions. In terms of design, it is irrele-
vant to understand whether one experiences red alike another, whereas how the 
experience of red may be influenced offers a potential design-tool. In a nutshell, 
the argument is not to inquire the content of the experience, but instead, the gen-
eral structure of experience making it at all possible in the first place. Even the 
question of what a new utopian material feels like is a question of how the mixture 
of sensations are constructed, e.g. the blending of visual and haptic sensations.
With the overarching approach, which is to link an empirical framework to 
phenomenology, in mind; could it be that the experience should be approached 
strictly from a temporal dimension, i.e. an approach that investigates the dynam-
ics of experience rather than the content of experience?
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5.4 Conclusion
In sharing the same starting point, i.e. Riemannian multiplicity, their philo-
sophies naturally synthesise and converge in several concepts. Both rejected the 
truth-value in perception and built instead a framework of perception around the 
bodily perspectival, i.e. the embodied and embedded, constraints so that percep-
tion depends on the kinds of actions the body can bring. Consequently, percep-
tion becomes rooted in action, i.e. knowing via a process of act. Their similarities 
function firstly as an argument of extending Bergsonian distinction of space and 
time into Husserlian phenomenology, and secondly as a Husserlian unpacking of 
Bergsonian philosophy of time. Husserl elaborates on the Bergsonian virtual by a 
rigorous analysis of the intended, portraying the process from virtual to real action 
as to the asymmetry of the transcendental and immanent, i.e. both the virtual and 
the intended are existence-independent and forms perception as a question rather 
than an answer. “The transcendental conditions of experience are no longer abstract conditi-
ons of possible experience, they are virtual conditions of real experience” (Moulard-Leonard, 
2008, p. 7). Concisely, the Bergsonian virtual approximates the Husserlian hori-
zonal intentionality as an anticipation feature in practical synthesis belonging to 
intuition rather than intellect.
With Husserl and Bergson, a framework of the immediate constituted expe-
rience of the world is provided. There exists an asymmetry, a paradox, a parallel 
co-conditional feature between the subject and object. The homogeneous spa-
ce is scattered in its relation to the heterogeneous duration, spanning from past 
to future while held in the present. Distinguishing ideal from the perceptual, i.e. 
intellectual and intuitive, the practical synthesis was demonstrate to govern the 
act—rather than the object of— of knowing. It is not surprising that both ultimate-
ly explain subjectivity and time as self-temporalising and dynamic in their nature. 
The next chapter elaborates on the duration/spanning through diagrams pin-
ning down time-related concepts e.g. horizonal intentionality, appresentation and 
retention that are later important features in comparing the phenomenological 
conditions with the empirical framework.
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Summary. How can one describe the relation between experience and time? This short 
chapter seeks to clarify the critical topic of  the concrete structure of  time in the 
constitution of  experience. Husserl and Bergson shared the interest in the tempo-
ral unfolding of  experience, which leads them to similar structures of  time—iron-
ically, over time both Husserl and Bergson continuously realised issues with their 
diagrammatic structures of  time leading them to several numbers of  revisions. It 
is here attempted to put forward a framework of  time and experience, which will 
lay the foundation and conditions for the empirical theory in the second part of  
the doctoral thesis. The objective is thus to expand further and unpack the theo-
retical framework of  temporality and add Husserlian points to the existing list of  
conditions for a proper investigation of  experience. 
6.1 Type of  time
6.1.1 Cognitive paradox 
At the very heart of time, there is movement; there is change. Describing the 
change in consciousness as a stream is different from a succession1. William James 
(1842-1907) famously described consciousness as a stream, where the now had a 
Model of  temporality: 
the structure of  temporal unfolding 
in experience
CHAPTER 6
“Life can only be understood backwards; 
but it must be lived forward“
Søren Kierkegaard
1 Succession here must not be understood as Bergsonian duration where time interpenetrates, but rather as a 
juxtaposition of  points in space, i.e. Bergsonian homogenised space.
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width rather than being a knife-edge. Indeed, time moves, but the integration of 
past, present and future has been debated at least since the Numidian philosopher 
and bishop, St. Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430) Confessions from year 400. The core 
issue has been presented in numerous ways but can be approximately summed as 
the cognitive paradox (Gallagher, 1998, pp. 6–7). It is named the cognitive paradox 
because it is a matter of resolving the integration and relation between memory 
as the past, perception as the present and expectation as the future. How can past 
be represented as past by an impression that is present? How does a stream of 
consciousness represent more than a single time simultaneously? Is change not 
that which it was not? The cognitive paradox is primarily an issue concerning the 
simultaneous occurrence of cognitive functions. Although the specious present 
has puzzled Aristotle, St. Augustine, Locke, Lotze, William James, and many oth-
ers, only the approach by Bergson and Husserl are here considered.
Nowhere else was Bergson’s understanding of the duration in the present more 
concisely expressed than in the second lecture of Perception of Change:
“Thanks to philosophy, all things acquire depth,—more than depth, something like 
a fourth dimension which permits anterior perceptions to remain bound up with 
present perceptions, and the immediate future itself to become partly outli-
ned in the present. Reality no longer appears then in the static state, in its manner of 
being;	it	affirms	itself	dynamically, in the continuity and variability of its tendency.” 
(Bergson, 2007, p. 131; emphasis added)
This description of the present is strikingly similar to Husserl’s structure of 
temporality, which also is their solution to the cognitive paradox; Husserl’s inten-
tionality avoids the problem of the cognitive paradox by his notion of intention-
al relation and by describing the temporal flux through his concepts of retention, 
primal impression and protention, which are neither memory, the now nor an expectation, 
respectively. 
Before diving into Husserlian temporality and unpacking the mentioned con-
cepts, consider first the direction of time. Bergson and Husserl understand time as 
a flux, a dynamic and continuous process that is indivisible. This may seem quite 
natural to many, but this does not reach universal acceptance among philosophers. 
McTaggart (1866-1925), a Scottish philosopher of time, distinguished between 
A-series and B-series, which designate different approaches to time and came to 
define two common philosophical descriptions of time (see also presentism and 
eternalism in; Buonomano, 2017). Philosophers belonging to A-series believe 
that time flows from the future to the present, to the past as a dynamic process; a 
stream. Such an account makes events move from and presumes that the present 
is not fixed and unchanging, but variable and changing.
In contrast, philosophers who belong to B-series, believe that time is a physical 
substratum, where the flux is merely an illusion of the mind (Fig. 6.1). For them, 
terms as past, present and future, are irrelevant and instead pays attention to being 
earlier than and being later than relative to each other. Time is an objective measure; 
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thus, nothing will ever subjectively change due to the passage of time. One event 
comes after another, chronologically and objectively; a succession (McTaggart, 
1908, pp. 457–459; Gallagher, 1998, p. 87; Mullarkey, 2000, p. 12). Coarsely, 
A-series philosophers cast time as subjective, whereas B-series philosophers cast 
it as objective.
2 Hyle data is Husserl’s expression of  sensory content, which is understood as the current sensory response, 
e.g. the current light onto the eyes, the current sound in hearing and the current temperature in a space. It is the 
non-representational and immanent in consciousness (Williford, 2013).
Past Present
B
A
Future
Figure 6.1— A. The solid continuous line designates the structure of  experience according to Bergson and Hus-
serl. One starts from the past, using prior experiences to accurately perceive the environment and to intuitively gen-
erate virtual actions, moving into the future through experience. B. The juxtaposed dots forming a line designates 
the structure of  events. The present is always the present; it never changes. Time is objective in this sense.
Bergson’s critique of the spatialised time is precisely a critique of the B-series 
philosophers, who do not attribute continuous change value nor importance to 
the conception of time. Duration seems more in agreement with A-series philos-
ophers regarding the movement of time, so that time moves with the condition 
that the future is based on the past: “In any case, the Bergsonian revolution is clear: We do 
not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past 
to the present, from recollection to perception” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 63; emphasis added). 
Vital for the upcoming structure of time is that the direction of time flows from 
past to future according to Bergson; thus, the present depends on earlier encoun-
ters. A closer look reveals that already at this assumption of direction of time pre-
sumes the present to be constituted by more than given. Diving into hyle data2, 
Husserl reveals that in the sensory content itself, there is no more than given, but 
that the apprehension mechanism is increasingly complex (Gallagher, 1998, pp. 
46–47). This necessarily problematises the temporal explanation, because then one 
may have sense contents that have not yet reached the perception organ. How is 
it possible to sense something that is not currently apparent?
6.1.2 Husserl extending Bergson
The issue at hand is to explain how temporality allows the possibility to have 
reell sense-contents to be both now and not-now. Deleuze interprets Bergson’s 
use of recollection as preserved in itself, i.e. in duration, so that the recollection 
belongs to the intuition of time, and not (working-) memory as contemporarily 
defined (Deleuze, 1988, p. 54). For Bergson, the past and present coexist, i.e. 
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the recollection is intuitive and serves as the foundation of the present. In other 
words, to believe that the past is no longer is to confuse Being with being-present. 
“[…] Bergson invokes metaphysics to show how a memory is not constituted after 
present perception, but is strictly contemporaneous with is, since at each instant dura-
tion divides into two simultaneous tendencies, one of which goes toward 
the future and the other falls back into the past.” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 118; 
emphasis added)
Presence is not—instead, it is becoming. While the present passes, the past pre-
serves itself in itself as a whole integral past, making all past contemporaneous 
with the present (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 58–59). Bergson turns to the concrete struc-
ture of apprehended time and Being to psychologise time by embodying it (Deleuze, 
1988, p. 57). It is the embodying and concretising that Husserl excels at, and so 
extends Bergson’s ideas involving tendencies going towards the future and falling 
back into the past.
Husserl, agreeing that the present is a duration, introduces not intellectual acts 
of consciousness, but performances belonging to consciousness, such as retention: 
“The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone ‘primarily remembered’ in the 
now” (Husserl, 1991, p. 33). Husserl exemplifies retention by referring to musical 
tones so that one holds a tone in retention even when it has just-passed and ano-
ther tone is reell. The retention must not be confused with the intellectual act of 
recollection or reflection, because it is part of the immediate consciousness:
“But it surely does belong to the essence of the intuition of time that in each point of 
its	duration	(which	we	can	make	into	an	object	reflectively)	it	is	consciousness	of what 
has just been and not merely consciousness of the now-point of the object that appears 
as enduring” (Husserl, 1991, pp. 33–34; original emphasis). 
Husserl elaborates on the retention and the now:
“When a primal datum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding phase does not 
vanish but is ‘kept in grip’ (that is to say, precisely ‘retained’); and thanks to this 
retention, a looking-back at what has elapsed is possible. The retention itself is not a 
looking-back that makes the elapsed phase into an object; while I have the elapsed phase 
in my grip, I live through the present phase, take it—thanks to retention—’in addition’ 
to the, elapsed phase; and I am directed towards what is coming (in a preten-
tion).” (Husserl, 1991, p. 122; emphasis added)
In this sense, retention performs as direct intentionality, allowing continuity of 
itself as a just-passed referent by transcending itself and posit something as being 
just-passed, without something being reell. This is the mastery of intentionality and 
the solution posed by Husserl for the coexistence of past and present; it is an in-
tended just-passed, which is structurally part of the present. The very same idea 
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Figure 6.2—Husserl’s diagram of  time, based on drawings from the Bernauer Manuskripte (Husserl, 2001b, 
pp.	20–22).	The	solid	horizontal	line,	CDEFG,	designates	the	flow	of 	events.	Each	phase	contains	retention,	
primal impression and protention. The retentions are designated by blue dots below the horizontal lines, whereas 
the protentions are red dots above the horizontal line. The vertical lines illustrate retention, protention and primal 
impressions at the crossing. For instance, at the phase of  D, there is more certain protention of  the upcoming 
phase, pE, compared to the further phases p2F and p3G. There is also retention of  prior phase, rC, which simi-
larly is more certain than the further phases r2B and presumably r3A. As everything is pushed into retention, time 
can be conceived as an ever-growing retentional train (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, p. 84). It is worth noting that 
one neither move backwards nor forward, but somewhat sideways, through time, i.e. facing the future above and the 
past beneath while moving to the right.
applies to the future, i.e. the protention as mentioned above. Note that both re-
tention and protention perform as uncountable nouns, i.e. mass nouns.
Throughout his investigations, Husserl developed different diagrams of tem-
porality that are expressed in the famous Bernauer Manuskripte (Husserl, 2001b, pp. 
20–22), from which also his diagram lays point of departure in Fig. 6.2.
At each phase, illustrated as a vertical line3, an enduring act of consciousness 
contains retention of the just-passed, a reell primal impression and a protention 
of the about-to. Within the phases, both retention and protention stretch far into 
their respective directions, so that one hold a less certain conscious intention of 
the just-just-passed compared to just-passed, and mutatis mutandis for protention 
(Gallagher, 1998, pp. 50–52). The intelligible manoeuvre that Husserl exhibits in 
his model is two-fold. First, neither retention nor protention contains anything 
reell, but are instead intentions with references—not representation. Such account 
3 As mentioned by both Bergson and Husserl; the moment the structure of  time is spatialised through a 
drawing, it becomes obsolete. The contemporaneous property of  time becomes juxtaposed rather than inter-
penetrating. For this reason, both struggled with their development of  diagrams of  time—however, Husserl’s 
proposal seems adequate to make the points.
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allows for more than a single static understanding of the world, as retention and 
protention do not hold any representational status—that is, one does not expe-
rience more than one world by having retention and protention. Instead, the ex-
perience of the world is precisely co-intentional, which in turn makes the flow 
indivisible; at each instant of time, the protention and retention change in kind. 
Second, by intentionality, each phase contains another phase without being reell, 
consequently stretching the now-phase by an intentional self-temporalising pres-
ent4, ultimately bringing an alternative to the cognitive paradox. Husserl’s co-in-
tentionality necessarily produces a Bergsonian interpenetration of time, making it 
indivisible into separate wholes. It always stretches in time, as durée. Husserl thus 
solves both (1) the possibility for an indivisible horizontal flow of duration by in-
terpenetrating past and future into the present, and (2) vertical co-intentional sim-
ultaneity of past and future, i.e. retention and protention, in the present. It must 
be emphasised that neither retention nor protention is a function of memory or 
intellectual anticipation, but a constant feature of consciousness, intuitively widen-
ing the present with an intentionally constituted duration (Gallagher, 1998, p. 51). 
The primary reason for Husserl’s diagrammatic readjustments of the tempo-
ral synthesis, as evident throughout Bernauer Manuskripte (Husserl, 2001b), is the 
cognitive paradox—he could not make sense of the primal impression as a flux 
in the diagram. Perhaps, this is the reason for Bergson rarely drawing diagrams 
of the unfolding of time. Translating time to a diagram is to necessarily change 
its nature to that of space, which consequently becomes infinitely divisible. For 
instance, the primal impression in Fig. 6.2 can be understood as a point and can 
thus be divided continuously, which might have brought Husserl to the drawing 
desk time and again. 
How does the structure of time fit with the practical synthesis, the horizonal 
intentionality and the asymmetry between transcendent and immanent? The rela-
tion between protention and retention is a structure of fulfilment of protentional 
directedness, necessarily situating protention in a guiding role of experience. In 
contrast to retention, protention is unfulfilled intentionality, providing a virtual 
horizon of perception. “In general, protention indicates the mode of givenness of an immanent 
object-point that is directed toward a future mode of givenness in which this object-point will be 
given in its maximum fullness” (Kortooms, 2002, p. 166). In this sense, protention as 
a horizonal intentionality approximates Bergsonian virtual actions because pro-
tention is an immediate performance of consciousness with intentionality that has 
yet to be fulfilled. Given the interest in immediate experience of transition, the 
structure of immediate fulfilment is essential.
6.1.3 Synthesis
Fulfilment can be split into passive and active levels, so that the former, in 
4 The present becomes self-temporalising in the sense that the stream of  pretention moves towards becoming 
retention. This stream temporalise the now-phase.
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5 The Ego translates to the intellectual act of  consciousness. Active synthesis is the involvement of  the Ego, 
while passice synthesis occurs at the level of  intuition, i.e. in absence of  the intellect. 
contrast to the latter, occurs without intellectual acts of the Ego5. Roughly put, 
passive synthesis, as elaborated in Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis (2001a), is an unconscious synthesis with manifold of lived experiences 
of a transcendent that believes it needs fulfilment (Husserl, 2001a, p. 148). The 
radical claim Husserl puts forward is that experience is guided by, and thus depend 
on, passive anticipations of normality, which is established by prior experiences. In 
other words, the current and upcoming experiences depend on prior experiences. 
Protentions are thus not mere unfulfilled intentions, but an immediate expectation 
of normality that the retention must adhere—however, if the current experience 
mismatches the prior experiences, an experience of anormality emerges, adjusting 
future anticipations (Zahavi, 2003, p. 133). Only the negation, which is expressed 
in different ways, is of relevance. 
“First, an original negation here essentially presupposes the normal, original consti-
tution of the object […]. The constitution of the object must be there in order for it to be 
modified	originally.	Negation	is	a	modification	of	consciousness	that	shows	up	as	such	
in accordance with its own essence. Secondly, the original constitution of a perceptual 
object is carried out in intentions (where external perception is concerned, in apperceptive 
apprehensions);	these	intentions,	according	to	their	essence,	can	undergo	a	modification	
at any time through the disappointment of protentional, expectational belief.” (Husserl, 
2001a, p. 71)
 “The being of the world is only apparently stable, while, in reality, it is a con-
struction of normality, which in principle can collapse” (Husserl as cited in Zahavi, 
2003, p. 139; original emphasis). 
It thus follows that there is no stagnant, invariable world, but a relation be-
tween normality and anormality. To this end, it is at this level of the passive syn-
thesis in the immediate experience that concerns the architectural experience of 
transitions. Notably, the attentive and affective dimensions in passive synthesis 
elucidate the felt experience and its bridging to active synthesis. For instance, dur-
ing the nagging experience of a staircase having too big steps, there is a peculiar 
affective pull from an object given to consciousness, and then to the attentive of 
the Ego (Husserl, 2001a, p. 196). The fact that the stairs are too big is not given 
by conscious inferences, or active synthesis, but by unconscious inferences, or 
passive synthesis, based on prior experiences and a proper understanding of the 
bodily physical structure. This very process of intuitively constituting the world 
is reflected in the horizonal intentionality, e.g. upon encountering staircases, one 
constitutes that these are stairs and not fallen roof or broken floor. This consti-
tution is independent of any conscious intervening, but based on passive imma-
nent connections, and brings forward with it the affective similarities. Upon the 
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constitution of the staircase, an affective pull is felt, which tends towards previously 
experienced affective pull (Husserl, 2001a, chap. 2).
Given the possibility of adjusting in cases of asymmetry in normality, the role 
of the passive synthesis is to perform inference to the best explanation. In other 
words, passive synthesis performs abductive reasoning, i.e. tending self-evidenc-
ing reasoning, to grasp affectively and practically the environment. In the act of 
transitioning, prior experiences aid the experiencing agent to generate protentions 
of the upcoming space—not by first perceiving, then relating to prior experience 
and then connect the perception to the prior experience. In this sense, the world 
would be dissociated from meaning, so that one first encounters a world, and then 
adds meaning to it. Instead, within the act of perception, retention and protentions 
are already within the horizonal intentionality endowed with meaning, referring 
to the primacy of perception. It is always a meaningful world one encounters.  
The following aesthetic passage of Bergson observing the clock describes the 
relation between passive synthesis and duration:
“[…] four o’clock strikes… each stroke, each disturbance or excitation, is logically 
independent of the other, mens momentanea. However, quite apart from any memory or 
distinct calculation, we contract these into an internal qualitative impression within this 
living present or passive synthesis which is duration. Then we restore them in an auxil-
iary	space,	a	derived	time	in	which	we	may	reproduce	them,	reflect	on	them	or	count	them	
like	so	many	quantifiable	external-impressions.”	(Deleuze,	2004,	p.	92)
6.1.4 Points of  convergence
Although there seem to be several points of agreement, there are also several 
disagreements. For instance, Bergson refrained from drawing models of time, as 
opposed to Husserl, because the models are necessarily externalised by using an 
infinitely divisible line that spatialises time. However, the first point of concrete 
agreement is the nature of time. This argument amount to the Bergsonian argu-
ment of time, namely that it is indivisible into separate wholes that are independent 
of one another. If one attempts to divide time, one will not have differences in 
degree, i.e. moments that share the same unit of measure as mathematicians con-
sider t, but differences in kind where each moment must be considered separately 
with a different unit of measure. Therefore, time is theoretically separable, but 
when separated, the moments differ in kind, not degree. Another point, among 
others, is that Husserl addresses the performance of immediate consciousness to 
hold experience in retention, while Bergson is preoccupied with the fact that all 
present are based on the past. Both positions hold that at any given now-point, an 
immediate past, or merely past, interferes with the apprehension of a constituted 
present. Husserl extends this idea to also pretention being part of the now—that 
which Bergson approached as virtual action. Bergson’s account in this sense has 
paved the way for Husserl’s temporality, where the past and the future coexists 
with the present. 
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Figure 6.3—Converging points between Bergson and Husserl that illustrates in which fashion Husserl functions 
as an extension to Bergson. The outset for both philosophers is human perception, which depends on a situated 
acting	body,	which	practically	perceives.	Any	experience	endures,	otherwise	one	is	not	able	to	fulfil	the	primary	
conditions for knowledge, which in turn is believed to belong to intuition, or the transcendental in Husserlian terms 
so that the multiplicity is given beyond what is perceived immanently. The asymmetry between the transcendent and 
immanent illustrates an indeterminate state of  the body, only resolved through dynamic processes between proten-
tion	and	retention,	where	unfulfilled	intentions	are	either	rejected	or	fulfilled	in	retention.	This	allows	a	co-inten-
tionality to take place already at the stage of  intuition, hence the name ‘passive synthesis’. Virtual action covers the 
exclusively detailed descriptions of  intentionality offered by Husserl, and it is precisely his detailed descriptions that 
are necessary to understand the temporal structure of  experience.
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It appears Bergson and Husserl agree upon:
• Duration in any given moment, making time indivisible as it contains 
retention and protention that differs in kind, not in degree.
• Embodied perception, which depends on the action, situating the expe-
riencing agent in a practical world through a bodily physical structure. 
• Temporalisation proposes a change that proposes an action that 
is guided by virtual actions and protention, which thus are comparable.
• Passive abductive reasoning occurs in the absence of the intellect, i.e. 
the possibility of logical operations by the unconscious to perform abduc-
tive reasoning, so it adjusts the world through experience.
• Neither a pure realist nor idealist position can account for experien-
cing the world. Perception does not serve truths. Instead, the experience 
is a mixture where protention is expected to be fulfilled and adjusted ac-
cordingly if any asymmetry occurs relative to retention. 
These points reflect the agreements between the philosophers—not the con-
ditions for a proper investigation of experience. Interestingly, as Husserl comply 
with Bergson to this level, and given that Husserl went on further in his philoso-
phy of experience than Bergson, taking Husserl’s points seriously can illuminate 
the immediate experience of architectural experience transitions (Fig. 6.3).
6.2 Temporalising nature and naturalising time
By now, it is clear that time and experience are inseparable and interlinked 
notions, so that speaking of temporalising nature and naturalising time is a topic 
relative to the nature of experience; it is a relation between the intended and the gi-
ven. Analysing Bergson and Husserl helps bridge the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between biology and experience, i.e. the earlier mentioned hard problem. However, 
both philosophers have positioned themselves as critics of purely natural sciences, 
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believing the agenda of natural science alone does not comply with each philo-
sopher’s respective agenda. Consider Bergson’s critique of Fechner for instance. 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson provides a rigorous critique of the detrimental re-
duction of sensation in psychophysics to understand what it means to experience. 
Bergson stated that Fechner confused measuring sensation with determining the 
exact moment at which an increase of stimulus produces a change in the sensati-
on (Bergson, 2001, p. 61). The quantitative intensity was confused with qualitati-
ve phenomena. Bergson held that quality is private, inaccessible by others—how 
it arises; we shall never understand (Bergson, 2004, p. 39). There are traces of 
a similar line of argument in his critique of idealism and realism. The service of 
perception is not to provide absolute truths about the world, and so their relation 
is not one-to-one. The sensation is not a matter of intensity and should not be 
confused with the qualitative aspect of experience. There is not much chance for 
naturalising experience through science alone according to Bergson. 
Instead of naturalising experience, he was primarily occupied by a temporalised 
nature, finding in the mobility of time much more about the qualitative human 
nature of the action, body and experience and their complex dynamic interrela-
tions. Temporalising experience is a necessary step to naturalise experience; this 
is evident in Husserl’s general approach and development of phenomenology. 
Although, for Husserl, the central issue in naturalising phenomenology is the 
different agendas. Phenomenology is not only concerned with a psychological 
description of an experience, which approximates what Husserl termed pheno-
menological psychology but also phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy 
concerned with the possibilities of knowledge and the general conception of a 
priori, i.e. subjectivity in transcendental phenomenology. Importantly, according 
to Husserl, empirical and transcendental subjectivity are not two different sub-
jectivities, but two aspects of the same subjectivity. The fundamental difference 
between the psychology and the philosophy is their aim, so that phenomenological 
psychology concerns descriptions of first-person perspective and intentionality, 
while transcendental phenomenology concerns the possibility for knowledge, i.e. 
consciousness as a condition for meaning and appearance. Insofar, transcenden-
tal phenomenology is a matter of an indeterminate body that can, due to its tem-
poralising nature, make use of action and perception to resolve the asymmetry 
between the transcendental and immanent. This issue has been well-discussed 
by Zahavi (2004), who suggest at least four potential ways a naturalising pheno-
menology can go:
• Empirical sciences continue, regardless of phenomenology.
• Phenomenology must constrain empirical science, situating phenomen-
ology over empirical science in one-way communication, meaning that 
phenomenology sets the agenda of experience. 
• Distinguish between the transcendental and psychological phenomeno-
logy, investigating the psychological aspect alone, so that the transcenden-
tal dimension remains untouched. Such an approach amounts partly to 
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an investigation of the (retrospective) intellectually processed experience. 
• Allow an inter-manipulative relation between empirical science and tran-
scendental phenomenology, informing on another and thereby changing 
continuously their definitions, including what might be understood by 
nature, i.e. a reciprocal dynamic approach.
The approach suggested by Bergson proves supportive of naturalising phen-
omenology without reducing its transcendental character. Given the transcen-
dental dimension, phenomenology is not explicitly concerned with the content 
of experience, i.e. the hard problem, but rather with the possibility of knowing 
a colour, a taste, a smell or other qualitative experiences. The proper nature of 
transcendental phenomenology is temporal. It is a question of how it unfolds over 
time as an experience, revealing the pure structure and possibility of experience. 
Time is not strange to empirical sciences, and can with metaphysical conditions 
generate better knowledge applicable to both science and philosophy. Recall that:
“Scientific	hypothesis	and	metaphysical	thesis	are	constantly	combined	in	Bergson	in	
the reconstitution of complete experience.” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 118)
Therefore, the fourth suggestion is precisely what must be attempted in the 
current context—namely, to establish a list of conditions by Bergson and Husserl 
to ensure a proper investigation of the structure of experience during architectural 
transitions. In this sense, investigating the immediate, embodied and lived experi-
ence serves the purpose of naturalising specific aspects of the experience. As sug-
gested in the last point of Zahavi’s (2004) list, the two can join a fruitful exchange 
of findings, suggesting progressive thinking without an ontological duality in sight. 
The inevitable question becomes; how does the body become more determi-
nate and confident about a world? The variational certainty is revealed in action 
and perception, so both in time and space. The twist added to the current appro-
ach is that, to paraphrase Zahavi (2004, p. 336), the general assumption has often 
been that a better understanding of physical space brings a better understanding 
of time, perhaps due to the general confusion of mixing them—however, the as-
sumption here is that a better understanding of time provides a better understan-
ding of space and its relation back to time. 
6.3 Immediate experience
With three distinct models of time, protention hardly played any role until 
the last model (Kortooms, 2002, p. 158). Protention is highly underestimated 
in Husserl’s accounts of time. Indeed, protention is comparable to virtual ac-
tions, revealing virtual perception of the space, i.e. specific perceptions that could 
emerge from specific actions. Bergson asserts that the virtual is more than the 
actual numerous times. In the passive pre-reflective synthesis, the a priori to ex-
perience is precisely the protention of the immediate experience—it is proten-
tion before becoming retention. Passive synthesis is thus capable of explaining 
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the dynamics of how experience is temporalised and constituted before the active 
intellect intervenes. 
It would be to misunderstand Husserl’s model of time to believe that the pri-
mal impression is constituting experience if by constitution is understood a stable 
unity of experience. Keep in mind that the transcendental is that which has a role 
in the constitution of a world (Kant, 2000, p. 23), which mean that if the primal 
impression constituted experience, it must itself hold retention and protention, 
and admittedly fall into a regressive fallacy6. 
What is then the role of primal impression in constituting a world? The pri-
mal impression is when the effect of the constitution takes place rather than the 
cause. Husserl solves this issue by suggesting that the continuous progression of 
the flow is not analogous, but as “[…] shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may 
seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless 
the case that it does” (Husserl, 1991, p. 84; emphasis added). It was already stated 
that subjectivity is self-temporalising (Zahavi, 2003, p. 90), so this is hardly a sur-
prise. The important note here is that the self-temporalisation is the genesis of 
experience emerging from the asymmetry between protention and retention—it 
is not the primal impression, retention or protention alone that are the genesis of 
experience, but their dynamics. 
“Further, the phenomenon gives itself as a genesis, with the one term [protention] 
as awakening, the other [retention] as awakened. The reproduction of the latter gives 
itself as aroused through the awakening” (Husserl, 2001a, p. 166)
The emergence from the asymmetry between retention and protention is pre-
cisely what gives the possibility for experience, i.e. lived experience is made up 
of a continuous stream of retention and protention, so that it is brought forward 
through a vast anticipative construction (Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 70).
6.4 Conclusion
Husserl has proven helpful in extending and unpacking Bergson’s contempla-
tions regarding time. In broad terms, what Bergson termed intuition approximates 
Husserl’s passive synthesis, since both happen before the functioning of the active 
ego or intellect. Both hold time is indivisible because it is interpenetrated by reten-
tion and protention, which is how the self-temporalised subjectivity makes sense 
of the asymmetry between the transcendental and the immanent. In other words, 
the asymmetry is an intuitive process, i. .e a passive synthesis, of comparing pro-
tentions that are based on prior experiences with the immanent hyle data that are 
evident in the primal impression and held in retention. The immediate experience 
becomes a river of intentionality that is either fulfilled or met with obstruction ba-
sed on normality. Intentionality, including virtual actions, all depend on the body’s 
6 If  the primal impression (pi) is constitutive, it holds retention (r) and protention (p)—but if  one strip, once 
again, the r and p from the new pi, there emerges a new r and p—and so on, ad infinitum.
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physical structure and capabilities to investigate and generate apperceptions.
The strategic manoeuvre by Husserl was to not assign reell status to retention 
and protention, so that the theory offers an alternative to understanding the im-
mediate experience as stretched into the past and future as a co-intentional struc-
ture. Co-intention in perception is the outcome of this manoeuvre, i.e. being able 
to co-present perception due to retention and protention. 
Following points can be considered as Husserl’s unpacking and extending of 
Bergson’s conditions for a proper investigation of experience:
1. Heterogeneity of duration is unpacked and extended as the indivi-
sibility of time. Husserl unpacks the indivisibility by casting any given 
moment as constituted by retention and protention so that the stream 
of consciousness is eventually self-temporalised. The extension is in the 
co-intentionality giving the retention and protention non-reell status, mo-
ving beyond the cognitive paradox.
2. Indeterminate state of the human is unpacked as the asymmetry of 
the transcendental and the immanent. By holding an embodied an-
chor in the empirical framework, the indeterminate state is unpacked as 
incongruence between idealist and realist, which is resolved only through 
action/perception.
3. Dynamic relations are unpacked as the primacy of intuition. It refers 
to what Husserl named passive synthesis, which is the phase of immediate 
retention and protention. By operating at the level of intuition, the inve-
stigation remains at the threshold of dynamic self-temporalisation. 
At the very threshold between the transcendental and the immanent is this 
peculiar performance of self-temporalising. It functions as a cornerstone in the 
phenomenological account of experience and temporality, yet it seems obscure 
and vague. What does it mean to self-temporalise? How does intuition self-tem-
poralise? How many of these constructed metaphysical terms are empirically de-
termined? Which terms are dissociable processes and not the outcome of inter-
mingled processes? These are some of the questions that Part II must pursue 
to answer—and it does so by questioning firstly, what does it mean to emerge in 
biology?
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The question, from the architectural quandary in Chapter 3, was whether the 
experience of space B, arriving from space A, is identical to the experience if ar-
riving from space C—keeping in mind that architectural transitions are reduced 
to shapes and forms. In the current context, the affective experience is never 
questioned because that belongs to the psychological description rather than the 
transcendental. Instead, it is held that to understand transitions, we must under-
stand under which measures and conditions they emerge in perception. It is the 
possibility of creating a meaning of the world; not the psychological effect, but 
the transcendental cause.
It was argued that equating specific spatial configurations with specific expe-
riences is to confuse space with time. Instead, one should acknowledge that the 
body is embedded in space so that the experience of space is always from a spe-
cific point of perspective, which means that space is never grasped as a whole 
space, but only as what is available to the organs of perception. The experience 
unfolds over time, where dynamics of retention, primal impression and proten-
tion constitute experience. Necessarily, the experience of space B as approached 
from space A is distinct from the experience of space B as approached from space C, 
because the retention differs, which in turn cause other protentions. Architecture 
differs in degree since it is in space, whereas the experience of it is continuous 
and dynamic, i.e. indivisible, differing in kind just as the motion that propels the 
body through space. 
Husserl unpacks and extends Bergson’s concepts and philosophy of time, 
which brings with it the strategic manoeuvre of co-intentionality. Although the 
perceptual organs do not present one with the backside of a cup or the up-
coming space behind a transistor, there is an a priori practical understanding of 
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the potential interaction with the cup or the transistor. Husserl named this the 
practical synthesis, which is enacted by a dynamic relation between retention and 
protention, on which the co-intentional feature in perception is based. Retention 
and protention describe the temporal phase of the practical synthesis so that po-
tential interactions are situated as virtual actions in the protention, whereas the 
prior experiences to construct the current state of the world are situated in the 
retention. This analysis reveals that the architectural experience of transition is a ques-
tion of the dynamics of immediate prediction and prior experiences.
In sum, according to Bergson and Husserl, space can influence experience as 
it is involved in forming the perception and the potential action in the environ-
ment. This observation emphasises the action-perception process of experience, 
which articulates the research question in the direction of the process of actively 
moving between two spaces delineated by a spatial threshold. At the temporal 
scale, the research questions address the immediate experience, i.e. the experien-
ce that anchors the experiencing agent to the world. At the spatial scale, it is the 
unfolding of animate space as one transit from one space to another. The over-
arching research question is thus: 
How does experiential transition unfold through action and perception 
relative to architectural transition?
It is worth noting that the nature of the research question in the thesis is a 
rolling one, i.e. it changes as more knowledge is acquired throughout the thesis. 
The forthcoming chapters must indeed be conceived as an attempt to naturalise 
phenomenology and aspects of experience, involving complex dynamic systems 
that share the same foundations as the philosophical outset. This is precisely the 
reason for initiating the research question from philosophical grounds, i.e. phe-
nomenology sets conditions for a proper investigation of experience. The follow-
ing conditions must be met in an empirical account of the experience:
1. Heterogeneity of duration as an indivisibility of time, i.e. continui-
ty in the stream of consciousness by interpenetrating moments of time.
2. Indeterminate state of the human as the asymmetry of the transcen-
dental and the immanent, i.e. reducing indeterminacy about the world 
through embodied and embedded action/perception.
3. Dynamic relations as primacy of intuition, i.e. the immediacy of the 
given and the process of self-temporalising. 
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Summary. What is the point of departure of experience in biological science? In order 
to build a model that enables empirical testing of a hypothesis, it is essential to 
shape an understanding of the interplay between environment, body and brain 
relatively detailed. Thus, this chapter marks a change in the scientific discipline. 
Directing attention towards a naturalised theory will form the point of departure 
for this second part. The naturalised approach must fulfil the conditions from 
Part I to argue an investigation of the human experience. This chapter provides 
an overview of cognitive function relative to the anatomical organisation of the 
brain and body with an emphasis on the neuronal relations. To this end, this 
chapter anchors the theory in certain positions in cognitive neuroscience, e.g. a 
minimally decomposable system. For now, there is no consensus regarding the 
underlying biological processes describing the relation between body and brain, 
and therefore the following is not an absolute theory, but a prominent account. 
A dualism between global (including body) patterns and local components enab-
les a discussion of causations between the body, brain and the environment. It is 
argued that to maintain the homeostatic balance, which is necessary to stay ali-
ve, the brain is embodied via biologically self-organised dynamical systems that 
regulate the homeostatic balance. In this sense, the body and brain entertain a 
circular causal relation, where the brain is influenced by, and influence, the body. 
Self-organisation and circular causality are dynamically indivisible systems because 
Self-organising dynamical systems:
embodied emergence of  cognition
CHAPTER 7
“The term dynamics refers to phenomena that produce time-changing patterns, the 
characteristics of the pattern at one time being interrelated with those at other times. 
The term is nearly synonymous with time-evolution or pattern of change. It refers to the 
unfolding of events in a continuous evolutionary process.”
(Luenberger, 1979, p. 1)
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components of the systems cannot maintain themselves, which addresses the 
condition on the indivisibility of time. The take-home message is that action-per-
ception of the world emerges in time via the dynamics between predictions and 
sensory. This chapter seeks to address:
• Why is investigating the brain and neuronal activity an advantage during 
architectural experience and transitions? 
• Is it expectable to establish linear-models of  brain functions during architectural 
experience and transitions? 
• Is it reasonable to search for architectural experience-dedicated brain region(s)? 
• How do experiential transitions relate to global and local patterns?
7.1 Basic minds
It is by now clear that the research question addresses transcendental cause 
that are fundamentals of existence, i.e. a matter of basic human functions, compa-
rable to the task for a living creature to remain alive in its environment—in other 
words, the maintenance of homeostatic balance. To succeed in this task, any living 
organism must interact with its environment in a manner that optimises chances 
of survival. Therefore, by first investigating the elementary processes of staying 
alive as a human organism, it is intended to highlight the indeterminate nature of 
the human body embedded in an environment that needs to be understood dyna-
mically. A look into the biological perspective of the most basic types of life sheds 
light upon the question: what are the most basic functions of a living creature? 
According to Antonio Damasio, the mechanics of life management—includ-
ing procuring nutrition, consuming and digesting it, finding the energy products, 
placing them in the body, disposing of waste—are crucial for living cells to stay 
alive (Damasio, 2010, p. 41). Any deviation of the acceptable narrow range results 
in discomfort experienced in the organism. To stay alive, the cell goes through 
homeostasis, so the internal milieu fits the external milieu in a sense that maxi-
mises potential to stay alive. What does this mean? Maintaining homeostasis is 
not simple. It requires the cell to maintain a collection of parameters dynamically 
in its internal milieu within an acceptable narrow range from an always chaotic 
external milieu. These parameters include tracking levels of oxygen and carbon 
dioxide, converting energy to ATP, regulate temperature, relocate nutrition and 
much more. Damasio (2010, p. 44) argues that actions within the internal milieu 
are guided by what now comes to flourish as emotions in complex human beings, 
making emotions more basic than earlier anticipated. Although Damasio claims 
homeostasis to be able to do the magic for life to happen, he does not believe that 
simply correcting after any imbalances will keep the cells alive. Instead, Damasio 
suggests that evolution “[…] took care of this problem by introducing devices that allow 
organisms to anticipate imbalances and that motivate them to explore environments likely 
to offer solutions” (Damasio, 2010, p. 44; emphasis added). From being able to an-
ticipate, which applies equally to an amoeba as to a human being, biological values 
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emerge. This concept describes the values assigned to external milieu concerning 
the anticipated implications of homeostasis. By interoceptive and exteroceptive 
sensing, the organism can predict the biological value according to the particular 
regulation required to maintain the homeostatic balance (Damasio, 2010, p. 49).
At the threshold between a living organism, performing homeostasis to stay 
alive, and a chaotic external milieu, the organism through exteroceptive sensory 
actively interacts with its environment, and even assigns biological values to some 
of the features that it anticipates will improve the current balance. Damasio emp-
hasises multiple times that these regulating and predicting processes are non-con-
scious processes (2010, pp. 42, 49). At this threshold, we find the origin of per-
ception, i.e. how a living system responds to its environment. 
Responding to an environment is perhaps the most important feature for survi-
val, precisely because a response involves movement. To paraphrase Damasio, 
plants can have tropisms, but they cannot uproot themselves and cross the gar-
den where there is currently a better environment (Damasio, 2010, p. 50). The 
given example is limited in the sense that before the plant decides to uproot it-
self, it needs to sense that there is a better environment across the garden. This 
emphasises the relation between movement and intero-/exteroceptive sensory, 
namely that sensing changes can lead to movement. Interoceptive senses came 
to include internal pH-levels, temperature, muscle tension and other molecular 
tracking, whereas exteroceptive senses came to include smell, taste, touch, hearing 
and seeing, without going into details (Damasio, 2010, pp. 50–51). To move and 
respond to the environment does not require a complex brain or a mind (formal 
subject); plants, eukaryotic cells and bacteria express these capabilities. It is easy 
to see how the basic feature, i.e. action-perception, co-evolved into a complex 
reciprocal system that is essential to understand given the nature of the research 
question. The unfolding of action and perception depend on the environment, but 
the direction of the unfolding is, according to Damasio, a matter of responding to 
environmental incentives (2010, pp. 51–54). These incentives, independent from 
conscious deliberation, serve to guide behaviour in favour of biologically econo-
mic outsets through rewards and punishments. Incentives came to be because of 
brains able to measure the degree of need for correction. For such measurement, 
the brain needs to have an impression of the current state, desired state and the 
comparison of these. Damasio explains briefly how this process takes place:
“The agents involved in orchestrating these tissue states are known as hormones and 
neuromodulators and were already very much present in simple organisms with only one 
cell. We know how these molecules operate. For example, in organisms with a brain, 
when a given tissue is risking its health due to a dangerously low level of nutrients, the 
brain detects the change and grades the need and the urgency with which the change must 
be corrected. […] [A] corrective chain of responses is engaged, in chemical and neural 
terms, helped by molecules that speed up the process.” (Damasio, 2010, p. 53)
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Brain activity, through hormones and neuromodulators, in this sense, refle-
cts the degree of need for correction (see Appendix B for a brief introduction to 
neuron and nerve systems). Keep in mind that the brain must understand internal 
and external milieus, and thus responses to both milieus are implicitly reflected 
in cortical activity (this topic is returned to in Chapter 10. On a molecular level, 
the brain would begin to release dopamine and oxytocin for rewarding, whereas 
it releases cortisol and prolactin for punishing. In return, these releases optimise 
behaviour and prediction in the sense that “they would differentiate the coming of an 
expected	item	and	an	unexpected	one	by	degrees	of	neuron	firing	and	the	corresponding	degree	of	
release of a molecule (e.g. dopamine)” (Damasio, 2010, p. 54). The upshot is that respon-
ses improve by predictions, which further anchors total bodily states as emotions, 
drives and motivations. 
It becomes apparent to see how a living organism can respond and automa-
tically adjust to events in the environment—however, a continuous preparation 
for what might be coming next, requires pre-emptive action and not mere reactive 
actions, i.e. an active agent rather than a passive agent. The organism must pre-
dict multiple contingencies and have strategies for dealing with potential events. 
Allostasis designates such a predictive self-adjustment (Sterling, 2012). Allostasis 
is a process that allows for strategical planning and prediction to override ideal 
homeostatic balance because it is concerned with adapting to change to achieve 
stability (Sterling, 2004). By having a predictive attitude towards regulation, allost-
asis respects the homeostatic balance by satisfying the internal and external needs 
before they arise, making prediction a most basic feature of natural biology and 
life. The term basic feature has appeared twice, that is, once relative to action and 
perception and once relative to predictions in organisms. As it turns out, these 
features may not be as distant as seemingly so. 
However, it remains difficult to see precisely how the process of an organism 
making sense of the external milieu with regard to its internal milieu unfolds. The 
body and brain make sense of the environment through exteroceptive sensory 
organs, which are constantly active, but always uncertain of the signals. Aranyosi 
(2013) has extensively researched the relation between philosophy of mind and 
the peripheral nervous system (PNS) because the PNS is the apparent outermost 
distinction between the human body and environment. The sensitive parts of the 
PNS serve to make sure that exteroceptive stimulus, through nerve cells, finds a 
way to the central nervous system (CNS), which then enters awareness (Aranyosi, 
2013, pp. 1–2). The brain is anatomically a centre of nervous systems, co-constru-
ed in a manner that fits the beholder’s body. The uncertainty about the environ-
ment has an immense influence on the internal states, e.g. believing that a ball is 
coming at one’s face is going to put one in either a nervous state or a courageous 
state—either way, it is felt throughout the body. Precisely the question of how the 
brain and body make sense of the environment is essential to the research questi-
on. Dynamics systems theory (DST) provide a perspective that suggests how an 
organismic system may organise itself and respond to the environment to settle 
the indeterminate state of the body into a more certain state.
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7.2 Dynamic systems theory
7.2.1 Non-linear dynamics
Before introducing DST, the importance of parallel processing in even the 
most basic biological creatures retaining a brain must be considered. From simple 
studies of the nematode C. elegans, which has 302 neurons and thus can be con-
sidered to hold a very basic brain, it can be observed how not only touch, but 
different kinds of touch will affect the worm in its exploration of the environ-
ment (Li et al., 2011). Besides managing tactile sensations in the environment, the 
worm is further able to set out strategies for when to consume food and how by 
way of smells (Hart and Chao, 2009). For instance, by use of olfactory cues, the 
worm explores its environment and decides whether to feed alone, which it usu-
ally does when given a quiet environment, or if to come in groups, given a par-
ticular odour that indicates threat (Damasio, 2010, pp. 56–57). Despite holding 
a very basic brain, the worm exhibits complex behaviour that is not too far from 
human behaviour. The worm does not know what is really going on but is instead 
guided by environmental cues that its eight dopaminergic neurons responds and 
adjusts to while providing action possibilities (Kindt et al., 2007; Vidal-Gadea and 
Pierce-Shimomura, 2012). In this sense, the body only has control of itself, and 
by being in an indeterminate state constantly, exploring the potentially harmful 
environment is the only hope for survival. The pressing question is then, how 
to manage in parallel the bodily system given all available environmental cues? 
DST offers an explanation, and it has to do with temporal relations in systems. 
The forerunner of DST, cybernetics, embodies the underlying ideas in DST. “The 
most fundamental concept in cybernetics is that of ‘difference’, either that two things are recognisa-
bly different or that one thing has changed with time” (Ashby, 2015, p. 9). By these words, 
Ross Ashby understands the minimal requirement for a transition. Cyberneticists 
were occupied with building mechanical structures that could maintain themsel-
ves internally by retrieving information about the external environment. Ashby 
explicitly retrieves inspiration for such a mechanical system from biological sy-
stems, ultimately building a mechanical machine that can maintain its homeostatic 
balance, i.e. The Homeostat (Ashby, 2015).
In DST, as the opening quote suggests, the term dynamic refers to time-chan-
ging patterns, where a pattern at one time is interrelated with that at another time. 
In other words, “it refers to the unfolding in a continuing evolutionary process” (Luenberger, 
1979, p. 1). Time is the essence in DST, dealing in particular with the transitional 
pattern involved in a given system, explaining why DST is presented mathemati-
cally as differential or difference equations, i.e. they represent the temporal linka-
ge between variables. The term system refers to the recognition that a meaningful 
investigation of phenomena can only be achieved by considering the entirety, in-
cluding its environment. In this sense, one should expect complex interrelations 
with several components in the system of the body, where meaningful analysis 
can only emerge if taking into account the entire system and relations among its 
components (Luenberger, 1979, p. 2). Systems involving a large number of inter-
related variables are named multivariable systems, where the change of the output is 
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not proportional to that of the input, i.e. a non-linear system. Linking the mind 
in science with DST can be traced back to cybernetics (Ashby, 2015) and syner-
getics (Haken, 1983)—however, their link has not been posited as explicit as 
Van Gelder’s (1998) Dynamical Hypothesis (DH)1. Van Gelder explicitly states that 
action, perception and cognition can be better understood by way of a DST ap-
proach as opposed to the dominant computationalist approach. DST introduces 
advantages over non-dynamic (digital) systems in, for instance, the von Neumann 
bottleneck problem2.
DST provides a way around the Neumann problem, which is the limitation 
of throughput given the computer architecture, that is, by the use of symbols in 
processing, a sequential rule is inevitable, making parallel processing difficult or 
impossible. The paradigm that designates this approach is usually referred to as 
the input-process-output system, which is precisely what DST avoids. By disregarding 
symbolic processing, which is localised, meaning that any malfunction will result in 
a severe malfunction of the system as a whole, DST instead makes use of distri-
buted operations, making the system more robust to single malfunctions (Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch, 2016, p. 86). 
The issue of any non-dynamic approach to cognition is that of prioritising 
state over time. Instead of inquiring the precise state of a system, DST attempts 
to establish how the state changes, i.e. the transitions between states. This makes 
DST a prominent theoretical approach to understanding the human experience 
in transitions. To give an example beyond computer science, consider the clas-
sic example of the solar system. The system consists of various components, i.e. 
the planets, the moons and the sun. The DST approach aims to describe the sy-
stem’s behaviour over time by modelling the change mathematically. To this end, 
DST is a mathematical model of system behaviour (Thompson, 2007, p. 39). To 
contrast DST and computationalists (non-dynamic approaches), consider here 
their characteristics (Port and Van Gelder, 1995; Van Gelder, 1998, pp. 38–43; 
Thompson, 2007):
• Change/State: dynamicists prioritises how things change over time, whe-
re the medium is the state, which is of little interest. Computationalists 
focus on the state so that change is merely the bridge between states. 
• Geometry/Structure: dynamicists understand a state by its relative po-
sition in the system as a whole, so what constitutes the state is of little 
interest. Computationalists focus on the internal structure to explain how 
combining pieces form a structured whole.
1 DH refers to a DST approach, casting the organisation of  the brain as maintaining a dynamic system. 
2 von Neumann’s bottleneck problem refers to the computational limit due to its architecture, i.e. between 
processors and memory storage, where running programs are held in memory, there is an inevitable latency 
when running a program (data transfer rate). Because processors have become increasingly faster, while the 
memory processing has not, the processor spends a lot of  time idle. Despite the velocity of  a processor, the 
bottleneck problem regarding the data transfer rate cannot be overcome. 
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• Timing/Order: dynamicists are interested in when states change, rather 
than what the states are, as opposed to computationalists. In light of hu-
man nature, dynamicists are interested in how behaviour happens in time, 
in contrast to what the behaviour is.
• Parallel/Serial: dynamicists hold that processes operate in parallel inter-
dependently given their complexity in relations, whereas computationa-
lists hold that processes change in series. Dynamicists hold that processes 
unfold continuously and simultaneously. 
• Continuous/Discrete: dynamicists do not consider inputs as the initia-
tion of the system nor outputs as the goal or result, as computationalists 
do. Instead, dynamicists hold that the system is a continuous model of its 
environment, maintaining appropriate change. 
• Coupling/State-setting: interaction is a matter of influences on the 
shape of change. In contrast to computationalists, who hold that inter-
action is a matter of state changes, dynamicists hold that interaction is a 
matter of continuous changes coupling systems reciprocally. 
• Antirepresentation/Representation: dynamicists hold that there is no 
use of symbols or representations in systems, as opposed to computatio-
nalists, but instead parameters that hold no other purpose but to influence 
its environment, e.g. a specific parameter as viewed from one aspect of 
the system, may seem different from another aspect. 
These points outline the main differences between DST and non-dynamic 
approaches, which generally can be distinguished as centralised (non-dynamic) 
and decentralised (dynamic) accounts of neuronal and cognitive functions. DH, 
being the link between algorithmic processes of DST to biological and cognitive 
processes, explicitly states that the body of cognitive agents are dynamic systems, 
where cognition, action and perception do not happen over time, but rather in time. 
Recall the example of the solar system. The system behaviour was initially thought 
to be predictable by way of differential equations so that when given the initial 
conditions, all future states are calculable (Thompson, 2007, p. 39)—however, 
differential equations depend on initial conditions, e.g. the velocity of all particles 
that exhibits non-linear behaviour, which makes calculating all possible future sta-
te in principle impossible. Instead, Henri Poincaré provided a novel approach in 
a series of papers starting from 1881 where he simultaneously initiated the early 
days of DST. Poincaré introduced the qualitative study of differential equations. 
“Rather than seeking a formula for each solution as a function of time, he proposed to study 
the collection of all solutions, thought of as curves or trajectories in state space, for all time and 
all initial conditions at once” (Norton, 1995, p. 46). In this geometric understanding 
of equations, topological/geometric techniques were a clear choice. To consider 
all possible solutions collectively is achievable by using phase space3 (Fig. 7.1). The 
notion of process and time in complex systems seem to have led both Riemann 
3  Phase space refers in DST to a space where all possible solutions are traced, i.e. the full trajectory of  a planet.
PART I I :  CHAPTER 7
113
and Poincaré to a topological understanding of systems (see Poincaré’s epic pub-
lication Analysis Situs). This approach, instead of seeking the exact values of states, 
seek to understand the character of the system’s long-term behaviour. In contrast 
to computationalists, the symbol processing is here replaced by the topology of 
the system and its components, so its functions are directly dependent on their 
physical realisation.
Why is it important to understand the underlying principles of DST given a 
research question on architecture and transitions? The architectural experience 
of transition depends on the embedded body from which action and perception 
emerge. The basic feature, i.e. action and perception, was shown to be tempo-
rally extended and involve retention and protention. Insofar, Husserl, Bergson 
and now Damasio emphasise the importance of anticipative behaviour in basic 
cognition, e.g. action and perception. This approach does not solve the puzzle of 
anticipative ability—however, DST does shed new light upon how cognitive pro-
cesses relative to the body and environment might be understood, and it certainly 
involves predictive behaviour, i.e. long-term behaviour. To this end, DST is an 
approach that focuses on the pattern of change that admits to a parallel reciprocal 
system that can reach an immensely complex structure.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the whole body interconnects directly, as 
this would bring forth an ineffective network. Ashby (1960, p. 219) rightfully ar-
gues that there are occasions where an increase in the number of connections can 
be harmful. Considering neuronal networks, Ashby radically states that coordina-
tion between parts in the brain can take place in the environment, “communication 
within the nervous system is not always necessary” (p. 222). 
Figure 7.1—This trajectory is known as the Lorenz attractor. Here illustrating all the possible states (within 
discrete	time)	of 	three	simplified	non-linear	Navier-Stokes	equations	from	fluid	dynamics.	When	plotting	all	
possible states in phase space, a complex ordered system emerges, known as a strange attractor. Characteristic of  
strange attractors is that they never close on themselves, and thus never repeat the same motion, as long as the state 
remains on the attractor. The attractor can be considered the global pattern, which emerges from local rules directed 
by dynamics equations.
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“The anatomist may be excused for thinking that communication between part 
and part in the brain can take place only through some anatomically or histologically 
demonstrable	tract	or	fibres.	The student of function will, however, be aware 
that channels are also possible through the environment.” (Ashby, 1960, p. 
220; emphasis added)
This radical claim has direct implications for architecture begging the question; 
how does the brain make use of the environment, if at all? This question is ad-
dressed later (Chapter 8). Insofar it has been established that operating with DST; 
the whole system changes if a single state change, which makes the implications 
of change global, as opposed to local, i.e. any change, is a change at the global level 
of the system. It is worth noting that global in this sense refers to the body as a 
whole—hence, embodied cognition. This approach may seem chaotic in the sense 
that, if a human brain consists of 86 billion neurons where 16 billion are in the 
cerebral cortex (Herculano-Houzel, 2009) and a single neural state changes, then 
it will have an effect on the system as a whole. However, DST favours a network 
theory of cognition, which emerges from neuronal reciprocity and anatomical 
connections that are necessary (Sporns, 2011, p. 184). If the role of the environ-
ment in the cerebral function is a question of dynamical linking the biological 
body with its environment, it is necessary to dive into the very threshold of how 
such systems emerge. This inevitably leads to a brief discussion on the biological 
origin of cellular and neuronal activity.
7.2.2 Biological emergence
To specify a system accurately, organisational behaviour, i.e. a set of relations, 
is necessary. In The Organizational Behavior (Hebb, 2002) Donald Hebb famously 
introduced the idea that neurons	that	fire	together,	wire	together, implicating that the 
connection between two neurons that fire simultaneously, strengthen their con-
nectivity as an abstract form of learning. This has often been referred to as learning 
by correlation (Hebb, 2002, p. 158). From this theory on cellular assembly (Hebb’s 
rule) flourished the idea of neural networks, forming the connectionist approach 
to neuronal activity. In this sense, the history of neurons is inseparable from its 
connectivity since stronger connectivity indicates prior compliance. Hebb’s rule, 
therefore, holds that neuronal activity is intrinsically related to that neuron’s par-
ticular history, which exhibits adaptive behaviour. This is quite a powerful sta-
tement. Assuming Hebb’s rule to be accurate, neural networks respect a DST 
approach since such a strategy would prioritise the network rather than a given 
independent neuron. The system, in this manner, takes part of a higher complex 
system, which, when presented by a pattern, goes through a learning phase and 
then creates strong or weak links that ultimately can fall into an internal configu-
ration that reflects the learned item (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016, p. 88).
In the science of non-linear dynamical systems, which ranges from chaos the-
ory, complexity studies and connectionist modelling, these biological systems are 
known as autonomous systems. In this biological view, autonomy can ultimately be 
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viewed as a self-maintaining organisational system that enables living creatures to 
manage their interactions with the world using their own capacities. Consequently, 
such a system must self-regulate to maintain itself (Vernon et al., 2015, p. 3), which 
complies with Damasio’s account of homeostasis as a primary balance for life. 
Autonomy closely links to self-organisation and emergence, and although these are 
not interchangeable concepts, they are indefinable without one another. At least 
since the symposium The Notion of Emergence in 1926 by the Aristotelian Society, 
various types of things have been characterised as emergent, e.g. laws, effects, 
events, entities, and properties (Stephan, 1992, pp. 25–26). In the context of bio-
logical systems, a definition of self-organisation goes: 
“Self-organization is a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emer-
ges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components of the system. 
Moreover, the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed 
using only local information, without reference to the global pattern.” (Camazine et al., 
2001, p. 8)
This definition emphasises the lower-levels of the system as predominant for 
the emergent pattern, i.e. local-to-global—however, emergence also refers to pro-
cesses that involve interacting components in a system stemming from a global 
pattern, i.e. global-to-local. Due to the interacting components “there is a global 
cooperation that spontaneously emerges when the states of all participating ‘neurons’ reach a 
mutually satisfactory state. In such a system, then, there is no need for a central processing unit 
to guide the entire operation” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016, p. 88)—hence, a 
decentralised approach. In emergence, the self-organisation amounts to an appa-
rent behaviour through either a local-to-global pattern or a global-to-local pattern; 
each with their characteristics. Local-to-global is constrained by local interactions, 
whereas global-to-local constrains the local interaction through its interaction 
with the system environment (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Vernon et al., 2015). 
As noted by Vernon and colleagues, the link between autonomy, self-organisati-
on and emergence is that self-organisation results from the intrinsic character of 
the system rather than by some external force, i.e. emergent self-organisation is 
autonomous similar to how autonomous systems involve emergent self-organi-
sation (Vernon et al., 2015). 
To give an example of self-organisation, consider, for instance, cellular auto-
mata, where interaction between elements amounts to spontaneous global pat-
terns. What makes it indeed a self-organised system, is the fact that there is no 
centre holding information on how to form and organise itself—instead, it hap-
pens from simple interactions, devoid of any pre-informed code or program, e.g. 
John Horton Conway’s Game of Life, or other mathematical games, which Martin 
Gardner published in a series of articles in Scientific	American. By straightforward 
Boolean rules regarding each cell’s environment, a global pattern emerges due to 
cellular interaction. 
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The critical lessons in the context of neurons concern the characteristics of 
emergence: 
• First, an autonomous system, as an emergent process, acknowledges a 
reciprocal relationship between neurons (Maturana and Varela, 1992). 
• Second, the whole system (neuronal network) is non-reducible to its 
parts (neurons) (Thompson and Varela, 2001), similar to how only the 
fusion of hydrogen and oxygen displays an emergent behaviour, where the 
properties of the parts cannot explain the behaviour of water. 
• Third, autonomous systems exhibit self-organising capacities where glo-
bal pattern, which stem from interacting elements in the system, also has 
downward causation (Varela et al., 2001). 
On a biochemical level in cellular systems, autopoiesis refers to a particular form 
of self-producing self-organisation. Autopoiesis is essential in this context because 
it provides biological evidence for cellular closure that is continuously coupled to 
its environment while being self-sustained. An autopoietic organisation within the 
cell admits to a recurrent circular dynamic where molecular components determi-
ne bounded systems. The molecular components then generate metabolic reacti-
ons that, in turn, produces molecular components. When extending autopoiesis 
to autonomous systems, it is usually referred to as either organisational closure or 
operational closure (Maturana and Varela, 1992), but it certainly brings closure to 
the system. Organisational closure refers to its self-referential and recursive net-
work that defines the system as a unity, whereas operational closure refers to the 
recurrent dynamics within the system. 
Critical for autopoietic systems is the ability to self-produce their own topo-
logical boundaries. It can be determined whether a system is self-organised if it is 
true that (1) the system is defined by a semipermeable boundary, (2) the compo-
nents are being produced by reaction of an internal network, and (3) the produced 
boundary is produced by the internal network while the network is regenerated 
due to the boundary (Thompson, 2007, pp. 45, 103). Such circular causality and 
autonomy enable emergent processes. Thompson coined the term dynamic co-emer-
gence, which embodies the temporal dilemma of over-determination (Chapter 8) 
(Thompson, 2007, pp. 60–65). According to dynamic co-emergence and autopoie-
sis, the causal changes on a local level are synchronous with those at a global level; 
they are temporally interdependent. This naturally leads to an over-determinate 
supervened position of the system, where “who is in charge” seems to be un-
der-played (Kim, 2001, pp. 13–14). Questioning “who is in charge” is an example 
of redundantly questioning the control-centre in decentralised systems—yet, this 
question is an essential kind because it is addressing the direction of evolution of 
time. The question could be rephrased: is it the global or the local patterns that 
decide the direction, or is it the interaction that unfolds in time? How does the 
global pattern constrain the local patterns, while simultaneously local patterns 
emerge as global patterns? A detailed review of how the three characteristics of 
emergence apply to the neurons and brain offers a hint.
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7.2.2.1 Setting up the brain mesh
The characteristics of emergence are essential to understand in detail, since 
they ultimately concern the link between brain and body, linking further to the 
environment. It is difficult to discuss the three characteristics independently of 
each other since they are based on similar grounds. 
The first characteristic states that the emergent process stems from the inter-
dependency of elements. Unidirectional relations behave differently from bidi-
rectional relations because the causal link is only dependent in one direction, as 
opposed to the interdependent relation where x may influence y just as vice versa. 
In bidirectional relations x and y causally couple. In unidirectional relations, one 
necessarily causes the other, so that the other cannot occur without the occurren-
ce of the first. In other words, x cause y (Fig. 7.2). Dynamic systems differ from 
computational symbol processing precisely in this regard. Computationalists hold 
that neuronal processes occur separately and in series that resolve one issue at the 
time, whereas a DST approach supports reciprocal causation, i.e. coupling, which 
allows for multiple processes to occur in different tempos from different sources.
The second characteristic entails the non-reducibility of an emergent process. 
Reducing a process or a system is a topic well-discussed in philosophy. According 
to Silberstein and McGeever (1999), there are two kinds of emergence relative to 
emergent properties. Emergent properties are properties of a system that exert a 
causal influence down on the parts of the system consistent with the causal capa-
cities of the parts themselves. If the emergent property is understood as the global 
pattern, then this is downward causation, which leads to the third characteristic. 
The first kind of emergence is epistemological, i.e. epistemological emergence, where 
a property is considered emergent “[…] if the property is reducible to or determined by 
the intrinsic properties of the ultimate constituents of the object or system, while at the same 
time	it	is	very	difficult	for	us	to	explain,	predict	or	derive	the	property	on	the	basis	of	the	ultima-
te constituents” (Silberstein and McGeever, 1999, p. 186; emphasis added). In this 
sense, trying to understand the behaviour of a system as a whole by tracking indi-
vidual part or process will be inconclusive. Instead, as DST suggests, one must try 
to grasp the qualitative behaviour of the system by grouping various systems with 
different underlying causal substrata (Silberstein and McGeever, 1999, p. 185). 
The other kind of emergence is ontological, i.e. ontological emergence, by which 
x y x₁ x₂
Interdependent Dependent
Figure 7.2—Interdependent	relations	have	bidirectional	relations	so	that	y	may	influence	x,	as	well	as	x,	may	
influence	y.	Dependent	relations	have	unidirectional	relations	so	that	x2	can	only	occur	if 	x1	takes	place.	In	this	
sense, x2 is dependent on x1, or put differently, x1 cause x2. For dependent relations, the state goes from x1 to 
x2 because the linear relations indicates that x2 can be conceived of  as an extension of  x1, that is necessarily part 
of 	the	same	system.	For	interdependent	relations,	the	two	states	may	influence	one	another,	so	that	one	state	cannot	
be conceived of  as an extension of  the other. In other words, x could be y2, while y could be x2—both would be 
true.
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they mean a system that holds causal capacities that are non-reducible to any of 
its intrinsic parts. Ontological emergence holds that the relations between parts 
of the system are all determined without remainder by the intrinsic properties 
(Silberstein and McGeever, 1999, p. 186; Thompson, 2007, p. 417). The causal 
features in ontologically emergent features are thus not reducible to more basic 
features, e.g. the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts. 
In this context, the dispute regarding kinds of emergence concerns whether the 
brain’s cognitive organisational system is decomposable to the intrinsic properties 
of its subsystems, which closely links to the debate regarding structural localisation 
of specific cognitive functions (see Appendix C for a discussion on the integration 
and segregation of anatomical and cognitive structures). Approaching the brain as 
a decomposable system allows to address each operation of a subsystem indepen-
dent from other subsystems. Such an approach posits a modular organisational 
system of the brain, where the level of modularity depends on the strength of the 
reciprocal connections. If one holds at all the brain to be decomposable, then if 
the connections are weak, the system is nearly decomposable, because the causal inte-
raction within the subsystem takes a stronger role in determining the operation of 
the subsystem. Instead, if the subsystem has strong connections, which refers to 
minimally decomposable system, then the causal interaction between subsystems take 
a more significant role than the those within the subsystem (Thompson, 2007, pp. 
420–421, 2014). It is generally a matter of whether the environment of the subsy-
stem governs a more significant role in determining the operation as compared to 
the intrinsic properties of the subsystem itself. Besides nearly and minimally decom-
posable systems4, there is also strictly decomposable system, where specific brain areas 
can be conceived of as intrinsically specialised, and thus independently responsible 
for specific cognitive functions. This stands in high contrast to non-decomposable 
systems, which are systems where the connectivity and relations themselves bet-
ween the components that give rise to global patterns so that the components are 
no longer clearly separable. Compared to Silberstein and McGeever’s account of 
different kinds of emergence, only the non-decomposable system is an ontological 
emergence, because the behaviour of the system cannot be reduced to non-linear 
dynamics between components. This came to be known as a form of relational ho-
lism due to inexplicable states in quantum mechanics, where the underlying state 
of a system occurs in a holistic sense (Morganti, 2009).
Considering DST and DH, the emergent processes favour a minimally decom-
posable approach, i.e. the brain reflects a complex non-linear dynamic system, whe-
re ongoing global activity collides with non-linear dynamics of the local compo-
nents, amounting to large-scale networks (Chapter 8 and 10 discusses neuronal 
responses). As illustrated in a study by Anderson and colleagues (2013), analysing 
4 The decomposability of  the systems can be conceived as the degree of  decomposition before causing a 
turn from stability to chaos. A strictly decomposable system will continue staying stable even after removing 
great junks, whereas the non-decomposable system suggests that chaos reigns in removing any parts of  either 
large- or small-scale networks. 
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accumulated neuroscientific data demonstrates that the brain operates using emer-
ging networks that exhibit strong assortativity5, whereas other networks consist 
of relatively heterogeneous parts. Accordingly, the networks that display strong 
assortativity are dominant modes (Corbetta, Patel and Shulman, 2008), which in 
future terms can be characterised by functional fingerprints (Anderson, Kinnison 
and Pessoa, 2013). The global pattern in this sense is not constrained to the ac-
tivity of a single recognisable network but to the emerging pattern as a whole, 
including other brain regions and areas. That some networks appear as more do-
minant in certain functional tasks is precisely what is understood by a minimally 
decomposable system, as compared to the view of strictly decomposable system. 
Consequently, nearly decomposable systems are insufficient to illustrate strong 
assortativity, ipso facto, if it consists of weak connections, so that one might still 
falsely hold that “the phenomenon of interest is due to component operations discretely locali-
zed in component parts of a mechanism” (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p. xxx). Thus, 
in agreement with Pessoa (2014b):
“[…] decomposition of the brain network in terms of meaningful clusters of regions, 
such	as	the	ones	generated	by	community-finding	algorithms,	does	not	by	itself	reveal	‘true’	
subnetworks. Given the hierarchical and multi-relational relationship between regions, 
multiple decompositions will offer different ‘slices’ of a broader landscape of networks 
within the brain.” (Pessoa, 2014b)
The structure-function mapping, i.e. specific parts of the brain are assigned 
specific tasks, of the brain, thus become obsolete, precisely because, at the level 
of brain regions, the area itself is not a meaningful unit of function as compared 
to the network that is distributed onto several brain regions. To quote Pessoa 
(2014a; original emphasis): “The network is the unit, not the brain region.” 
The embodiment in this context emerges from the fact that interoceptive sig-
nals are inherently bodily. For instance, a critical part of regulating homeostatic 
balance is to estimate positions of limbs for action, blood-sugar levels, filtering of 
blood and extracting nutrients from food in the intestines, all of which provide 
5 Assortativity refers to a preference for a network’s nodes to attach to others
Strictly
decomposable
Nearly
decomposable
Minimally
decomposable
Non-
decomposable
0% 100%
Figure 7.3—Decomposability of  a system. The degree of  decomposability can be illustrated on a spectrum—the 
spectrum goes from 0% to 100% on the dependence of  interaction between large- and small-scale networks to 
function. Applying these systems to the organisation of  the brain, then the strictly decomposable system designates 
a modulatory view where removing parts is equivalent to removing functions. A nearly decomposable system favours 
the interaction of  local component (small-scale) over large-scale networks, whereas the minimally decomposable sys-
tem suggests that the large-scales of  the brain exerts authority over small-scale networks. Finally, the non-decom-
posable system states that the function of  the brain rests on its entire organisation, from small-scale to large-scale.
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the brain with signals about the internal milieu. The brain is indisputably bodily. 
As the next chapter will reassure, cognitive processes are not skull-bound so, as 
the student of function would argue, the networks go beyond brain regions. For now, 
the chapter deals with cognition from the brain perspective.
7.2.2.2 Reciprocal causality
The current position is that the brain is minimally decomposable because the 
emerging features stem from a non-linear dynamic system, which leads to the third 
characteristic of an emergent process, namely that the global pattern also has an 
upper hand on local systems. Global patterns designate the state of the system as 
a whole, meaning it often constrain the behaviour of their local parts, known as 
downward, or top-down (TD), causation. On the other hand, local patterns de-
signate the state of the parts of a system, meaning it partially determines the state 
of the system as a whole, known as upward, or bottom-up (BU), causation. Most 
do not find BU causation mysterious because intrinsic properties of a component 
usually constitute the system as a whole, e.g. components of a computer consti-
tute the computer as a whole, e.g. if the RAM dysfunctions, the computer as the 
whole dysfunctions. However, it seems puzzling to many how TD states can have 
the upper hand on local parts (Bechtel, 2017). To be sure, upward and downward 
causations are not a matter of whether the systems hold a unilateral direction so 
that exclusively global or local patterns govern one another, but instead a matter 
of which pattern dominates the other, i.e. it is a reciprocal link, so the domination 
is both TD and BU. In line with DST, the emergent process establishes large en-
sembles of networks across brain regions, where their arising and disappearance 
is tightly linked with their context. TD-states concern the ongoing endogenous 
activity originating from bodily states, in contrast to BU signals that concern on-
going exogenous activity anchored in the external milieu (neuronal response to 
endo- and exogenous activity is returned to in Chapter 8). Regarding reciprocal 
causation, once again, the problem with global patterns governing lower levels is 
that such a feature may seem logically overdetermined. 
Consider BU causality in sensory signals, so that the local activity in clusters 
of neurons in sensory regions, have the upper hand on the global pattern of the 
brain. On a neuronal level, in bilateral relations any local dysfunction will influ-
ence the global state, it means that dysfunction in specific clusters of neurons can 
cause a disruption, or a spread of disruption, in the emergent process of the global 
pattern. If, for instance, a single cell misbehaves in some cellular automata, it is 
impossible to reach a similar global pattern as if the cell was not dysfunctional. On 
the other hand, TD causation can be understood as the irreducibility of a system 
to its parts, so the most basic state is that of the whole. In such TD causation, 
the global pattern has the capacity to constrain local activity, which means, on a 
neuronal level, that its local functional environment influences the dysfunctional 
neuronal cluster. Thus, there will be very little, if any at all, disruptions on a glo-
bal level of the brain state. In other words, the global pattern constrains the local 
pattern so that disruptions on a local level have less impact on the global outcome. 
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In light of DST, large-scale functional networks of the brain operate through 
TD causation in the sense that TD causation is a matter of a collection of intercon-
nected brain areas that interact to perform circumscribed functions (Thompson 
and Varela, 2001; Varela et al., 2001; Bressler and Menon, 2010). The issue with 
overdetermination is that there seems to be conformity between TD and BU pat-
terns before they take place—as if the global and local patterns predict one ano-
ther perfectly. Is there a form of neuronal emergence based on internal prediction?
Recall the first characteristic; the relations are reciprocal. This cooperativeness 
within various brain regions was realised when the prefrontal cortex required 
reinterpretation (Nauta, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1988). In investigating the visual 
cortex, Zeki states: 
“The picture that one obtains from studying the visual cortex is one of multiple 
areas and of parallel pathways leading to them. It is a picture that shows a deep 
division of labour, the evidence for which is best when obtained from the pathologic 
human brain” (Zeki, 1993, p. 295; emphasis added). 
Zeki suggests that vision emerges from multiple areas that are parallel con-
nected, and thus divides labour. Importantly, Zeki emphasises the pathological 
(anatomical) importance in understanding cortical processes: “Nothing in that 
integrated visual image suggests that different visual attributes are processed in physically se-
parate parts of our cortex” (Zeki, 1993, p. 295; emphasis added). As the influential 
paper by Varela and Singer (1987) indicate, the visual pathway seems to hold a 
significantly higher amount of connections from the cortex to the lateral genicu-
late nucleus (LGN) than from the eyes themselves. This intuitively rejects the se-
quential understanding of vision, because, as they suggest, a transient mismatch 
between ongoing cortical activation and newly arriving retinal activity should al-
ter the activity pattern of the feedback projection (Varela and Singer, 1987, p. 11; 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016, p. 95). 
In brief, reciprocal relations are thus essential for TD causation, which in turn 
is essential to explain large-scale networks, constituting global patterns. Emerging 
from reciprocal relations, the network dynamics depend on their particular to-
pology and closure so that TD causation concerns constraining local patterns 
through global interrelations, whereas BU causation concerns cellular metabolic 
reactions and molecular components initiated by external stimuli, offering diffe-
rent topological constraints on global patterns. 
In this regard, the agent’s life is constituted by TD predictions that are matched 
with BU signals, essentially anchoring and situating the agent in a body and en-
vironment. The predictive behaviour that Damasio, Sterling, Husserl and Bergson 
refer to are all different from one another. Bergson referred to virtual actions, 
i.e. the interaction depending on physical structure, whereas Husserl referred to 
protention in temporality, i.e. the immediate prediction as part of a present. In 
both Damasio’s and Sterling’s terms, this predictions in neuronal activity during 
adjustments is vital to life in general (Damasio, 2010; Sterling, 2012). 
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Furthermore, on a topological level, how the mechanism restricts the behavi-
our of its parts differs from how the parts are affected by an external stimulus 
(Bechtel, 2017). It becomes clear here that the brain operates in a dynamic fas-
hion, where interdependent relations constitute neuronal activity. From such in-
ternal relations, specialised and complex networks emerge, satisfying in parallel 
exogenous and endogenous signals here expressed as BU and TD, respectively. 
Insofar, the nervous system and the brain are argued to be coupled on various 
levels, detaching cognition from the skull and rightfully linking it back to more 
than internal neural states—however, can cognition be considered released from a 
skull-bound theory, and onto an embodied and environmentally situated process? 
Such an account has serious implications for interpretations of cortical activity 
and functional networks.
7.2.3 Bergson and Husserl coming to light
Numerous claims regarding cortical organisation have been put forward and, 
yet, there remain unsolved issues. Examining these claims relative to the establis-
hed phenomenological principles seem reasonable. 
Dynamic co-emergence had difficulties explaining how two independent compo-
nents could bilaterally comply and thus co-create one another, i.e. the issue of 
over-determination. Dynamic co-emergence is an essential feature for circular 
causality in explaining brain organisation as self-organising and autonomous. 
Surprisingly, an answer to the problem was already within Damasio’s account on 
how primitive cells adjust—they need to be anticipative so that the homeostatic 
balance is not disrupted. If the process of homeostasis is interrupted, it is arguably 
too late for the organism, which was the critical argument of allostasis (Sterling, 
2004, 2012; Vernon et al., 2015). Such jeopardising is evitable with predictive 
features already at the cellular level. For components within a cell, to predict is 
a powerful feature that requires an action by the component towards the other 
component(s). Bergson foreshadowed this feature in his concept of the virtual. 
Needless to state that the DST approach complies with the very core of Bergson’s 
philosophy because the cortical activity is not restricted to spatial matters, but 
rather to dynamics and time, i.e. cognition emerges in the process of interaction. 
Bergson’s principle of indivisibility of time due to the interpenetration of any gi-
ven moment onto the next one, which Husserl complies with by stretching the 
present into retention and protention, extends to this cellular micro-level of life 
as the predictive behaviour. The components at any given moment already hold 
a prediction of how the other components will act, based on the retained history 
of itself and its relations, thus acting accordingly. In this sense, emergence sheds 
light upon the possibility of prediction on a cellular level up to a global cognitive 
level. The local patterns have a BU influence on the global stage, which in turn 
may have a TD influence on local patterns. 
If to predict is no longer conceived only as a long-term psychological process, 
but also as a short-term transcendental act, it becomes clear how intuitive predic-
tion is part of the present, immediate experience.
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This relation sheds light upon the process of resolving uncertainty about the 
world that consequently settles the body in a more determined state. Consider 
pure TD dominance on local patterns. In such cases, which is comparable to a 
purely mental world that is devoid of any BU sensory signals, an ideal world is 
established. The exact opposite—so that local BU modulations entirely govern 
global states—is comparable to a realist’s account of the world. Bergson and 
Husserl disregarded both idealist and realist approaches to cognition. According 
to Bergson, their most significant mistake entails the value of truth, so that any 
change is linearly describable. For instance, external stimulus x will always yield 
precisely cortical activity y, where a dynamic approach suggests that the cortical 
activity is non-linear, e.g. neuronally resolved through a network. In both the 
idealist and realist approach, the neuronal response from internal and external 
stimulus, respectively, will always direct global or local patterns, which would be 
incompatible with both the cortical anatomy and with DST because DST is based 
on non-linear reciprocity between multiple variables. In other words, the idealist 
holds that the world is a projection of internal changes, e.g. nihilism, whereas the 
realist holds that the world is directly sensed and constructed based on sensory 
signals, e.g. empiricism.
DST allows for coupling so that two systems interacting can shape each other’s 
change. Ultimately, akin Husserl and Bergson, systems are governed in part by an 
idealist and in part by a realist that come together to resolve uncertainty about the 
world using sensory signals and global predictions. Chapter 9 will discuss these 
matters explicitly.
7.3 Conclusion
Insofar, there has been a great number of claims, begging an overview. First, 
Damasio argued that in order to maintain life, a homeostatic balance must be re-
spected. During the process of homeostasis, the living organism must regulate the 
internal milieu in accordance with the external milieu since the living organism 
only holds control of its own milieu. This regulation depends on interoceptive 
and exteroceptive sensory, from which a model of the world emerges internally as 
externally. By observing merely internal regulations, it is theoretically possible to 
tell whether an organism is in an environment that is cold or hot, hungry or full, 
decaying or thriving, dying or living. More importantly, for a more complex orga-
nism such as human beings, when experiencing a threat, the human can move and 
improve its chances for survival. According to Damasio, an act of improvement is 
rewarded, while a damaging act is punished, so that these incentives guide the or-
ganism as a whole. Essentially, for any of these processes to be successful, the or-
ganism must successfully construct a model of itself and thereby its environment 
well before disrupting the homeostatic balance; this is the anticipative behaviour 
emphasised in allostasis and the principles of Part I. Time becomes the essence.
Given the temporal priority, DST proved to be a qualified approach to the 
biology of the human body as compared to computationalists because the impor-
tance is in the potential of change and interaction rather than the current state. By 
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6 There is here no distinction between cellular action and bodily action. 
illustrating how neurons anatomically interact on both a local and global pattern 
and their interdependent relations, it is shown that DST favours a network appro-
ach to cognition over a location determined approach. The relation between net-
works is argued to be minimally decomposable so that local hubs can exhibit spe-
cialised behaviour governing global patterns. For instance, autonomous systems 
have organisational closure, which is not a matter of a single cell maintaining its 
own homeostatic balance, but a constant exchange of matter and energy with its 
local environment. This further illustrates the interdependent coupling between 
different levels (levels of the spectrum of TD and BU) throughout the brain and 
body. In this sense, cells and neurons are always structurally coupled to their local 
environment, meaning the history of dynamic interactions leads to a structural 
congruence. Prediction based on cellular history is a form of practical primitive 
operation, where a decision of how to act is necessary6. The process of how this 
primitive kind of learning takes place will reveal how the brain organises itself. 
Husserl refers to this logical operation as a passive synthesis, because it hap-
pens on an intuitive level that is constrained by bodily functions without any inte-
raction from the intellectual self. Further, from the enactment of the logical ope-
ration, it necessarily ensues that a form of synthesis is constructed, which within 
itself hold new prediction of actions. 
The discussion serves as an anatomical and functional outset for investigating 
the human brain through architecture. By unpacking the underlying processes 
of cognition in the brain, including the anatomical landscape, the implications 
of architecture on brain responses are clearer. Furthermore, the outset for inter-
pretation of neuronal data is better anchored. Returning here to the anticipated 
questions:
Why is investigating the brain and neuronal activity an advantage du-
ring architectural experience and transitions? 
• The brain contains neurons that reflect internal and external interactions 
between body and environment via the peripheral and central nervous sy-
stem. Neuronal behaviour can reveal causal interactions stemming from 
both environmental features and bodily states.
Is it expectable to establish linear-models of brain functions during ar-
chitectural experience and transitions? 
• As attractive as it may seem to establish linearly predictable models of how 
the environment affects the brain, the cortical systems function as non-li-
near dynamic systems so that the complexity of the brain as a whole ex-
ceeds such possibility. A linear model assumes a unique, stable, functional 
organisation—instead, the brain contains many interrelated networks that 
are minimally decomposable, where some may confine to linear models.
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Is it reasonable to search for architectural experience-dedicated brain 
region(s)? 
• Given the dynamics systems fundament, it is not reasonable to attempt to 
localise or assign regions to cognitive functions. 
How do experiential transitions relate to global and local patterns?
• During the continuous unfolding of experiential transitions, global pat-
terns reflect the predicted state, whereas the local pattern the continuously 
incoming sensory. Experiential transitions thus relate to global and local 
patterns through the dynamics of mismatch between predicted and in-
coming sensory.
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Summary. How do the brain and body relate to the environment? The previous chap-
ter established a biological framework from a cellular level and neuronal activity 
to large-scale networks in the brain. This chapter intends to link the environment 
to brain and body firstly on a neuronal level and secondly on a philosophical and 
psychological level. The emergence approach in biology depends heavily on the 
interdependent coupling so that patterns and systems emerge from bidirectional 
influences that couple the body and brain. The coupling argument reaches into 
the environment well-beyond the body and brain. This chapter provides an over-
view of the origin of neuronal responses by reviewing passive and active models 
of the brain and emphasises the relation between environment and body-brain by 
discussing a critique of central arguments in the extended mind hypothesis. In defen-
ce of the environmental coupling, three objections have been established. Taken 
together, there are empirical and philosophical reasons to pursue cognition as 
coupled to the environment. 
Coupling architecture to brain and 
body
CHAPTER 8
“The brain neither generates its neural activity in a completely passive way as 
driven by the external stimuli nor in an exclusively active way, that is, entirely driven 
by its spontaneous activity. Instead, based on empirical evidence, we need to accept a 
model of brain that undermines the passive/active dichotomy and integrates both in a 
spectrum that allows for categorizing different forms of neural activity according to the 
degree of the brain’s participation in generating that activity.” (Northoff, 2018, p. 5)
“The principal activities of brains are making changes in themselves.”
(Minsky, 1988, p. 288)
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8.1 On a neuronal level
Body and brain have not been separated from one another insofar—and right-
fully so. When considering the neuronal activity, it originates from different sour-
ces. It is argued that two such sources are the body and environment. The cortical 
synaptic activity reflects message-passing between neurons through neurotrans-
mitters (see Appendix B), but what are neurons communicating and how is this 
related to either body or environment? The task here is to discuss two different 
kinds of models of the brain, as brought forward by Northoff (2018, chap. 1), 
to empirically identify the origin of synaptic activity. Eventually, it is shown that 
architecture, as external stimuli, is supposedly reflected in neuronal activity but 
intertwined with endogenous activity.
An early model of the brain and spinal cord proposed that these are reflexive in 
nature so that the brain reacts automatically to external stimuli. The implications 
are that all external stimuli are reflected in brain activity, i.e. any external stimu-
li encountering the spinal cord, e.g. touch, will exclusively define the immediate 
brain activity—hence, passive model of the brain. It is passive in the sense that it 
awaits stimuli from external sources before generating activity. Such a model as-
sumes Humean views (Chapter 3).
A different model suggests that external stimuli do not exclusively sustain 
brain activity, but that spontaneous activity emanates from within the spinal cord 
and the brain themselves. Hans Berger (1873-1941), the inventor of electroen-
cephalogram (EEG; elucidates brain waves from the synaptic activity), proposed 
that the brain is constantly busy. That the brain is restless and generates its own 
activity is famously known as resting-state activity1 (Raichle, 2011, 2015), which la-
tely has been hypothesised to be involved in certain conscious features, such as 
day-dreaming, mind-wandering and retrieval of autobiographical pieces (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna and Schacter, 2008). The resting-state activity is characterised by 
the absence of and any external stimuli, i.e. the body and brain simply rest. The 
critical question is thus; what is the origin of the neuronal activity?
8.1.1 Exogenous approach: passive brain
The reason both the passive and active models of the brain are of interest 
is to define the boundaries of the potential impact of architectural experience. 
Architecture is here considered an external stimulus, i.e. the built environment. 
If the brain is active in the sense that it generates its own activity, then cortical 
measures will reveal nothing about the impact of architecture, simply because the 
brain reflects its own activity exclusively. If the brain is passive in the sense that 
its activity depends on external stimulus, then cortical measures will reflect only 
the impact of external stimulus, e.g. architecture. For this reason, this issue needs 
to be resolved; a strong, moderate and weak model of both passive and active 
model of the brain are reviewed.
A strong passive model of the brain suggests that there is no neuronal activity 
1 Resting-state activity, spontaneous activity and endogenous activity are used interchangeably. 
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2 The inventor of  EEG, Hans Berger, discovered that when closing the eyes, there is a natural increase of  alpha 
frequency (8 Hz to 12 Hz) in the continuous electrocortical activity.  
unless there are external stimuli. This argument is objected by several empirical 
findings, particularly in the topic of metabolism and neuronal activity (Northoff, 
2018, p. 9). According to this model, the metabolic activity (measured by the rates 
of glucose or oxygen in the brain) is not reflected in neuronal activity (measured 
by the cycles between glutamate and glutamine; see Appendix B) (Hyder et al., 
2006; Shulman, Hyder and Rothman, 2014; Northoff, 2018, pp. 8–9). However, 
it has been shown that there is, in fact, a close coupling between metabolic acti-
vity and neuronal activity, i.e. the cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen consumption 
and the rate of firing in neurons (Shulman, Hyder and Rothman, 2014). Because 
the process of metabolism (e.g. the energy consumption for converting food to 
building blocks for proteins) is in fact reflected in neuronal activity, this strong 
passive model of the brain in inconceivable. 
Consider a moderate passive model of the brain, which suggests that spontane-
ous activity and stimuli-induced activity co-exist with no interaction, i.e. neuronal 
activity resulting from endogenous sources have no impact on neuronal activi-
ty stemming from an external stimulus (Northoff, 2018, pp. 10–12). A series of 
studies led by Hesselmann and Kleinschmidt show that resting-state activity just 
before the auditory stimulus was able to predict the successful and unsuccessful 
trials (Sadaghiani, Hesselmann and Kleinschmidt, 2009). An inclined resting-state 
activity predicted successful trials. In another study, they were further able to pre-
dict whether the participants would visually perceive a vase or a face in an ambi-
guous figure, again using the resting-state activity as a marker (Hesselmann et al., 
2008). Various other studies show that resting-state activity has an impact on the 
behavioural outcome (Andrews et al., 2002; Hesselmann, Kell and Kleinschmidt, 
2008; Sadaghiani, 2010). Thus, ongoing resting-state neuronal activity cannot be 
segregated from the neuronal activity stemming from external stimulus—in fact, 
the empirical data suggests an integrative position—which makes the moderate 
passive model inconceivable as well. 
Between resting-state activity and stimulus-induced activity, a weak passive 
model of the brain proposes that only external stimulus influence the apparent 
stimuli-induced activity, which means that no matter the level of the resting-sta-
te activity, the external stimulus alone can explain the stimulus-induced activity. 
In a study by Qin et al. (2013), they took advantage of the Berger waves2 in the 
continuous activity of the brain when the eyes are closed, as compared to when 
the eyes are opened. Thus, setting eyes-closed and eyes-open as the two states of 
the participants yielded two different resting-state activities. The fMRI-study re-
vealed that during eyes-open, there was no difference in neuronal response when 
the participants heard either their own name, friend’s names or unknown names. 
However, during eyes-closed when the participants heard their own name, as com-
pared to friend’s names and unknown names, there was a significant difference in 
auditory cortex, indicating that the resting-state activity does have a causal impact 
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on stimuli-induced activity. This study is limited to self-specific stimuli but offers, 
nonetheless, insights into the dependency of resting-state activity in the stimuli-in-
duced activity. It is important to note that there were no significant differences in 
all variables; hence, it cannot be said that the resting-state activity has an exclusi-
ve influence on stimuli-induced activity. Instead, it can be said that self-specific 
stimuli are reflected differently in the brain when the resting-state activity is high. 
Taken together, there is evidence that the brain is not a passive bystander dri-
ven by external stimuli—instead, it contributes the ongoing activity to its own 
neuronal activity. However, spontaneous activity does not appear to exclusively 
account for neuronal activity (Northoff, 2018, chap. 1).
8.1.2 Endogeneous approach: active brain
If the brain is exclusively contributing to its own neuronal activity, which may 
be named a strong active model of the brain, then the neuronal activity is effecti-
vely self-evidencing. If this is the natural behaviour of the brain, it brings with it 
many philosophical issues as it tends towards a nihilistic perspective of life. If the 
brain is exclusively self-evidencing, then when was any impression of the world 
ever given in the first place? There is an apparent bootstrap problem. Such an 
account assumes no difference in neuronal activity between spontaneous activity 
and stimuli-induced activity. It was clearly shown above that this is not the case—
thus, this model is empirically inconceivable.
It is worth noting that the resting-state activity is not restricted to specific 
locations in the brain, which was hypothesised to be the default-mode network 
(Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Raichle, 2011), but put back down 
again by Klein (2014). The spontaneous activity does not operate within limited 
regions but is evident throughout the whole brain in every region. It is also worth 
noting that the firing rate of neuronal activity, i.e. the temporal dimension, of re-
sting-state activity suggests that low- and high-frequencies modulate each other 
through phase-coupling from slow to fast frequencies (Buzsáki, Logothetis and 
Singer, 2013; Northoff, 2018, p. 18). This means that phase-locking in one region 
can modulate frequencies of different regions. The fact that all neuronal activity 
behaves in different spatiotemporal dimensions suggests that resting-state activity 
is a rather dynamic and wide-spread activity. Thus, even a moderate model of an 
active brain is difficult to defend since it holds that stimulus-induced activity does 
not interact with the spatiotemporal structure of spontaneous activity (Northoff, 
2018, p. 20). The weak model of an active brain states that the neuronal activity 
of external stimulus is exclusively explicable by resting-state activity, but this was 
resolved with Qin et al.’s (2013) experiment above. In sum, the brain cannot be 
accounted for generating its own neuronal activity, that is, neither radically, mo-
derately nor in a weak sense.
8.1.3 The spectral model
In line with Bergson and Husserl, Northoff (2018) suggests that one must go 
beyond the mere dichotomy of active/passive and introduce instead a scale in 
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which both extremes are present (Fig. 8.1). Eventually, the concepts of active and 
passive models of the brain displays the degree of involvement of the brain to its 
neuronal activity, where the extreme passive end is no involvement of spontane-
ous activity, whereas the extreme active end of the spectre is exclusively self-ge-
nerated activity independent of any external stimuli (Northoff, 2018, p. 7). This 
account amounts to the Bergsonian and Husserlian criticism of pure realism and 
idealism as unpacked in Chapter 4 and 5. According to Northoff (2018, chap. 4), 
the spectral model of the brain is the model that best explains the unfolding of neu-
ronal activity, where none of the extremes occurs in healthy people:
“[…] the spectrum model of the brain suggested here is about the balance between 
the contributions of resting-state activity and external stimuli to the brain’s neural ac-
tivity. Since various constellations in the balance between the resting state and external 
stimuli are possible, the brain’s neural activity can best be captured by a spectrum model 
that	has	room	for	configurations	between	purely	active	and	purely	passive	models	[…]” 
(Northoff, 2018, p. 21)
Neither the endogenous nor the exogenous stimuli determine the neuronal 
activity alone—instead, it is a mixture of both signals. Although the spectral mo-
del provides an empirically plausible model on the source of neuronal activity, 
it must be emphasised that it does not encompass a unifying theory of the brain 
as it does not explain how external stimuli, i.e. architecture, is directly related to 
neuronal activity, e.g. through TD and BU signals. For now, the spectral model 
served the purpose of linking body/brain to the environment on a neuronal le-
vel, bringing to light the fact that external stimuli, e.g. architecture, are reflected 
in neuronal activity.
Passive Active
sP mP wP wA mA sA
Mania DepressionHealthy
Figure 8.1—The spectral model, as suggested by Northoff  (2018). The spectral model holds that the norm oper-
ates within the yellow-range (mid) of  the spectre, displaying no extreme cases of  active or passive brains. Northoff  
suggests instead that extreme cases can be found in psychiatric disorders, where the balance tends one or the other 
extreme, e.g. active as depression and passive as mania (Northoff, 2018, p. 22). Strong passive model is here 
designated as sP, moderate passive as mP and weak passive as wP. Similarly, for active models of  the brain, the 
weak model is designated by wA, the moderate active as mA and strong active as sA. It is unfortunate that the 
taxonomy of  the models that best describe the general population, thus proposing strong models of  the brain, are 
termed the weak models of  the brain.
8.2 On a philosophical and psychological level
It is clear that external stimuli have an impact on neuronal activity—howe-
ver, to move beyond the neuronal level, one must question how do the brain and 
body interact with the environment beyond neuronal activity? Or to paraphrase 
Clark and Chalmers (1998); where does the mind stop and environment start? 
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This next part intends to argue that external features are actively exploited to 
improve cognitive organisation. The underlying argument is that self-organisati-
on on cellular and neuronal level extends beyond bodily barrier by dynamically 
externalise features relevant to cognitive processes into the environment. In other 
words, the same manner in which the cells and neurons act upon the active brain 
beyond their barrier, the brain acts upon the body through CNS and the body acts 
upon the environment. Cognition is ubiquitously present through all the stages. 
Although this is not entirely in line with the extended cognition hypothesis (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998), it does share the fact that cognition goes beyond body and 
brain. This has been met with criticism, which is here reviewed and answered as 
a defence of the externalisation of cognitive relevant features.
8.2.1 Coupling-constitution fallacy
How does the brain make use of the environment, if at all? In setting up the 
brain mesh (Chapter 7), it was argued that a necessary outcome of a DST approach 
means that the brain operates through interdependent rather than unidirectional 
dependent relations. While the brain and body are interdependently coupled, it is 
here argued that the environment enters a similar coupling with brain and body, 
so that the brain, body and environment are dynamically coupled constituting a 
system as a whole. The coupling to the environment is cast as extra-neuronal in 
the sense that cognitive processes make use of external interaction to succeed in 
a given task. A common critique of this position is the coupling-constitution (C-
C) fallacy by Adams and Aizawa (2009), which states that “coupling-arguments” 
to the environment are confusing causality with constitution (Aizawa, 2010). In turn, 
Adams and Aizawa promote a symbol-processing account for cognition so that 
semantic content is necessary for meaning (Adams and Aizawa, 2001).
Regarding the C-C fallacy, put in their own words: 
“The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which some 
object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, one sli-
des to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s 
cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.” (Adams and Aizawa, 2010, p. 
68; emphasis added)
What does this mean? To put it in an example, the C-C fallacy opposes that a 
frequently used notebook constitutes part of the memory because the notebook 
is not part of the cognitive process but instead causing a cognitive process (Adams 
and Aizawa, 2010). The fallacy was a reaction to two students of function, namely 
Clark and Chalmers and their active externalist Parity Principle that states:
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were 
it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive 
processes ain’t (all) in the head!” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 8; original emphasis)
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The issue at hand concerns whether coupling is constitutional or causal. If the 
environment takes part in a cognitive process, e.g. a notebook, do the environ-
ment compose that cognitive process, or is it causally coupled? To answer such a 
question, it is necessary to consider the difference between coupling (causality) and 
constitution. Coupling is a causal relation. A relation is coupled between two events 
or states if one produces the other. Pushing a button to turn on a screen is a causal 
relation, i.e. the pushing of the button caused the screen to turn on. However, 
constitution is a compositional relation. A relation is compositional if one event 
makes up another type. An example of compositional relation is that of water and 
H2O, i.e. the substance water is composed of H2O. Can it be said that H2O cause 
water, and can it be said that the pushing of the button composes the turning on of 
the screen? According to the C-C fallacy, coupling should not be confused with 
constitution so that the coupling of X with Y cause a cognitive process, does not 
mean that X and Y compose that cognitive process. The form of C-C fallacy can 
be unpacked as following (Aizawa, 2010):
1. C is a cognitive process.
2. E causally couple to C.
3. E is part of a cognitive process.
The reason for this critique is that causation and constitution are independent 
relations, where one does not tell us anything about the other. At the core of the 
fallacy lays a question on whether coupling includes composing. To answer this, 
Adams and Aizawa (2010, p. 68) propose that it is necessary to define a mark of 
the cognitive, because the nature of cognition will reveal whether causal relations 
also compose cognition. In other words, they are inquiring; when is something 
cognitive?
8.2.1.1 Objection 1: the mark of  the cognitive
Recall the characteristics of emergence, the dynamic approach and the mini-
mally decomposable networks to see an initial objection. Any internal mark of 
cognition seeks to reduce behavioural operations such as reasoning, memory, 
learning, concept formation, to the internal relations within the brain so that a 
process involving a plethora of variables can be fully decomposed. The C-C fal-
lacy and the desire for a cognitive marker are rooted in the spatial dimension of 
cognition so that the process itself is less important compared to where it occurs. 
This is particularly clear when directly asking “Which parts of the brain are doing cogni-
tive processing?” (Adams, 2010, p. 330). If acknowledging that decomposing is a spatial 
operation, it is easy to illustrate the difficulty of classifying a process because it 
is purely dynamical. Going backwards can be helpful, i.e. what can one remove 
from the process before it ceases to serve the cognitive purpose? Minsky’s quote 
comprises the difficulty in decomposing a process:
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“Why are processes so hard to classify? In earlier times, we could usually judge ma-
chines	and	processes	by	how	they	transformed	raw	materials	into	finished	products.	But	
it makes no sense to speak of brains as though they manufacture thoughts the way fac-
tories make cars. The difference is that brains use processes that change them-
selves—and this means we cannot separate such processes from the pro-
ducts they produce. In particular, brains make memories, which change the ways 
we’ll subsequently think. The principal activities of brains are making changes 
in themselves.” (Minsky, 1988, p. 288; emphasis added)
Neuronal processes are dynamic, influencing and being influenced by multiple 
external and internal variables, producing what that today is generally accepted as 
cognitive behaviour, namely reasoning, memory, learning, language processing, 
and concept formation, which are difficult to separate. The need for a mark of 
the cognitive is vaguely comparable to determining the mark of the ringing of a 
clock; is it the arm of the bell, the cave of the bell, the environment the bell is in 
or the auditory process? There is no ringing without the arm, neither without the 
cave of the bell nor the environment. The reducibility of a process to its parts to 
determine a mark misguides the understanding of that particular process. 
According to Ross and Ladyman (2010), investigating water by applying the 
C-C fallacy brings with it an important observation:
“The usual philosophical identity claim ‘water is H2O’ ignores a rich and subtle 
scientific	account	that	is	still	not	complete.	What	is	important	in	this	context	is	that	the	
causal–constitutive distinction dissolves because the kind water is an emergent feature of a 
complex dynamical system. It makes no sense to imagine it having its familiar properties 
synchronically. Rather, the water’s wetness, conductivity, and so on all arise because of 
equilibria in the dynamics of processes happening over short but nonnegligible time scales 
at the atomic scale. From the point of view of any attempted reductive explanation, the 
kind water is not held by physicists to be ‘constituted’ as opposed to ‘caused,’ because it 
is not a ‘substance’ in the classical metaphysical sense of that term. Instead, it is a kind 
of process explained as the result of emergent features of the interaction of atomic proper-
ties” (Ross and Ladyman, 2010, p. 160)
If the world is made of small bricks that are fully able to explain anything the 
bricks put together, then emerging properties remains a phenomenon. Water is 
wet, which is a property that emerges from the causal linkage between hydrogen 
and oxygen forming dihydrogen monoxide (water). Surely, in this sense, dihydro-
gen monoxide composes the wet water similar to the fact that dihydrogen monoxide 
causes it, despite the wetness is not an intrinsic property of neither hydrogen nor 
oxygen. The modern scientific account of water is not a matter made of smaller 
matters, but an emerging process particularly rooted in the emergent properties 
of hydrogen and oxygen. These dynamics are overlooked and goes by unacknow-
ledged, which is precisely what the second objection concerns.
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8.2.1.2 Objection 2: disregard of  the temporal 
dimension
This objection builds on Kirchhoff’s argument stating that synchronic constituti-
on cannot account for diachronic processes in dynamic patterns (Kirchhoff, 2015). 
When analysing the temporal aspect in analytical metaphysics, it becomes clear 
that a cognitive process is not a decomposable material that can clearly be mar-
ked, but rather a system that develops over different temporal frequencies linking 
reciprocally to other systems, which further entail inter- and intra-level dependent 
relations that operate at the level of local and global patterns. Instead of consi-
dering (1) C a cognitive process where an external entity couple to it, i.e. E does 
to C in (2), then the dynamic approach suggests that the reciprocal coupling of E 
and C constitute the cognitive mark Z. As Menary puts it: 
“The aim is not to show that artifacts get to be part of cognition just because they 
are causally coupled to a pre-existing cognitive agent, but to explain why X [E] and Y 
[C] are so coordinated that they together function as Z, which causes further behaviour.” 
(2006, p. 334)
This critique by Menary (2006) illustrates the static and synchronous under-
standing of cognition presented by Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2009, 2010) versus 
the dynamically diachronous processes of cognition. It is easy to demonstrate how 
diachronic processes can constitute cognitive processes, having already established 
the biological background in emergentism and integrated a DST perspective. In 
the synchronic constitution, time is subject to a form of reduction so that proces-
ses occur in a series of snapshots that synchronically attempts to initiate a process. 
On the other hand, diachronic constitutions are embedded in a dynamic system 
where time is continuous so that slowing any processes yields a change in either 
the lower-level processes or the higher-level phenomenon (Kirchhoff, 2015, p. 
325). Only when considering time as continuous and constitution as diachronic is 
it possible to establish a form of causal constitution as advocated by DST—which 
explains why cognitivists, computationalists and others who consider cognition as 
static, may run into, what Bergson would name, false problems. Because any chan-
ge in either the environment, brain or body will cause a change in the cognitive 
process, it is not possible to speak of a specific mark of cognition. Cognition is 
not a matter of difference in the degree of a boundary—it is a matter of different 
kinds of systems. As Bergson discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, discussing differences 
in degrees yields false problems. Given that Z itself unfolds dynamically, while 
being composed by process that unfold over different frequencies, the cognitive 
process changes in kind over time. For instance, the cognitive act of remembering 
the exact address of Museum of Modern Art (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) at time 
t is a different kind of cognitive process of remembering at time t+1. 
By having a causally constitutive coupling, any change to the parts of the sy-
stem will have an influence on the system as a whole—and thus, cognition, re-
ferring here to the process as a whole, is influenced by the environment of the 
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brain and body, just as the brain and body influence environment. Accepting this 
temporal dimension, a definition for their mark of cognition could be: anything 
with	an	influence	on	brain,	body	or	environment	may	partake	in	cognitive	processes.	Gallagher 
reaches a similar conclusion, i.e. cognition depend on the instantiation of certain 
dynamical couplings so that a specific kind of cognition would not arise were it 
not for the causal interaction that defines the system (2017, p. 10). Material un-
derstanding of constitution underplay time to a degree where it simply cannot 
account for dynamic systems giving rise to cognitive processes:
“If the notion of ‘time’ in synchronic accounts of material constitution entails that 
temporality itself is not essential to the constitutive nature of constituted entities, then the 
explanatory language of material constitution will be inappropriate for describing and 
explaining dynamical systems, and the way in which such systems give rise to distributed 
cognitive processes, that are temporal in their very essence.” (Kirchhoff, 2015, p. 325)
Kirchhoff further emphasises the importance of time in emergent processes:
“In emergence, if the relation between lower-level processes, Xs, and the higher-level 
emergent feature, Y, is diachronic (ontologically), then the relation of emergence is not 
ontologically synchronic—that is, it is not present in its entirety within a single time slice. 
In cases of diachronic emergence, the relata are commonly processes; and for processes 
to be what they are, they depend on spatiotemporal or causal continuity.” (Kirchhoff, 
2014, p. 92)
8.2.1.3 Objection	3:	the	butterfly	objection
The butterfly objection pursues to emphasise the level of global impact from 
local changes. Changes in local systems may cause severe changes in global sy-
stems, e.g. epileptic discharges that may cause a chain of reactions throughout the 
brain (see for instance; de Curtis and Avoli, 2010). Chaotic structures underline 
the difficulty in clearly delimiting natural complex processes, i.e. the wind pro-
duced by the wingbeat of a butterfly may cause a storm elsewhere. Delineating 
a complex process is what makes the butterfly objection relevant to cognition. 
Adams (2010) suggest that the C-C fallacy needs a mark of the cognitive to state 
whether a process is a cognitive or non-cognitive process, thus Adams questi-
on whether something is cognitive because it takes place within, or couple to, a 
cognitive system. What is at stake when insisting on defining what is not yet fully 
comprehended is the risk of reducing the phenomenon to simple, and potential-
ly misguiding, semantic concepts. Consider the following two examples for why 
letting semantics guide cognition might be misleading. 
First, although colours can be perceived as discrete, they are far from being 
so. For instance, in a rainbow, the colours do not form discrete limits but smooth 
and continuous changes in wavelengths, and yet, they are experienced as discrete 
stripes of different colours in the sky. Colours seem to be intellectually catego-
rised mental concepts that might have been dissociated for practical purposes, 
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e.g. colours of plants and fruits guide potential human interaction (Barrett, 2017, 
pp. 84–85). Also, facial expressions are intellectually categorised mental concepts 
that share no universal distinction across cultures. This thesis has been brought 
forward multiple times by various affectivity researchers (Gendron et al., 2014; 
Barrett, 2017). Realising the complexity of natural processes, or at least understan-
ding the limitations whenever suggesting a semantic concept to define a natural 
process, leads to a fuller understanding that eventually is more practical than re-
ducing a process to a culturally anchored concept. Reductionism is not wrong in 
science; it is necessary. However, one must understand the limits of the reducti-
on and not erroneously insist that the reduced concept may explain a full-blown 
natural process. In a nutshell, given the complexity of dynamic systems, it seems 
inappropriate to determine when cognitive processes start and end, and even mis-
leading to define the start/end by a semantic concept, i.e. a mark of the cognitive.
Second, Adams (2010, p. 325) argue that the fact that cognition has been inve-
stigated for so long without a precise definition is not an indication that cognition 
need no precise definition, but simply that science of X can arise before a con-
sensus on what X exactly is. To Adams’ surprise, there “[…] seemed to be a wealth 
of opinion that one doesn’t need a mark of the medical to practice medicine, or a mark of the 
biological to do biology, or a mark of the psychological to do psychology […]” (2010, p. 325). 
Adams believes there is a need for a mark that makes the field so that cognition is 
confined to the brain and body. It is difficult to follow this line of thought becau-
se e.g. plants do exhibit cognitive abilities, and yet plants are not a mark of the 
psychological (Gagliano, Abramson and Depczynski, 2018). However, it is clear 
that reductionism in science is necessary to investigate a particular process—yet, 
it must be accepted that a medical doctor and a plant do not belong to two se-
parable worlds that are mutually exclusive. In other words, one may distinguish 
between a gardener and a cognitive scientist, but a plant still seems to share with 
a human being comparable fundamental cognitive abilities as simple movement, 
i.e. geotropism, phototropism, chemotropism, and hydrotropism. The ability may 
be informative to cognitive scientists after all, as it may apply to human beings as 
well, thus questioning why cognition need to be confined to brain and body (Alpi 
et al., 2007; Garzón, 2007). As tempting as it may seem to centralise and force 
practical categorisation onto complex natural processes, it is not always the case 
that these concepts reflect delimited processes. It is precisely because they may be 
decentralised and more practical if delimited in multiple ways. The consequence 
might be, that results reflect the chosen categorisation just as much as the topic 
under investigation, and thus leads to circularity.
Ultimately, given the dynamic approach to the intricate natural process, one 
may question; can something be part of a process without being involved in 
composing it? It does not make sense to pose that elements, which may influen-
ce the system causally, do not constitute that system. If dynamic emergentism as 
a biological framework is accepted, then it is clear that the nature of cognition 
depends on the instantiation of dynamical (causal) coupling between brain, body 
and environment (Gallagher, 2017, p. 10).
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8.2.1.4 Is the C-C fallacy a threat?
It is important to recall the main difference between DST and computationa-
lists. The former handles cognition as relevant to time, while the latter handles 
cognition as symbol and information processing. When approaching cognition 
from DST, capacities such as reasoning, memory, language processing and con-
cept formation are not a matter of degree of complexity, so that phototropism either 
does or does not, make the cut for a cognitive mark. Instead, cognition is a matter 
of different kinds. The complexity of dynamic networks cannot be equated with 
linear laws where external stimuli produce identical network activity—however, 
some tendencies form over time, which is precisely why the networks can only 
be considered minimally decomposable. Instead of reducing cognition to a set of 
marks, where a process that “[…] rises to the level of the cognitive” (Adams, 2010, p. 
330) can be considered cognitive, then DST suggests that cognition belongs to the 
discussion of relative interaction and emergent properties (Fig. 8.2). In this sense, 
the C-C fallacy is ontologically not valid yielding no threat to the argument that 
cognition emerges from the interaction between brain, body and environment.
8.2.2 Learning from Tetris
When using an abacus for arithmetic, is one not outsourcing cognitive loads, 
and by doing so, externalising the cognitive process into the environment? One 
of the most convincing studies is the task of mentally versus physically rotating 
a zoid during Tetris (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992). According to Kirsh and Maglio, 
epistemic action can be distinguished from pragmatic action (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). 
Their infamous experiment displayed how it took significantly more time to reach 
a solution when mentally rotating the zoid coming down to an existing environ-
ment of zoids, as compared to physically rotating it (Fig. 8.3). Kirsh and Maglio 
argue that epistemic actions are performed to uncover information that are dif-
ficult to represent mentally, whereas pragmatic actions are performed to bring 
one physically closer to a goal (1994, p. 513). Translated to their experiment, the 
epistemic action is the rotation while the pragmatic action is to land the zoid in 
the organised environment. Experts in Tetris make excessive use of epistemic 
actions by externalising the rotation, i.e. physically rotating it. This kind of action 
Environment
Brain Body
! !
Figure 8.2—The triad describes how cognition emerges through the interaction between body, brain and environ-
ment. Physiological and perceptual investigations address body/brain-to-environment relations (dotted blue/dotted 
red)—however, the environment-to-body/brain impact remains largely understudied. The exclamation marks des-
ignate the links that are necessary to address to answer the research question, namely the link to the environment.
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serves to change the world (perception of the world) to facilitate a task, i.e. the 
world is actively changed to guide perception. Many movements involve episte-
mic extension on different levels throughout an average day, e.g. writing down a 
phone number or an address are basic epistemic actions, whereas sketching before 
painting, making a draft of a doctoral thesis, or the gestures used for warming up 
before a physical exercise are all advanced epistemic actions utilised to facilitate 
a pragmatic action.
Considering architectural transitions, are there epistemic or pragmatic acti-
ons? There certainly are pragmatic actions, as one practically moves through the 
transition—however, there are rarely epistemic actions. If, for instance, one wa-
kes up during the night to go to the bathroom, and it is too dark, epistemic acti-
ons through a tactile and auditory sensory act as an exploration that inform the 
agent about the environment (Gehrke et al., 2018). These are touches that aid the 
pragmatic action—however, there is a feature that precedes the epistemic acti-
on, namely the virtual action. Virtual actions are the possible interactions, given 
a physical structure, one may have with an environment, without necessarily un-
folding the actions, hence virtual. An example of how virtual actions interact with 
epistemic actions is the active use of the desk at the office, where unread articles 
are stacked on the left and read articles on the right. Virtually, all papers could be 
stacked on top of each other, but then the researcher must remember all the un-
read and read articles, which significantly increase the difficulty of the task. The 
epistemic act of organising the articles, using left and right, aids off-loading the 
cognitive process. When reorganising an apartment, the virtual actions encompass 
the possible scenarios the apartment could take, but the unfolding the physically 
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Figure 8.3— A. The zoids on top are the shapes that need to be rotated, where the dashed zoids represent the 
rotated possibilities. B. This is how the game unfolds. Tetris consists of  continuously falling zoids that show up 
one	at	a	time,	which	the	operator	must	rotate	and	fit	into	an	environment	at	the	bottom	of 	already	landed	and	
organised zoids. The goal of  the game is to organise the zoids so that a continuous horizontal line, from wall to 
wall, is established. The shaded bottom line is a full horizontal line, which then goes on to diminish.
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organising the apartment is the epistemic action. Virtual actions operate at the 
level of intention serving the epistemic action of placing something in a certain 
way in space to reduce expenses of neuronal currency. How does this relate to 
architectural transitions?
The body of the zoid and the affordances of the zoid-environment, which the 
zoid is embedded in, determines the process during the slow fall. In the human 
case, while approaching a door, the process of unfolding bodily actions approxi-
mates a bodily posture that fits the door. It is clear that the process of externali-
sing cognitive features to offload the cognitive process is fundamentally a process 
of action-perception, i.e. one changes what the world is perceived like by acting 
upon it to improve the conditions for the cognitive results according to the in-
tentions. The process of action-perception originates in the virtual actions, un-
folds as epistemic actions to fulfil pragmatic actions. In other words, the process 
of experiential transition (temporal) in architectural transition (spatial) is highly 
dependent on the interaction between action and perception and reflects the me-
chanics of externalising cognition furthermore. Although human beings have here 
been reduced to zoids and the architectural environment to a two-dimensional 
environment, it will be shown onward how action-perception is essentially how 
cognitive processes operate. It was shown here that the externalisation of virtual 
actions is essentially how the brain, body and environment couple on a psycho-
logical and philosophical level.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter set out to link environment to brain and body first on a neuro-
nal level and then on a philosophical and psychological level. The nature of the 
neuronal activity was shown to stem from an intertwining of spontaneous and 
stimulus-induced activity. This eventually yielded the spectral model of the brain, 
which suggests that the balance of endogenous, i.e. self-generated, and stimuli-in-
duced, i.e. built environment, activity reveals the psychiatric position of the brain 
in question. This approach ensures an empirically possible investigation of archi-
tecture as an external environment may be reflected in neuronal activity. 
The psychological and philosophical linkage of the environment to body/
brain unfolded through a defence of the parity-argument in the extended mind hypo-
thesis by Clark and Chalmers (1998). It was shown that the C-C fallacy is invalid 
with a dynamic and emergentist approach to cognition because there is necessa-
rily a temporal and diachronic dimension that dissolves the causal/constitutive 
relation. It seems that the process of cognition goes beyond the spatial character. 
Interestingly, it appears that the link between brain/body and environment un-
folds through the basic feature of action-perception, which was precisely dictated 
by Bergson, Husserl, Damasio and Varela. There are good reasons to believe that 
the way the environment enters the process of cognition is through the process 
of action-perception.
With that said, when revisiting the research question of the thesis, two dimen-
sions need to be addressed, namely the architectural transition and the experiential 
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transition. The issue at hand becomes how architectural transition, as an external 
stimulus, has an impact on the experience. Keeping in mind that neuronal activi-
ty itself has not been stated to reflect experience; in fact, such would amount to 
unfortunate radical epiphenomenalism. It is for this reason that the phenomen-
ological conditions were set up; to attempt to establish an empirical framework 
that does not reduce the phenomenological nature of experience. Instead, the 
next challenge is to understand how the experience of the environment enters the 
action-perception process. How is the environment experienced?  How does the 
environment imprint itself in cognition via action-perception? It is unknown to 
which degree architecture can influence neuronal activity and even more critical; it 
is unknown what kind of influence architecture can have on neurophysiological 
balances. 
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Summary. What are the roles of  action and perception in experience and cognition, and 
are these internally represented? It was shown in the prior chapter that the environment 
as an external stimulus is reflected in neuronal response and that cognitive pro-
cesses externalise elements relevant to cognitive operations. This chapter remains 
on a philosophical level and targets experience of  architecture from a cognition 
perspective. In this chapter, the notion experience in architectural experience is ad-
dressed via an enactive account, i.e. sensorimotor contingency (SMC), to introduce 
SMC and to investigate whether SMC is a representational or non-representati-
onal account of  basic cognition. Eventually, this will guide the direction of  the 
empirical framework. It is found that SMC casts perceptual experience as emer-
ging from the active structure of  change in the sensory signals. SMC dictates that 
cognition emerges from the coupling of  brain, body and environment, where the 
link to the environment is critical. Earlier accounts of  the coupling have argued 
the interaction to be based on internal representations of  the world. However, 
through action-perception, an internal representation of  the environment is unne-
cessary, suggesting a non-representational account of  the causal coupling instead.
9.1 On action and internal representation
As the contemporary debate on mental representation is complex, the pre-
valent implications are sorted out and used to generate a list of conditions that 
Sensorimotor contingency and 
representations in the brain
CHAPTER 9
“Seeing is directed to the world, not the brain.”
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 962)
“We go wherever we are looking.”
(Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 67)
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a representation must fulfil to be considered a representation at all. The kind of 
representation that is addressed is only relative to action-perception, i.e. whether 
action needs representation in an action-perception approach to the coupling to 
the environment. In phenomenological words, whether the protention prior to 
action, or the potential action itself, is representational. Since it was established in 
Chapter 7 and 8 that the process of action-perception could be considered very 
basic, the task at hand is to investigate whether a representation is necessary for 
basic cognition1. 
What is meant by mental representation in action? Because there is no agre-
ement on what mental representation is, various philosophers generate different 
conditions for a representation. Whether there is any mental representation when 
asked to reproduce the route from the office to the café mentally, is beyond this 
discussion. In the present discussion, the immediate action-related experience is 
of concern. Similar to intentionality and representation is their concern of physi-
cal and mental contents, e.g. qualia. They are also thought to be related not only 
because they hold the feature of pointing, so that the world is pointed to through 
internal mediators, but also because they are about a variety of things, e.g. proper-
ties, abstractions and relations. Any form of representation includes a series of 
complex processes to make the content to be internally represented. As Ramsey 
(2007, p. 16) states: “My belief that Columbus is the capital of Ohio is about Ohio, its seat 
of government, the city of Columbus, and the relation between these things.” For instance, the 
complexity of belief in representationalism; it is a complex operation that refers 
to logical propositions, i.e. to believe in having learned that architecture is a crucial 
discipline to understand cognition is a fact that is stored in memory, from which 
it is then retrieved, accessed or recalled when necessary—in other words, a beli-
ef is a propositional knowledge that holds a truth-value, in contrast to pragmatic 
knowledge. Believing is not an immediate operation at the level of action-per-
ception, and it is precisely the immediacy of action-perception that makes it such 
a basic feature of cognition. Although belief can be used in various contexts, it 
is yet one thing that a particular space appears marine-blue and another thing 
that one deduces the colour, i.e. one is immediately given while the other takes a 
1 Only representation relative to action-perception are discussed, any approach involving cognition and repre-
sentations, such as Fodor’s representational theory of  mind (Fodor, 1987) or Marr’s approach (Marr, 1982) are 
not considered. Such approaches have been sorted out during the discussion of  DST, decomposability and 
global-to-local effects, as incompatible with biological brain and body structures. This is not to deny that the 
mental does not involve language and symbols operations, but that language and symbols are helpful only on a 
highly advanced class of  high cognitive processes. This investigation concerns the complexity of  pre-linguistic 
organization of  experience, which is arguably devoid of  language and symbols, and instead organized and 
driven by action and perception. Believing that language and symbols are necessary to understand the world, 
is stating that language and symbols precede action; that one could talk before acting. Berthoz and Petit name 
these approaches crypto-dualism. In space, things happen outside, and mental representations inside. In time, 
stimulus comes first, then the percept. In causal order, first come cause, e.g. an event, then comes effect, e.g. 
visual representation (Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 15).
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2 Refers to the cortical process of  the integration of  the sensory and motor systems.
logical propositional attitude. Both the protention and virtual action are knowing 
how and take part in immediate consciousness, making it difficult to declare either 
one as representational.
Why is representationalism a critical subject for the current research question? 
Recall the quandary introduced in Chapter 3. If the brain constructs the world 
through representation, our investigation must necessarily take a representati-
on-related turn, including locating the content in perception such as qualia, which 
consequently impose a computational-approach neglecting the dynamic nature of 
cellular organisation and cognition (Chapter 7 and 8). It would include locating 
perception as a re-reality in the brain. Even if there is no re-reality representation 
in the brain, but instead states that are semantically evaluable (Adams, 2010), the 
brain still faces a loci-oriented approach that is criticised hitherto—however, by 
taking a DST approach and attempt to understand the sensorimotor2 relations to 
cognitive processes, it may be shown that there is no representation in the brain 
neither in action nor in basic cognition. 
Many have found it necessary to solve representation through action, giving 
rise to motor representations as the link between action and the outcome of that ac-
tion (Butterfill, 2014). This approach still serves the claim that the only objective 
of mental states is to represent, i.e. mental states only exists as representations. 
An example is action-oriented representation as described by Clark (1997, p. 49): 
“representations that simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe possible actions, 
and are poised between pure control structures and passive representations of external reality.” 
These action-representations display the idea in question addressed in the next 
parts. Exactly how does the environment emerge from action-perception, or more 
precisely, how does an architectural transition emerge from action-perception? 
Recall that architectural transitions are reduced to their properties of forms and 
shapes, where, e.g. colours, lights, texture, are not considered. To simplify even 
further, only the visual contribution to perception is taken into account. Seeing 
the colour dark green is different from seeing the colour red, but not too different 
from light green. Why is that? It may be tempting to say that the green colours are 
close in wavelengths stimulating similar neuronal processes and thus giving rise 
to similar percepts, but since there is no a priori reason for why neuronal activity 
should generate experiences, this cannot be regarded as a valid answer. Is experi-
ence reducible to the little space between neurons, namely the synapses (Appendix 
B), as LeDoux (2003) suggested? Even if assuming that different neurotransmit-
ters give rise to different experiences, there is the question of why and how these 
neurotransmitters give rise to precisely those experiences. 
To reassure, representation in perceptual experience refers to the hard pro-
blem of qualia (Chalmers, 1996). Quale is usually exemplified as a phenomenal, 
qualitative and subjective experience of colour—however, does quale include 
shape and form? The hard problem of form is rarely mentioned as part of quale. 
Analysing form as a function of time, Robbins manages to encapsulate the essence 
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of inquiring temporal questions, rather than spatial, relative to quale (2007, p. 24). 
Although Robbins argues for a holographic theory of perception, the strategic 
approach is admirable. Robbins introduces an experiment, namely a rotating cube 
with varying speeds. When the speed is strobed in phase with its symmetry period, 
it is perceived as a rigid cube. When it is strobed out-of-phase breaking the tempo-
ral constraint that the perceptual system is constrained to, the cube is perceived as 
wobbly (Robbins, 2007, pp. 5–6). The example is comparable to the reverse-rota-
tion effect, i.e. when a wheel spins at a specific frequency, it is perceived as rota-
ting backwards. Form and shape can undoubtedly be considered as phenomenal, 
qualitative and subjective experiences equivalent to the notion qualia. 
In architecture, form has indubitably a significant role. The nature of form 
emerges from any edge-like perceptual behaviour that is subject to the figu-
re-ground organisation in perceptual grouping, e.g. colour differences, lines and 
general geometric forms. Shapes emerge from differences in patterns during any 
change in perspective causing a sense of shape and form appropriate to the per-
ceptual apparatus. Shape and form cannot emerge from their simple occurrence. 
Thus, from these observations, the claim is that the qualitative character of expe-
rience is not a matter of static states of something, but directly a consequence of 
the action-perception process. Experience is an active, qualitative feature, leaving 
nothing to a static spatial character, such as a colour or a shape. As put forward 
by O’Regan and Noë: 
“Qualia are meant to be properties of experiential states or events. But experiences, 
we have argued, are not states. They are ways of acting. They are things we do. There 
is no introspectibly available property determining the character of one’s experiential 
states, for there are no such states. Hence, there are, in this sense at least, no (visual) 
qualia. Qualia are an illusion, and the explanatory gap is no real gap at all […] Our 
claim, rather, is that it is confused to think of the qualitative character of experience in 
terms of the occurrence of something (whether in the mind or brain). Experience is 
something we do and its qualitative features are aspects of this activity.” (2001, p. 960; 
original emphasis). 
Since there are no states in experience but only dynamics, the explanatory 
gap3, thus, does not exist. Experience has a qualitative character that depends 
on the forms of activity, which relate to environment-involving interactions, but 
there is no explanatory gap equivalent to qualia as described; this is a false pro-
blem (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 169). The feeling of what something is like (Nagel, 
1974) is here argued to stem from the activity in the dynamics of the sensorimo-
tor integration. This hardly seems as a novel idea since the practical synthesis in 
3 “One of  the central philosophical debates surrounding qualia concerns the question whether qualia can be studied by means of  
traditional biological and cognitive science. It has been suggested on this point that there is an unbridgeable ‘explanatory gap,’ that 
it is not possible to explain the subjective, felt aspects of  experience in behavioral, physical, or functional terms.” (O’Regan and 
Noë, 2001, p. 960)
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Husserlian phenomenology is a forerunner to this idea. Before drawing the pa-
rallels to Husserl, the conditions of a representation is here taken into account.
9.1.1 Conditions of  representation
As it turns out, several definitions of representation in action explain the relati-
on between body, brain and environment. Instead of focussing on a set of defini-
tions by a single author, the recurrent conditions by numerous authors are exami-
ned to get a holistic aspect of the issue. The conditions closely follow Gallagher’s 
(2017, chap. 5) outset of representations of Rowlands (2006, pp. 5–10), Wheeler 
(2005, chap. 8.2), Orlandi (2014, p. 9), Hutto and Myin (2013, chap. 1) and Clark 
(1997, pp. 47–49). The various definitions range from representations being ex-
clusively internal, discrete, content bearing with reference for something else, re-
quiring interpretation and decouplability from the context. Recall that the repre-
sentation in question is related to action.
The following definition of representation stems from carefully reading the 
mentioned authors to include the recurrent/chronic principles. First, there is con-
sensus about representation standing in informationally for something else, taking 
a mediator role within a system. This has been referred to as the representatio-
nal constraint, that is, to be representational it must carry information about so-
mething other than itself. Consequently, the representation calls for interpretation 
as in symbols and signs, which necessarily calls for propositional knowledge. In 
the context of action, this means that the chains of reactions are not causal but 
communicative, i.e. the body schematic process when walking through an archi-
tectural transition is a process of a moment to moment interpretation of actions 
to understand the limb positions in space.  
Second, besides interpretation, a representation must be teleological; that is, 
it must track or hold a specific function towards the represented, similar to how 
a thermometer tracks the temperature of a space. To this end, the thermostat can 
be said to represent the temperature of the space. This constraint sets forth the 
frozen static and discrete ontology of representation. In the context of action, a 
discrete view suggests that the just-passed (retention) is processed independently 
of the about-to (protention) in the sense that these two moments are communica-
tive rather than causal.
Finally, if something is representational, it is decouplable from that something, 
so that something can be represented even in the absence of that something. In 
the context of action, decouplability is the argument that an action can be detached 
from perceptual and proprioceptive input. This constraint sets forth the need for 
decouplability in representation (Gallagher, 2017, p. 99). In sum4:
1. Informational mediator.
2. Discrete duration.
3. Decouplability.
4 The points further resemble those summed up by Gallagher (2017, p. 99).
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All points are interrelated given they follow a computationalists approach to 
cognition. This is necessarily in conflict with the hitherto established dynamic 
nature of the biological properties. In the next part, Husserl’s practical synthesis 
is linked with a sensorimotor perspective of enactivism inference and hereafter 
compared to these three conditions for representation in action. 
9.1.2 Husserl’s practical synthesis
Husserl argued that perception is practical, making it irreducible to sensory 
events or parts. Instead, it must be grasped in its entirety since perception is not 
given in separated forms (Chapter 5). It is immediate and pregnant with its form, 
devoid of intellectual processes as in deciphering and intermediate inferences of 
what each sign may signify. The immediacy covers the transcendental dimension 
of perception, namely that one perceives more than given. It was concluded in 
Chapter 5 and 6 that this was due to the anticipatory process of visual percepti-
on involving fulfilment of intention as action unfolds. The predictive feature of 
perception is arguably the root of the impression of seeing every detail in visual 
perception as if one can read this page from a mental representation. 
The counter-intuitive trait of transcendental and non-representational percep-
tion is the feeling of being able to see it all, even without a picture-like internal 
representation. According to Husserl, it is tempting to believe that at first glance 
one can see all the details of the visual scene, but this is explicable as a practical 
synthesis. 
“As you look at a visual scene, you can interrogate yourself about different aspects 
of the scene. As soon as you do so, each thing you ask yourself about springs into aware-
ness, and is perceived—not because it enters into a cortical representation, but because 
knowledge is now available about how sensations will change when you move your eyes, 
or move the object” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 946). 
The visual scene is readily there for the observing agent, who, with a healthy 
pair of eyes, knows how to actively generate saccades or movement and see what 
is of interest, and thus bringing that detail to visual perception.
The appearance that one perceives all is similar to the investigation of frid-
ge-light; is it always on? When opening the refrigerator, the light is on—even af-
ter closing it, then opening it again, the light is yet on. If one wants to see if the 
light is on, one simply opens the fridge. Analogically, “[…] the	visual	field	seems	to	
be	continually	present,	because	the	slightest	flick	of	the	eye,	or	of	attention,	renders	it	visible” 
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 947). Interestingly, bringing a visual detail to atten-
tion is a practical task as it involves eye saccades.
Nevertheless, beyond eye saccades, the transcendental dimension of percep-
tion holds also for other sensory organs:
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“Let’s return again to simple examples. You hold a bottle in your hand. You feel 
the whole bottle. But you only make contact with isolated parts of its surface with iso-
lated parts of the surface of your hands. But don’t you feel the whole bottle as present? 
That is, phenomenologically speaking, the feeling of presence of the bottle is not a conje-
cture or an inference. The feeling you have is the knowledge that movements 
of the hand open up and reveal new aspects of bottle surface. It feels to you 
as if there’s stuff there to be touched by movement of the hands. That’s what the feeling 
of the presence of the bottle consists in. But the basis of the feeling, then, is not 
something occurring now. The basis rather is one’s knowledge now as to 
what one can do.” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 963; emphasis added)
The sense of touch, and getting a full haptic grasp of the bottle, is guided by 
the visual sense as it continues to extend beyond the currently given interaction 
with the bottle. The feeling of fully grasping the bottle is not due to being in full 
haptic contact with the bottle, but because the visual sense assures that if the agent 
wishes to interact with other parts, it is readily there. The interaction gives rise to 
a feeling of transcendence in perception, which is precisely the phenomenon ne-
cessary to understand in architectural transitions because it seems sensory predicts 
the environment using prior experiences during movement. Recall the architec-
tural quandary, i.e. whether space B is experienced in the same way when approa-
ched from space A compared to space C. In this sense, the point of departure in the 
approaching of the experiencing agent is different environments that give rise to 
different predictions. Not because the environments are represented differently 
in the brain, but because the predictions in the practical synthesis are different; 
one has the knowledge about which bodily parts to move to modify the sensory 
input bringing one closer to the next space. In other words, the continuous per-
ception of transitioning in space is strictly a matter of how the body schema and 
future actions in that space, i.e. knowing how. 
This is not different from other observations insofar, e.g. Bergson introduced 
virtual actions, Husserl introduced practical synthesis and horizonal intentionality, 
whereas the DST/DH approach offered an action-perception process encoura-
ging a radical embodied cognitive science, and finally, epistemic actions were intro-
duced as a type of action, which extends mental operations into the environment. 
Beyond the sensorimotor system as the integration of sensory and motor system, 
which unfolds in the brain, the claim is as summed in Berthoz and Petit: “We are 
going to claim that the brain is essentially an organ for action, whereas others hold that 
on the contrary, the brain is an organ of representation. Many have concluded that the 
basic division is between those who hold the view of representation for action, and those who 
hold the contrary view, of action for representation” (Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 1; 
emphasis added). In Bergsonian spirit; the division between representationalists 
and non-representationalists can be set out as the difference between those who 
hold the brain is a master of representation or a master of action. Enactivism casts 
the body and brain as masters of action and taking a non-representational positi-
on that emphasises the importance of action-perception for cognitive processes. 
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9.2 What is enactivism?
Enactivism was coined the first time in 1991 by Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
(2016, p. 173), suggesting the origin of cognition to be in the action-perception 
process so that cognition ultimately emerges from sensorimotor patterns that 
enacts a world. Put briefly, the world is understood through senses and the spe-
cific laws that govern that specific sensory modality, which differ in characteristic 
structure from modality to modality, e.g. visual to auditory. Similar to all senses 
is their dynamics of being enacted in the sense that BU sensory signals are met 
by TD predictions that are based on the history of the structural coupling. Varela 
and colleague’s early enactivism introduce the idea of sensorimotor dependen-
cies (2016, p. 172). Interestingly, they go on to dismiss the (discrete) truth-ness 
of idealism and realism, because they take the notion of representation to reflect 
truth-value. This rejection is precisely like that of Bergson and Husserl; the lines 
of arguments add up. Perception holds no truth-value but depends strictly on 
the dynamics of the sensorimotor contingency pattern that may be taken as per-
ceptual experience (O’Regan and Noë, 2001). Enactivism has ever since grown 
considerably and developed into 4E-cognition (Newen, De Bruin and Gallagher, 
2018). The ism itself is not of interest, but the principles covering the coupling5 
of experience between the world and body are of major importance towards an 
empirical theory. 
To demonstrate how perception is interlinked to action, take perception and 
action independently into regard6. The emerging problem of perception is that since 
the brain does not have direct access to causes of the sensation, it must infer the 
origin. For instance, the visual sensory signal of white may be caused by staring 
into the wall at Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art by Steven Holl, or facing 
another wall in Kunsten Museum of Modern Art by Alvar Aalto, but indeed not a 
Rothko painting. Each of these examples attenuates experience in each their way 
when acting in the respective environment—thus the experiences of whiteness 
(or non-whiteness) are not comparable. In other words, the perception problem 
is to infer the source of the sensory signal. 
The problem of action refers to being able to infer causes of sensation and the 
consequences of actions from only operating with sensory signals. In enactivism, 
the basic feature of perception and action linking in a manner where they hardly 
can be separated may be termed basic cognition. Basic cognition is constituted 
by and understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated orga-
nismic activity relative to action and perception (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 11). 
Both problems highlight the same issue but from different points of view. They 
are arguably identical. One problem forms the solution of the other, and this is 
5 The coupling is the action-perception process that deeply integrates one with the other so that they are 
inseparable, and essentially, separating two philosophies of  science, namely intellectualists and dynamicists. 
6 The problem of  perception and the problem of  action are two extremely important notions for the upcoming 
chapter, which seek to resolve firstly the problem of  perception by setting an inferential model of  the world, 
and hereafter apply an “update” of  the inference by resolving the problem of  action.
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precisely what O’Regan and Noë advocates in the sensorimotor coupling. 
9.2.1 Sensorimotor coupling > Representation
In their seminal paper, O’Regan and Noë present a general framework to vi-
sual consciousness (2001). The problem they address is related to qualia, that is, 
the hard problem of experience relative to neural activity. O’Regan and Noë argue 
that although the brain maps the spatial position of the body through place-cells 
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1979; Moser, Kropff and Moser, 2008), the neural activity 
cannot explain the quality of the experience of being somewhere. This is an im-
portant statement relative to architecture and the research question. The central 
thesis in O’Regan and Noë’s proposal is a sensorimotor contingency (SMC) approach, 
which is ultimately an approach that is based on DST focusing on the change of 
pattern instead of the state of the pattern itself. Vision in SMC becomes an active 
exploration of the world through sensorimotor contingencies, thus usually refer-
red to as an actionist approach. 
”Actionism is committed to the idea that perception is active, but not in the sense that 
it requires that one move. What is required is that one understand the relevance of move-
ment to action, and that one knows what would happen if one were to move. Perception 
is active, according to the actionist, in the same way that thought is active. We exercise 
our sensorimotor understanding when we see.” (Noë, 2010, p. 247)
Consider the first condition for a representational account, namely that of in-
ternal representation as propositional knowledge, i.e. informational mediator. To 
properly unpack SMC against this condition, it is necessary to evoke Ryle (1945) 
and the difference between propositional knowledge (intellectual) and practical 
knowledge (intuitive). Ryle distinguished between knowing-that and knowing-how, 
and states that knowing-how necessarily precedes knowing-that because knowing-how 
cannot be defined in terms of knowing-that, but only vice versa. That is, the intui-
tive knowledge is logically prior to the intellectual (Ryle, 1945, pp. 4–5). 
“Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra information but being 
able to perform an intelligent operation. Knowing a rule is knowing how. It is 
realised in performances which conform to the rule, not in theoretical ci-
tations of it.” (Ryle, 1945, p. 7; emphasis added). 
According to O’Regan and Noë, the kind of knowledge in SMC is not propo-
sitional, but practical, in the sense that the perceiver knows how to interact with 
the percept; it is a skilful deployment of specialised practical knowledge relative 
to the sensory organ. It is knowing “the ways in which stimulation in a certain sense 
modality changes, contingent upon movements or actions of the organism” (Hutto and Myin, 
2013, p. 25). SMC’s account of action-perception does not comply with the first 
condition for representation. 
SMC does not comply with the second condition either, namely that of 
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discrete duration. This can be shown by drawing parallels from Husserlian passi-
ve synthesis, and the fulfilling of intention in experience and perception to SMC, 
i.e. retention and protention are necessarily respected in SMC. The physiologist 
Alain Berthoz comments on action and intention in a manner that complies with 
Husserl’s initial account:
“What is brought into play in the preliminary phases of the micro-genesis of the ac-
tion is not just an accumulation of energy awaiting the moment of release but rather the 
formation of an intention before the occurrence of the movement; that is, 
of a sense content that would make of this movement something more than simply a mo-
vement: a motor behaviour, but precisely an ‘action’ directed towards a goal.” 
(Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 62; emphasis added)
In other words, the protention becomes the immediate prediction in action 
necessarily linking any continuous action dynamically. There cannot be any action 
before the forming of an intention to act which extends dynamically over time, 
i.e. it naturally streams towards the retention that forms the prior experiences, 
which in turn adjust normality used to form future protentions. This is how the 
passive synthesis forms a practical abductive loop. 
On a neuronal level, anticipative activity has been measured at least since the 
discovery of the readiness-potential (Libet et al., 1983), that is, cortical activity be-
fore action. The difference on a neuronal level between the representational and 
non-representational account of cognition in action is that the connections in the 
sophisticated connectivity of the brain are affected causally by chemical proces-
ses, as opposed to representational communicative processes (Gallagher, 2017, 
p. 101). “The dynamical process […] does not require the idea that one discrete part of the 
mechanism interprets in isolation (or off-line) the information presented by another part. Rather, 
the protentional/anticipatory aspect that characterizes action itself, on the dynamical model, fun-
ctions only in relation to the ongoing, online, project-determined coupling with the environment” 
(Gallagher, 2017, p. 102). Given the dynamic and self-organising continuous cau-
sation in the temporal structure, there cannot be static/frozen moments during 
action/perception7. In fact, actions can be fallible precisely because perception 
can be misenacted, e.g. the step was a bit taller, the door was not that wide or the 
space was lighter than anticipated. 
Regarding the third condition on decouplability, there is a misconception of 
the feature with regards to action. Re-enacting an action, i.e. to remember or si-
mulate the action of walking through a transition, may require representation—
but this says nothing about representation in the immediate and intuitive action 
(Gallagher, 2017, p. 91). Any immediate action preparation is not only physical-
ly linked to the current environment but also to the current body schema and 
7 Needless to state that Bergson built the very fundament of  his philosophical framework precisely on the 
impossibility of  movement in spatialised time, which is precisely the founding idea of  static time-evolution in 
cognition. 
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current task. The criticism of the second condition elucidates the continuity in 
action so that any immediate action is not decouplable from neither the current 
environment nor the retained or protentive properties of that action. The percep-
tual and proprioceptive inputs are part of the unfolding of the continuous action. 
Therefore, SMC does not comply with the third condition either.
9.2.2 Perceptual experience in architectural experience
The SMC approach to experience helps de-mystifying experience, so the gap 
between natural sciences and social sciences is reduced, allowing a reach from one 
to another. For architecture, closing the gap is to extend architectural research 
from pure phenomenological descriptions to experimenting and constructing the-
oretical frameworks that embrace the complexity in architecture. If one continues 
to restrict architectural experience to quale one is failing to accept the non-exi-
stence of qualitative properties. This is not to say that subjective experiences are 
illusory; the perceptual experience of red is explicable through SMC, but the pheno-
menological subjective experience is not accessible by others. The subjective experi-
ence is confined to the experiencer alone. Nonetheless, architectural experience 
occurs over time and space:“[…] experience is shaped by a heterogeneous environment, as a 
perspectival deformation that is continuously synthesized in temporal transitions—the fundament 
of architectural experience is that of a continuously heterogeneous environment.” (Djebbara, 
Fich and Gramann, 2019, p. 271)
The perceptual experiences have insofar been (methodologically) restricted to 
phenomenological descriptions on a personal level. SMC offers a novel way of 
understanding the perceptual experience, namely through action, which in itself 
is a phenomenological turn: 
“[Phenomenology] demonstrates the wide-ranging features of experience through 
reflections	on	 the	experience	 itself,	by	not	restricting	experience	 to	representation	and	
perception. In fact, phenomenology teaches an important lesson on human experience 
by emphasizing time as a necessity for experience (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, chap. 
4). Merleau-Ponty et al. (1968, p. 29) underlines that from feeling and vision will be 
retained only what animates and sustains them, meaning that perceptual experience is 
what enables a continuity, a passage from one moment to another. Experience as such 
does not become a matter of ‘knowing’ and rationally untangling the depth of percepti-
on. Rather, experience develops from perception as ‘in action’ and thereby, attributing 
perception a primacy due to its bodily relation (Merleau-Ponty and Edie, 1964, pp. 
12–13).” (Djebbara, Fich and Gramann, 2019, p. 266)
The idea of quale holds back architecture from natural sciences—thus, if SMC 
holds true, architectural research may encounter a wave of novel research that is 
based on sensorimotor dynamics enlightening the perceptual experiences of ar-
chitectural settings. The temporal approach to experience disregards the spatial 
character of experience, shifting the focus towards dynamics. Instead of spatial 
character (quale), the rules of change in action become the perceptual experiences 
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that are free of any representation. If actions entailed representations then to 
answer the research question, the approach necessarily needs to be representa-
tion-oriented, which entails investigating the brain as a centre of representation 
instead of action. Hitherto, it seems that action entails no representation but ope-
rates through a dynamic (causal) relation with perception. In sum, SMC provides 
a non-representational approach that rearranges how an experience should be 
conceived and determines the direction of the empirical framework. 
9.3 Conclusion
The radical argument in SMC is that the dynamics, or the law governing the 
sensory apparatus, is the experience. O’Regan and Noë refer to the dynamics that 
give rise to experience as the structure of changes (2001), highlighting the importance 
of the temporal structure in an experience. SMC offers not only an account of 
the action-perception process as non-representational dynamic coupling but also 
a philosophically and physiologically bound theory, paving the way for a range 
of serious investigations in the mysterious field of human experience. In many 
ways, it seems that perception can almost be entirely summed, as the possibility 
for the brain to extract from the environment information relevant to action. To 
use Bergson’s term; to perceive is to anticipate the virtual interaction. Not only 
does SMC fit perfectly into the DST/DH approach, but it also complies with 
Bergsonian and Husserlian principles on immediacy and dynamicism, and the 
relation between action and perception. In brief, Bergson, Husserl, Damasio, 
Thompson and Varela all suggest that action and perception are so intimately in-
terwoven, they cannot be fully separated; they depend on one another in a circular 
causal manner. Bergson directly suggests “[…] the truth is that perception is no more in 
the sensory centres than in the motor centres” (2004, p. 43), while Husserl suggests that 
kinesthetic synthesis and fulfilling an intention make up a system of action and 
perception over time (Chapter 5 and 6). 
However, SMC has not been able to offer a detailed structure of practical 
knowledge in the relation between action and perception. A representationalist 
may rightfully criticise SMC for not being able to bring an appropriately detailed 
description of the practical knowledge and how it links over time. Undoubtedly, 
the dynamic coupling is describable as above, but what is needed is an explicit and 
direct description of the practical inferential link that governs the action-percep-
tion system—otherwise, SMC offers an ideal/abstract and inefficient solution to 
action-perception. As such, SMC is meaningless with regards to the construction 
of an empirical framework. To properly amount to an empirical framework, the 
problem of perception and the problem of action must be grabbed by their horns and 
handled. The question is; how does the active inference of action-perception un-
fold? This was recently answered in a methodological paper by Djebbara, Fich 
and Gramann: “The non-radical claim is that investigations in action-perception are able to 
provide a better understanding of how architecture affects and shapes our experiences. We thus 
set out to understand the advancement of movements, through active inferences and affordances” 
(Djebbara, Fich and Gramann, 2019, p. 269).
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Summary. How does the actual process of  action-perception unfold? SMC claimed 
to provide a non-representational account of  the action-perception process 
but lacked an explicit and direct description of  the practical inferential link that 
governs the process. How the active inference of  action-perception unfolds is 
surprisingly well described in Bayesian cognitive science. Unbeknownst among 
architects, Bayesian cognitive science has recently proven outstanding in terms of  
describing cortical responses and human behaviour. This chapter goes beyond phi-
losophy and takes a deep dive into computational neuroscience. Applying Friston’s 
active inference to action and perception highlights the dynamics in the practical 
inferential link between experiencing agent and environment. Furthermore, the 
links between enactivism, Bergsonian virtual action, Husserlian temporality, and 
active inference are highlighted to demonstrate the similarities and thus compli-
ances. This chapter suggests that Bayesian cognitive science may pave the way 
for a new field of  architectural research, namely a form of  architectural cogni-
tion where cognition is enacted by virtual actions that are offered in a designed 
environment. Important terms that will be unpacked include Hidden Markov 
Models, generative model, Jensen’s formal description of  inequality (variational 
free energy), Kullback-Leibler Divergence and action policies (virtual actions). 
A Bayesian cognitive neuroscience:
Active Inference
CHAPTER 10
“Probability theory is nothing
but common sense reduced to calculation.”
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827)
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10.1 Generation Predictive Mind
Throughout the recent years, a trend towards a predictive mind has emerged 
from both philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. It was recently revived as a mo-
del for visual perception under the name Predictive Coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999), 
where hierarchical layers couple through top-down (TD) and bottom-up (BU) 
signals, encoding prediction and prediction-errors (PEs) and further weighted by 
their precision. However, the predictive and hypothesis-testing approach to the 
brain has been hypothesised for many years using different terms (von Helmholtz 
and Southall, 1962; Gregory, 1980; Frith, 2009). Generally, the Bayesian appro-
ach to modelling holds that cognitive processes depend on predictions that are 
based on inferential models. Since Predictive Coding, various kinds of Bayesian in-
ferential models have been developed, for instance, predictive processing (Clark, 
2015), predictive mind (Hohwy, 2013) and active inference (Friston, 2010). Their 
common denominator is the generative1 Bayesian model, which can be briefly 
summed up as the probability of an event to take place based on prior knowled-
ge regarding conditions relative to the event (for a brief walk-through of Bayes’ 
theorem see Appendix D). This chapter deals specifically with active inference, 
which is a rewriting of the free energy principle as applied to action-perception.
10.2 Framework of  Free Energy Principle (FEP)
This chapter builds around the problem in perception (inferring the sensory 
outcome) and in action (planning which actions are appropriate to solve the per-
ception problem). Both problems were pointed out in Chapter 9. The outline of 
this subsection is to provide an overview of the theoretical ground by firstly re-
solving the problem of perception, i.e. how perception emerges from a process 
of minimising free energy, by giving a walk-through of how one may apply Bayes 
theorem to infer sensory signals. FEP displays ingenuity in the resolving of the 
intractable problem of too many hidden states—FEP suggests that free energy 
can be used as an approximation. Second, a resolving of how the action policies2 
emerge parallel to perception is added to the equation—here, the links to enacti-
vism, non-representationalism, Bergson and Husserl become explicit. Finally, in 
the next subsection, an instance is given to demonstrate how this may be applied 
to action-perception situations in architecture.
10.2.1 FEP in words
FEP, a prominent framework in Bayesian cognitive science, dictates that the 
brain functions as a predictive organ that continuously guesses the incoming 
1 A generative model can be contrasted with a discriminative model. Their main difference is that the generative 
model learns the joint probability distribution, i.e. P(o, s), for categorising, e.g. signals, whereas the discrimi-
native model learns the conditional distribution, i.e. P(o|s), for categorising. Generative models can be said to 
address the question regarding which category generates a signal, whereas the discriminative models are not 
concerned about the signal, but on how to best categorise given the data—thus, conditional. 
2 The set of  possible actions.
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3 A true state in FEP lingo is the best approximation possible—not an absolute truth-value of  the world that 
must be pursued. 
sensory signals using prior experiences (Friston, 2005, 2010). Such a brain con-
structs a probable model of the world by acting in the world “in ways appropriate to 
the combinations of bodily and environmental causes that (it estimates) make the current sensory 
data most likely” (Clark, 2015, p. 7), enforcing a constant prediction of incoming 
sensory signals (Friston, 2005; Friston, Kilner and Harrison, 2006). It is worth 
noting that the model that is referred to is the world and not a representation of 
the world (Friston, Thornton and Clark, 2012). More specifically, FEP states that 
the brain models a hierarchical generative model with bidirectional links for TD 
predictions and BU sensory signals, where the PEs serve to correct the generative 
model. In line with homeostasis (Damasio, 2010) and allostasis (Sterling, 2012), 
any living organism seeks to avoid surprises, which is here quantified by the PEs, 
to maximise chances of staying within the homeostatic balance—therefore, accor-
ding to FEP, living organisms need to predict the external (and internal) events 
correctly. One may minimise entropy (uncertainty) about the predictions through 
a range of specific actions. In other words, predictions are improved by actions 
that best minimise PEs. 
The characteristics of Bayesian cognitive science is that the approach suggests 
only two states need to be inferred, namely (1) the state of the world and (2) the 
uncertainty about the state (Friston et al., 2012, p. 2). The state of the world refers 
to the true state3, which is not how the world is perceived (R(s, o) in Fig. 10.1), but 
how it is as objectively as the perceptual organs can portray it. Since the body and 
brain have no direct access to true states of the world through other modalities 
than sensory, perception is based on these available sensory observations, where 
uncertainty about the inferred state further needs to be inferred. 
The mathematical framework in the context of modelling FEP is dynamic 
programming, i.e. Markov decision process (Bellman, 1957, 2010). Importantly, 
FEP is not a magical theorem from which the world magically emerges, unravel-
ling consciousness. It is an ingenious probabilistic approach to the nature of how 
the brain makes qualified guesses, and particularly a highly plausible description 
of neurophysiological responses (Friston et al., 2012). It is surprisingly in line 
with basic principles found in Damasio’s homeostasis principle (Damasio, 2010), 
Varela’s radical embodiment and emergence approach (Thompson and Varela, 
2001; Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016), dynamic systems theory (Van Gelder, 
1998), Bergsonian (Bergson, 2001) and Husserlian (Husserl, 1997) temporality 
and phenomenology. As the author of FEP refers to the framework, it is a unified 
brain theory (Friston, 2010).
Recall the two different transitions, namely architectural and experiential tran-
sition. The term generative process is the equivalent of the environment, i.e. the archi-
tectural transition, while the generative model is the constructed world that demands 
an observer, i.e. the experiential transition. 
Eventually, the FEP can be rewritten into active inference so that perception, 
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Here, ϑ designates environmental parameters and y designates sensory inputs. 
It is not yet clear from Eq. 10.1 how a probabilistic model of the environment 
using action and perception may emerge. This is because action has not yet been 
introduced to the equation. Applying Bayes theorem is already to have the sensory 
data, and then generating a model that approximates the sensory the best—how-
ever, this is only possible with a known number of hidden states. When dealing 
with an infinite amount of hidden states, the brain must model an approximated 
model that through action-generated PEs pulls in closer on the evidence model. 
The term active inference4 refers to the minimisation of free energy through action 
and perception and is a rearranged form of FEP (Parr and Friston, 2018a). 
The Bayesian pattern is not only applicable to cognitive neuroscience but va-
rious sciences. In fact, FEP has been suggested to explain the dynamics of living 
systems and their ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment (Ramstead, 
Badcock and Friston, 2018), bringing FEP to an equivalent of natural selection. 
In a nutshell, FEP is a Bayes optimisation according to PEs that further depend 
4 In the generative model, there are a number of  matrices that correspond to steps, e.g. the A matrix corre-
sponds to the likelihood, B matrix corresponds to the transition causing an action, C matrix corresponds to 
the prior preferences as probability distributions over observations (that it “feels good” to not be hungry), D 
matrix corresponds to the prior beliefs before any sensory observation, E matrix corresponds to the action 
policy prior, F function corresponds to the variational free energy, G function corresponds to the expected 
free energy and H matrix corresponds to the entropy of  likelihood (Parr and Friston, 2019). In this chapter, 
however, the focus rests on action and perception, which include matrices and functions A, B, E, F and G. 
F = ( ) (10.1) 
Environment/Architecture Generative model
Hidden state Sensory 
outcome
s*
Inferred state
s
P(s|o)
P(o|s)
P(s,o)
P(s)P(o)
o
R(s,o)
Figure 10.1—Architecture functions as a hidden state that the brain must infer to perceive. The hidden state gen-
erates a sensory outcome, which in turn enters a Bayes inferential loop that infers the cause of  the sensory outcome 
resulting in an inferred state about the hidden state. S* designates the true state, opposite to the inferred state, 
which is s without asterisk (Solopchuk, 2018).
i.e. the generative model, and action, i.e. the action policies, coexist through a 
Bergsonian and Husserlian understanding of time. Instead of static, frozen m -
oments, active inference suggests that any given moment interpenetrates so that 
t –1 and t+1 are integrated into the minimal formulation of FEP. The continuous 
function of free energy can be expressed (Friston, Kilner and Harrison, 2006, p. 
73):
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(10.2) 
(10.3) 
P(s|o) = P(s) P(o|s)
P(o)
P(o) = P(s) P(o|s)
P(s|o)
on predictions and shreds of evidence. This is the generality of FEP that is ap-
plied to widen the understanding of architectural and experiential transition in the 
upcoming subsections (for discussion on the darkroom problem, see Appendix 
D). There might seem a lot to take in at first glance, but a simplified and syste-
matic description of active inference will highlight the internal structure of FEP. 
10.2.2 Applying Bayes to perception
While providing a statistical background for PEs, remark how Friston’s FEP 
theorem synchronise with enactivism and DST through active inference and how 
representation also here is unnecessary when considering the action-perception 
system. Much of the following evaluation of active inference is built on existing 
papers and blog-posts (Friston, 2005, 2009; Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston et 
al., 2010, 2017; Parr and Friston, 2018b; Solopchuk, 2018).
The problem in perception is that for the body and brain, the world is pre-
sented through sensory signals without details on causes of sensation—the world 
and architectural spaces are thus referred to as hidden states (s) that generate sensory 
outcome (o). As the sensory outcomes are the only access the embodied brain has 
to the environment, hidden states are inferred through the Bayesian model:
What is important in using Bayes’ theorem is to quantify the probability of a 
hidden state given an observation. The probability of an observation, P(o), will 
itself function as a quantity that represents the quality of the model.
The embodied brain must infer the evidence, earlier referred to as P(B) but 
now as P(o), which is usually an intractable issue since there may exist infinite 
causes with various probability for each sensory signal, leaving P(s|o), the poste-
rior probability, without results (Friston, 2010; Ramstead, Kirchhoff and Friston, 
2019). P(o) is named model evidence because it quantifies how well the model is pre-
dicting the real observations. It is also known as marginal likelihood because it is the 
sum of all possible hidden states given a sensory signal (it marginalises the hidden 
state, s), here put as the joint probability:
P(s, o) =P(o) = P(s) P(o|s)
If calculating an exact posterior probability is an intractable issue, how then 
does the embodied brain generate it? Recall the DST principle involving not 
calculating a single exact outcome, but rather all potential outcomes (Poincaré in 
Chapter 7). One way of making an inference is to find the state that best maximises 
the likelihood, P(o = s|o), of the sensory input. Assuming a binomial distribution 
of the data, one must look to maximise the likelihood by estimating the distribu-
tions of the hidden state (Fig. 10.2). Maximising likelihood is the equivalent of 
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5 Using the logarithm has different advantages. First, multiplying a plethora of  very small numbers yields 
numbers that are too small to be computed, whereas representing the numbers by log means they should be 
added rather than multiplied, i.e. log(a ∙ b) = log(a) + log(b). Second, due to the nature of  log, optimising the 
log-likelihood is the same as minimising the negative log-likelihood. The approximation probability, Q, is always 
above the negative log of  the model evidence, and by minimising the free energy, it approximates the negative 
log of  the model evidence, P(o).
P(s, o)–log P(o) = –log (10.4) 
(10.5) 
By introducing an approximation, it is possible to get around the intractable 
issue of estimating all possible values of hidden states. For the embodied brain to 
estimate the cause of the sensory, it instead performs an approximate Bayesian 
inference, involving an inversion, as if the embodied brain had access to the evi-
dence. As shown above, the generative model can instead be written as the pro-
duct of the likelihood function of the sensory signal given the hidden states and 
the prior probability of these hidden states. Now, the inversion entails a statistical 
mapping from observable consequences to hidden causes. In order to allow for 
such inversion, a belief updating, which is usually referred to as variational densiti-
es, is necessary. However, first, let Q designate the “approximate posterior probability 
distribution or Bayesian belief that constitutes the organism’s ‘best guess’ about what is causing 
its sensory states (including the consequences of its own actions)” (Ramstead, Kirchhoff and 
Friston, 2019, p. 3) so that Q approximates P(s|o):
Before diving into the operations of belief update, consider how the discrete 
description of active inference (Eq. 10.1) emerges when approximating the mo-
del evidence by adding the approximation Q(s) and applying Jensen’s formal 
P(o)P(s) P(s)
= ∑ P(s)P(o|s)
Figure 10.2—Compare two models with different estimated distributions of  the true posterior, which is 50/50 of  
two measures (e.g. number of  times people chose the right door compared to the left door). The closer to the mean of  
the true posterior, the higher the likelihood estimation. The model on the left shows a distribution close to 50/50, 
whereas the model on the right shows a distribution of  70/30, which is off. Notice the estimated distribution 
(Solopchuk, 2018).
minimising surprise, which is the negative log of the evidence (Eq. 10.4). The ra-
tionale is that low probability equals high surprise, while high probability equals 
low surprise. From Eq. 10.3, the evidence can be written as the sum of the joint 
probability; therefore, the surprise can be written5:
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6 Jensen inequality ensures that the right side is always greater than or equal to the left side due to the convexity 
of  the function. With this in mind, we keep the free energy as an upper bound of  the negative log, minimising 
it until equilibrated.
7 Keep in mind that –log(A) = log(1/A), hence the switch in denominator from Eq. 10.6 to Eq. 10.7.
(10.6) 
(10.7) 7 
(10.8) 
–log logQ(s) –P(o,s)
Q(s)
Q(s) P(o,s)
Q(s)
logF = Q(s)
P(o,s)
Q(s)
description of inequality6 in Eq. 10.7. The Bayesian minimisation involves the 
minimisation of an upper bound (quantity approaching from above) on the evi-
dence model, and this is known as the variational free energy. The strategic mano-
euvre by Friston in the approximation method originates from Feynman’s (1972) 
variational free energy that represents a bound on the log-evidence, which is pre-
cisely where Jensen’s inequality guarantees that the free energy functions as an 
upper bound.
In brief, given the maximum likelihood estimate, which was pursued by mini-
mising surprise, and then Q(s) was added as an approximate Bayesian inference. 
This can be expressed:
logKL[p(x) || q(x)]  = p(x)
q(x)
p(x)
Eq. 10.7 is the famous formulation of active inference usually read in active 
inference papers (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2013; Bogacz, 2017; Parr 
and Friston, 2018a, 2018b). 
Returning to belief updating, to optimise the belief, one must minimise the 
variational free energy, which can be shown to be the difference between expecta-
tion and true posterior observation. In other words, the difference between expe-
ctation and true posterior observation reflects the generalised PE that needs to be 
minimised. For this purpose, it is necessary to provide a detailed introduction of 
Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KL) because, as demonstrated, the minimisation of 
variational free energy leads to minimising the difference between two probability 
distributions. KL is a measure of how two different probability distributions are 
different from one another. By minimising the difference, one is approximating 
the other. The minimisation has been argued to hold a representational feature, as 
KL represents the difference of internal states introducing decouplability (Kiefer 
and Hohwy, 2018). The difference that KL offers can be interpreted in multiple 
ways, e.g. simply the divergence of P from Q, the relative entropy of P to Q, the 
surprise in seeing P expecting Q. KL always yields a non-negative because if the 
two probability densities are similar, KL yields 0. For probability measures that 
are continuous KL is generally defined as:
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KL measures the anticipated number of extra bits required to code samples 
from p(x) when using an approximation q(x)—thus, KL is not a direct measure 
of difference in distance (Bishop, 2006, p. 55), but rather an indirect measure of 
uncertainty reflecting how surprising a set of sensory outcomes are on average. 
With some rewriting of the denominator, Eq. 10.7 can be written as:
8 Keep in mind that: log(A/B) = log A – log B, and that:
s
(10.9) 
(10.10) 
(10.11) 
Following Ramstead, Kirchhoff and Friston (2019), variational free energy is 
the equivalent of the relative entropy between Q(s), the approximated posterior 
probability distribution, and P(s|o), the true posterior distribution8. Now, the 
central aim is to minimise PEs by minimising the divergence between the approxi-
mated and the true posterior, so that:
KL[Q(s) || P(s)] – Q(s) log P(o|s)
KL[Q(s) || P(s)] – EQ[ln P(o|s)]
complexity accuracy
Eq. 10.11 is stating that the minimisation of free energy is the equivalent of 
minimising the relative entropy between the approximation and the true posterior. 
However, the equation can be rewritten more effectively, so that the divergence is 
not between Q(s) and P(s|o), but instead between the approximated probability 
and the probability of the sensory, P(s):
logKL[p(x) || q(x)]  = p(x)
q(x)
p(x)
(10.12) 
(10.13) 
F = Q(s)
P(s|o) P(o)
Q(s)
KL[Q(s) || P(s|o)]  = –log P(o)
Eq. 10.13 is a rewritten form of the variational free energy (Eq. 10.9), now 
expressing the complexity, which displays the anticipated number of extra bits requi-
red to code samples from P(s) when using an approximation Q(s) and the accuracy 
that displays a score of the expected outcome.
These rewritings do not solve how action should aid perception becoming 
more certain about its model of the world, and this is because “beliefs about [action] 
policies rest on outcomes in the future, because these beliefs determine action and action deter-
mines subsequent outcomes. This means that policies should, a priori, minimise the free 
energy of beliefs about the future” (Friston et al., 2016; emphasis added). Insofar, 
the temporal structure has not been considered at all—instead, the theoretical 
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9 Keep in mind that the prior state referred to here is not the prior state of  a single variable, but the prior 
state of  the Markov blanket as a whole. Furthermore, the philosophical counter-argument to the Markov 
property is that the state would not have been considered in the first place was it not for the prior states, which 
means—ipso facto—all their priors necessarily already define any current state.
background of how free energy is minimised is reviewed. The outcomes in the 
future, which is named expected free energy, is only possible by adding action into 
the equations. Before doing so, it is necessary to show that the perception (mo-
del of the world), established is a non-representational one, to ensure that it fits 
with enactivism and the phenomenological conditions. Ultimately, when adding 
action into the equation, the best option is to cast predictions as the expected 
free energy, which we shall turn to later. For now, consider representation in KL.
10.2.2.1 (Non-)Representation in KL
Regarding representationalism, Kiefer and Hohwy (2018) argue that preci-
sely because the divergence and the posterior are not identical, i.e. KL [Q(s) || 
P(s|o)] ≠ 0, the inferred state is a misrepresentation, making room for a repre-
sentational account of FEP by casting the KL as a decouplable feature (Chapter 
9; 3rd condition for representationalism) in active inference. A strong objection 
is that KL is only a measure of internal densities, whereas a true measure of rela-
tive entropy would compare the difference between internal and environmental 
dynamics (Kirchhoff and Robertson, 2018). As KL obey neither internal repre-
sentation through signs or symbols between internal and external states (1st con-
dition), discrete duration (2nd condition) nor decouplability (3rd condition), there 
is no reason to suspect representational content in KL.
When variational free energy has been minimised so that KL equals 0, it can 
be said that free energy is equal to surprise, which, as put earlier (Eq. 10.4), equ-
als –log P(o). In words, minimising free energy yields approximating the predic-
ted posterior probability model to the true posterior probability model, which in 
turn means that one is avoiding surprise and thus obeying a homeostatic balance. 
According to active inference, this is how perception emerges without conside-
ring any form of action.
10.2.2.2 Hidden states and Markov Blankets
Insofar, this particular walkthrough of active inference is a case of a single 
observation—however, over time, the generative process must dynamically mo-
del time series. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are widely used to model time 
series where a true state is not directly observable. Instead, HMMs are used to 
infer the hidden state through observations, so it is necessary to introduce how 
HMMs may help resolve hidden states. HMMs are a particular kind of dynamic 
Bayesian network, which forms a (graphical) representation of the conditional in-
terdependencies of random variables, specifically well-suited for modelling time 
series (Jordan et al., 1999; Ghahramani, 2001). Such systems may take advantage 
of the Markov property9, which is that the next state depends mathematically only 
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on the current state—the prior state is obsolete, thus the method is frequently 
referred to as memoryless (Clark, 2017). 
In Fig. 10.3, the prior states do not enter the probability of the current state, 
i.e. the state V does not depend on S, but on Z (and U), but Z would not be con-
sidered in the first place if not for the state, S. However, the next step depends not 
on the prior. The Markov blankets serve precisely to disambiguate the boundari-
es of one specific state by considering a number of pre-set rules of hierarchy, i.e. 
the Markov boundary, which is more feasible after introducing the graphical layout. 
To understand the graphical representation properly, basic notations from 
graph theory, which is essential in connectionism and network theory, are here 
introduced. In Fig. 10.3, nodes represent random variables and edges represent the 
dependencies in the Bayesian network revealing the parent-child relation—parents 
influence children, which in turn may influence their children (children’s children). 
An essential advantage of using graph theory is to make obvious the Markov blan-
kets, which is defined for a given variable as its parents, children, and the parents 
of its children (Pearl, 1988). It has been suggested that nature in general, including 
human consciousness, experience and any living organism, is composed by milli-
ons of blankets within blankets and thus explicable by adequately understanding 
the relation between these (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2017; Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Parr 
and Friston, 2018b; Ramstead, Badcock and Friston, 2018). In turn, the nested 
Markov blankets give rise to a hierarchy in the generative model.
Given that Markov blankets and the graphical representation are purely functi-
onal, one may suspect that a physical boundary for any living organism is difficult 
to put down by absolute. For this purpose, Pearl (1988) coined the term Markov 
boundary, which designates “when a Markov blanket for a node has no proper subset that is 
also a Markov blanket for that node” (Clark, 2017). With Markov blankets, systems can 
be outlined graphically and statistically, which has significant implications for how 
to understand the structure of, e.g. the brain. Although neurons are intermeshed 
in various directions, seemingly with no boundary, Markov blanket may aid how 
the brain can still be viewed as a minimally decomposable entity because systems 
U
X
YV W
RS Z
P(U)
P(S) P(R)P(Z|S)
P(V|U,Z) P(W|V)
P(X|V)
P(Y|W,X)
Markov Blanket
Figure 10.3—An example of  a Markov blanket, Bayesian network and the basics of  graph theory. The circular 
shapes represent single nodes. The arrows represent their parent-child relation. In the example, the Markov 
blanket for node V is the dashed area, which entails the parents, children and the parents of  its children. In terms 
of  the Bayesian network, its parent gives the probability for each node, so that the node V depends on U and Z, 
and both W and X depend on V, which takes the form of  the Markov blanket. A single node may correspond 
to a neuron, where the blanket describes the Markov blanket relevant to that neuron, explaining the minimal 
decomposability. Keep in mind the direction of  the stated probabilities are only given for one direction.
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10 E refers to the expected outcome of  what is within the brackets—in this case, the KL between outcomes 
predicted and outcomes subsequent to actions. R refers to probability.
(10.14) ut   =  arg minu EQ[ KL[P(ot+1|st+1 ) || R(ot+1|st , u)] ]
emerge from the parent-child relations between neuronal hubs. Interestingly, this 
offers a statistical perspective of the anatomical functions of the brain, i.e. a conne-
ctionist aspect. It is worth noting that Markov blankets have been used to explain 
how the biological self-organisation (see Chapter 7) distinguishes itself from its 
immediate environment, e.g. organelles within cells, within tissues, within organs 
(Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Palacios et al., 2020).
10.2.3 Adding action to active inference
Adding the action to active inference, note that observations depend only 
upon the current state, opposite to state transitions that depend on action policy 
(a sequence of actions; π) (Friston et al., 2015, 2016). When introducing time to 
the equations, observations become necessarily dependent on the action policy 
that currently unfolds, as the new observations that are generated depend on the 
action. In active inference, action (u) can be understood as an operation that mi-
nimises the expected KL between outcomes predicted at the next time step and 
the outcome after each act. Formally10:
Figure 10.4—This	figure	serves	to	illustrate	how	time	integrate	into	active	inference	(Solopchuk,	2018).	With	
time	comes	the	possibility	for	action,	and	in	this	particular	case,	there	is	only	a	single	action	policy	(π).	Fig.	10.1	
illustrated how active inference models the world passively—however, in time, it can be shown how action and 
perception	are	interrelated	(this	figure	is	heavily	based	on	Appendix	D).	The	minimisation	of 	free	energy	entails	
changing parameters serving to minimise the KL, and thus optimising perception. The transitioning needed to 
improve the parameters of  the model is action! The true state of  the environment, therefore, depends on the prior 
true state and the prior action. The approximated distribution is still in play, informing which action policies may 
improve perception. The terms -1:1 designates the range of  integers from -1 to 1 including 0, which designates 
not-past and not-future.
s*t-1 s*t s*t+1
ot-1 ot ot+1
s*
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t-1 t+1 t-1:1t
Environment General active inference
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The action is minimising the expected outcome while simultaneously reali-
sing the expected outcome (Fig. 10.4). Almost tautologically, action is causing 
perception, which in turn makes the inference active. To put it in perspective, 
the coupling suggested in enactivism, i.e. SMC, suggests that perception is active, 
and that exercising sensorimotor skills is to understand perception practically. 
The exercise itself is inherently dependent on predictive mechanisms that display 
practical knowledge relative to the sensory organ. Eq. 10.14 expresses how the 
generative model makes sense of action relative to perception—although, in line 
with SMC, there are many possible actions one may take, causing various models 
(see Appendix D for discussion on selection among models). In SMC, the model is 
driven by a practical intention to investigate or interact with the world from which 
action sequences, i.e. action policies, emerge (Fig. 10.5). Once again, recall that this 
approach is a dynamic (Poincaré) approach; thus, all possible competing action 
policies are considered at the same time in parallel. It is worth noting that the ac-
tion policies are very reminiscent of Gibson’s affordances, but in fact, they do not 
correspond. This discussion is critical because it clarifies what is meant by action 
policies in active inference given the enactive approach, which leans considerably 
on ecological psychology (Gibson’s theory of perception using affordances).
In this context, it is argued that Bergson’s term virtual action describes much 
better the underlying process as compared to Gibson’s term affordances. There 
are two major differences between the terms in the current context. Firstly, an 
affordance is inconceivable without an intention of an agent. On the one hand, 
affordances arguably describe potential interaction relative to an intention, i.e. it is 
task-oriented. On the other hand, virtual actions describe the potential interaction 
in the absence of an intention. Secondly, the manner affordances link to inten-
tion encompasses a complex feature of human perception involving values and 
meanings that surpass the concept of a range of unrealised actions. Affordance 
“[…] is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow 
added in a way that no one has been able to agree upon; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich 
ecological object” (Gibson, 1986, p. 140). Furthermore, affordance is “something that 
refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies 
the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (Gibson, 1986, p. 127). It is clear 
that affordance refers to the complex relation between the perceiver and the per-
ceived, where the genesis of unrealised actions is part of the relation. To make 
explicit the difference between the two terms, virtual actions operate exclusively 
at the level of the intuitive (practical) with no influence from the intellect, whereas 
affordances can be highly influenced by the intellect, which forms the intention11. 
This is not to say that the affordances do not influence the execution of the in-
ferred action; indeed, the emotional and bodily state will have a direct influence 
on the performance of the selected virtual action. It is more appropriate to refer 
to action policies as virtual actions refer to the range of unrealised actions. To 
paraphrase Bergson, action policy refers to a set of action sequences that differ 
11 Intention is here used as in the will to act rather than as intentionality, which is inherently intuitive.
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Figure 10.5—With multiple action policies, they are all considered in parallel at the same time (Poincaré).
st-1 st st+1π1
s*t-1 s*t s*t+1
ot-1 ot ot+1
t-1 t+1t
Environment
Generative model(s)
P(o|s)
u
Q(st|π1 )
Q(st|π2 )
st-1 st st+1π2
in kind. Actions that differ in kind delimits the sequences so that taking a step up 
a staircase can only differ in degree when not proprioceptively placing the foot the 
exact same way, but cannot differ in kind since the action brings you up a step. 
This discussion is further unpacked in Chapter 11. 
Returning to action policies, these competing virtual actions depend on the 
goal behaviour (intention) of the agent, but architecture is seldom explicitly expe-
rienced. The majority interacts with their architecture on a basic level, where it is 
implicitly part of everyday routines. It can thus be assumed that the case of tran-
sitioning from one space to another is, for the most part, a question of passing 
with minimal effort in the sense of less effort. These actions are skilful actions 
mastered by the experiencing agent, and so need no explicit attention, but rather 
unfolds implicitly (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). The action sequences, bodily 
trajectory or virtual actions that are offered by the environment refer to the same 
underlying process in the action-perception loop; namely, π.
(10.15) 
(10.16) =
s o
Recall that expected variational free energy required predictions, which now 
can be described through action. Thus, the expected free energy, G, can be rewrit-
ten from Eq. 10.7 as follows:
Notice that time has been added to the equation and the substitution of action 
(u) in Eq. 10.14 for action policy (π). 
PART I I :  CHAPTER 10
171
While action unfolds in the generative process, the virtual action becomes an 
intrinsic part of the generative model. Although not all virtual actions are actively 
unfolded; they are tied to the body as possible outcomes with different probabi-
lities depending on their expected free energy. When an action policy is outlived, 
the virtual action manifests itself in time (because it unfolds as a bodily trajectory 
at that given moment bringing with it new action policies on the go) and in space 
because the virtual action is transcending the generative model towards the gene-
rative process to, in turn, improve the model; this makes the generative model and 
process inseparable. 
Taking the next steps in active inference, with numerous rearrangements using 
rules of arithmetic and by adding of prior preference on future outcomes, namely P(o), 
then the free energy equation reaches a practical form as explained by Solopchuk 
(2018) and equation 6 in Friston et al. (2016):
(10.17) 
expected cost expected ambiguity
Active inference is attractive because it not only infers states of the world 
by maximising model evidence P(o), but it also infers the policies that should 
be pursued in terms of maximising the evidence expected (Kaplan and Friston, 
2018). Recall the two primary states that need to be inferred from earlier, namely 
the state of the world and the uncertainty about that state. That is precisely what 
Eq. 10.17 expresses; the expected cost informs the free energy minimisation and 
thus the best guess of the current state of the world, while the ambiguity literally 
scores the uncertainty about the best guess. In brief, the generative model consi-
ders the expected cost, which is the divergence between the expected observation 
under the virtual action and the prior preferences, and the expected ambiguity 
that denotes the expected uncertainty about the environment. Eq. 10.17 demon-
strates that the expected ambiguity does not depend directly on virtual action, π, 
but is instead a question of quantifying the mutual information between sensory 
outcome and input, which in turn is informed by action. 
In summary, active inference is a matter of minimising surprise while sampling 
an environment through a single function, namely variational free energy. The free 
energy functions as an upper bound on surprise, so that minimising free energy is 
the equivalent to minimising uncertainty. Since the embodied brain has no access 
to the hidden states, given they are hidden from direct observation, it generates 
an approximate posterior density, namely Q(s), over the hidden states and infers 
their state through qualified action. What makes active inference appealing is the 
integration of action and virtual action into the modelling of the environment—
or in other words, the integration of action that is selected from posterior beliefs 
about a particular virtual action in perception, and vice versa. 
More importantly, Bayes’ rule, HMMs and active inference all depend on the 
transition matrix, which, in other words, can be said to be the structure of change. 
This is precisely the reasoning behind this particular approach to experiential 
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transition; namely it foreshadows both the perceptual experience and architectural 
space not only at the same time but also in time. In sum, because the approach 
makes use of non-representational processes, interpenetrating temporal states, 
coupled systems and focuses mainly on transitions, i.e. in the spirit of DST, it 
qualifies as an overarching empirical framework, from which the research ques-
tion may emanate. 
10.3 Simulacrum 
The statistician Box (1976) coined the general idea and limits of using stati-
stics to explain natural phenomena when he stated that: “All models are wrong, but 
some are useful”. Active inference is a statistical model of the world inferring its 
hidden states. This begs the question of limitation in neurobiological measures. 
Friston (2006; 2010; 2011) stated that the world is a model, i.e. a generative model, 
that reflects all neurobiological parameters—however, how should active inference 
be interpreted (given its computational nature) in a strictly non-computational, 
non-representational framework? Active inference is able to describe the underly-
ing operation of qualified guessing, using Bayes theorem, which seems to appear 
in numerous systems in the body. 
Active inference is per principle a statistical model that approximates human 
processes, using nothing but arithmetic manipulations that are free of representa-
tional content (Kirchhoff and Robertson, 2018). Indeed, active inference reflects 
the exact mechanisms or biological operations that take place in the body, brain 
and environment (Howard et al., 2017; Haarsma et al., 2019). Albeit, the embodi-
ed brain has no particular knowledge on Solomon Kullback/Richard Leibler and 
their probability distribution divergence—nor do the embodied brain know Karl 
Friston, active inference or FEP. Nevertheless, these terms and mathematical mo-
dels serve to simulate the rationale behind the dynamics between brain and body 
serving action, perception and cognition to give science a predictive upper hand, 
which is essential in theorising. In fact, prediction errors (Schultz, 1998; Friston, 
Mattout and Kilner, 2011), Bayesian learning (Friston, 2003; Friston et al., 2016), 
TD and BU signals (Cupchik et al., 2009; Adams, Shipp and Friston, 2013) are all 
empirically measurable and consistent with active inference. Whether a model can 
comprise cognition comes down to the complexity of the particular model that is 
simulated, and as stated by Conant and Ashby: “Every good regulator of a system must 
be a model of that system” (1970). 
Recall the initial quote from Laplace: “Probability theory is nothing but common sense 
reduced to calculation.” The keyword in this sentence is that probability theory is a 
reduction of common sense to calculation; indeed, it is not a direct equivalence fully 
explaining a natural phenomenon, but offers rather particular aspects of interest. 
If the interest is of increasing complexity, so must the probability model increase 
in complexity to be a better predictor of that natural process. 
As for architecture, why is it essential to consider active inference if it is me-
rely a simulacrum? Architecture is the equivalent of the environment in the triad 
of cognition (brain, body and environment), and this poses a serious approach 
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to causal physiological relations. For too long has architectural research been re-
stricted to pure speculations or behavioural experimentation, which traditional-
ly is executed in psychology (Arnheim, 1977), philosophy (Bo ̈hme and Engels-
Schwarzpaul, 2017), sociology (Jensen, 2014), anthropology (Amerlinck, 2001) 
and other social sciences. Approaching a human-centred research programme in 
architecture becomes immensely important to understand general physiological 
consequences of space. As stated by Solupchuk (2018): “However, the scheme [active 
inference]	is	rather	intended	as	a	proof	of	principle,	and	is	sufficient	to	be	useful	in	computa-
tional	psychiatry.	For	example,	precision	is	believed	to	reflect	the	function	of	dopamine,	meaning	
that inability to infer the optimal precision would have adverse psychopathological implications.” 12 
10.4 Phenomenology and inference in sensorimotor
At the level of sensorimotor measurements of the brain, the selection between 
virtual actions operates in a predictive manner by inferring policy-dependent out-
comes, as shown in Appendix E (Pezzulo, Rigoli and Friston, 2018). Action in 
terms of PEs is a question of proprioceptive PEs; the PE minimisation relative 
to action is affected by proprioceptive PEs at the sensory level13 (Friston et al., 
2012, p. 3). What may one expect to measure on a sensorimotor level given vary-
ing virtual actions? Keep in mind that according to active inference14, predictions 
function as TD signals (Friston, 2005), which is precisely how virtual actions ma-
nifest as proprioceptive PEs. TD refers to the local expectation in single neurons, 
which can be hierarchically scaled up when concerning clusters of neurons so that 
it becomes the expectation of cortical areas. Between the layers of the hierarchy, 
a process of backpropagation takes place, enforcing a learning sequence on a 
chemical level in neurons (Parr and Friston, 2018b). It is here argued that featu-
res of global-to-local (Chapter 7) and TD are interlinked so that global patterns can 
emerge from a general conformity of prediction (minimal PEs) in greater cortical 
areas. If multiple brain areas and regions conform to the TD-signalled predicti-
ons, a global pattern emerges from such prediction.
Active inference genially establishes a principle for such dynamics, namely that 
states are actively inferred from the smallest scale and onward. Indeed, the very 
core of active inference reflects both Husserlian temporality and Bergsonian in-
terpenetration of time—thus, making active inference a qualified theoretical and 
practical approach to experimenting with human experience, brain structures and 
architecture as a phenomenological framework. 
One obvious issue with Bayesian cognitive science as a phenomenological fra-
mework is the seeming incompatibility of a computational approach compared 
to the dynamic approach. Computation was related to an intellectualist approach 
12 A neurophysiological perspective is provided in the next chapter.
13 This is a topic covered in the Chapter 11.
14 Note that the current inference cannot be free of  past and future; in other words, any current experience 
cannot be free of  retention and protention. G, which is literally a prediction, takes part of  the current inference 
F, which in turn bases probabilities on prior experiences.
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to cognition, which was disproven earlier in the advantage of intuition. One such 
problem is the discrete stages in Markov decision process, e.g. belief updating in 
inference and belief propagation in learning (Friston, Adams and Montague, 2012; 
Friston, Parr and de Vries, 2017). Is it possible to update belief without being an 
intellectualist, but rather a dynamicist? Without further unpacking the implications 
of intellectualist and intuitionist (Chapter 7), if one acknowledges that neurons 
respond relative to their history, there must be an inference at this cellular level, 
i.e. Hebb’s law (cell assembly theory). Consequently, active inference is not an 
intellectual operation but operates at the level of intuition, i.e. on a cellular level. 
This is precisely where active inference as a statistical simulacrum of a natural 
process is clear; it holds an explanatory function of neurobiological responses in-
stead of stages performing a KL operation. Instead, the neurobiological respon-
ses approximate an active inference process of cognition (Friston, 2005, 2010) 
particularly—and this, in turn, poses the strategy that it may be better to ask not 
what cognition tells about the nature of active inference but what the nature of 
active inference tells about cognition. Since active inference approximates neu-
robiological responses, it may be an advantage to turn the table and understand 
cognition from the relations in the approximated model. 
Following active inference, one should not expect sensorimotor PEs in scena-
rios that are predictable in practical terms—however, one should instead expect 
an emerging sensorimotor pattern culminating in a practical experience relative to 
that perception and that predicted action. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 
9, the case of feeling a bottle: “It feels to you as if there’s stuff there to be touched by move-
ment of the hands. That’s what the feeling of the presence of the bottle consists in. But the basis 
of the feeling, then, is not something occurring now. The basis rather is one’s knowledge now 
as to what one can do” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 963). The present feeling is not 
present; it is predicted. Following active inference, the outset for a prediction is a 
transition matrix, or put in SMC terms; a structure of change, which is caused by 
a hidden state, e.g. the form of space (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 952). According 
to SMC, the experience of the hidden state depends on the structure of change, 
which is defined by the virtual action that best minimises free energy, meaning 
that there is good reason to believe the human experience of space depends on the 
experiential transition through action-perception features in that space. Indeed, 
a physiology of anticipation is necessary to the experiment, and since any given 
moment must be understood in its temporal context, at the level of intuition (re-
tention and protention), the experiment must be designed with cautious regard to 
time. The world is not construed linearly, but dynamically through so immediate 
predictions that they cannot be separated from the current moment.
 
”In fact, constitution is not just the attribution of properties to a pre-constituted 
object but an originary constitution of the latter, and without which the latter could not 
support such properties: a pre-configuration of the analysis that the brain is 
going to make of the world and not just a mental representation, which al-
ways comes on the scene after the event. The decisive step in neurophysiology is 
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therefore the transition from a bottom-up neurophysiology to a top-down neurophysiology, 
a physiology of anticipation.” (Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 130; emphasis added)
10.5 Conclusion
It was demonstrated how FEP, as a hybrid of a hierarchical and heterarchical 
system15 (Turvey, 2007), is useful in predicting action-perception related questi-
ons. With sufficient rearrangements, FEP is an active inference, sharing the fun-
damentals of enactivism and predicting perception by selecting a virtual action 
that best minimises free energy. “Active inference can be seen as an embodied (enactivist) 
form of predictive coding, in which perception minimises exteroceptive prediction errors and ac-
tion minimises proprioceptive prediction errors” (Friston et al., 2012, p. 1). It serves as a 
simulacrum that might develop into a full-blown experiential simulation of the 
human action-perception cycle that excels at predicting the transitional matrix 
(experience) given a certain space and task. 
The structure of active inference can be generalised to the usage of Bayes’ the-
orem to predict the effect virtual actions has on the posterior probability and sele-
cting the virtual action that best minimises the expected free energy. Nonetheless, 
the term free energy emphasises the general approach, namely that the approximati-
on unfolds by using free energy as an upper bound on surprise, i.e. –log P(o), and 
by selecting the virtual action that minimises the expected free energy, the model 
pulls in closer and closer on the true posterior. 
However, FEP, as a normative theory similar to natural selection in evolution, 
cannot itself be falsified, as it is a self-evident truism. Instead, a range of falsifia-
ble hypotheses can be generated from FEP so that it functions as a framework 
instead of a natural true law, i.e. a tautological self-evident truism (Allen, 2018). 
FEP explains, through DST, how organisms survive by respecting homeostasis 
(Damasio, 2010) what arguably is a process of allostasis (Sterling, 2012), by acting 
(perception), adapting (minimise expected free energy), adjusting (correcting PEs) 
and anticipating (generate predictions). 
Yet, FEP stays within the phenomenological conditions. As stated in SMC, 
while respecting the phenomenological and temporal principles of Bergson, 
Husserl, DST and active inference, experience is the transitional pattern itself. 
This conclusion is evident given the Bergsonian time, Husserlian temporality, 
the dynamically embodied brain and now a theory of active inference structurally 
coupling environment and the embodied brain through action and perception. Put 
in other words, perceptual experience is to predict the structure of the transition 
correctly through change by acting. Although active inference cannot account for 
a fully naturalised phenomenology of experience, it has a promising take on some 
of the most fundamental aspects of experience, e.g. the relation between action 
and perception. Instead of falsifying FEP, the next chapter generates a falsifiable 
15 A hierarchical system refers to the flow of  control from higher positions to lower positions, whereas the 
heterarchical system refers to a reciprocal system. A hierarchical architecture: A ⟶ B ⟶ C.
A heterarchical architecture: A↔B, C↔A, C↔B (Turvey, 2007). 
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hypothesis using active inference in action-perception loop. Critical for the argu-
ment is that the process of estimating which virtual action to proceed with is the 
capability of the brain and body to process in parallel, i.e. dynamically. Chapter 
11 elaborates on this subject. 
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Summary. What implications—on a physiological and neuronal level—does the unfolding 
of  action-perception have on human experience? By identifying the underlying cortical 
activity for the intuitive process of  selecting amongst virtual actions using their 
affordances, a testable and falsifiable hypothesis is derived using principles from 
active inference and enactivism. A temporal scale of  neuronal activity serves to 
map the cascade of  bidirectional predictions and to enlighten the importance 
of  the time-domain in sensorimotor integration. Furthermore, an aspect of  the 
role of  neuromodulators emphasises the anchor of  embodied underpinnings 
in behaviour. Ultimately, because brain, body and environment are dynamically 
coupled, it is argued that designed environment is neither governing nor gover-
ned by the brain and body, but instead non-linear dynamic relation. This suggests 
responsibility for architects because the environment, through virtual actions and 
affordances, may systematically favour specific brain structures.
11.1 What to look for?
11.1.1 Neuronal activity
In approaching an experimental setup to address experience in architectural 
transition, it becomes urgent to know what to look for. Since the framework 
insofar has narrowed the journey to a cognitive neuroscientific approach, the 
question is what to look for in the brain. It was previously argued that the brain 
Virtual action, affordances and 
active inference
CHAPTER 11
“If this is the best of possible worlds,
what then are the others?”
Voltaire (1694-1778)
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does not form internal representations of the world—perception instead emerges 
from the dynamics of the embodied brain integrating physical action. In the fra-
mework of active inference, the process of action-selection, i.e. selecting virtual 
actions by their affordances, is a bidirectional cascade of TD and BU predictions 
and probabilities operating in different time-scales. According to recent Bayesian 
cognitive neuroscience, the brain describes these predictions and probabilities 
physiologically through a range of neuromodulators that in turn may be measured 
electro-cortically (Doya, 2002; Yu and Dayan, 2005). Electro-cortical responses 
reflect the embodied brain’s attempt at minimising free energy by acting (Friston, 
2005). In other words, the typically analysed endogenous components of evoked 
cortical responses in electrophysiology reflect PE minimisation stemming from 
TD/BU error-correction. Particularly the nature of the synaptic behaviour is here 
investigated to form what to expect in an electrophysiological experiment. 
Synaptic activity behaves in frequencies so that populations of neurons fire 
at specific rates, such as delta (~0.5-3 Hz), theta (~4-7 Hz), alpha (~8-12 Hz), 
beta (~16-31 Hz) and gamma (~32-100 Hz). The classic evidence is the clear in-
crease of alpha waves when closing the eyes (Gloor, 1969; see Appendix B). The 
time-domain of neuronal activity may reveal much about the nature of synapses 
relative to behaviour. Take for instance the sense of time. There seem to be an 
understanding of it at the neuronal (microcircuits) level of in-vitro brain-slices of 
rats (Goel and Buonomano, 2016). In Johnson, Goel and Buonomano’s (2010) 
experiment, auditory neurons were electrically stimulated with intervals of 100 ms, 
250 ms and 500 ms for a couple of hours, to simulate what the brain stimulates 
typically by sensory organs. The neurons have no contact with the outside world. 
When stimulating the same microcircuits in the dish, they found that: “Naïve slices 
often respond to a brief electrical pulse with a burst of network activity that lasts up to a few 
hundred milliseconds. This occurs because the neurons directly activated by the shock will activate 
other neurons, which in turn might further activate others—the activity ‘reverberates’ for a few 
hundred milliseconds until the activity dies out” (Buonomano, 2017, p. 97). This signature 
reverberation depends on how the neuronal microcircuit was encultured before 
situated in the dish, which was either by intervals of 100 ms, 250 ms or 500 ms. 
It is an important discovery because it indicates that neurons, despite being 
completely decoupled from a living body, reflect an encultured pattern that ex-
clusively depends on the surrounding synapses, which the sensing body ordinarily 
constitutes. What the neurons undergo in terms of electric stimulation depends 
on the respective sensory organ, which in turn makes the neurons reverberate a 
specific behaviour. In other words, neuronal activity on a sensory level reflects a 
reactive behaviour bound on the activity of a sensory organ, which in their study 
was auditory. More importantly, as Buonomano (2017, p. 97) asserts, the neuro-
nal activity reflects not a specialised computation per se, but an intrinsic property 
of neuronal circuits that is relative to the sensory organs—thus, the body. The 
unfolding of a particular behaviour induced by an electric charge is not stored 
computation that is electrically activated, but an ingrained, congenital property 
of living neuronal microcircuits. Indeed, as indicated above, neuronal behaviour 
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is a complex topic that is not well understood yet, and it is not the purpose here 
to expand on this scientific topic. However, the task of this chapter is to identify 
the relation between action-selection and neuronal activity by firstly reviewing 
selected previous studies, then pinpointing the temporal scale and order of active 
inference and finally unpack the character of virtual actions and affordances in 
neuronal activity. Furthermore, a note on neuromodulators enlightens the impor-
tance of the designed environment. 
11.1.2 Previous studies
Questioning whether neuronal activity describes the decision-making between 
multiple actions has been posited before in simple motor-related reaching tasks 
using single-unit recordings (an invasive measure of action potential in a neuron) 
in primates (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005). Recording from microelectrodes on the 
arm area of the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd), Cisek and Kalaska designed a 
reaching task that involved choosing between two or one circle(s) when presen-
ted with eight circles (Fig. 11.1). Their study presented their primates with a cen-
tre-hold on a screen, which is simply a yellow circle with a cross in it at the centre 
of the screen (500 ms), followed by a spatial-cue (1000 ms) that would reveal the 
position of two (red and blue), or one (red), circle(s) on the radially distributed 
circles. The spatial-cue was followed by a second centre-hold stimulus (500-1500 
ms). A colour-cue (1500-2000 ms) would then indicate which of the two circles 
to select when presented with the total eight circles. Finally, a Go-cue that pre-
sented all possible eight circles again from which the primate had to select the 
circle with the colour presented in the colour-cue. During the 2-target task, the 
primate needed to remember the location of both circles and the colour-cue to 
plan its actions correctly. 
Their study report that when given the possibility of choosing between two 
different actions, neuronal population activity increase equally and immediately 
after being presented with the location—the virtual actions—of the circles. After 
the colour-cue, there was a strong bias in population activity in favour of the indi-
cated colour. The population activity reveals where the stimuli will show up in the 
Go-cue. Between these cues, population activity described neuronal competition 
between two actions, before a decision. This translates to a competition between 
two possible actions, where the highest neuronal activity wins the competition. 
Interestingly, their results demonstrate that a preference, reflected in popu-
lation activity, was present immediately after the colour-cue. In a matter of ~50 
ms, the competition seems almost settled. As they conclude, their results indi-
cate “[…] the dynamics of the competition that determines decisions are dependent on spatial 
variables. These are irrelevant for the abstract economics of cognition, but are important for the 
motor system, which selects between physical actions where geometrical relationships matter” 
(Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). This is an important conclusion about the ac-
tion-perception process since the neuronal activity reflects the decision-making 
already at the level of sensorimotor, independent from higher cognitive regions. 
They continue: “[…] although	decisions	between	actions	are	influenced	by	variables	supplied	
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by higher cognitive regions, they are determined by a competition which takes place within sensor-
imotor circuits” (Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). Their results further suggest that 
competing actions are considered in parallel, dynamically, complementing the 
enactive inference framework. Regarding the neuronal populations, the two po-
pulation activities (n=100) demonstrated dissociable activity patterns relative to 
the two possible actions. 
An increasing neuronal activity before action is not a novel discovery in cog-
nitive neuroscience. Increasing activity prior to action is reflected in a well-esta-
blished component in contemporary electrophysiology, namely the contingent 
negative variation (CNV). Its discovery by Walter (1967) led to a wave of CNV 
studies, which led to the discovery of more components (see Brunia, 2003 for a 
discussion on anticipative behaviour and electro-cortical components). The novel-
ty in the study by Cisek and Kalaska is that they were able to differentiate between 
two neuronal populations, each describing differentiable action clearly displaying 
the action-selection. However, did their study locate where to look for physiolo-
gical descriptions of predictions and probabilities relative to virtual actions? The 
limitations of this study are many—keep in mind that the critique is approached 
from a critical architecture experimental perspective. First, the study was perfor-
med on a primate, making the results (although minimally) translational neuro-
science. Second, the experimentation itself was performed on a two-dimensional 
platform (a screen), choosing between different circles that were placed radially. 
The restrained spatial dimension limits the interpretation of architectural design 
since architecture is embedded in the real-world three-dimensional environment. 
More fundamentally, the task does not correspond to navigating in space direc-
tly—although it has to do with action-selection. Third, the results may describe 
the neuronal activity of selective attention (sharing characteristics with the Posner 
paradigm) rather than of virtual actions and affordances. Recall that virtual acti-
ons determine the transition matrix in active inference, informing the experien-
cing agent how to minimise best expected free energy. This process is much more 
immediate than >1000 ms of planning and bringing the virtual actions to aware-
ness—they are so immediate that they are part of early perceptual processes. The 
experimental setup demonstrated the planning of action and navigation, which is 
much in line with how grid cells map locations in space. 
How does this relate to action-perception as described in active inference? In 
the ‘Go-cue’, the eight circles describe the virtual actions, i.e. “which actions does 
this particular situation induce me to pursue” (Fig 11.1). The affordances of the virtual 
actions would depend on the ‘Spatial-cue’, i.e. which one I should choose. When 
the virtual action of interest is denoted, affordances change and consequently 
select (attract) a virtual action. In active inference, sensorimotor constructs have 
both sensory and proprioceptive consequences. “These constructs are maintained by 
bottom-up prediction errors in both modalities and reciprocate top-down (proprioceptive) predic-
tions	to	the	peripheral	motor	system	that	drive	classical	motor	reflexes;	while	top-down	predicti-
ons to sensory systems play the role of corollary discharge and suppress (exteroceptive) prediction 
errors” (Friston et al., 2012, p. 3).  The BU PEs reciprocate the TD predictions in 
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Figure 11.1— Experimental paradigm. Reproduced procedure from Cisek and Kalaska (2005). The 
‘Centre-hold 1’ instructs the perceiver to focus attention to the centre, which yields equal values (denoted by ‘o’) 
of  affordances for all virtual actions (denoted by ‘𝜋’). The ‘Spatial-cue’ instructs the perceiver about two colours 
in each their location. This changes the affordances to attract (denoted by ‘+’) two virtual actions that are now 
competing, which consequently makes other virtual actions less affordable (denoted by ‘-‘). The ‘Centre-hold 2’ 
functions as a brake, which yields no differences from the prior scene. The ‘Color-cue’ reveals which virtual action 
that yields a congruent trial, which in turn biases the affordance competition. Affordances. The affordances 
corresponding to each stage are given through coloured precision. Continuous. The last line, ‘Continuous’, 
illustrates the continuous development of  precision also through coloured precision.
their experiment by adjusting the affordances according to the sensory, which in 
the example of Fig. 11.1 is the blue circle (northeast), and therefore they were 
able to measure the competition in the motor system. Operating at the level of 
sensorimotor, cascades of PEs in active inference also takes place on a much fa-
ster temporal scale as compared to the unfolding of behaviour, which the ‘Go-
cue’ allowed. The time-scale at which active inference operates needs elaboration.
11.2 Time-scales in active inference
According to active inference, lower sensorimotor inferences are faster than 
higher cognitive features. In fact, the “hierarchical” in hierarchical model refers to 
the nonlinear coupling between anatomical layers of the brain that operate in dif-
ferent time-scales. At the lower levels, i.e. primary sensory areas, neuronal states 
describe the course of short/fast environmental causes, whereas higher levels 
describe the context where lower levels unfold (Kiebel, Daunizeau and Friston, 
2008). This couples the distinct areas in a diachronic manner precisely due to the 
asymmetric temporal unfolding in each hierarchical level (Chapter 8). This is an 
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essential feature since the behaviour of an adaptive agent should not depend on 
equally slow processes, but rather on faster processes from which the adjustabi-
lity may emerge. It has been reflected in Zajonc’s (1980) argument that intelle-
ct is slower than intuition, so that affect is faster than reflective cognition. The 
affective dimension of Zajonc’s argument corresponds here to TD predictions 
that stem from separate endogenous compartments, which culminates as emoti-
onal, or affective, experience (Barrett and Bar, 2009; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; 
Barrett, 2017). 
Kiebel and colleagues (2008) list an order of brain systems that form levels in 
an anatomical-temporal hierarchy. The following table (Table 11.1) is based on 
their supplementary review (specifically their Table 1).
Their proposal respects both the established minimally decomposable attitude to 
the brain and cognitive functions, and cortico-cortical long-range coupling across 
time-scales, referring here to global-to-local effects mentioned in Chapter 5. Note 
that although sensory processing is faster than the higher processes of the orbi-
tofrontal cortex, an active inference approach still makes possible for the higher 
levels to bias, by TD precision in prediction, a BU sensory signal. For instance, 
it has been shown that visual object recognition initiates TD processes projected 
from orbitofrontal to the visual cortex (Bar et al., 2006). The biasing depends on 
precision weighting during err, which (as will be presented) is an essential feature 
in the relation between virtual actions and affordances. In total, Kiebel and colle-
ague’s (2008) proposal adds a temporal dimension to several established concepts:
• the current framework of cortical responses (Friston, 2005),
• diachronic hierarchical generative model (Kirchhoff and Robertson, 2018)
• and minimally decomposable brain areas relative to function (Pessoa, 
2014), and thereby provide a consistent and integrated theory of an em-
bodied brain. 
Active inference supports the concept of fast, lower sensorimotor processes 
contributing to a hierarchical and dynamic model of the world. This means that 
Cortical area Description Time-scale
Sensory and association 
cortex Sensory processing
Milliseconds → 
Centi-seconds
Primary motor and 
premotor cortex
Serve the prediction of  sensory 
consequences of  action
Centi-seconds → 
Seconds
Rostral anterior cingulate 
cortex
Hierarchical, contextual influence on 
action prediction
Deci-seconds → 
Longer period
Lateral prefrontal cortex Hierarchically ordered ‘cognitive control’ system
Deci-seconds → 
Longer period
Orbitofrontal cortex Most stable environmental states Very long period
Table 11.1—Reproduced as presented by Kiebel et al. (2008) and their supplementary review.
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how one might act upon the environment is an ongoing process of selecting vir-
tual actions taking place as early as perceptual processes, contributing to resolving 
navigation and affordances, fitting the presented phenomenological and enactive 
framework.
11.3 Virtual action, active inference and neuromodulators
11.3.1 Precision weight in virtual action
The idea of continuously resolving affordances has been hypothesised by 
Pezzulo and Cisek (2016) and coined hierarchical affordance competition (HAC). 
HAC aligns closely with the current framework. Generating a set of virtual actions 
is a much faster process than the complex behaviour in navigating affordances, 
because generating virtual actions takes place at the level of sensorimotor proces-
ses, whereas affordances is a selection among virtual actions with different den-
sities, i.e. an affordance describes the probability of selecting (attracting) a virtual 
action. HAC emphasises the action selection, i.e. affordance density. For instance, 
during transitioning to another space, HAC suggests the higher levels bias the low-
er level competitions, which operate at the level of action itself, through a cascade 
of expected affordances. Given the lower levels are fast, a continuous process of 
selecting amongst virtual actions that best satisfy expected affordances unfolds. 
Recall the Tetris example from Chapter 8, where pragmatic action differ from 
epistemic action (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). Affordances, in active inference, are 
P(ot|st )
st st+1st-1
πn
γn
P(st+1|st ,πn )
P(ot ) ot ot+1ot-1
P(πn ) = σ(-γn·G(πn )) Q(πn ) = σ(-γn·G(πn ) - F(πn ))
Action policy
Precision
Hidden states
Likelihood
Outcomes
B1 B2
A A A
Prior Posterior
Retention Protention
Figure 11.2—This Forney factor graph/diagram designates a probabilistic generative model. The hidden states (s) 
generate sensory observations (o) using the likelihood matrix (A). The transition from prior to posterior depends on 
the transition matrix (B), which further depends on the action policy. In other words, how to change observations 
depends on the selected kind of  action, which in turn depends on the degree of  prior precision. The probability of  
a virtual action depends on the expected free energy and precision, which is given by the softmax function of  the 
expected free energy. 𝛾	designates	the	precision	of 	the	expected	free	energy	under	the	specific	policy,	𝜋. There are 
many policies (𝜋n) considered at the same time, yielding different precisions (𝛾n ).
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defined as the epistemic and pragmatic values, in terms of the posterior predictive 
distribution over outcomes, of a virtual action. In other words, “minimizing expec-
ted free energy minimizes the divergence between predicted and preferred outcomes […] and any 
uncertainty afforded by observations […]. Heuristically, this ensures observations are informa-
tive. For example, an agent who wants to avoid bright light will move to the shade, as opposed 
to closing its eyes” (Friston et al., 2015, pp. 193–194). The pragmatic value describes 
the predicted reward relative to behaviour, whereas the epistemic describes the 
salience relative to ambiguity-resolving (Friston et al., 2016). 
Virtual actions, on the other hand, is the set of possible motor trajectories as 
sequences of action, usually referred to as policy in active inference papers, that 
emerge along with the unfolding of action-perception. Naturally, the unfolded 
action sequences are precisely behaviour; thus, virtual action corresponds to po-
tential behaviour (Fig. 11.2). The value of these virtual actions corresponds to 
affordances so that affordances becomes an attribute determining the certainty of 
the state; this is precisely why the value (affordance) of a virtual action is determi-
ned by the epistemic value and pragmatic value (Friston, 2018).
To briefly sum up and use the taxonomy of active inference; prior beliefs and 
sensory observations inform the updating of the states of the world, which in 
turn is continuously updated by action policies (virtual actions) that are valued 
by their epistemic and pragmatic estimates (affordances). Ultimately, this process 
accumulates—using a softmax function1—to a precision of beliefs given specific 
policies (virtual actions). This precision weighing has been pointed out on diffe-
rent occasions (Fig. 11.2, Chapter 10 and Appendix E, Eq. E.4).
1 The softmax functions is method to normalise (make probabilities to sum 1), so that vectors that do not sum 
to 1 and might hold negative numbers are remapped/normalised so that the numbers are between [0 1] and 
sum to 1 making them readable as probabilities. 
(11.1) 
n
The σ designates the softmax function, π designates the virtual action, γ de-
signates the precision weight and G designates the expected free energy. In the 
vast number of virtual actions, the selected attractor, which depend on the pre-
cision of sensory PEs that has yet to be unpacked, defines the current sequence 
of action that is unfolding. The number of virtual actions is equal to the number 
of possible ways the future can unfold, that is an infinite number. Whenever P(π) 
= 0 there are no changes in sequential actions, so the selected virtual action is 
continuously selected. 
In the process of unpacking, the PEs can either persuade or annihilate hig-
her-level metastable attractors that best explain the sensory input. This process 
of selecting an attractor corresponds to selecting an attractor with an affordance 
that best explains sensory input (Friston et al., 2012; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). In 
active inference, the precision weighing is hypothesised to be described by the 
dopaminergic activity, so that dopaminergic rewards reflect familiarity of sensory 
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states (Friston et al., 2012; Eshel and Tian, 2014; Shea, 2014). If true, the salien-
ce is a question of precision, which was denoted γ (see e.g. Hickey, Chelazzi and 
Theeuwes, 2010). Dopamine, in this sense, can bias the sensorimotor integration 
and action selection, because it controls ongoing competition on higher levels 
through adjusting the precision in the selection of proprioceptive and exterocep-
tive signals. Fig. 11.3 attempts to illustrate the complex relation between virtual 
action, precision and selected virtual actions (attractors).
The importance of a neuro-electrophysiological marker, e.g. dopamine, is that 
it makes the virtual actions and affordance measurable; what can one expect, on 
A    B
Figure 11.3—An	abstract	diagrammatic	state-space	illustration	of 	increasing	precision	in	attractors	in	a	field	
of  virtual actions, π. This abstraction serves merely to visualise the general idea—under no circumstances does 
the brain or mind produce such representation. A. Each voxel describes a virtual action, which is theoretically 
not	directly	dissociable	but	maintains	a	fluid	and	continuous	nature.	The	size	and	colour	describe	certainty.	Each	
virtual action is a sequence of  actions that can be biased by the ascending proprioceptive and exteroceptive PEs. 
In this example, due to high precision around two competing virtual actions, two attractors naturally emerge from 
the range of  virtual actions. B. Using here the taxonomy of  active inference, the voxels are replaced by π with its 
respective precision-value.
a neuronal level, by systematically manipulating virtual actions and affordances? 
Recall the Tetris example from Chapter 8. Virtual actions and affordances 
belong to epistemic and pragmatic actions, in the sense that virtual actions and 
affordances are continuously unpacked, even during pragmatic action. However, 
virtual actions only bring the kind of action necessary to change the perception to 
the generative model, whereas the affordance (precision weight) depends on (1) 
the environment, (2) the physical structure of the current zoid and (3) the inten-
tion of the agent. Architectural transition is very much like a three-dimensional 
game of Tetris—with extra steps. The separation of virtual action from affordan-
ce makes clear the difference between the necessary actions to perceive (practical 
perception) versus actively selecting what one wants to improve the perception 
thereof. There is an intention in affordance, whereas virtual action is the practical 
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knowledge that if the urge to improve the perception of this particular environ-
ment, it can be done so and so. 
To exemplify the differences further, consider a dinner situation. The affordan-
ces of a fork not only depend on what is for dinner but also what one intends to 
do with the fork in general, i.e. chopsticks may be the agent’s preference given a 
specific kind of dinner. The virtual actions of the fork do not vary according to the 
intention. The fork is perceivably the same physical structure because the virtual 
actions remain the same, whereas the attracted set of actions (Fig. 11.3) depend 
on the intention and vary accordingly. Affordances of the fork depend on what 
is for dinner, while virtual actions depend on the physical structure of the fork.
11.3.2 Electrophysiological response
Concerning the biological underpinnings, FEP corresponds to a computational 
formulation of homeostasis, where the objective is to resist a tendency to disorder 
and thereby keeping the organism alive. FEP does so by minimising PEs and keep 
the organism within an acceptable bound. The synaptic gain of neurons, which is 
the magnitude of the neuronal synaptic response, is directly related to adjustments 
relevant to homeostasis (Burrone and Murthy, 2003). In fact, this is one of the es-
sential novelties FEP (Friston, 2005) brought forward arguing that the predicted 
states of the world are described through synaptic activity. Synaptic gains in the 
cortical system reflects different kinds of precisions through neuromodulators, 
e.g. cholinergic system is hypothesised to reflect the precision of expected uncer-
tainty, whereas noradrenergic system reflect the precision of state transitions, i.e. 
unexpected uncertainty, and finally the dopaminergic system reflects the precision 
of action selection, i.e. precision of beliefs about policies2 (Parr and Friston, 2017). 
According to the outlined framework, an increasing uncertainty of the sensori-
motor integration will build up a synaptic gain that is hypothetically caused by inter 
alia dopaminergic activity because it directly relates to action selection, i.e. goal-di-
rected behaviour (Phillips et al., 2003; Montague et al., 2004; Montague, Hyman 
and Cohen, 2004; Thurley, Senn and Lüscher, 2008). PEs may elicit different kinds 
of behaviours, e.g. positive PEs elicit approach behaviour that conceivably brings 
along a range of positive emotions and is approached, whereas negative PEs eli-
cit avoidance behaviour, which is more likely to be hated and avoided. Despite 
the negative PEs not being rewarding per se, they do describe (negative) reward 
(Matsumoto et al., 2016) as opposed to fully predictable rewards; these natural-
ly do not produce any PEs (Montague, Hyman and Cohen, 2004). The negative 
2 Neuromodulation is the chemical process throughout the body and brain that regulate various populations 
of  neurons in different timescales and locations in the brain. The major systems include dopaminergic, noradr-
energic, serotoninergic and cholinergic system. These have different signatures and different characteristics in 
terms of  point of  origin, neural targets and bodily effect. For instance, the noradrenergic system, which is also 
known as norepinephrine system, originates in the lateral tegmental field, targets the hypothalamus and effects 
the arousal (reactivity/selective attention, see e.g. De Martino, Strange and Dolan, 2008). See Appendix B for a 
description of  neurotransmitters and neuromodulators. 
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reward reflects a physical intensity rather than a negative value; dopaminergic re-
sponses in macaques indicate an increase with intensifying physical impact, while 
bitterness in liquid solution reduced the activity (Fiorillo, Song and Yun, 2013).
Dopamine and other neuromodulators are of particular interest because they 
are known to alter behaviour, which is ultimately the outcome of action-selection. 
According to the current framework, different environments may elicit different 
behaviours (Elliot, 2006; Doya, 2008); including addiction, anxiety, depression, 
schizophrenia and PTSD. The reason for different emerging behaviour is con-
jectured to be rooted in affordances and virtual actions. This is partially suppor-
ted by the architectural, psychosocial and physiological study by Fich and col-
leagues (2014). By systematic architectural variations during psychosocial stress 
(Trier-Social-Stress-Test), where participants delivered saliva-test samples every 
ten minutes, their results show that open spaces induce significantly less stress as 
compared to enclosed spaces. The stress was induced psychosocially by asking 
the participants to count backwards in steps of 13 from 1687 and to prepare a 
speech for a highly attractive job-interview. Cortisol was measured in the saliva 
as a measure of stress, which conveniently—relative to FEP—partially describes 
disturbances in the homeostatic balance (Herman et al., 2016). Their results are in 
line with the hypothesis that restrictions on virtual actions may cause avoidance 
behaviour, which in turn is directly related to the dopaminergic activity. As sta-
ted early on by Schultz, there is evidence for “the involvement of dopamine neurons in 
central processes determining the behavioural reactivity of the subject to important environmental 
events” (Schultz, 1992). Indeed, concurrent dopaminergic activity during different 
behavioural processes emphasises its role in motoric activities. 
To briefly sum up, it is suggested firstly that the cholinergic, noradrenergic and 
dopaminergic systems describe certainties relevant to maintaining homeostasis, 
i.e. minimising free energy. Secondly, it is suggested that the amplitude in neuro-
nal responses reflects the PEs relative to disturbances in the homeostatic balance. 
Increasing uncertainty in the sensorimotor integration, which is preferably avoided 
as it decreases chances to survive, has a primary effect on synaptic transmission, 
i.e. neuromodulatory gain control. Thirdly, because environment restricts actions, 
it naturally restricts behaviour, i.e. one cannot merely storm out a prison cell or 
transit into the next room without a door. There are no affordances because fir-
stly the virtual actions do not exist. 
The relation between behaviour and precision is dynamic in the sense that be-
haviour can both be modulated continuously by fast BU sensory precision, or by 
TD proprioceptive (behavioural) predictions. Neuromodulators alter/modulate 
the precisions of the virtual actions yielding the probability they will be enacted 
(Friston et al., 2012). Because a new update brings with it new expected free energy 
of a policy, affordances and virtual actions are continuously renewed and internally 
competing in a winnerless competition. In other words, the generative model may 
bring with it new virtual actions and precision values that directly influence the 
attraction/selection of action sequences, so that a specific virtual action is only 
an exciting action if it holds a high precision, i.e. useful affordances. For instance, 
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as mentioned, if the sun is blinding, one goes to the shade, and not merely close 
the eyes (Friston et al., 2015, pp. 193–194). This is simply because the affordances 
of the virtual action better minimise the expected free energy by moving to the 
shade as opposed to closing the eyes, and essentially, the affordances attract that 
particular policy. “The precision updates are effectively driven by the difference between the 
expected free energy over policies, relative to the equivalent expected free energy prior to observing 
outcomes” (Kaplan and Friston, 2018, p. 328).
11.4 Hypothesis
Active inference builds on the coupling between body, brain and environ-
ment by suggesting that action and perception are inseparable, making cognition 
the outcome of a dynamic triangulation between (1) what the environment has 
to offer, (2) an acting body with proactive sensory organs and (3) a hierarchical 
generative model of the world. Cognition, being inherently temporal, is to reason 
a coherent spatial world continuously by acting and perceiving. For this reason, 
the following testable, falsifiable hypothesis is established: 
“If an enactive account of perception, action, and cognition is correct, then affordan-
ces are intimately related to higher hierarchical levels through low-level perceptual cues. 
Such an account would situate the processing of affordances at a similar stage as early 
perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory and motor-related ERPs 
associated with the perceived affordance of an environment. […] [It is]	expected	to	find	
differences in cortical responses to covary [resonate] as a function of affordances over 
sensory and motor areas. In addition, [it is] expected to see differences in MRCPs as a 
function of the environmental affordances […].” (Djebbara et al., 2019)
11.5 Conclusion
Given the architectural conundrum of transiting from one space to another, 
the experiencing agent generates a TD prediction that meets a BU sensory signal 
where their incongruence generates PEs. This complex cascade unfolds in diffe-
rent time-scales, where the sensorimotor integration is the lowest, thus the fastest, 
as opposed to higher cognitive processes. This is in line with active inference and 
HAC (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016; Parr and Friston, 2017). Neuroanatomically, one 
can at least expect to measure the generated PEs as endogenous components in 
the sensorimotor areas. Note that such a measure does not describe the decisi-
on-making of virtual actions in architectural transition, but the free energy mini-
misation of a selected virtual action. In particular, the measure reflects the incon-
gruity between a specific virtual action, e.g. π1, and a specific visual observation 
of a transition, e.g. o1.
The relation between virtual actions (policies) and affordances (precisions) 
have been elaborated. Affordances according to Gibson (1986) describe the prac-
tical interaction-relation between subject and object—one that relates to the form 
of an acting body and the form of an object/environment—so that object and 
environments may have good, or bad, affordances. The context in which Gibson 
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refers to good affordances is in evolutionary terms, i.e. terrain features, shelters, 
water, object (Gibson, 1986, pp. 18–19, 36–42), e.g. good affordances in the en-
vironment are spaces that allow for flight in stressful situations (Fich et al., 2014). 
By adding the layer of virtual actions, the term affordances may expand to encom-
pass the intention of the experiencing agent, so that what determines whether an 
object/environment has good affordances is already in the intended interaction 
with that object/environment. Recall Chapter 5 and 6, where Husserl investi-
gated intentionality in experience, which was a prolongation of Bergson’s early 
phenomenology and a forerunner to the predictive mind framework. Husserl’s 
and Bergson’s temporal approach to experience emphasises the role of action, 
ultimately relating to the afforded interaction of a living body and its immediate 
environment under a specific intention. Fich and colleague’s (2014) experiment 
elicited an implicit intention, i.e. the fight/flight mechanism, based on evoluti-
onary terms, which may explain why cortisol levels in open spaces (flight) were 
significantly lower as compared to enclosed spaces (fight). However, according to 
the framework of virtual actions and affordances, the value of affordances depend 
directly on the intention of the experiencing agent—and furthermore, is the very 
fundament of the emerging cognitive process.
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Conditions of Part One
The overall strategy was to establish phenomenological conditions regarding 
experience using Bergson and Husserl for an empirical framework to ensure that 
it addresses experience. These conditions are compared to emergence, enactivism 
and active inference (FEP). The conditions are here recited:
1. Heterogeneity of duration as an indivisibility of time, i.e. continui-
ty in the stream of consciousness by interpenetrating moments of time.
2. Indeterminate state of the human as the asymmetry of the transcen-
dental and the immanent, i.e. reducing indeterminacy about the world 
through embodied and embedded action/perception.
3. Dynamic relations as primacy of intuition, i.e. the immediacy of the 
given and the process of self-temporalising. 
1. The heterogeneity of time characterises the view that time is continuous 
and interpenetrated by past and future—thus, it is indivisible to separate distingu-
ishable parts. Active inference is essentially the core of this principle because it 
builds on the continuity, i.e. the transition states, of a current state. Indeed, this is 
due to the predictive brain outset. Emphasising the predictive nature of the bra-
in by using the prior experience, which essentially is a Bayes optimal generative 
model, proposes that the brain is operating on the upcoming experience, i.e. pro-
tention, using prior experiences, i.e. retention, to generate qualified guesses. The 
specious present serves as the unity of retention and protention—a phenomenon 
in time where it is neither protention nor retention alone that reigns, but a compa-
rison through unity, which active inference refers to as PEs. Despite the apparent 
Specifying the research question
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congruence regarding indivisibility of time in the condition and the empirical fra-
mework, active inference as an inferential generative model struggles to make up 
for continuous-time1. Active inference currently operates in discrete state-space, 
which makes the continuity divisible in theory—yet, each given moment, even 
when divided, is constituted by the prior moment and the prediction. In brief, this 
means that the unfolding of time in the simulation is divisible, but the simulated 
agent still depends on prior experience and predictions of expected free energy.
The closer an empirical theory is coming to experience, the more it seems that 
time has been misunderstood. Perhaps because mathematics and statistics always 
reduce it to a static frame-count. This seems not to be the natural behaviour of 
time—instead, it seems that time is heterogeneous, involving manifolds beyond 
the known two-dimensional number system (Appendix A). This turn of events in 
the theory is akin to that of Poincaré in mathematics; that is, the introduction of 
movement and time in the equations is the origin of dynamic systems theory. For 
Poincaré, all possible points were drawn, or in other words, the virtual actions of 
the behaviour are drawn, and these determine that particular system.  
2. The key argument to make up for the indeterminate state of the human is 
the self-organising process in emergence, i.e. a process where the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. There is no hurricane in water nor in the wind, similar 
to how there is no financial collapse in a dollar bill. These things emerge from 
local components and their interplay. According to Damasio (2010), homeost-
asis is the process that enabled basic reflexes and metabolic regulations through 
incentives that guide and drive the living creature. This would eventually lead to 
emotional states anchored in the body, describing a cognitive architecture that 
places the affective dimension equally with more conventional processes (Vernon 
et al., 2015). To avoid straining the homeostatic balance, allostasis was suggested 
to function as a predictive self-regulation during perturbation stemming from 
interactions with the environment, requiring adjustments before actual events 
(Sterling, 2012). This complex biological behaviour rest on the ability to predict 
on a cellular level, which is where DST demonstrate how the body functions as 
a dynamic system using patterns of change over time instead of symbolic pro-
cessing. Given the DST approach, the argument took a biological turn towards 
autopoiesis and self-organising principles demonstrating how organisational and 
operational closure maintains a system through visceral top-down signals that 
compete with sensory signals of the environment. Furthermore, DST demon-
strates how networks of the interconnected brain cannot fully decompose to its 
component parts to explain cortical functionality. Instead, the brain uses the glo-
bal network as a whole with minimally decomposability of local patterns in the 
brain to enact cognition. 
Concerning the asymmetry of the transcendental and immanent, active infe-
rence wholly encapsulates the Husserlian concept of transcendental perception, 
1 This is not referring to the rewriting of  an expression from summation to integral. 
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i.e. horizonal intentionality. The anticipated perception [Vorgriff] is precisely the 
prediction in active inference and SMC, so that the perception that one anticipates 
to perceive depends on the action than one selects—this is essentially the core of 
proactive sensory. The asymmetry thus refers to the comparison by unity in the 
specious present, which in active inference is a prediction error. 
3. The last condition concerns the immediacy of the given and how that par-
takes in self-temporalising. The link between DST and emergence is the depen-
dency of dynamic causality. By arguing that a living organism operates through 
reciprocal causality, it becomes clear that the organism and environment couple 
structurally, which further yields an embodied congruence between system and 
environment. Dynamic co-emergence is an expression for this diachronic co-de-
termined coupling between an organisms system and its environment—thus, ar-
chitecture takes an essential position in the structure of cognition. If the environ-
ment is coupled to brain and body, it seems natural to investigate how designed 
environment partake in the complexity of this dynamic system. 
Furthermore, DST links to Bergson’s continuity and heterogeneity of time, not 
through the fact that DST can account for continuous time-series, but through 
the fact that dynamic systems do not target the state in a given system—instead, 
DST aims to understand the transition, the change of pattern over time. Similar 
to DST, the Hidden Markov Model is certainly also Bergsonian in its approach 
inference and time. In these models, the environment is held to be hidden states, 
i.e. an environment that the architects usually design. They are hidden states for 
the observing agent, but not for the all-seeing architect who designed the environ-
ment. The hidden states that the actively inferring agent must infer are essentially 
designed hidden states that influence the unfolding of the inference Markov chain. 
Any inferences at the lowest scale (prediction) of the hidden states are predictions 
about the designed environment that refer to action. These predictions unpack 
at the level of intuition. Active inference as a framework of explaining experi-
ence through virtual actions links perfectly well with SMC, DST, enactivism and 
phenomenology. 
Specifying the research question
The early distinction between architectural and experiential transition (Chapter 
3) has guided the research question more than expected. Architectural (physical) 
transition is interrelated with the (metaphysical) transition in time since cogniti-
on is anchored in body, brain and environment. If the function of the brain is to 
predict potential movements instead of resolving representations of an external 
world, it seems that architecture may hold a much greater privilege on cognition 
than anticipated. The research question may thus go from: 
How does experiential transition unfold through action and perception 
relative to architectural transition?
To:
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Can	an	embodied	neuroscientific	framework,	based	on	phenomenology,	
experimentally answer how the experiential transition relates to the cog-
nitive process of action-perception with regard to architectural transition?
The question is two-fold. It questions whether it is possible to derive an empi-
rical framework from phenomenological conditions, and it questions whether the 
framework can answer how experience relates to action-perception and the en-
vironment. The answer to the latter will also determine the answer of the former. 
To be sure, active inference only makes up a specific aspect of a phenomeno-
logical understanding of experience—in no way can active inference correspond 
directly to a phenomenological dimension of human experience. The novelty 
proposed here is the integration of the argument in SMC, namely that experience 
depends on the structure of change in the perceptual organs (O’Regan and Noë, 
2001), with active inference, because the structure of change corresponds to the 
transition matrix. Furthermore, the transition matrix is inherently dependent on 
the action policy (virtual action) and precision (affordance). Comparing the condi-
tions for phenomenology to active inference essentially states that active inference 
offers a computational cognitive neuroscientific approach to understand how the 
environment appears as it does—not that active inference can correspond to a 
full-blown experience with intentionality/quale. In practice, how the environment 
appears, is deeply seated in neurophysiological processes, which reveals how im-
portant it is to understand the underlying processes of human homeostasis and 
basic cognition, i.e. action-perception, since psychiatric and psychological con-
ditions emerge from disturbances in precisely neurophysiological processes (see 
e.g. Grant and Adams, 2009). As mentioned before, this poses the strategy that it 
may be better to ask not what cognition tells about the nature of active inference 
but what the nature of active inference tells about cognition.
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Summary. If  an enactive account of  perception, action, and cognition is correct, then it is 
expected	to	find	differences	in	cortical	responses	to	resonate as a function of  affordances over 
sensory and motor areas—can this be tested? This chapter concerns the experimental 
setup to test the established hypothesis. The utilised method is a mobile brain/
body imaging approach recording brain activity synchronised to head-mounted 
displays. Participants perceived and acted upon virtual transitions ranging from 
non-passable to easily passable. It was found that early sensory brain activity, on 
revealing the environment and before actual movement, differed as a function of  
virtual actions. In addition, movement through transitions was preceded by a mo-
tor-related negative component that also depended on affordances. Surprisingly, 
the empirical data are in line with the hypothesis, complementing the empirical 
framework as a whole.  
12.1 The hypothesis
“If an enactive account of perception, action, and cognition is correct, then affordan-
ces are intimately related to higher hierarchical levels through low-level perceptual cues. 
Such an account would situate the processing of affordances at a similar stage as early 
perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory and motor-related ERPs 
associated with the perceived affordance of an environment. […] [It is]	expected	to	find	
differences in cortical responses to covary [resonate] as a function of affordances over 
Sensorimotor brain dynamics reflect 
architectural affordances
CHAPTER 12
This chapter is an extended version of the thesis-related publication 
Sensorimotor	brain	dynamics	reflects	architectural	affordances	in	Proceedings	of	
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America by the author 
(Djebbara et al., 2019).
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sensory and motor areas. In addition, [it is] expected to see differences in MRCPs as a 
function of the environmental affordances […].” (Djebbara et al., 2019)
12.1.1 Phenomenology, SMC and active inference
Phenomenologically, the hypothesis questions the immediacy of the experien-
tial transition concerning the architectural transition. According to the framework 
insofar, the continuity of experience is a constant integration of sensorimotor 
activity, so that action and perception cannot be distinguished to separate who-
les. Consequently, phenomenology situates the perception of the environment 
at the intuitive level, meaning the virtual actions and affordances should not be 
considered intellectual outcomes, but rather intuitive givens, i.e. the early and fast 
cortical processes that are linked to sensory processing must resonate with the 
virtual actions and affordances of the environment. However, this is not to say 
that a full-blown experience is captured in these early, fast processes of the brain, 
but that experience emerges from those operations, i.e. the following experiences 
are further based on these. 
Sensorimotor activity, according to SMC, reflects the perceptual experience in 
perception where that pattern of change in a sensory activity constitutes the expe-
rience. The pattern of change depends on one part on the actions of the agent, but 
since the perceptual organs are proactive, there is a continuous practical feed of 
structural change over time in the sensory activity. An agent cannot reduce actual 
uncertainty about what is not perceivable without physically moving the body—
however, the proactive perceptual organs contribute to the stable (non-acting) 
perception of the world. From the perspective of SMC, the hypothesis is that since 
the perceptual experience originates in the structure of change over time, which in 
turn depends on the action policies, the sensorimotor activity resonates with the 
environmental affordances, if the agent intends to interact with the environment.
Regarding active inference, the environment is equivalent to the generative 
process. Motor systems suppress errors through a dynamic interchange of pre-
diction and action so that there are two ways to minimise prediction errors. One 
may adjust predictions to fit the current sensory input, or one may adapt the un-
folding of movement to make predictions come true (Chapter 10). Action is thus 
both perceived by and caused by perception (Friston, 2003), which means that 
action, perception and cognition coordinate to move in ways that conform to a 
transitional set of expectations (Clark, 2013). The set of action policies constitute 
the transition matrix in active inference, where they are considered in parallel to 
alter the generative process according to the intention of the agent.
12.2 Event-Related Potential brain components
Previous neuroscientific experiments addressing this issue contributes to 
discussions centred on how human beings relate to the world. Enactivists have 
stated the reciprocal dependency of the living organism, as a self-organised living 
system, and the embedded body in a world for cognition (Maturana and Varela, 
1992; Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016). Enactivism shares 
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roots with phenomenology (Jelić et al., 2016; Gallagher, 2017), similar to promi-
nent architectural theorists, who put body, action, and cognition central to expe-
rience. The link between active inference and enactivism rests on the critical con-
cept that one acts to perceive, and vice versa. Such a thesis rests on a hierarchical 
and dynamic model of the world, which temporally dissociates lower sensorimotor 
inferences from higher motivated goals, as fast and slow, respectively (Chapter 11; 
Kiebel, Daunizeau and Friston, 2008). Fast, lower sensorimotor inferences depict 
processes related to virtual actions and affordances, which thereby must be pre-
sent in early stages of perception. HAC takes the temporal aspect of affordances 
much further, by suggesting that cortical activity relates to the immediate decision 
of action selection, which occurs fluently during movement (Pezzulo and Cisek, 
2016). Such an account of temporally extended affordance is in accordance with 
active inferences, SMC and phenomenology.
The Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach (Makeig et al., 2009; Gramann et 
al., 2011, 2014) allows recording brain activity with EEG, synchronised to move-
ment recordings and head-mounted virtual reality (VR) to investigate the impact 
of environmental affordances on early sensory processing in acting humans. This 
approach allows for investigating brain dynamics of participants perceiving an en-
vironment and the transitions contained therein as well as brain dynamics during 
the transitions themselves. Previous studies investigating event-related potential 
(ERP) activity in stationary participants demonstrated slow cortical potentials to 
indicate anticipative motor behaviour (for an overview see Luck and Kappenman, 
2011, chap. 8). Known motor-related cortical components (MRCPs) are the rea-
diness potential (RP; Kornhuber and Deecke, 2016), contingent negative variati-
on (CNV), and the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN; Brunia, 2003), which can 
be seen as indicators of predictive behaviour (Di Russo et al., 2017). MRCPs are 
negative-going waveforms preceding an actual, or imagined, motor execution. 
However, these negative components are associated with multiple processes in-
cluding sensory, cognitive, and motor systems. Bozzacchi et al. (2012) attempted 
to measure affordances of a physical object by evaluating whether the anticipa-
ted consequence of action itself influences the brain activity preceding a self-pa-
ced action. The authors compared MRCPs of situations where it was possible to 
reach out and grasp a cup, versus situations where it was impossible to grasp the 
cup, by tying the hands of the participants. A motor execution was forced at all 
times. In situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, the authors reported 
an absence of early activity over the parietal cortex and found instead increased 
activity over the prefrontal cortex. The results were interpreted as reflecting an 
awareness of the inability to execute a goal-oriented action. Closely related to the 
MRCPs is the post-imperative negative variation (PINV), a negative-going wave-
form that is present following an imperative stimulus. It reflects the immediate 
motor execution related to the onset of an imperative stimulus and is observed 
during experiments investigating learned helplessness or loss of control (Elbert 
et al., 1982; Diener et al., 2009). The PINV thus allows linking motor-related po-
tentials to the readiness to act (Casement et al., 2008).
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12.3  Method 1 
12.3.1 Participants
Twenty participants, of which nine were females and none with a history of 
neurological pathologies, were recruited from a participant pool of the Technical 
University of Berlin, Germany. All participants needed to read and sign the written 
informed consent, which was approved by The Ethics Committee of Technical 
University of Berlin, about the experimental protocol. Participants received either 
monetary compensation (10€/hour) or accredited course hours. The mean age 
was 28.1 years (σ = 6.2 years), all participants had normal or corrected to nor-
mal vision, and none had a specific background in architecture (no architects or 
architectural students). A single participant was excluded due to technical issues 
during the experimental setup.
12.3.2 Paradigm
The experiment took place in the Berlin Mobile Brain/Body Imaging 
Laboratories (BeMoBIL) with one of the experimental rooms providing a space 
of 160 m2. The size of the virtual space was 9 m × 5 m with a room size of 4.5 
m × 5 m for the first room and a room size of 4.5 m × 5 m for the second room. 
Participants performed a forewarned (S1-S2) Go/NoGo paradigm (pseudorando-
mised 50/50) in the VR environment that required them to walk from one virtual 
room to a second virtual room, akin to the architectural conundrum (Chapter 3). 
Doors of different width ranging from unpassable (20 cm, Narrow) to passable 
(100 cm, Mid) to easily passible (1500 cm, Wide) manipulated the transition affor-
dance between rooms. The experiment consisted of a 3 × 2 repeated measures 
design, including the factors door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide; pseudorandomised) 
and movement instruction (Go, NoGo). A total of 240 trials per participant were 
collected with 40 trials for each of the factor levels. One trial consisted of a parti-
cipant starting in a dark environment on a predefined starting square (Fig. 12.1). 
The “lights” would go on after a random intertrial interval (mean = 3 s, σ = 1 s), 
and participants faced a room with a closed door. They were instructed to wait 
(mean = 6 s, σ = 1 s) for a colour change of the door with a change to green indi-
cating a Go trial and a change to red indicating a NoGo trial. In the case of a gre-
en door, the participant walked toward the door, which would slide aside. Upon 
entering the subsequent space, participants were instructed to find and virtual-
ly touch, using the controller, a red rotating circle. The circle would inform the 
participant to have earned another 0.1€ to their basic reimbursement of 10 Euro 
per hour. After each trial, participants had to give an emotional rating of their 
state irrespective of whether they transitioned through the door (Go condition) 
or whether they remained in the same room (NoGo condition) without transition. 
To this end, participants were instructed to go back to the starting square to fill 
in a virtual Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) questionnaire, using a laser pointer 
from the controller, and subsequently to pull the response button located at the 
1 This subchapter is heavily based on the writing in (Djebbara et al., 2019)
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Figure 12.1— A. Participants were instructed to stand in the start square. A black sphere would restrict their 
vision	to	pure	black	for	3	seconds,	σ	=	1	second.	The	moment	the	black	sphere	disappears,	participants	perceive	
the door they have to pass. They wait for the imperative stimulus, either a green door (Go) or a red door (NoGo), 
for	6	seconds,	σ	=	1	second.	In	the	case	of 	Go,	participants	were	instructed	to	pass	the	opening,	virtually	touch	the	
red circle, which in turn would release a monetary bonus, return to the start square and answer the virtual SAM 
questionnaire. In the case of  NoGo, participants were instructed to turn around and answer the virtual SAM. 
B. The three different doors were dimensioned as follows: Narrow 0.2 meter, Mid 1 meter, and Wide 1.5 meters. 
Note the colour code for each door as they are used throughout the paper. C. The diagrammatic timeline depicts the 
sequences of  events for a single trial in a conceptual manner. Illustration from Djebbara et al. (2019).
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pointer finger to turn the “lights off.” The lights would go back on automatically 
to start the next trial.
In Go trials, participants were instructed to walk toward the door and into the 
second room even in cases where the door was too narrow to pass. This ensures 
control for motor execution in the Go condition while allowing movement toward 
the goal irrespective of the affordance (passable vs unpassable). A narrow opening 
was thus different from a NoGo trial, in the sense that a NoGo trial did not require 
any movement toward the door, whereas a Go trial always required approaching 
the door. Upon touching the surrounding walls, the walls would turn red and in-
form the participants that they have failed to pass, and thus must return to the start 
square, fill in the virtual SAM, and start the next trial. Participants would quickly 
notice that the narrow door (20 cm) was impossible to pass without producing 
the warning feedback that they have failed to pass, and yet they were required 
to try passing. All participants had a training phase to get accustomed to the VR 
environment and the different conditions. The experimenter observed the parti-
cipants from a control room, separated from the experimental space, using two 
cameras and a mirrored display of the virtual environment to reduce interactions 
to a minimum during the experiments.
12.3.3 Subjective and behavioural
The subjective experience of the task was investigated by introducing the par-
ticipants to a virtual SAM questionnaire after each trial. The SAM is a pictorial 
assessment of pleasure, arousal, and dominance on a 5-point Likert scale (Bradley 
and Lang, 1994). The manikin display ranges from smiling to frowning (pleasure), 
from a dot in the stomach to an explosion (arousal), and from being very small to 
massive (dominance). Participants were asked to self-assess their current state after 
each trial. Furthermore, regarding behavioural measures, the reaction time was 
recorded from the onset of the Go-stimulus (door colour change) to reaching the 
opening-threshold itself, to assess the behaviour. The data were analysed using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the width of the doors as repeated measures 
factor. In the case of violation of normality and homogeneity, corrected p-values 
are reported. For post hoc analysis, the data were contrasted using Tukey HSD.
12.3.4 EEG recording and data analysis
All data streams were recorded and synchronised using LabStreamingLayer 
(LSL; 37). Participants wore a backpack, which held a high-performance gaming 
computer to render the VR environment (Zotac, PC Partner Limited, Hong Kong, 
China) attached to two batteries and an EEG amplifier system. The technological 
combination consisted of a Windows Mixed Reality (WMR; 2.89″, 2880 × 1440 
resolution, update rate at 90 Hz, 100-degree field of view with a weight of 440 
grams, linked to the Zotac computer through HDMI) headset and one controller 
by Acer to display and interact with the virtual environment based on Unity (Fig. 
12.2). Events for recordings of performance and physiological data were trigge-
red by the position of the participant in the tracking space or by the respective 
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response buttons of the remote control. Specific events, such as touching the wall, 
all button presses, transitioning through the door, answering the questionnaire, 
and all cases of “lights on” (and off), were synchronised with the recorded brain 
activity and the presented VR environment through LSL.
EEG data were acquired continuously with a 64-channel EEG system (eego-
Sports, ANT Neuro, Enschede, Netherlands), sampled at 500 Hz. Impedances 
were kept below 10 kΩ. The computational delay generated by the interaction of 
ANT Neuro software, Windows Mixed Reality, and Unity was measured to be 20 
ms (σ = 4 ms), which was taken into account during the analysis by subtracting 
the average delay from each event latency. With a jitter of 4 ms, the delay was 
considered to have little to no impact on the ERPs. Offline analysis was conduc-
ted using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) and the EEGLAB toolbox 
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The raw data were band-pass filtered between 1 Hz 
and 100 Hz and down-sampled to 250 Hz. Channels with more than five standard 
deviations from the joint probability of the recorded electrodes were removed 
and subsequently interpolated. The datasets were then re-referenced to an avera-
ge reference, and adaptive mixture independent component analysis (AMICA; 
Palmer, Kreutz-Delgado and Makeig, 2011) was computed on the remaining rank 
of the data using one model with online artefact rejection in five iterations. The 
resultant ICA spheres and weights matrices were transferred to the raw dataset 
that was preprocessed using the identical preprocessing parameters like the ICA 
ANT Neuro
Zotac
LabStreamingLayer
Windows 
Mixed Reality
Figure 12.2—Mobile Brain/Body Imaging setup. The participants wore a backpack, carrying a high-perfor-
mance	gaming	computer	(Zotac,	Cyan	colour),	powered	by	two	batteries	(Red	colour).	An	EEG	amplifier	(ANT	
eegoSports, Yellow colour) was attached to the backpack and connected to the computer. The participants wore a 
VR head-mounted display (Windows mixed reality) on top of  a 64-channel cap. This setup allowed participants 
to move freely around while recording data. Illustration from Djebbara et al. (2019).
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dataset, except the filtering, which used a band-pass filter from 0.2 Hz to 40 Hz. 
Subsequently, independent components (ICs) reflecting eye movements (blinks 
and horizontal movements) were removed manually based on their topography, 
their spectrum, and their temporal characteristics.
Epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the room including the clo-
sed door (“Lights on”) from –500 ms before to 1500 ms after stimulus onset for 
Narrow, Mid, and Wide door trials. Similarly, another set of epochs was time-locked 
to the second stimulus Go/NoGo from –500 ms before to 1000 ms after the on-
set of the stimulus for Narrow, Mid, and Wide door trials. On average, 15% (σ = 
10.8) of all epochs were automatically rejected when they deviated more than five 
standard deviations from the joint probability and distribution of the activity of 
all recorded electrodes.
The visual-evoked potentials, as well as MRCPs, were analysed at central mid-
line electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz, and Oz) covering all relevant locations inclu-
ding the visual and the motor cortex as reported in previous studies (Bozzacchi et 
al., 2012, 2015). Because stimuli were distributed across the entire visual field and 
participants walked through the virtual spaces, any lateralisation of ERPs were 
not expected. All channels were analysed, however, only three channels (FCz, 
Pz, and Oz) are reported and discussed in-text according to reported results by 
Bozzacchi et al. (2012). The analysis results of all six channels can be found in 
Appendix F. For peak analysis of the P1-N1 complex, the grand-average peaks 
were estimated, and individual peaks were defined as the maximum positive and 
negative peak in the time window surrounding the grand-average P1 and N1 pe-
aks (±10 ms from the peak), respectively. An automatic peak-detection algorithm 
detected the peaks in the averaged epochs for each participant. Multiple peaks 
were detected and systematically weighted depending on the magnitude, the di-
stance to the grand-average peak latency that was determined by visual inspection 
of grand-average ERP, and the polarity. For anterior N140 and posterior P140, 
by visual inspection of the grand-average ERPs, the grand-average latency was 
estimated to be 140 ms with a search window for individual peaks ranging from 
50 to 200 ms. For the anterior P215 and posterior N215, the grand-average peak 
latency was estimated to 215 ms with a search window for individual peaks ran-
ging from 140 to 290 ms.
Mean peak amplitudes were analysed using a 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA 
using the door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide) and electrode as repeated measures. 
The results descriptions focus on the visual-evoked P140 component at poste-
rior electrodes (Pz, POz, and Oz) and the N140 component at frontal leads (Fz, 
FCz, and Cz) based on separate ANOVAs. For the N215 and P215 components 
at posterior electrodes (Pz, POz, and Oz) and frontal leads (Fz, FCz, and Cz), 
separate ANOVAs were computed in the time range of 140 to 290 ms. For the 
later motor-related potentials, an ANOVA was computed for the mean amplitu-
de in the time range from 600 to 800 ms. The data were analysed using a 2 × 3 
× 6 factorial repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors imperative stimulus 
(Go and NoGo), door width (Narrow, Mid, and Wide), and electrode location (Fz, 
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Figure 12.3—Box plot of  the SAM questionnaire results for the three different SAM scales (Arousal, Domi-
nance, and Valence) as a function of  the door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide). The left column displays a pictorial 
representation of  the SAM manikin for the highest value of  each condition presented. The middle column displays 
the SAM ratings for the Go condition. The right column displays the SAM ratings for the NoGo condition. 
Means are indicated by a dashed line, while medians are a solid line. Illustration from (Djebbara et al., 2019).
FCz, Cz, Pz, POz, and Oz) within the time window (600–800 ms). For post hoc 
analysis, the data were contrasted using Tukey HSD. In the case of violations of 
the sphericity, corrected p-values are reported. All ANOVAs were computed as 
linear mixed models.
PART I I :  CHAPTER 12
207
12.4  Results 2 
12.4.1 Subjective data: SAM
The SAM questionnaire was answered regardless of Go or NoGo, and for all 
door conditions. A 2 × 3 factorial repeated measures ANOVA with the factors 
imperative stimulus (Go and NoGo) and door width (Narrow, Mid, and Wide) for 
each emotional dimension of the SAM questionnaire revealed differences in the 
main effect for width in Arousal (F2, 90 = 3.35, p = 0.0393, η
2 = 0.048), Dominance 
(F2, 90 = 10.03, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.138), and Valence (F2, 90 = 5.31, p = 0.0065, η
2 = 
0.073). For the imperative stimulus, differences were found for Arousal (F1, 90 = 
36.81, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.266), Dominance (F1, 90 = 25.26, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.173), 
and Valence (F1, 90 = 28.59, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.196). Interaction effects revealed sig-
nificant difference for Dominance (F2, 90 = 4.14, p = 0.0189, η
2 = 0.056) and Valence 
(F2, 90 = 7.04, p = 0.0014, η
2 = 0.096), however only tendencies for Arousal (F2, 90 
= 0.92, p = 0.4000, η2 = 0.0134). Post hoc contrasts using Tukey HSD (Fig. 12.3) 
showed no significant differences for NoGo in Arousal, however, significant dif-
ferences were identified for Go between Narrow × Mid (p = 0.0386). For NoGo in 
Dominance, no significant differences were revealed as opposed to Go for Narrow 
× Wide (p < 0.0001), Mid × Wide (p = 0.0335), and Narrow × Mid (p < 0.0345). 
Similarly for Valence, significant differences were only revealed in Go for Narrow 
× Mid (p = 0.0326), Narrow × Wide (p < 0.0001), and a tendency for Mid × Wide 
(p = 0.0625).
Figure 12.4—Rain-cloud plot of  approach times for each door width condition. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey 
HSD test. Means are indicated by a dashed line, while medians are displayed as solid lines. Illustration from 
(Djebbara et al., 2019).
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Figure 12.5—Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz, and Oz) at the onset of  “Lights On” event. Narrow con-
dition in yellow, Mid condition in blue, and Wide condition in red. Two time-windows are indicated with dashed 
lines	and	grey	transparent	box.	The	first	time	window	(50–200	ms)	marks	the	anterior	N140	and	posterior	
P140, while the second window (140–290 ms) marks the anterior P215 and posterior N215. The components 
are marked with arrows. Illustration from (Djebbara et al., 2019).
200ms
Anterior P215
Posterior P140
Anterior N140
Posterior N215
12.4.2 Behavioural data: approaching-time
This analysis is only possible for Go trials, as it required actually approaching 
the door. To investigate the time it took participants from the Go-stimulus to pass 
the door, a one-way ANOVA with repeated measures for different door widths 
was computed revealing a significant difference for the factor door widths (F2, 
36 = 6.07, p < 0.0053, η
2 = 0.232; Fig. 12.4). Post hoc comparison (Tukey HSD) 
showed no significant differences in behaviour when approaching the Narrow 
compared to Mid doors (p = 0.3073), approaching a tendency to be slower when 
approaching Mid as compared with Wide doors (p = 0.1312), and a significant dif-
ference between approaching Narrow as compared with Wide door (p = 0.0038) 
with significantly faster approach times for the Wide door condition.
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Figure 12.6— Posterior P140. Rain-cloud plot of  detected mean amplitude of  the positive peak in the time-
locked event “Lights on” in the time range of  50 to 200 ms for Pz, POz, and Oz. Means are indicated by a 
dashed	line,	while	medians	are	a	solid	line.	The	significance	is	calculated	using	Tukey	HSD.	Significant	differences	
were	observed	for	Oz	between	Narrow	×	Mid	(p	=	0.0021)	and	Narrow	×	Wide	(p	=	0.0065),	while	POz	in	
Narrow	×	Wide	revealed	a	significant	difference	(p	=	0.028);	however,	no	significant	differences	were	observed	in	
other electrodes and other contrasts. Posterior N215. Rain-cloud plot of  detected mean amplitude of  the nega-
tive	peak	in	the	time-locked	event	“Lights	on”	in	the	time	range	of 	140	to	290	ms	for	Pz,	POz,	and	Oz.	Signifi-
cant	differences	were	observed	only	for	Oz	in	Narrow	×	Mid	(p	=	0.0113)	and	Narrow	×	Wide	(p	=	0.0372).	
Anterior N140. Rain-cloud plot of  detected mean amplitude of  the negative peak in the time-locked event 
“Lights	on”	in	the	time	range	of 	50	to	200	ms	for	Fz,	FCz,	and	Cz	No	significant	differences	were	observed	for	
any electrode. Anterior P215. Rain-cloud plot of  detected mean amplitude of  negative peak in time-locked event 
“Lights	on”	in	the	time	range	of 	140	to	290	ms	for	Fz,	FCz,	and	Cz	Significant	differences	were	observed	in	
all	channels	in	Narrow	×	Wide,	except	for	only	a	tendency	in	Fz	(p	=	0.0717),	FCz	(p	=	0.0071),	and	Cz	(p	
=	0.0214).	Double plot. Frontal (dashed line) and posterior (solid line) time-locked ERPs (Fz and Oz) at 
the onset of  “Lights On” event. Narrow condition in yellow, Mid condition in blue, and Wide condition in red. 
Two	time-windows	are	indicated	with	dashed	lines	and	grey	transparent	box.	The	first	time	window	(50–200	ms)	
marks the anterior N140 and posterior P140, while the second window (140–290 ms) marks the anterior P215 
and posterior N215. Illustration from (Djebbara et al., 2019).
12.4.3 Electrophysiology: Event-Related Potentials
12.4.3.1 Posterior P140
With onset of the lights that allowed participants to see the room including 
the door (“Lights on”), the ERPs demonstrated a clear P1-N1 complex most 
pronounced over the occipital midline electrode with a first positive component 
around 140 ms, followed by a negative peak around 210 ms (Fig. 12.5 and see Fig. F.1 in 
Appendix F for full six channels). At the frontal midline electrode, this pattern was inver-
ted, and a negative component around 140 ms was followed by a positive peak observed 
around 215 ms. The 3 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA on P140 amplitudes for po-
sterior channels revealed significant main effects for both the factors door width 
(F2, 108 = 8.163, p = 0.005, η
2 = 0.096) and channel (F2, 36 = 15.868, p < 0.0001, η
2 
= 0.187). The interaction effect was not significant (F4, 108 = 1.669, p = 0.1624). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD revealed significant differences in peak 
amplitudes at channel Oz between Narrow and Mid transitions (p = 0.0021) and 
between Narrow and Wide transitions (p = 0.0065) and at POz comparing Narrow 
and Wide transitions (p = 0.028).
12.4.3.2 Posterior N215
The 3 × 3 repeated measure ANOVA on N215 amplitudes for posterior chan-
nels revealed a significant main effect for the factor door width (F2, 108 = 4.348, 
p = 0.0153, η2 = 0.066) and no significant impact for the factor channels (F2, 36 
= 0.0893, p = 0.9147, η2 = 0.001). Post hoc Tukey HSD contrasts revealed no 
significant differences for Pz and POz. However, similar to posterior P140, sig-
nificant differences at Oz for the comparison of Narrow and Mid transitions (p = 
0.0113) and for the comparison of Narrow and Wide transitions (p = 0.0372) were 
found (Fig. 12.6).
PART I I :  CHAPTER 12
211
12.4.3.3 Anterior N140
The 3 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA on N140 amplitudes for anterior chan-
nels revealed no significant main effect for the factor door width (F2, 108 = 1.823, p 
= 0.1663, η2 = 0.024). In contrast, the main effect of channels reached significance 
(F2, 108 = 8.109, p = 0.0012, η
2 = 0.107). The interaction did not reach significance.
12.4.3.4 Anterior P215
An inverse pattern was observed for amplitudes over anterior leads with a main 
effect of door width that differed depending on the affordances (F2, 108 = 11.071, p 
Figure 12.7—Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz, and Oz) at the onset of  Go/NoGo. Narrow condition in 
yellow, Mid condition in blue, and Wide condition in red. The time window, indicated with dashed lines and grey 
transparent box, illustrates the selected time window to analyse the MRCP by a global 2 × 3 × 6 factorial repeat-
ed-measures ANOVA. Anterior and posterior PINV are marked with arrows. Illustration from (Djebbara et 
al., 2019).
Anterior PINV
Anterior EPIC
Posterior PINVPosterior EPIC
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Figure 12.8—Rain-cloud plots of  the mean amplitude of  negative development in the time-locked event of  Go/
NoGo in the time range of  600 to 800 ms for FCz, Pz, and Oz. Means are indicated by dashed lines, while 
medians are solid lines. The Tukey HSD contrast revealed differences only in FCz and Oz, and between Narrow 
×	Mid	for	FCz	(p	=	0.0059)	and	for	Oz	(p	<	0.0001),	and	between	Narrow	×	Wide	for	FCz	(p	=	0.0323)	
and	for	Oz	(p	<	0.0001).	No	differences	were	observed	for	NoGo.	Illustration	from	(Djebbara	et	al.,	2019).
< 0.0001, η2 = 0.139). The main effect of channels also reached significance (F2, 36 
= 5.3627, p = 0.0092, η2 = 0.067). Tukey HSD contrasts revealed significant diffe-
rences only between Narrow and Wide transitions for FCz (p = 0.0071) and Cz (p 
= 0.0214), and a tendency at Fz (p = 0.0717). The interaction was not significant.
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12.4.4 Motor-related processes
12.4.4.1 Anterior EPIC
A 2 × 3 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant difference in the 
main effect for widths (F2, 270 = 4.21, p = 0.0157, η
2 = 0.025), imperative stimulus 
(F1, 270 = 23.66, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.071), and for channel (F2, 36 = 6.70, p = 0.0033, 
η2 = 0.040). No interaction effect was observed. The post hoc Tukey HSD revea-
led no significant differences between the transition widths for different channels 
or imperative stimuli.
12.4.4.2 Posterior EPIC
The identical ANOVA for the posterior potentials of the EPIC revealed no 
significant impact of transition width (F2, 270 = 2.001, p = 0.1371, η
2 = 0.013) nor 
imperative stimulus (F1, 270 = 2.30, p = 0.1298, η
2 = 0.007). Significant differences 
in EPIC amplitudes were observed for the factor channel (F2, 36 = 5.45, p = 0.0085, 
η2 = 0.035). Because topographical differences were not the focus of this study, 
no further post hoc contrasts were computed. No interaction was significant.
12.4.4.3 PINV
In the preparation time before the onset of the door colour change, indicating 
either to walk through the door or to remain in the same room, no systematic 
negative-going waveform was observed as reported in previous studies (Brunia, 
2003; van Boxtel and Böcker, 2004). However, after the onset of the colour chan-
ge, a pronounced positivity, the EPIC, followed by a long-lasting negative wa-
veform over frontocentral locations was observed in the ERP (Fig. 12.7 and see 
Fig. F.2 in Appendix F for all six channels). This negative waveform resembled 
a PINV as described in previous studies (Klein et al., 1996; Casement et al., 2008; 
Diener et al., 2009). The PINV component was observed 600–800 ms after the 
imperative stimulus (colour change of the door) and varied as a function of the 
affordance of the environment (door width). A global 2 × 3 × 6 factorial repeated 
measures ANOVA was computed to analyse the MRCPs using Go/NoGo, Width, 
and Channel as repeated measures. The ANOVA revealed significant differences 
in the main effect for Go/NoGo (F1, 540 = 19.54, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.039) and for 
Channel (F5, 90 = 16.69, p < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.112). Significant differences were repor-
ted for the interaction effect of Go/NoGo × Channel (F5,540 = 5.25, p = 0.0001, η
2 
= 0.035) and for Width × Channel (F10, 540 = 2.61, p = 0.0042, η
2 = 0.035). A ten-
dency was observed for the interaction of the factors Go/NoGo × Width (F2, 540 = 
2.33, p = 0.0975, η2 = 0.006).
Post hoc contrasts, using Tukey HSD, revealed significant differences only 
for the Go condition, as opposed to the NoGo condition (Fig 12.8). Similar to the 
early evoked potentials, differences were only observed at frontal and occipital 
sites and between Narrow and Mid door widths over FCz (p = 0.0059) and Oz (p 
< 0.0001), as well as between Narrow and Wide doors at FCz (p = 0.0323) and Oz 
(p < 0.0001). No differences were observed between the Mid and Wide doors (Fig. 
F.3 in Appendix F for all six channels).
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12.5  Discussion 3 
12.5.1 SAM and approaching-time
The analysis of subjective ratings revealed significant differences between dif-
ferent Go trials, but no differences for NoGo trials regarding all ratings. Notably, 
in cases of NoGo, all participants perceived a similar scene standing in front of a 
red (NoGo) door, turning around, and answering the virtual SAM. Varying door 
sizes for Go trials yielded differences for Dominance, reporting that Narrow doors 
were more dominating than Mid and even more for Wide doors. The increase in 
Dominance for Narrow doors is inversely reflected in Valence because increasing va-
lues were observed with increasing door widths. Regarding Arousal, participants 
reported less arousal for Narrow doors compared with Mid and Wide. Furthermore, 
it is noteworthy that Dominance for NoGo is relatively high in value, compared with 
NoGo in Arousal and Valence, which score a low and central value, respectively. 
Taken together, the findings indicate that subjective reports differ significantly 
depending on whether participants received a Go actively moved through the ro-
oms or not implying an impact of action affective ratings of an environment. The 
results, however, should be considered with caution as the subjective ratings might 
have been influenced by several factors beyond affordance, including monetary 
reward, different trial durations, physical activity, and different skills of subjecti-
ve/introspective emotional evaluation.
Performance data might thus provide a better basis for interpreting the impact 
of affordances on behaviour. The time it took participants to reach the door after 
the onset of the imperative colour change varied according to the environmental 
affordance. Participants approached the Wide doors either with a tendency to a 
significance or significantly faster than the Mid and Narrow doors, respectively, 
while there was no significant difference for Mid and Narrow transitions. While the 
Wide door clearly offered a passage without greater demands regarding the motor 
plan and execution, the Mid door width, being ambiguously wide/narrow, might 
have triggered motor processes simulating a transition to estimate whether the 
door was passable or not. In this sense, the Mid and Narrow doors, causing uncer-
tainty, might have delayed approach times due to increased processing demands. 
Admittedly, results derived from the approach time are limited, partly due to the 
caused fatigue of operating a physically demanding task for a relatively long time 
period, and partly due to passing a door that is seemingly impossible to pass. This 
led participants to develop different approach strategies, e.g., twisting their bo-
dies, peeking inside from different angles or walking directly into the virtual wall 
to trigger a failed attempt, causing different delays. Given no participant was told 
beforehand that one opening is impassable, the enthusiasm and creativity decrea-
sed over the course of trials when they learned it was the narrow door. However, 
the fact that participants, in general, spent significantly more time approaching 
the Narrow doors compared with Wide doors provides sufficient guidance for the 
analyses of cortical measures associated with these differences.
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12.5.2 Early evoked potentials
As an initial insight into the association of affordances and cortical potentials, 
the early visual-evoked potentials were analysed. It was expected to find diffe-
rences in the stimulus-locked ERP at occipital channels reflecting differences in 
sensory processing of affordance-related aspects of the transition. Based on the 
assumption of fast sensorimotor active inferences that should be reflected in ac-
tion-directed stimulus processing influencing not only sensory but also motor-re-
lated activity, it was also hypothesised to find differences in the ERP over motor 
areas in the same time window as sensory potentials (i.e., between 50 and 200 ms). 
As illustrated in the analysis, significant differences were found in amplitudes of 
the visually evoked P140 component over the central occipital electrode varying 
with the affordance of the transition. In addition, and in line with the hypothesis, 
a difference over frontocentral leads starting around 50 ms and lasting until 200 
ms after onset of the doors display was found. Taken together, no significant dif-
ferences in peak amplitudes were found when comparing the passable Mid and 
Wide doors while peak amplitudes associated with both door widths significantly 
differed from impassable Narrow doors. Note that the visual scene of the three 
doors was comparable as they contained the same physical contrasts in the Go 
and the NoGo condition. Also, being merely introduced to the environmental set-
ting, participants did not know whether they would have to attempt to pass, or 
not. These results indicate that impassable doors with poor affordances produce 
significantly different early evoked potentials compared with passable doors, par-
ticularly at the frontocentral and occipital sites. Thus, environmental affordances, 
in terms of being able to program a trajectory to transit spaces, yield a significantly 
measurable effect on early cortical potentials best pronounced over frontal and 
occipital sites at approximately 200 ms after the first view of the environment.
Considering the affordance-specific pattern observed for the early P1-N1-
complex, prior studies have shown this visual-evoked potential complex to reflect 
attentional processes associated with spatial or feature-based aspects of stimuli 
(Posner and Dehaene, 1994; Hillyard and Anllo-Vento, 1998; Mangun, Hopfinger 
and Heinze, 1998; Gramann et al., 2007; Gramann, Töllner and Müller, 2010). 
Attended stimuli elicit larger P1-N1 amplitudes than unattended ones. Based on 
these findings, the results suggest that passable transitions were associated with 
increased attentional processing. Keeping this in mind, viewing the affordan-
ce-specific pattern of P1-N1-complex in light of active inferences (Friston et al., 
2012), the difference confirms the assumption that perceptual processes covary 
with environmental affordances. In this sense, the amplitude difference might be 
credited to the process of actively inferring whether the body can move and transit 
at all, implying that visual attention is also guided by action-related properties of 
the environment. Similar to HAC (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016) and active inference 
(Kiebel, Daunizeau and Friston, 2008; Friston, 2013), these findings are in line 
with parallel cortical processes integrating sensory information to specify currently 
available affordances. How one might act upon the environment is an ongoing 
process of resolving affordances, taking place as early as perceptual processes, and 
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which situates actions in an intimate position with perception. Such early proces-
ses are deeply involved in the conception and articulation of the environment for 
an agent, pointing toward the importance of movement in cognition, and of how 
an agent continuously enacts the world.
12.5.3 Motor-related potentials
Although the ERP plots indicated an affordance-trend of the EPIC, statistical 
tests revealed no significant differences. However, the Narrow door width elicited 
the greatest amplitude, both in case of anterior positivity and posterior negativity. 
The increased amplitude associated with Narrow transitions can be interpreted as 
a reflection of the body simply not fitting, producing a prediction error because 
one is forced to interact with the transition. The nature of the PINV component 
is not as well investigated as other ERP components, limiting the reliability of 
an interpretation. Some studies treat this component as modality-unspecific “elec-
trocortical correlate of a cognitive state” (Rockstroh et al., 1997). The study by Gauthier 
and Gottesmann (1977) hypothesised the PINV, similar to affordances, to act 
as a marker of change in the psychophysiological state. Ever since, the PINV 
has been used to investigate depression, schizophrenia, learned helplessness, and 
loss of control (Elbert et al., 1982; Kathmann, Jonitz and Engel, 1990; Klepeis et 
al., 2001; Casement et al., 2008; Diener et al., 2009). Results show depressive and 
schizophrenic participants to exhibit an increased PINV that is explained as an 
increased vulnerability for loss of control, as well as increased anticipation for fu-
ture events (Klein et al., 1996; Casement et al., 2008; Diener et al., 2009). It must 
be emphasised that affordances reflect actions directed toward the future. If an 
increased PINV reflects increased vulnerability for future events, as observed 
for impassable doors, then the component might shed new light on the intenti-
onality in affordances. Given the intention to pass, yet deprived of doing so, se-
ems to be reflected in the PINV. Casement and colleagues (2008) suggested the 
PINV depended on lack of control as the state of having no influence; depriving 
the potential to act. This could explain the difference in the Narrow condition, as 
participants were instructed to attempt to pass at all times until failure, even for 
impassable openings, leading to a sense of loss of control.
A difference in the PINV component was only observed in cases of Go, which 
varied with the environmental affordances. Amplitudes of the component for 
Narrow doors were significantly different from Mid and Wide doors, while the 
passable conditions did not differ from one another. Further, there were no sig-
nificant differences in the PINV component in cases of NoGo, emphasising the 
importance of the motor execution itself to evoke the PINV component. These 
results point toward the PINV component as an expression of the readiness 
to interact with the designed environment, i.e., less negative for passable doors 
and more negative for impassable doors, thus serving as a potential marker for 
the readiness to act given environmental affordances. The presented results are 
further consistent with the observed increase in activity over frontocentral sites 
by Bozzacchi et al. (2012). Bozzacchi and colleagues concluded that the meaning 
PART I I :  CHAPTER 12
217
of the action and awareness of being able to act—affordances—affect action pre-
paration, which is here understood as the motor-related potential before move-
ment onset. One may argue that the PINV component might reflect a readiness 
aspect of affordances. This would mean that the PINV is not modulated by the 
perception (that the door is different visual information) but reveals something 
about the readiness to act. For this reason, significant differences in cases of Go, 
but not in NoGo, are found, and further for passable compared with impassable.
In light of HAC (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016), a potential explanation for the 
absence of differences in the NoGo trials is related to the immediate action sele-
ction, which in all cases (Narrow, Mid, and Wide) is a simple turn to answer the 
questionnaire, and thus the task presents the participant with identical affordances. 
When instead given a Go, cortical processes require an action selection related to 
the anticipated motor trajectory, which differs according to the affordances of 
the door width. HAC suggests the higher levels bias the lower level competitions, 
which operate at the level of the action itself, through a cascade of expected next 
affordances. The lower levels have a continuous competition of how to satisfy the 
higher expectations. Action selection, executed while continuously unfolding the 
planned movements, depends on the expectation of next affordances.
Notably, regarding architectural experience, because the PINV component 
was only expressed in the Go condition (forced interaction with the environment), 
these findings support the importance of movement for architectural experien-
ce, in a sense that action or even only the perception of action possibilities alters 
brain activity. Visually guiding and propelling the body in space dramatically in-
fluences the continuous emerging of affordances, which in turn affect the human 
experience. Differences in frontocentral and occipital areas, prior to movement 
through space with the post-imperative negative-going waveform most pronoun-
ced over FCz indicated an involvement of the supplementary motor area (SMA) 
as reported by Bozzacchi et al. (2012). Earlier studies showed the involvement of 
the SMA in visually guided actions (Picard and Strick, 2003), which is the essence 
of active inferences. The PINV can be generated independently from the re-affe-
rent signal, which is, in terms of active inference, understood as ascending (bot-
tom-up) proprioceptive prediction errors (Adams, Shipp and Friston, 2013). This 
suggests the PINV component might reflect descending (top-down) predictions, 
rendering SMA as an essential area of the action-perception loop, and thus crucial 
for processing continuous affordances. This account might resolve the finding of 
frontocentral differences in Go trials only. The SMA is anatomically bridging the 
frontal cortex with motor cortex—perhaps also functionally as argued by Adams 
et al. (2013) because this anatomical nature fits with the proposed hierarchical 
characteristics of forward and backward projections in active inferences.
Using VR to investigate cortical processes has its natural limitations, for in-
stance, the absence of a physical body. Regarding the sense of body, which is at 
stake in the current study, it is suggested that VR “may offer new embodied ways for 
assessing the functioning of the brain by directly targeting the processes behind real-world behavi-
ors” (Riva, Wiederhold and Mantovani, 2019), which is remarkably valid for the 
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current study. Riva and colleagues (Riva, Wiederhold and Mantovani, 2019) argue 
that the brain’s predictive capability immerses the body, and thus related proces-
ses if the visual perception is in line with the body’s actions, for instance by head 
movements and wandering. Through the process of trial and error, the brain and 
body adjust to VR. Furthermore, in terms of architecture, VR as a head-mounted 
display (Pasqualini, Llobera and Blanke, 2013) and as a CAVE system (Vecchiato 
et al., 2015) has been integrated into studies with bodily and environmental inte-
rests yielding comparable results. However, VR in combination with neuroscien-
tific methods, is still a novel method and thus must be utilised with care. It must 
be emphasised that the purpose of VR, in the current experimental setup, was to 
isolate and control the factor of interest. Future studies will have to use MoBI in 
real-world environments to investigate whether the results from VR can be ge-
neralised to the real world.
12.6  Conclusion 4 
The present study provides strong evidence for affordances to be processed 
as early as perceptual processes, linking action and perception in a similar manner 
to active inference. The results point toward a conception of the brain that seems 
to deal with “how can I act” while in parallel processes referring to “what do I 
perceive” take place. The results thus support the assumption that perception of 
the environment is influenced by affordances and action itself—hence, affordan-
ces and action can influence the experience of an environment. Because of the 
importance of affordances and action for brain dynamics, this further emphasises 
and qualifies the general idea of enactivism as a holistic approach to investigate 
cognition. It is important to emphasise that these results do not claim that archite-
ctural affordances are directly represented as a specific ERP component; however, 
the current study provides evidence for an action-perception account of cogniti-
on, which systematically differentiates according to the definition of affordances.
As a note for the architects: the fact that human beings are mobile and predic-
tive beings suggests that architects should take the temporal aspect as seriously as 
the spatial, given that the predictive process of unfolding bodily movement can 
alter the perception of space. Moving and transitioning in space is to construct 
continuously a prediction of a world, a world that one perceives dependent on 
the action potentials, which informs the brain, body, and mind. By altering per-
ception, it would ultimately lead spaces to have a potential physiological impact 
on users. Much remains to be uncovered in architectural cognition.
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Summary. What can be concluded insofar? Although each chapter provided unique 
conclusions, this chapter offers an overarching conclusion by addressing the ar-
chitectural quandary and introducing the scope of  architectural cognition for 
future research. Furthermore, a discussion on limitations and criticisms, as well 
as further research and speculations regarding the position of  architectural cog-
nition is offered. 
13.1 Brief  outline
The research question was developed throughout Part I and Part II, starting 
from a philosophical point of departure and ending in a cognitive neuroscienti-
fic research question. Before commencing the phenomenological framework, a 
philosophy of science was put forth to frame the overarching strategy. Mainly, a 
synthesis of Peircean abductive reasoning, Popperian falsifiability and Hackian 
foundherentism—framed as an abductive-Bayesian approach—was proposed as 
the epistemological position. Such an approach allows rationally critical reasoning 
to adjust the currently best explanation of a phenomenon. In the current context, 
the research question forms the phenomena, whereas the experimentation seeks 
to falsify the hypothesis derived from the theoretical arrangement.  
By creating a dualism of time and space, Chapter 3 demonstrated the different 
natures of the two concepts—mainly, a spatial approach and a temporal appro-
ach to transitions. An architectural transition was defined as a sequence of space 
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delineated by an observable threshold, i.e. a transistor, whereas an experiential 
transition does not start nor stop, but is a continuous unfolding of events that a 
conscious being experiences. Their relation was summed through a quandary of 
comparing the experience of transitions.
Bergson is invoked to tackle the relation between space and time and provides 
that space is infinitely divisible and time as indivisible. Duration is introduced as 
a concept of temporal, experiential transitions in contrast to space and matter; 
duration differs in kind while the matter in degree. A multiplicity of both compo-
sites is henceforth provided, which in turn develops into virtuality and reality, i.e. 
duration and matter, respectively. The multiplicity of inner experience is a creative 
process of becoming in time, whereas space offered mere quantity. 
Such a thesis further encouraged pursuing the temporal nature of inner human 
experience through a Husserlian phenomenological scope, which primarily was a 
prolongation of Bergsonian conception of experience and time. Both characterise 
time and experience as indivisible in the sense that each moment interpenetrates 
the other. However, Husserl investigates the quality of experience, a transcenden-
tal phenomenology, far further than Bergson, providing a window into the condi-
tion of experience. This necessarily yielded a discussion on the relation between 
action-perception and multiplicity. 
Ultimately, Part I constituted three conditions which any empirical framework 
must entertain to argue an investigation of the immediate experience. Such an 
approach yielded the following research question:
How does experiential transition unfold through action and perception 
relative to architectural transition?
Part II sought to establish an empirical framework that fit under the pheno-
menological framework and to rework the research question to become a point 
of departure for a testable hypothesis. A biological framework rooted in the phi-
losophical thought, namely emergence, and homeostasis initiated Part II by ar-
guing that bodily and cortical dynamics depend on the homeostatic balance. This 
essentially argues that the brain is embodied so that the body and brain entertain 
a circular causal relation via a biologically self-organised dynamical system, i.e. the 
body and brain function as dynamical systems. The environment thus emerges 
in time through interaction, which appropriates Bergson’s creative process of be-
coming—becoming is the operation of self-organisation. 
Such a position suggested investigating how the relationship between body/
brain and environment appears on a neuronal level. By discussing active and pas-
sive brain models, it was found that the brain and nervous systems are organised 
according to the primary mechanism of action-perception so that the brain and 
body couple to the environment through a bidirectional relation, i.e. prediction 
about the action influence perception and vice versa. Cognition emerges from the 
bidirectional interaction between body, brain and environment. 
Extending this conception was supported by sensorimotor-contingency (SMC, 
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which argues for an enactive (4E; embodied, enactive, embedded and extended) 
programme of cognition. Perceptual experience is best explained as a structure 
of change in the organs of perception that is free of representations. SMC sugge-
sted to approach the action-perception loop through dynamics of perception and 
action as they unfold in the body—however, enactivism and SMC were found to 
be limited in the sense that they were not able to formulate a concrete approach 
to cognition. Thus, it was supported by Friston’s Free Energy Principle (FEP), 
which when reformulated yielded active inference. 
Active inference is a Bayes-optimal generative model of action-perception that 
concretely describes the predictive process of action-perception so that it may 
be testable, and ultimately brings back aspects of Bergson’s virtual action and 
Husserl’s temporality. Furthermore, although active inference was formulated in 
computational neuroscientific terms, it translates to neurophysiological parame-
ters, e.g. dopamine as the precision of action policy (virtual action), which proved 
to be adequate to rework the first research question:
Can	an	embodied	neuroscientific	framework,	based	on	phenomenology,	
experimentally answer how the experiential transition relates to the cog-
nitive process of action-perception with regard to architectural transition?
A neuroscientific experiment was carried out to answer the research question 
by generating virtual spaces that human participants had to walk through. The 
environment formed a transition in the form of door-like openings that challen-
ged the bodily posture depending on the size of the doors. The research question 
was addressed through the following hypothesis:
“If an enactive account of perception, action, and cognition is correct, then affordan-
ces are intimately related to higher hierarchical levels through low-level perceptual cues. 
Such an account would situate the processing of affordances at a similar stage as early 
perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory and motor-related ERPs 
associated with the perceived affordance of an environment. […] [It is]	expected	to	find	
differences in cortical responses to covary [resonate] as a function of affordances over 
sensory and motor areas. In addition, [it is] expected to see differences in MRCPs as a 
function of the environmental affordances […].” (Djebbara et al., 2019)
13.2 Conclusion and critique thereof
Expecting the upcoming space during an architectural transition is a long-term 
process that is modulated by short-term processes on the sensory-level. Instead 
of approaching the psychological expectation of space, the thesis argues that wha-
tever psychological concepts that may be conceptualised, such process build on 
a world constructed by the senses, which are demonstrated to be biased by the 
affordances and virtual actions provided by the environment. Consequently, by 
addressing the intuitive rather than the intellect, the architectural impact can go 
beyond the long-term psychological outcome—in fact, it affects the fundamental 
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process of constructing the world through sensory signals. 
Irrespective of which long-term processes that are initiated during archite-
ctural transitions, their genesis and commencement are in the basic feature of 
action-perception—albeit, long-term processes may also impact short-term pro-
cesses. Indeed, future research must consider this conclusion before interpreting 
the psychological impact of the environment. Otherwise, the interpretation may 
lead to erroneous conclusions, e.g. radical biophilic design.
13.2.1 The conditions
It has been necessary to synthesise theories from different fields than architec-
tural research to answer the research question. In turn, it has provided an empirical 
framework on the experience of architecture, which is beneficial for the architec-
tural research community. Evident in both the research question and conditions, 
the question of whether a neuroscientific framework is at all compatible with the 
phenomenological framework is essential to review. The question supposes that 
a phenomenological account is empirically testable. It was attempted to ensure a 
phenomenological account by establishing three conditions rooted in Bergson and 
Husserl. The problem is thus; how well did the neuroscientific framework comply? 
13.2.1.1 First condition
The first condition constrains the empirical theory by the heterogeneity of 
duration as an indivisibility of time, which is to respect the interpenetration of 
experience. Experience is a construct over time, according to both Bergson and 
Husserl, that is experienced as a continuity, i.e. there are no abrupt experiences. 
The theoretical process commenced in dynamic systems theory (DST) to ensure 
the property of indivisibility in the outcome. Indeed, DST alone merely suggests 
the kind of framework that must be composed and not a concrete model of that 
interpenetrates time—instead, this task was solved by the architecture of active 
inference as a stochastic Markov decision process. Although the Markov property 
suggests that the future state only depends on the present state, and not the chain 
of events that preceded it, it was shown in Appendix D that the preceding sta-
tes highly influence the probability of the completion of virtual states as it forms 
the point of departure. This was also expressed diagrammatically in Fig. 11.2 as a 
probabilistic generative model. Active inference certainly fits well within the ba-
sic principles of temporality and the emergence of experience. Active inference 
arguably translates to a computational phenomenology, where the complexity is 
reduced according to the carefully selected parameters. A full-blown human expe-
rience of space is not the task of computational phenomenology, but instead takes 
the role of a tool in architectural cognition, whose objective is to investigate the 
relation between brain-environment and body-environment.
13.2.1.2 Limitations
Whether the first condition was respected comes down to how interpenetration 
is defined. Interdependent relations were defined in Chapter 7 as a bidirectional 
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influence, which in this context translates to both how the retention project 
forward in time and how protention project backwards in time so that they con-
stitute a moment where both are present. Active inference suggests that a single 
moment is not a single state at time t, but a range where a prediction and a prior 
contribute in defining the current state. The interpenetration thus only occurs in 
the process of unfolding the Markov model, which makes the current state of 
the model questionable.
On the one hand, the fact that active inference divides states into discrete sta-
tes, suggesting a serial-like process instead, is a counter-argument of interpene-
tration. On the other hand, it could be argued that the interpenetration occurs in 
time, which means that the current state is dependent on how the prior becomes 
that current state, i.e. the pattern of change because only over time can the inter-
penetration occur. 
13.2.1.3 Second condition
The second condition refers to the indeterminate state of the human as an 
asymmetric relation between transcendence and immanence, which translates to 
an asymmetric relation between the experience beyond the given and the given, 
respectively. According to the phenomenological approach, the indetermination 
is reduced by acting and perceiving in the world. Keep in mind that experience 
was approached from a Bergsonian temporal perspective, where Riemann’s con-
cept, the manifold, was central because it allowed time to become virtuality that 
does not necessarily unfold in space, hence multiplicity. The virtuality, according 
to Bergson’s phenomenology, is temporal and bound to the body through acti-
on that has not necessarily been unfolded. Virtuality and time were drawn as in-
tuitive, escaping the retroactive nature of the intellect, which, according to both 
Husserl and Bergson, is not necessary for perception. Husserl picked up the line 
of thinking where the action plays a critical role in defining the relation between 
transcendence and immanence, expressed as horizonal intentionality in his theoretical 
work. There are virtual actions in horizonal intentionality as they both describe a 
multiplicity of possible actions—perceiving beyond what is present is then rooted 
in the ability to move and predict while moving. 
The indeterminate body was expressed through homeostatic and allostatic 
processes in the equivalent neuroscientific theory. According to emergence and 
self-organising dynamical systems, the body and brain constantly readjust accor-
ding to the environment. Perception and action are basic mechanisms that are 
developed to increase certainty about the body and the environment, which in 
turn improve the chance of surviving. The theoretical argument for action and 
perception being the same process is the bidirectional modulation of top-down 
predictions from the brain, and bottom-up signals picked up from sensory or-
gans. The prediction-errors occurring at the sensory level are much faster than 
higher-cognitive prediction-errors, e.g. complex mathematical reasoning, explai-
ning the fast neuronal response of the action-perception process. The action to 
unfold depends on the environment, and the action of passable transitions do not 
PART I I :  CHAPTER 13
225
vary, as they are passable—however, for the impassable transitions, the selected 
action is a different kind. The results from the experiment suggest that the con-
tinuous interaction with the environment is a relation of prediction and predicti-
on-errors. In other words, the brain seems to deal with “how can I act” while in 
parallel processing “what do I perceive”.
13.2.1.4 Limitations
Action-perception cycle is the effect of knowing how rather than knowing that, as 
elaborated in Chapter 2. SMC suggests that perception is rooted in the active infe-
rence of possible perceptions, i.e. knowing how to act to cause a specific percept. 
The limits of the experimental setup are that affordances, as defined by Gibson 
(1977, 1986), differs from virtual actions, as defined by Bergson (2001, 2004), by 
being known a priori. Recall the example of having dinner; the affordances of a 
spoon depend on what is for dinner, i.e. how to interact with the spoon depends 
on whether the dinner consists of soup or beef, whereas this is not the case of 
virtual actions. Instead, the possible ways one may interact with the spoon are 
defined by the physical structure of the fingers/hand and the spoon—not the in-
tentions. The process of action-perception thus develop by first knowing, a priori, 
that one can interact with the spoon in such and such ways, then intuitively select 
an action depending on intentions. In the case of transitions, the agent must have 
known a priori which possible actions to choose amongst, and 50-250 ms after 
perceiving the door width, a set of actions that fit accordingly have been selec-
ted—this is expressed in active inference as precision (γ) of action policy. One li-
mitation of the action-perception cycle is thus the unknown intentions of an agent 
that may change dynamically irrespective of task. Translated to the experimental 
setup, it is not possible to know whether the participants had other intentions du-
ring the experiment, which might have influenced the acquired neuronal data1. 
13.2.1.5 Third condition
The final condition guides the empirical theory towards a primacy of intui-
tion. According to Bergson, the “immediacy of conscious data” belongs to the 
intuitive knowledge, which is a practical knowledge emerging from the structural 
coupling2 between brain, body and environment—and the virtual. The virtual is 
the creativity rooted in the continuity within the structural coupling so that hu-
man decision depends on the duration and multiplicity, i.e. the human organism 
is duration (Fig. 13.1). 
The hierarchical architecture of active inference suggests that higher-order 
cognitive processes hold a long-term nature that is reciprocally related to short-
term processes. Indeed, considering the experiment, deciding which set of actions 
to unfold takes place at the sensorimotor time-scale (Chapter 11) with influence 
1 The hard question thus becomes whether neuronal activity reflects intentions, and if  so, how, e.g. large- or 
small-scale network, transient activity, frequency-related?
2 The structural coupling provides causal relations between body, brain and environment over time.
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Figure 13.1—This diagram serves to illustrate how the different stages of  experience have been investigated 
and applied in the empirical approach. Philosophy contributed with a model of  time that interpenetrates that the 
empirical theory must adhere. It does so by approach time and experience through dynamic systems theory and 
the property of  emergence. In the model, the protention of  a current experience corresponds to the expected free 
energy,	which	quantifies	the	probability	of 	action	over	a	precision.	The	retention	corresponds	to	the	adjusted	model	
of  the world, namely the posterior—and so experience continues to unroll itself  overtime; any posterior today is 
tomorrow’s prior. The transition between each moment is a pattern of  structural change, which according to SMC, 
may be the key to understanding the content of  experience, i.e. qualia.
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from bottom-up signals and top-down predictions, i.e. small-term and long-term 
processes. Both active inference and Bergson suggest that between stimulus and 
response lays a key-component to understand the nature of intuition, which con-
sist of bidirectional influences. To state that intuition is a problem of super-po-
sition is to have misunderstood the non-Cartesian monism at play. Emergence is 
precisely the counter-argument of dualism as it takes seriously the temporal decen-
tred subject, i.e. the development of action is the product of two forces dynami-
cally forming one another. It is a hybrid of a hierarchical and heterarchical system 
that couple reciprocally and structurally to the environment, body and brain with 
different priors and likelihoods. Although active inference refers to the nature of 
intuition as a process of action-perception, Bergson’s approach might be termed 
action-reaction, because it emphasises that it occurs between stimulus and respon-
se. Here, the virtual belongs to the stage of intuitive predictions before the action.
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13.2.1.6 Limitations
By suggesting a hierarchical/heterarchical generative model of the brain, body 
and environment, it may be argued that the problem of experience is merely relo-
cated to complex relations in temporal systems. The intuitive process of action 
selection and the generation of action policies have different durations and order. 
Active inference, as a theory, is not capable of locating the intuitively available sets 
of actions upon perceiving the environment, i.e. selecting among different actions, 
the sets of actions must emerge as a form of knowing how. Virtual actions are intui-
tively present, but not all virtual actions are considered. Sometimes, intuition may 
present one with new virtual actions. How does active inference resolve the gene-
ration of action policies? The experiment suggested that the functional relations-
hips in the process of selecting action policies are expressed in neuronal activity 
as prediction-errors3. In the equations, the generation of action policies remains 
hard-coded in the prior and likelihood matrices, which, since the posterior today 
is the prior of tomorrow, means that both the prior and likelihood arrays rest on 
previous priors (for more on hyper-priors; Clark, 2015, pp. 174–175). However, 
the debate on hyper-priors in active inference can be lead to an evolutionary scale 
of priors (Ramstead, Badcock and Friston, 2018). 
13.2.2 Experiential and architectural transition in action-
perception
The second part of the research question considers the relation between expe-
riential transition and architectural transition via action-perception—the central 
argument of the thesis. Discovering a similarity between Bergsonian/Husserlian 
phenomenology and emergence/enactivism/SMC provided an embedded appro-
ach to cognition and experience. The radical claim is that the human experien-
ce is the integration of retention and protention in the pattern of change during 
the action, which is precisely how the human organism is duration in Bergsonian 
terms. Since exteroceptive sensory is a matter of change over time, it means pre-
cisely that time is the best measure of space. Removing time from the experience 
of space would theoretical yield no experience since sensory is simply not able to 
change; action is not possible, thus causing no perception. Consequently, human 
experience is equated with action-perception as a small-term cognitive process. 
Given the organisation of the brain (Chapter 7 and 8), the dependencies of 
neuronal activity (Chapter 9, 10 and 11) and the empirical results (Chapter 10), the 
sensorimotor processing is the fastest network in the hierarchy, suggesting that any 
architectural investigation through neuroscience is firstly an investigation of acti-
on-perception. As argued throughout the thesis, the hierarchy is interconnected 
3 Indeed, the suggested model of  cognition is based on prediction-errors, as opposed to a two-factor theory of  
cognition (Corlett, 2018, 2019). A two-factor theory of  cognition suggests that delusions, for instance, needs at 
least two neuropsychological impairments, in perception and in the belief  evaluation. Prediction-error theory 
of  cognition suggests instead that a one-factor theory of  cognition is more appropriate, so that delusions are 
the product of  a process on one level modulating the hierarchical structure. 
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with bidirectional influences—therefore, the elaborated and sophisticated ques-
tion hereof is how architectural design, through sensorimotor processing, impact 
other networks and other systems in the body. In the current context, the empi-
rical results provide evidence for an action-perception account of cognition and 
that neuronal activity depends on architectural affordances.
The transcendental experience of perceiving more than apparent is the out-
come of the prediction in action-perception, i.e. the knowing how to make that 
which is not apparent, apparent. Bergson referred to this mechanism of percepti-
on as virtual action because one is virtually acting upon the space to generate pre-
dictions of perception. SMC suggest precisely the same operation in perception, 
but extend it to be able to explain qualia. Such approaches are rooted in knowing 
how (practical) rather than knowing that (propositional) as proposed in Chapter 2. 
Providing a bigger picture, SMC matches the active inference framework without 
compromising its central arguments. Primarily, it is suggested that the pattern of 
change translates to the B matrix (transition matrix) in active inference, making 
experience dependent on the virtual actions and expected free energy. A full mo-
del of the temporal unfolding, as Husserl’s model of temporality, is the generative 
model provided by active inference. Active inference, as a linking framework to 
phenomenology, qualifies as an answer to the question regarding the relationship 
between architectural and experiential transition. Figure 13.1 provides an overview 
of the corresponding philosophical terms in the empirical framework.
13.2.3 The quandary
13.2.3.1 An answer
Is the experience of space B, arriving from space A, identical to the experience if 
arriving from space C? According to the established framework, considering both 
the philosophical and empirical measures, the apparent answer is no—however, it 
arguably depends on the bounds of the experience of space B, i.e. when does the 
experience start and end. Recall that a transition consists of small-term processes, 
e.g. action-perception, and large-term processes, e.g. consciously reflecting or re-
trieving/recalling the experience. Although the conscious introspective retrieval 
of the experience is highly appealing, it may paint an inaccurate picture of the 
immediate experience, which, after all, is the primary concern. The experiment 
investigated both the short-term process before entering a subsequent space and 
the emotional state returning to the prior space, which is arguably the emotional 
outcome of a long-term process. The experience of space B was never directly as-
sessed by for instance posing the question “what was the subsequent space like?” 
Instead, electro-cortical measures and a questionnaire assessed the sensorimotor 
cortex activity prior transition and the emotional state of the participant post tran-
sition, respectively. An answer to the quandary takes shape from these measures.
 Given three different door sizes, the experiencing agent had three different 
prior spaces. According to the established framework, the immediate experience 
consists of retentional features and a multiplicity of protentional virtual actions. 
At the threshold of the transition, the experiencing agent is positioned between 
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two spaces4 that shape the gesture of the body. The gesture of the body is already 
shaped before reaching the threshold-position in the first place and influencing 
the planned motor-trajectory onward. Accordingly, both the sensorimotor dy-
namics and the emotional self-report reflected the affordances of the transition. 
Therefore, the experience of the subsequent space depends on the virtual actions 
in the transition from the prior space. 
The results may be criticised by arguing that the experience of space B is the 
conscious recognition of that space, i.e. the immediate recollection and introspe-
ction of the experiencing agent. If the measure was an immediate self-report of 
the experiencing agent, the experience of space B may consistently (across many 
trials) be recognised as space B, and thus infer that the experiences are identical 
irrespectively of the prior space. Such an account argues that the experience of 
space B does not depend on the prior space, but merely on the space itself. 
It is worth noting that such an account of experience is intellectualised into a 
long-term process that may be affected by various personal beliefs, for instance 
confusing that recognising a space is identical to the experience of that space5. In 
other words, it is an account that attempts to detach the bodily nuances and provi-
de a representational account of the space, e.g. the bedroom is always experienced 
as the bedroom, because it merely is the bedroom—however, as abstract a con-
cept one may be considering space B, it cannot be a disembodied account. Neither 
can it be detached from the current environment, which means that the current 
space most likely biases the immediate self-report that the experiencing agent de-
livers. It has been argued that cognitive processes that involve abstractions, lan-
guage, fantasy or more profound thoughts are disembodied cognitive processes 
(Chatterjee, 2010). Because these processes are seemingly stimulus-absent, they 
are thought of as disembodied and detached from the environment. Following 
Sims (2019), taking a radical example as mental imagery, it can be shown to be 
stimulus-sensitive, so that the current stimulus an agent experiences can affect 
the current mental imagery. The fact that bodily sensory from the environment 
affects is sufficient for a process to qualify as being embodied and coupled to the 
environment. Therefore, to state that the experience of the subsequent space is 
independent of the prior space is to suggest the possibility of disembodied cog-
nitive processes, and fall prey to the illusion that mental-life is detached from the 
body and immediate environment.
4 An architectural transition can be defined as a sequence of  space delineated by an observable threshold.
5 It seems that philosophers and neuroscientists that cast the brain as containing representations, rest their argu-
ments on purely inductive or deductive argumentations. It was shown in Chapter 2 that the abductive reasoning, 
which contain both induction and deduction, is a valid approach of  reasoning. Abductive reasoning invokes 
time to adjust the reasoning, which essentially means that the current truth is not necessarily true later—over 
time, one may have learned more. The meaningful explanation is more than the propositional truth-value; there 
is an inherent difference in kind and degree. Perhaps the discussions on decomposability and representations in 
the brain all rest on poorly stated problems, as Bergson and Deleuze would have stated it. 
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13.3 Future research
13.3.1 Architectural cognition
In recent literature, many cognition suffixes are emerging, e.g. embodied cog-
nition, natural cognition and quantum cognition. Why is it necessary to introduce 
architectural cognition? As a research discipline, it is suggested that architectural 
cognition addresses how architecture affects cognitive processes. Smart archi-
tectural designs can ignite novel interactions causing a spark in creativity, e.g. 
multifunctional transitional spaces. The question then becomes what is smart. 
Encompassing both small- and large-term processes, cognition is arguably an 
embodied process that is constantly situated in an environment of which the 
processes makes use. The term natural cognition is not opposing an unnatural cog-
nition, but advocating a methodology that takes movement in cognition serio-
usly (Gramann, Ferris, et al., 2014; Gramann, Jung, et al., 2014; Jungnickel and 
Gramann, 2016). Methodologies of brain imaging that restrict everyday mobility 
in solving tasks may be considered to measure a restricted form of behaviour and 
cognition, i.e. a physically detached human cognition. Particularly in architectural 
research, it is difficult to imagine a high level of spatial immersion while in a no-
isy fMRI depriving any three-dimensional spatial interaction—nonetheless, there 
must be some level of immersion. Indeed, architectural cognition belongs to a na-
tural, embodied cognition that integrates movement. The relation can be seen as:
Cognition
 ↪Natural cognition
  ↪ Embodied cognition
   ↪ Architectural cognition
As argued in Chapter 8 and 9, the reciprocal coupling to the environment is 
critical to cognition. The mind does not extend into the environment because the 
environment was always part of cognition. Instead, operations can be externali-
sed to off-load cognitive ballast. It is worth noting that the cognitive ballast that 
is off-loaded is necessarily situated in space, e.g. unread books to the left, dirty 
clothes in the basket, two steps heighten the bedroom. Architectural cognition 
involves unpacking the reciprocal relation between short- and long-term proces-
ses usually expressed through a spatial organisation. 
The reciprocity is an essential argument for the whole framework because it 
allows downward causation. Take, for instance, placing the book that one is cur-
rently reading on the leftmost side on the shelf. The necessity in systematically 
placing it is evidence of a long-term process (off-loading memory) that affects a 
short-term process (action-perception) through expecting to find the correct book 
on the shelf when needed. In active inference lingo, the action needed to bring 
forward the perception of the correct book is to reach actively for the leftmost 
side book. The prediction is then either met or updated. It may be updated becau-
se upon perceiving the correct book one is reminded which book is the current 
one and thus concluding the prediction as wrong. The benefit is that one relates 
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to the world through actions and perceptual predictions instead of perceptual 
recollection, i.e. it is the action of reaching to the leftmost book that determines 
which book one is currently reading—not the perceptual recollection, which may 
be flawed. In spatial design, the organisation of the spaces shape the action se-
quences necessary to bring forward the desired perception. For instance, before 
leaving home, the action sequences sometimes unfold almost ritually; leave the 
office, go to the bathroom, and go to the entré before leaving. Arguably, archite-
cts modulate how cognition unfolds, because architects design the action sequen-
ces that are necessary to bring forward the desired perception. This upward and 
downward causation is precisely the nature of cognition. In other words, space 
offers a set of virtual actions, [π1... πn], that form the cognitive process while the 
cognitive process forms the virtual actions. 
“Humans often represent and reason about unrealized possible actions – the vast 
infinity	of	things	that	were	not	(or	have	not	yet	been)	chosen.	This	capacity	is	central	to	
the most impressive of human abilities: causal reasoning, planning, linguistic communi-
cation, moral judgment, etc. Nevertheless, how do we select possible actions that are worth 
considering	from	the	infinity	of	unrealized	actions	that	are	better	left	ignored?”	(Phillips, 
Morris and Cushman, 2019)
The radical claim that needs further research is that architects design corti-
cal activity. If so, one may suspect that architects have not only affected by their 
designs our everyday environment but also the autobiographical narrative and 
unfolding of thoughts—assuming here cognitive processes influence thought.
13.3.2 Architecture and human systems
The phenomenological and empirical framework approached experience 
without critical incongruence. Indeed, terms like representation and belief are de-
batable—however, the general architecture and organisation of the body, brain 
and environment do not indicate theoretical inconsistency. Since the embodied 
cognition approach comprises all physical systems within the body, it means that 
cognition, as a process, can be investigated from any empirical experimentation 
of such systems. The systems follow according to FEP an active inference pro-
cess, thus providing a hypothesis generator, i.e. their activity can be simulated by 
modelling an environment and provide a task. Concisely, the future research of 
architectural cognition is to systematically investigate the essential systems of the 
human body and introduce systematic architectural variability (Fig. 13.2).
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Figure 13.2—A diagram of  possible ways of  investigating architectural cognition. The central (red) web addresses 
the interrelated physical human system. The central web (yellow) addresses the method of  measure. The outermost 
circle (blue) addresses the related organs and systems. The diagram merely illustrates potential measures where 
systematic architectural variability may cause a difference.
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(A.1) 
A.1 Introduction
Philosophy of mathematics is a critical discourse for the establishment of 
Bergsonian and Husserlian philosophy. This appendix utilises mathematical 
examples and reasoning to put forward the line of thinking in manifolds. For this 
purpose, it is vital to understand the similarities between Riemann’s manifold/sur-
faces and the nature of complex numbers. The mathematical steps are shortened 
to an absolute minimum to avoid misunderstandings. Riemann surface is a com-
plex single-dimensional surface that defines holomorphic functions between other 
Riemann surfaces. Riemann surfaces originate from the analysis of multi-valued 
functions. Concisely, a multi-valued function is a holomorphic function opera-
ting with complex numbers in complex planes. The phenomenon of holomorphic 
function is that the analytical continuation of the function along different paths 
leads to different branches of that function (Forster, 1981, p. 1). In other words, 
the unfolding of a holomorphic function yields different trajectories—Riemann 
explains this behaviour through the notion of complex planes, i.e. Riemann surface. 
An example is provided to ensure that the above makes sense. A short description 
of how imaginary numbers function is the most useful explanation of the term 
complex and Riemann surface.
A.2 Imaginary numbers
The fundamental theorem of algebra was put forward by Carl Friederich Gauss 
(1777-1855) in 1799 (see for instance; Derksen, 2003). It stated that any po-
lynomial equation of degree n has n roots or solutions. Consider the following 
polynomial:
Riemann surfaces and complex numbers:
numbers’ second dimension and imaginary numbers
APPENDIX A
f(x) = x2 + 1
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According to Gauss, Eq. A.1 has two solutions—however, Fig. A.1 indicates 
that this is not the case. A solution, or root, is the point where the function yields 
zero, which in graphical terms is where the functions cross the x-axis. To solve this 
problem, it is essential to summon the imaginary numbers (see e.g. WelchLabs, 
2015). The regular number line of natural numbers (also referred to as real num-
bers, i.e. ℝ) is a one-dimensional system of numbers, encompassing fractions, zero 
and negative numbers, but this system omits the imaginary numbers. Numbers 
are practical in the sense that they can be used to track sequences of anything in 
reality; it anchors mathematics in reality—however, what happens when abstracti-
on in mathematics proves to hold a solution to a practical problem, e.g. negative 
numbers? This is precisely the case of imaginary numbers.
1-1 -½ √2 π-2-3 20 3
Figure A.1—Graphical illustration of  Eq. A.1 in blue. Red numbers are examples of  fractions on the number 
line.
Take for instance the infamous case of –1 ; the square root of a negative num-
ber. The square root of a number is the number that is multiplied by itself, e.g. 
 What can result in a negative number when multiplied by itself? 
Upon immediate sight, there seems to be no solution—however, there is indeed 
a solution. The solution was initially worked out in 1572 by Rafael Bombelli in 
L’Algebra, which also laid the foundation to what is known today as the imagi-
nary numbers. Bombelli suggested that –1  is a new kind of number, one with 
a different nature than the one-dimensional that is going only and always in one 
direction. Instead, it is an imaginary number that holds a different property than 
natural numbers, but it is not merely an invention—it is a discovery because ima-
ginary numbers follow the established rules of algebra and arithmetics. The nature 
of imaginary numbers is arguably peculiar. Bombelli held that if one accepts that:
Then one can still show that this new kind of number behaves within the esta-
blished rules, for instance:
–1 = –1
–25 =  25  ·   –1  = 5  –1
2  –1  + 3  –1  = 5  –1
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
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(A.5) 
(A.6) 
Taking the thought even further, Leonhard Euler introduced the notation i 
for imaginary numbers more than a century later, so that:
This enabled to construct complex numbers, namely a combination of both 
natural numbers and imaginary numbers, for instance:
This eventually established the second dimension of numbers. The number 
line of natural numbers is a one-dimensional line, e.g. the x-axis in Fig. A.1, but 
when investigating the nature of i, there emerges a new system, a new direction. 
When multiplying positive natural numbers, e.g. 22, the results remain in the posi-
tive direction—when multiplying a negative natural number with a positive num-
ber, the direction flips 180 degrees, e.g. 2 ∙ (-3) = -6. Multiplying negative natural 
numbers, the direction flips once again 180 degrees and becomes positive, e.g. 
-32 = 9. The 180 degrees flip in the system of natural numbers is a consequence 
of the single dimension. Turning to imaginary numbers, the peculiar nature of i 
is that it has a repetitive pattern in polarity when it is increasingly squared. The 
pattern repeats every four increments, i.e. i1, i2, i3, i4. This behaviour is indeed dif-
ferent from natural numbers. When multiplying with i the rotation is no longer 
180 degrees, but instead 90 degrees (Fig. A.2.1). This suggests that the natural 
number line has a perpendicular dimension where the imaginary numbers exist 
as a natural extension.
i1 = i
i2 = -i
i3 = -i
i4 = i
i i
ℝ ℝ
eiφ = cosφ + i sinφ
1 2
φ
cosφ
sinφ
Figure A.2— 1. The horizontal line designates the natural number line, whereas the vertical line designates the 
imaginary dimension. When multiplying with i the rotation is no longer 180 degrees, but a mere 90 degree. The 
geometric plane of  the new dimension functions as an extention of  the natural number line, known as the complex 
plane. 2. As an example of  how imaginary numbers may be applied. Euler applied the geometric system of  
imaginary numbers to show that  . Eventually, Euler’s statement is only derivable in 
the complex plane, which is an important contribution to complex analysis.
–1 = i
x   +   y·i
natural imaginary
complex number
PART I I I :  APPENDIX A
239
A.3 Complex plane
Although it may seem this mathematical turn is irrelevant to Bergson and 
Husserl, it is, in fact, essential to their line of thinking regarding time. In many 
ways, time is equally one-dimensional going only and always in one direction. 
Nevertheless, the number line is shown to have a natural extension, namely the 
imaginary numbers, which further provides the advancement of the complex pla-
ne. After reading Part I, it is hopefully apparent why it is necessary to show that 
a single number in space can hold more than a single value, imaginarily1. One is 
inclined to question the nature of time as well. 
The short introduction to imaginary and complex numbers is necessary to ad-
vance the complex plane (Fig. A.2). The complex plane should not be confused 
with a conventional coordinate system (XY plane), because the complex plane 
operates with complex numbers, Eq. A.6, whereas the XY plane operates with 
XY coordinates. Addition in the complex plane are similar to vector additions, 
but multiplication is different:
1 The key-word is co-intentionality; retention and protention.
Translating complex multiplication to the complex plane can be done by ad-
ding the angles relative to the real number dimension, and multiplying the mag-
nitude of the complex numbers. Eq. A.7 is an example of algebraic (rectangu-
lar form) solving, whereas Fig. A.3 is an example of the geometric (polar form) 
Figure A.3—Multiplying complex numbers can be done by adding the angles relative to the natural number 
dimension and multiplying the magnitude of  the complex numbers.
1 20 3
√5
√5
5i
26.6° + 63.4° = 90°
√5 ∙ √5 = 5
1+2i
2+i
solving, based on Fig. A.2.
When moving beyond complex multiplication to complex functions, which is 
usually described in a two-dimensional plane, something philosophically intere-
sting emerges. Functions are engaging in this relationship because they describe 
a systematic trajectory—eventually, how this applies to the complex plane will 
explain the idea of movement and time in Bergson and Husserl. Functions have 
(A.7) 
(2 · 3i) (3 + 2i) =
6 + 4i + 9i + 6i2 =
3 + 13i + (6 · (–1)) =
–3 + 13i
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(A.8) 
(A.9) 
(A.10) 
(A.11) 
(A.12) 
(A.13) 
an input, usually a continuous range of numbers, and output, which is a syste-
matic rearrangement of the input caused by the function. Complex functions are 
geometrically challenging to visualise because it takes complex numbers as inputs 
and equally outputs are given as complex numbers, where both operate in com-
plex planes. Such an operation amounts eventually to a four-dimensional plane, 
which is impossible to visualise in a single coordinate system. For this reason, 
two complex planes are illustrated; one for input and the other for output. The 
complex function that is dealt with is Eq. A.1. 
Complex functions consist of a real number and an imaginary part. Thus, wri-
ting Eq. A.1 as a complex function amounts to changing the variable input, i.e. x, 
to a complex number (Eq. A.6):
(A.14) 
The output is also necessarily a complex number, so the natural number of 
the input, i.e. x, is the equivalent output u, whereas the imaginary number of the 
input, i.e. yi, is output as vi.The natural numbers in the function are thus u and x, 
and the imaginary numbers v and y. To simplify the matters, the output can be 
written as Eq. A.11, the input as Eq. A.12, hence the function in Eq. A.13. The 
variables of the input can be tracked on one coordinate system, while the variables 
of the output can be tracked on another coordinate system (Fig. A.4). The trans-
lation from one complex plane to another with the input 1 + i unfolds as follows:
f(x) = x2 + 1
2
x   +   y·i + 1f(x) =
natural imaginary
complex number
( )
u   +   vi    = (x + yi)2 + 1
natural imaginary
complex number
w   = u + vi
complex
z   = x + yi
complex
w = z2 + 1
complex function
w =
(1 + i)2 + 1 =
(1 + i)(1 + i) + 1 =
1 + 2i +  i2 + 1 =
1 + 2i
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(A.15) 
(A.16) 
v
u
y
x
(2 + i)(-2 + i)
(-2 - i)
(4 + 4i)
(4 - 4i)
Input Output
Figure A.4—The complex plane on the left represents the input values, whereas the plane on the right represents 
the output values. The red trajectory emerging from the yellow dots drawn in the input is nothing alike the output. 
The complex function not only completely remaps the trajectory; it even suggests that some different input values 
are remapped to the same output value. Given Fig. A.2 and A.3 the direction, magnitude and scaling adds up, 
however, this makes the complex function a multivalued function, as opposed to an ordinary function, which may be 
called a single-valued function.
A.4 Multi-valued function/holographic function
There are two important points to note. First, the input trajectory is a straight 
line, while the output is a curve. This interesting behaviour is revisited later. 
Second, one may quickly discover that inputs on the hatched areas amount to the 
same output, which makes the complex function a multi-valued function. Multi-
valued functions were referred to as holomorphic functions in the introduction. 
This is not similar to the ordinary single-valued function that is known in alge-
bra. One approach to multi-value functions is to inverse the remapping, so that 
one rather approaches the input through the output than vice versa. The order 
is inversed. This allows understanding how two different inputs can amount to 
the same output. 
To simplify even further, the formula is reduced to:
The inverse of the function is thus:
To solve the multi-valued output, Bernhard Riemann (1826-1866) brought 
forward that it is necessary to visualise more than two complex planes, i.e. one 
for input and one for output. Instead, three complex planes are needed to resolve 
the bistable outputs. One complex plane for the input, and two for the outputs. 
The complex plane of the input is thus divided into two halves, where the positi-
ve range of the x-axis of the input is output in the w1 plance and the negative range 
is output in the w2 plane.
w = z2
z = f -1(w) = ±   w
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Figure A.5— 1. The complex output plane in Fig. A.4 can be split into so-called branches. This is an import-
ant operation to understand the behaviour of  a path in complex functions. The advantage is that the points that 
referred to the same outputs are now remapped to different complex planes, consequently resolving the ambiguity 
of  an output. 2. Notice the change in direction, going from output to input (inverse function). When remapping a 
path in the inverse function, an abrupt discontinuity occurs, which is explained by Riemann as an invisible switch 
in the manifold in the two-dimensional coordinate system. 3. When remapping a closed path in the forward model 
again (notice the change in direction, going from input to output again), there is a characteristic behaviour of  com-
plex functions. The remapping is not enclosed because it does not continue in the same manifold—there is a switch.
v
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When splitting the complex plane of the input (Fig. A.5) into two branches, the 
output is easily tracked. The ambiguity of a point can thus be resolved. However, 
when going the inverse direction, i.e. from branch to input, a characteristic be-
haviour of complex functions emerge; there is a discontinuity in the input trajec-
tory when going backwards! This causes severe mathematical issues because one 
cannot calculate the derivative or integral of the function. Riemann solved this 
peculiar issue when going back to the forward model, and drawing a fully clo-
sed trajectory on the input function, which mapped back again to the branches 
in discontinuity. He then explained that this behaviour is due to the limitation of 
the two-dimensional coordinate system, which can only be improved to a natural 
limit, given the human experience of geometry is limited to three dimensions. To 
Riemann, it was evident that the points where the trajectory ends in w1 are the 
points where the trajectory starts in w2, which meant that the continuity happened 
on another dimension, which is not visible on a two dimensional coordinate sy-
stem! Therefore, Riemann suggested merging the two complex planes. The com-
plex plane w1 utilise already two dimensions, which means the third dimension 
can be occupied by one of the dimensions of w2, either the natural number or the 
imaginary numbers. For the sake of simplicity, the third dimension is attributed 
the natural number. The final dimension cannot be illustrated as an axis; thus co-
lours are used to display the intensity of the imaginary number.  
From simple observations of the Fig. A.5.3, it is visible that the negative axis 
of the real number line (x-axis) there is a shift/portal to another dimension. The 
self-intersection cause a switch in the manifold so that the trajectory changes pla-
ne/branch. One way of explaining the complexity of holographic functions is the 
analogy of shadows. The shadow of two pens crossing produces a figure of a cross 
where the two pens actually across and not two separate pens. The shadow corre-
sponds to the self-intersecting axis that also displays the portal to the other branch. 
The emerging Riemann surface (Fig. A.6): 
Figure A.6—The emerging Riemann surface reveals that when a path crosses the apparent self-intersection, 
which is not self-intersecting but a mere shadow of  another dimension, it switches branches and continues the path. 
The colour-map on the right illustrates the imaginary part of  the surface, i.e. the fourth dimension. The surface 
also reveals that the multi-valued function is in fact distributed between two branches.
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Figure A.7—The path drawn in Figure A.5.3 can be fully enclosed using the colours to illustrate the positon on 
the manifold. With a bit of  imagination, it is possible to see how the path wraps around in the Riemann surface. 
The colours of  the inputs correspond to the colours of  the output. 
Figure A.8—The blue function in Fig. A.1 is represented as the red curve. The curve is but a single dimension 
of  a surface—one that emerges from the collision with the conventional coordinate system. When investigating the 
surface as a whole, the two solutions appear to collide with zero (the yellow curves). Finally, it turns out that Eq. 
A.1 has two roots that hid in the imaginary dimension of  the function.
By using colours to display the change of branch, the path can be drawn as 
fully enclosed in a two-dimensional coordinate system with a bit of imagination. 
Returning here to Fig. A.1 and the question of how Eq. A.1 could have two 
solutions, it turns out that the solutions are taking place in another dimension 
that is not visible on the two-dimensional coordinate system. By introducing the 
imaginary axis in the z-axis, it is easily shown that the function Eq. A.1, has, as 
predicted by Gauss, two roots (Fig. A.8).
input output
w = z2
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A.5 Conclusion
How did Bergson and Husserl benefit from these mathematical approaches 
to geometry at the threshold of human perception? Recall that both Bergson and 
Husserl were trained mathematicians before becoming philosophers, so the fact 
that the very same trajectory of a function can lead to different planes became 
a source of inspiration for Bergson and Husserl. These contemplations brought 
Riemannian geometry into philosophy.
Numbers represent the time in many respects, e.g. calendars and clocks. This 
may be due to the singular dimensionality of experienced time as if time is the pro-
cess of an existing and predictive future; indeed, after 1 o’clock comes 2 o’clock. 
The singular dimensionality is challenged here by imaginary numbers, holographic 
functions and Riemann surfaces. It turns out that the medium utilised for tracking 
time is itself not single-valued as anticipated, but there exists a natural extension 
of that medium, namely the imaginary numbers. Does this mean that there exists 
imaginary time? 
Bergson builds around the idea of virtuality, which may be hypothesised to 
stem from imaginary time. There are clear trails of Bergsonian multiplicity and 
imaginary numbers in the concept of multi-valued functions, so the unfolding of 
a trajectory may not be as straightforward as first anticipated. Bergson holds a re-
spect for the unpredictability of time in the same sense that the trajectory drawn 
on a holographic function may be wholly misconceived. 
Indeed, Husserl continuous the idea of multiplicity in temporality, but Husserl 
was more interested in the continuity, which Riemann solved through strategic 
manoeuvres. Because the multi-valued function yielded the same output for dif-
ferent inputs, Riemann split the input into two separates that operate on each 
their branch. Husserl may have been inspired by this ingenious manoeuvre when 
writing on the possibility of co-intentionality, which ultimately brought Husserl 
closer to a final model of temporality.
Riemann surfaces and complex numbers are shreds of evidence that nature 
is more complicated than seemingly so. Nature operates in dimensions that are 
obscure to human experience, and as time may be considered a natural pheno-
menon, i.e. non-invented, Bergson and Husserl reasoned that time might opera-
te in manifolds that escape the human experience. Neither Bergson nor Husserl 
ever stated that time holds a specific function, translatable to Riemann surface, 
but emphasised the fact that time unfolds in more complex manners than antici-
pated by the mathematical t in ordinary functions. They suggest that time is not 
as linear as the intellect may want to project it, but it may seem linear given the 
retrospective nature of the intellect, i.e. wise in hindsight. 
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B.1 Introduction
Much of the second part of the thesis assumes basic knowledge of neurons 
and human biology. To ensure this assumption, this appendix is dedicated to a 
basic introduction of the central nervous system (CNS), the peripheral nervous 
system (PNS) and neurons. In this appendix, it is intended to answer why it is 
crucial to consider the brain when questioning the environment by embedding a 
human into an environment. Note that the appendix is based on acknowledged 
textbooks in neuroscience, namely Eric Kandel’s Principles of Neural Science (5th ed.) 
(Kandel, 2013), in human physiology, namely Cindy Stanfield’s Principles of Human 
Physiology (5th ed.) (Stanfield, 2013), and electrophysiology, namely Steven Luck’s 
An introduction to the event-related potential technique (2nd ed.) (Luck, 2005). Furthermore, 
this appendix serves to introduce electroencephalography (EEG) and a Mobile 
Brain/Body Imaging approach to EEG.
B.2 The nervous systems
In the human body, the nervous systems can generally be divided into two 
parts, namely the PNS and the CNS (Fig. B.1):
1. The CNS comprises the brain, the cerebellum and the spinal cord.
2. The PNS generally comprises sensory neurons (input to CNS from outside 
the CNS) and motor neurons (output from CNS from within the CNS). 
However, the PNS can further be divided into two subsystems:
• The somatic nervous system (SNS) is the system that is 
Neurons, the nervous systems and 
electroencephalogram:
a brief  introduction
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responsible for bringing back and forth sensory and motor in-
formation through the spinal cord and is generally linked with 
skin and voluntary movements (the outermost part of the body).
• The autonomic nervous system is the system that is responsi-
ble for internal regulations of bodily functions, e.g. blood flow, 
breathing, the beating of the heart, and is generally linked with 
involuntary movements (internal part of the body). 
Generally, the role of PNS is to link the CNS with the body, i.e. organs and 
muscles. By being extended to the outermost areas, the PNS serves to bring in-
formation upwards from sensory neurons regarding, e.g. pain, temperature, touch 
and downwards from the motor neurons. Both types of neurons are part of the 
SNS. The upward motion is termed afferent—thus, the sensory neurons are affe-
rent neurons, i.e. they serve to bring the information into the spinal cord and the 
brain. The downward motion is termed efferent—thus, the motor neurons are effe-
rent neurons, i.e. they bring down commands of voluntary actions from the brain 
to the muscle fibres. The nerves that make up the PNS are in fact the bundles of 
axons stemming from the neuronal cell body in the cortex. It is through the intera-
ction of CNS and PNS that one sense and acts upon the world. The SNS is by far 
the greatest in size of the nervous systems, taking up the whole body, and leaving 
merely the brain and the spinal cord for the CNS (Stanfield, 2013, chaps 9, 10, 11).
CNS:
- Cerebrum
- Cerebellum
- Spinal cord
PNS:
- Cranial nerves
- Spinal nerves
SNS:
- Sensory
- Voluntary action
ANS:
- Visceral sensory
- Involuntary action
Motor neurons:
- Activity from CNS
- Voluntary action
Sensory neurons:
- Activity to CNS
- Involuntary action
Figure B.1—The brain, the brainstem and the spinal cord constitute the CNS (brain and red nerves). The CNS 
consists mainly of  interneurons. The PNS (green nerves) comprises the 12 cranial nerves (e.g. olfactory, optic, 
abducens nerves) and spinal nerves that carry the motor-related activity. The PNS consists of  the SNS and the 
autonomic nervous system, which further is composed of  efferent motor neurons and afferent sensory neurons.
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Figure B.2—The	brain	can	coarsely	be	divided	into	five-part:	cerebellum,	occipital,	parietal,	frontal	and	temporal	
lobe. The dashed line designates the section-cut, which is illustrated on the right side. The outermost part of  the 
brain is the grey matter, usually referred to as the cortex, which holds the cell bodies of  the neurons. The internal 
part of  the brain is the white matter, usually referred to as the subcortex, which holds all the axons of  the 
neurons. 
B.3 Cerebral cortex
The brain consists of two hemispheres where each hemisphere is primarily 
concerned with sensory and motor processes on the contralateral side of the body, 
i.e. the right side of the brain operates mainly on the left side of the body, and 
vice versa. The cerebral cortex is structurally formed with intelligent evolutionary 
folds (sulcus are the folds inwards and gyrus are the ridges), from which five lobes 
across the hemispheres can be categorised: the cerebellum, occipital, parietal, fron-
tal and temporal lobe. The outermost part of the brain is the grey matter, whereas 
internally before the subcortical structures, i.e. basal ganglia, is the white matter. 
The grey matter, which is approximately 2-4 mm thin, is where some of the cell 
bodies of the interneurons reside. The white matter is composed of the axonal 
projections, e.g. the corpus callosum that holds 2-300 million axonal projections. 
Even deeper into the brain are the subcortical structures that also contain neu-
rons, e.g. the basal ganglia. The cerebrum, cerebellum, diencephalon, midbrain, 
pons, medulla and the spinal cord together compose the CNS.
Temporal lobe
Subcortical struc-
turesMedulla
Spinal cord
Cerebellum
Parietal lobe
Occipital lobe
Frontal lobe
Grey matter White matter
B.4 Neurons
The nervous system has three classes of neuronal cells: the sensory neurons, 
the motor neurons and the interneurons (Kandel, 2013, chap. 8). The motor and 
sensory neurons were briefly described above. The interneurons exclusively reside 
in the CNS, throughout the brain and the spinal cord. They connect one neuron 
with another, e.g. interneurons in the spinal cord receive activity from the affe-
rent sensory neurons (or other interneurons) and then transmit activity to motor 
neurons (or other interneurons). For instance, walking into Tadao Ando’s Chichu 
Art Museum in Japan, there are corners and transitions in the architecture that 
PART I I I :  APPENDIX b
251
are naturally picked up by the senses. These senses communicate the intriguing 
corners and transitions to the interneurons, which immediately activates motor 
neurons to approach the beautiful transitions and spaces.
B.4.1 Anatomy of  neurons
Interneurons are composed of mainly three parts, namely the soma (cell body), 
dendrites and axons (Fig. B.3). The soma consists of the same cellular parts as 
other body cells, so it is here the nucleus and other cell structures reside. An es-
sential purpose of the soma is to produce the protein necessary to construct the 
other parts of the whole neuron, i.e. dendrites and axons. From the soma, both 
dendrites and axons emanate with different purposes and structures. Neurons 
transmit and receive their signals through the dendrites and axons. These have 
different purposes.
B.4.1.1 Dendrites
Dendrites are responsible for receiving and process the incoming signals, so 
that it either makes the neuron behave excitatory, i.e. make the neuron fire, or 
inhibitory, i.e. resist the neuron from firing. Because a single neuron may have 
hundreds of dendrites (dendritic tree), it is the sum of the excitatory and inhibito-
ry signals that is finally responsible for the potential firing of an action potential. 
Excitatory post-synaptic potential (ESPS) and inhibitory post-synaptic potential 
(ISPS) are additive, so the summation must surpass a threshold before it makes 
the receiving neuron fire an action potential. ESPS and ISPS can also cancel one 
another out, given that one is positively charged and the other negative. This is a 
remarkably important note relative to electroencephalogram (EEG) because it is 
precisely the summation of post-synaptic potentials that are measured in EEG. 
In theory, the first electric activity of a neuron is the action potential (someti-
mes referred to as input spike, as opposed to output spikes in ESPS/ISPS), but 
as will be presented, this kind of activity is difficult to measure non-invasively. 
If the action potential is initiated, the signal is transmitted to the axons, which is 
linked to numerous other areas. 
B.4.1.2 Axons
The axons are mainly responsible for conveying the neuronal signal to vario-
us areas. Unique to the axon is the myelination of the nerve, which improves the 
rapidity of the conveying, i.e. conductivity improvement. Axon terminals, located 
at the end of the axons, link to target cells through synapses. In the case of inter-
neurons, the axons are linked to other cell bodies, and since axon is composed of 
numerous branches, the impulse can be distributed to several cells. At the axon 
terminals, the axon that conveys the signal is termed the pre-synaptic cell, where-
as the dendrite that receives the signal is termed the post-synaptic cell. It is worth 
noting that the interneurons are mainly multipolar neurons, which means there 
is only a single (outgoing) axon extruded from the soma but it has multiple (in-
coming) dendrites. This allows for a high degree of integration from other neurons 
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before transmitting a signal itself. In brief, when an action potential that stems 
from the processes in the dendrites initiates a neuronal firing, it is conveyed th-
rough the axon terminals that in turn triggers a chemical neurotransmitter, which 
must fill the gap between the pre-synaptic and post-synaptic cells.
B.4.2 Neurotransmitter
Between the pre-synaptic and post-synaptic cells, the electrical synapse triggers 
a chemical neurotransmitter where ions and other molecules cross the synapse 
between the two cells as a transmission (Kandel, 2013, chaps 12–13). In turn, 
this connection to the post-synaptic cell initiates either excitatory or inhibitory 
signal in the receiving cell—hence the convenient name, neurotransmitter. Their 
purpose is precisely to transmit. It is worth noting that the advantage of using 
electrical signalling is the rapidity of response, as compared to the endocrine sy-
stem (associated with homeostatic balance), which uses hormones as the chemical 
signalling. Electrical signals are fast whereas hormones are slow but long-lasting. 
Neurotransmitters also have a longer-lasting influence on neurons, but only 
through the modulatory effect. Whether a neuron responds excitatory or inhibi-
tory depends on the target dendrites—however, a neurotransmitter may also have 
a third class of influence, namely modulatory. These are not restricted to the gap 
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Figure B.3—The anatomy of  a neuron. The neuron is illustrated on the right, where the nucleus in the soma is 
designated by a yellow form. Dendrites emanate from the soma and are connected to other neuronal axons. If  the 
dendritic	process	sums	to	excitatory	behaviour,	the	action	potential	impulse	is	reflected	in	axons	terminals	as	syn-
apses. During synaptic transmission, different kinds of  neurotransmitter can be released and picked up itself  as a 
control of  the neurotransmitter level and by the target cell, which may be a cell body or a dendrite. Neurotransmit-
ter molecules are also picked up enzymes and thereby degraded. Molecules that are not pick up act as neuromodula-
tors by volume transmission and alters the activity of  a group of  neurons.
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between a pre-synaptic and post-synaptic cell but instead, they affect a large num-
ber of neurons ultimately regulating a whole population of neurons. The process 
of regulation is slower than the excitatory and inhibitory responses. 
There are different kinds of neurotransmitters with each of their characteri-
stics. Here, some of them are very briefly characterised:
• Glutamate is by far the most widespread neurotransmitter in the brain 
and is characterised by its excitatory property on neurons.
• GABA (gamma-amino-butyric acid) is an amino acid that is mainly chara-
cterised by its inhibitory property on neurons (for more on glutamate’s and 
GABA’s role in the brain, see: LeDoux, 2003, chap. 3). 
• Oxytocin is both a hormone and a peptide neurotransmitter. It plays an 
essential role in social bonding.
• Norepinephrine, a monoamine neurotransmitter, reflects the level of 
alertness in the body and is typically related to fight/flight responses, 
which links it further to mobilising the body and to regulations of stress 
levels. 
• Dopamine, which is also a monoamine neurotransmitter, plays an essenti-
al role in bodily movement, reward circuits and motivation levels. For this 
reason, it involved in a wide range of research, e.g. addiction, Parkinson’s 
and decision making.
• Serotonin is a powerful monoamine neurotransmitter involved in mood, 
anxiety, sleep and appetite. Serotonin reuptake inhibitors usually treat 
depression. 
• Acetylcholine is involved with motor neurons and muscular movements, 
and for this reason, plays a fundamental role in cognitive functions. As it 
is the only neurotransmitter found in the somatic nervous system of the 
brain, it holds a unique position regarding cognition—given that cognition 
depends on action (see Chapter 9).
There are generally three main ways in which neurotransmitters are elimina-
ted: reuptake by the pre-synaptic cell, enzymatic degradation and diffusion. In the 
synaptic process, there are neurotransmitter molecules released and picked up by 
receptors in the target cell. While the neurotransmitters are picked up, some are 
reabsorbed by the pre-synaptic cell as a type of regulation. This process is named 
reuptake. Reuptake is essential in regulating the level of neurotransmitter that is 
currently present. It can be considered a way of controlling the release amount. 
Besides the reuptake, enzymes in the cleft function as eliminating the neurotrans-
mitter by breaking it down. This is named enzymatic degradation. Furthermore, 
when the pre-synaptic cell detaches from the target cell, drifting neurotransmitter 
molecules are absorbed by glia cells and thus eliminating the neurotransmitter by 
diffusion. Diffusion also functions as a volume transmission to other areas of the 
brain, which is how neuromodulation emerges.
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B.4.3 Neuromodulators
When neuromodulators influence a population of neurons, the process is ini-
tiated by volume transmission where the neurotransmitter molecules are diffused. 
This process is also known as volume transmission, which due to lack of rapid de-
gradation and reuptake, the neurotransmitters modulate the neurons over a longer 
time. This is the main difference between modulators and synaptic transmitters, 
i.e. the effect duration, where synaptic transmitters last for a short time as oppo-
sed to modulators that have a long-lasting effect. The purpose of the neuromo-
dulator is to alter the activity of a group of other neurons by entering the field of 
post-synaptic receptors from a long distance.
B.5 Electroencephalogram
This subchapter briefly introduces the electroencephalogram (EEG). When 
millions of synapses are excited at the same time, they are measurable from the 
scalp using an EEG (Luck, 2005). Hans Berger (1873-1941), a German psy-
chiatrist, first discovered this in 1924 (Gloor, 1969) by placing an electrode on 
the scalp, then amplifying the signal and plotting the changes in volt over time. 
Demonstrating that it is possible to measure the electrical activity of the human 
brain revolutionised brain sciences because it enabled in vivo human experimen-
tations. For instance, Berger famously discovered the alpha oscillations (8-12 Hz) 
that increase upon closing the eyes and decrease immediately upon opening them, 
which today is a paradigm in experimenting the influence of external stimulus on 
spontaneous brain activity (Northoff, Qin and Nakao, 2010). Berger observed the 
alpha waves without a digitalised EEG, which is the norm today. 
A modern EEG consists of various electrodes and different types of ampli-
fiers with different recording tempo. A high-density EEG-recording is typically 
considered from 64 channels (electrodes) and upwards (256 channels), whereas 
a low-density is below 64 channels, typically 32 channels. Amplifiers today can 
easily sample data at 1 kHz, which means that it records 1000 points of voltage 
changes per second. The temporal resolution is the key-advantage of the EEG 
as a non-invasive technique for measuring cortical activity. Spatially, the EEG 
provides coarse measures where the raw data cannot be used to elucidate specific 
neuronal signals. First, the EEG signals reflect any voltage in the electrode’s en-
vironment, e.g. a computer screen or the subway system. Thus, raw EEG signals 
are considered highly noisy—however, this is solved by processing the raw data 
in ways that reduce the noise. Second, each channel reflects a mixing of neuronal 
sources of activity that stem from various cognitive processes. This is typically 
referred to as a cocktail party problem, because during a cocktail party, many open 
conversations add up to the noise, but each a distinct, and hopefully meaningful, 
conversation. This problem can be solved through algorithmic modifications of 
the data, e.g. an adaptive mixture of independent component analysis (Palmer, 
Kreutz-Delgado and Makeig, 2011). The technology behind an EEG is increa-
singly complex but has been simplified for the sake of description. What does 
the EEG then measure?
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B.5.1 What is potential? Ohm’s law
The origin of EEG signals stems from the pyramidal cells (neurons) that are 
always oriented perpendicular to the cortical surface. The electrical nature of neu-
rons that is measured is the voltage, which is typically referred to as potential becau-
se it describes the potential pressure for electrical current to move. Ohm’s law 
can sum the relation between voltage, current and resistance. Ohm’s law dictates:
A textbook example of their relation is the water hose analogy. Current, deno-
ted by I, is the flow of electricity. A measure of current is a measure of the number 
of electrons or protons through a given point at a specific time. The unit of the 
measure is ampere. The critical point of current is that it flows from negative to 
positive, i.e. it has a direction. In the context of the water hose, the current is the 
pressure of the flow of water through the hose, i.e. the actual vehicle. 
Resistance describes the ability to keep charged particles from passing. 
Opposite to resistance is the conductance, which facilitates the passing of par-
ticles. This property is tightly related to the composition of the substance, e.g. 
copper, silver and gold are good conductors, but also the length and the diameter 
of the substance contribute to the resistance. The unit of measure is ohm. Using 
the water hose analogy, a 50 metre-long water hose with a diameter of merely 
1 centimetre, will resist the flow of water as compared to a 1 metre-long water 
hose with a diameter of 5 centimetres will allow less resistance, and thus increase 
the current.  
Voltage, which is the unit that EEG measures in, describes the potential for 
the current to flow. Even if the current is not flowing in any direction, the poten-
tial to do so exists. Voltage can be considered the electrical pressure that enables 
current to flow, which analogous to the water hose example, means that there 
can be a lot of water pressure in a hose even if the end is closed off. The moment 
the hose is opened, the water starts to flow—that is, if there is sufficient pressure, 
i.e. no electric current can flow without the electrical potential to apply pressure.
B.5.2 Post-synaptic potentials and dipoles
Excitatory neurons produce an action potential along the axons to reach the 
axon terminals, where neurotransmitters are released. When the neurotransmit-
ters bind to a receptor on a post-synaptic cell, it causes a change in voltage that 
typically last tens or hundreds of milliseconds. Action potentials last only about a 
millisecond, so any measured potential 20 milliseconds after stimulus onset most 
probably reflects post-synaptic potentials. 
The physical structure of the brain is an important topic in EEG, because it 
describes both which neurons are measured but also what kind of electrical activity 
in neurons. If the current flowing in an action potential flow parallel to another 
axon until they reach an axon terminal their voltage summate and increase chan-
ces for measuring action potential through the scalp using EEG. However, if the 
(B.1) 
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Figure B.4—An	example	of 	the	summation	between	ESPS	and	ISPS.	This	process	is	largely	confined	to	den-
drites, where the decision whether to excite the neuron, or not, takes place. The dashed line represents the threshold 
to excite a neuron, while the dotted line represents the summation of  the ESPSs and ISPSs. In this example, 
there	are	three	ESPSs	and	a	single	ISPS,	which	amounts	to	one	ESPS	cancelling	out.	This	is	a	highly	simplified	
demonstration	of 	the	process,	as	the	temporal	summation	has	not	been	considered	(Stanfield,	2013,	p.	204).
Figure B.5—An example of  how the dipole emerges from the polarities in a pyramidal cell. In this example the 
cell is excitatory, which means the cell body is positively charged. The positively charged ion in the dendrites causes a 
negative charge forming a dipole altogether with the cell body. 
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action potentials are just slightly asynchronous, then as the action potential is flow-
ing into one axon, it may be flowing out other axons, which results in the signals 
cancelling out. By far, axons do not fire at the same rate; thus, action potentials 
are considered close to impossible to measure from the scalp (Luck, 2005, p. 39).
Particularly the summation of post-synaptic potentials allows the EEG to mea-
sure distinct and deep areas of the brain be they either excitatory or inhibitory (Fig. 
B.4). Because of the physical position of pyramidal cells, i.e. perpendicular to the 
cortical surface, the apical dendrite is always pointing outwards (cortical surface) 
while the dendrites are pointing towards the white matter. This physical structure 
allows inferring the direction of the current flow. For instance, when an excitatory 
neurotransmitter is released around the dendrite, the positively charged ions will 
flow into the cell body and change the polarity around the dendrite regions. This 
flow of current creates a small area of positive and negative charges, and that is 
precisely what a single dipole is; these are important for the processing of EEG 
data (Fig. B.5). In the case of an inhibitory post-synaptic potential, the polarities 
are inverted (Luck, 2005, p. 40) (To localise the dipoles, one needs to solve the 
forward problem, which is a statistical problem that is not touched upon here).
When thousands or millions of neurons form dipoles at the same time, they 
summate and become measurable from the scalp. The issue then is the folding of 
the brain, because the dipoles might be oriented such that they cancel each other 
out (Fig. B.6). The orientation is exceedingly important to infer the origin of me-
asured EEG data, and the organisation of pyramidal cells makes it more likely to 
be the source, merely because they are not randomly organised. Neurons in basal 
ganglia are increasingly random in their orientation, which makes it highly dif-
ficult to measure activity in that area from the scalp. Luck (2005, p. 42) following 
conditions for measurable signals from the scalp:
• Simultaneous activation of a large number of neurons.
• Similar orientation of individual neurons.
• The source of the post-synaptic potential must be similar, i.e. apical 
dendrites or cell body.
• The majority of neurons must have the same direction of current flow.
Figure B.6—The folds of  the brain complicate the estimation of  neuronal origin because the electrical charges may 
be additive in one sense, while possibly cancelling out in another sense. Beyond self-cancellation, the potential needs 
to be strong enough to be measured through the skull. 
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B.5.3 Processing
Recording meaningful EEG data requires a range of devices. A typical setup 
of using EEG consists of:
1. Device for presenting the stimulus, e.g. monitors, Virtual Reality, 
headphones.
2. Cap with electrodes:
• The number of channels defines the density of the EEG 
recording.
• A reference electrode and a ground electrode. The measured po-
tential of a single channel is always relative to the reference and 
ground electrodes.  
• Conductive gel to improve signal-to-noise ratio. 
3. EEG amplifier to synchronise the measured potentials and the events of 
the external stimulus at a fixed rate. Amplifiers also contain filters. 
4. Computer to digitise the signals.
How the data is pre-processed depends entirely on the hypothesis and the pa-
radigm of the experiment. However, the operations are usually entails down-samp-
ling the data, assign channel locations, filtering, rejection bad channels for each 
participant and eventually interpolate the bad channels using the approximate 
channels, referencing the channels and running an independent component ana-
lysis (ICA), which essentially attempts to solve the cocktail party problem. 
The brain is continuously processing for various reasons, which means that 
several processes overlap in the channel recordings. The ICA attempts to segre-
gate the reasons into separate components, where the sum of the components na-
turally yields the EEG data (see for instance Palmer, Kreutz-Delgado and Makeig, 
2011). Such an analysis allows identifying interfering activity measured from mo-
vements from the eyes or the neck muscles. Processing the data attempts to sup-
press noise in the data cautiously, without interfering with “true” cortical activity; 
down-sampling and filtering may cause artificial oscillations or distort temporal 
positions of stimulus onset. At any rate, un-cleaned and noisy EEG data cannot 
answer questions of cortical activity—thus, applying filters and ICA are essential 
steps in processing EEG data. For instance, muscles contribute to the noise in 
the EEG signal and obscure “true” cortical activity. However, a technique named 
Mobile Brain/Body Imaging (MoBI) has excelled in treating EEG data with mi-
nimal distortions to the cortical data.
B.5.4 Mobile Brain/Body Imaging technique 1 
The MoBI approach (Makeig et al., 2009; Gramann et al., 2011, 2014) allows 
recording activity of the human brain in actively moving participants using mo-
bile brain imaging devices like electroencephalography (EEG) or functional 
1 This subchapter is heavily based on the thesis-related publication: (Djebbara, Fich and Gramann, 2019)
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near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) synchronised to motion capture and other 
data streams. Head-mounted virtual reality systems can be coupled to the setup to 
allow full control over visual and auditory stimulation while human participants 
move through and interact with virtual worlds. The method was developed to 
allow investigation of the relationship of action, cognition, and brain activity and 
aims at overcoming the limitations of traditional brain imaging modalities that 
restrict active movement of participants to avoid artefacts originating from mo-
vement—thus, MoBI excels at investigating neuronal and functional principles of 
enactivism and active inference while acting in virtual architectural environments. 
MoBI is the method of choice to investigate the brain dynamics underlying the 
impact of architecture on perception and action in freely behaving humans. By 
synchronising recordings of brain activity with motion capture, MoBI allows us 
to investigate the interplay of sensation, perceptual experiences, and action, while 
recording the accompanying brain dynamics. This contrasts MoBI studies from 
mobile EEG studies that do not record specific aspects of participants’ behavi-
our but rather compare brain activity in different movement conditions like sit-
ting as compared to walking (Jungnickel and Gramann, 2018). Using data driven 
analyses approaches with the help of information from movement recordings to 
advance the signal decomposition, i.e. ICA, MoBI allows separation of brain and 
non-brain activity for further analyses. 
Early MoBI studies mainly focused on demonstrating the feasibility of the 
approach using treadmills that allowed movement of participants without neces-
sitating large physical spaces. These studies demonstrated that it is possible to 
investigate human brain dynamics accompanying cognitive processes including 
attention to relevant rare stimuli during active behaviours like walking (Gramann 
et al., 2010). In the study by Gramann and colleagues (2010), participants were 
standing or walking with different speed on a treadmill while, at the same time, 
responding to rare target stimuli in a visual oddball task presented on a screen in 
front of them. Using ICA and subsequent clustering of ICs, the authors demon-
strated that the P300 component, a positive deflection in the event-related poten-
tial, could be reconstructed for target stimuli irrespective of the behavioural state.
B.6 Closure
This appendix ranged from introducing nervous systems to neurons and the 
process of excited neurons, including neurotransmitters and the electrophysio-
logical underpinnings of neuronal activity. Ultimately, a method of measuring 
the voltage generated by pyramidal cells was introduced along with an advanced 
method of analysing cortical activity. The brain is indeed a complex organ that is 
exceedingly difficult to grasp and, despite the many discoveries of its organisation 
and functions, continuous to be a mysterious organ.
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C.1 Introduction
Additional to the discussion on the decomposability of the brain and its fun-
ctions, is the debate regarding functional segregation and integration in cognitive 
processes. This debate is highly dependent on the brains’ ability to bring together 
two spatially distinct processes that occur in parallel. To this end, it is necessary to 
briefly review how neuronal processes are observed to be linked and two different 
theories of how distinct areas may be interrelated. Both convergence-divergen-
ce-zones and phase synchrony are reviewed and supported by revisiting Hebb’s 
rule through excitatory post-synaptic potentials. Essentially, integration and se-
gregation of cognitive processes rely heavily on the neuronal ability to strengthen 
and weaken connectivity. 
C.2 Segregation and integration
Semir Zeki, a neuroscientist, captures the essence of the discussion regarding 
segregation and integration as organisational principles of the brain in his book 
A Vision of the Brain:
“For that experience is one of wholeness, of a unitary visual image, in which all the 
visual attributes take their correct place, in which one can register the precise position, 
shape and colour as well as the direction and speed of motion of a bus simultaneously 
and instantaneously, as if all the information coming from that bus had been analyzed 
in one place, in a fraction of a second. Nothing in that integrated visual image suggests 
that different visual attributes are processed in physically separate parts of our cortex. 
Functional segregation and integration
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The task, then, is to enquire into how the brain puts the separate attributes together.” 
(Zeki, 1993, p. 295)
Integration, as understood in this context, is the ability of the brain and 
body to integrate all necessary attributes of sensory into a meaningful percept. 
Phenomenology suggests that the integration is evident in behaviour and tran-
scendental states, i.e. one acts according to a multisensory world and experiences 
an integrated world. The paradox in this debate is that some neuronal responses 
are stimulus-specific and tend to form specialised hubs in the brain, and by doing 
so favours a localisation-oriented brain, but the meaningful percept is phenomen-
ologically evident to be an integration of the whole. Eventually, such a position 
states that functions of the brain emerge from their specific locations, whereas 
a dynamic systems theory (DST) approach suggests that the brain operates as a 
whole in spite of its anatomical structure. The debate can be distilled to a question 
of modulatory structures of cortex with a subdivision of labour, versus, a wide-
spread distribution of labour that depend on the ability of large-scale integration.
The concept of segregation in the cortex ranges from specialised neurons to 
neuronal hubs and cortical regions. It builds on the strategy that anatomical con-
nections shape the structure of separate cortical areas, so that information passed 
between these areas form a coherent and meaningful percept (Zeki and Shipp, 
1988). Importantly, segregation does not correspond to the radical localisation 
theory of mental functions, i.e. Broca’s theory of area-specific functions in the 
brain, but refers instead to a statistical distinction between neuronal responses, 
i.e. specialised hubs (Sporns, 2011, p. 185). This is an important note because the 
debate on segregation and integration is not the same as localisation versus an-
ti-localisation theories of cortical organisation, i.e. the structure-function dilemma 
(Sporns, 2011, chap. 4). Instead, segregation and integration address how separate 
areas of the brain integrates to a phenomenologically whole percept. There are at 
least two ways the integration may unfold, and once again, time is of the essence. 
Damasio suggests functional integration through convergence (Damasio, 1989; 
Meyer and Damasio, 2009), while Varela suggests distant phase locking or syn-
chronisation without convergence (Varela, 1995; Varela et al., 2001).
C.2.1 Convergence-divergence-zone framework
Damasio’s idea is that integration by convergence creates more specialised 
hubs by a conjunction of other less specialised hubs (Damasio, 1989). At any 
rate, convergence can “generate neurons whose activity encodes high-level attributes of their 
respective input space, increase the functional segregation and specialization of the architecture” 
(Sporns, 2011, p. 185). Damasio is suggesting a hierarchical structure to the cor-
tical organisation and cognitive function, where segregation and integration can 
hardly be separated processes because it makes extensive use of feedback and 
feedforward modulations (Meyer and Damasio, 2009). 
The framework casts neuronal architecture as ensembles in early sensori-
motor cortices and neuron ensembles located downstream the sensorimotor in 
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higher-order cortices—the architecture operates through convergence-divergen-
ce-zones (CDZs). Upon receiving convergent projections, CDZs send back diver-
gent projections to the same sites and hold in retention the combinatorial arran-
gement so that it is shaped by experience (Fig. C.1). Despite the separate sites, the 
influenced areas are temporally coincident in their activity and therefore modify 
the connectivity pattern within a shared CDZ downstream, which eventually as-
sociates their activity. The downstream is equivalent to top-down (TD) signalling. 
The connectivity principle takes place at all levels of the hierarchy, i.e. feedback 
and feedforward signals that allow for feature detectors (Meyer and Damasio, 2009; 
Sporns, 2011, p. 186). 
Different from traditional accounts of sensory perception is that CDZ register 
linkages among fragments, i.e. the combinatorial arrangement of the multi-site ac-
tivities, whereas the traditional accounts hold that information is transferred and 
projected to single anatomical sites to enable an apprehension further. As Chapter 
CDZ1
Visual
Visual stimuli
Higer-order cortices
Auditory
CDZ1 CDZ1
CDZ2
CDZn
CDZ2
CDZ1 CDZ1 CDZ1
No auditory stimuli
Figure C.1— Convergent-divergent-zones. A schematic overview of  visual apprehension of  lip movement 
without auditory stimuli. CDZ consists of  a multi-level hierarchy where response patterns retro-activate various 
CDZs. By visually observing a lip movement, the visual stimuli activate specialised visual hubs of  neurons due to 
convergent forward projections (solid arrows). However, the divergent projections lead to retro-activations (dashed 
arrows) in both the visual and auditory areas. This is due to the connectivity established during activation of  the 
pattern when the visual-auditory activity was previously experienced together. Parts of  the specialised hubs remain 
inactive (yellow arrows). The blue areas are retroactively enabled, while the red areas are the neuronal hubs activat-
ed by forward projections. Illustration inspired by (Meyer and Damasio, 2009).
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10 and Appendix D and E will elaborate on, the linkage can be seen as probabi-
lities that need to be improved, i.e. decrease the uncertainty, through interaction 
with the environment to enhance the grip of the percept. The CDZ trigger and 
synchronise neuronal patterns through the projections but cannot be the locus of 
integration themselves (Sporns, 2011, p. 186). Instead, the framework casts CDZ 
as hubs that are distributed throughout the cortical architecture and ensures fun-
ctional integration through coordinated activity, i.e. synchrony. 
To give an example of how CDZ synchronise auditory and visual sensory, con-
sider an observation of a lip movement. Because the auditory sensory repeatedly 
co-occurs with the visual sensory of a lip movement, the two events modulate 
connectivity in early sensorimotor areas. Consequently, the visual event of a lip 
movement will not only elicit visual activity alone but the activity pattern, given 
the modulate connectivity, will retro-activate (i.e. by backward projection) early 
auditory area despite the absence of the accompanying sound in the environment 
(Meyer and Damasio, 2009). 
“According to the CDZ framework, the meaning of a lip movement includes the sound typ-
ically associated with it, and the auditory map of that sound, therefore, has become an integral 
part of the lip movement’s neural representation.” (Meyer and Damasio, 2009, p. 378)
C.2.2 Phase-synchronisation
Integration has also been posed without convergence but instead through dy-
namic links, i.e. through phase-locking of distinct neuronal populations. Singer 
and colleagues have provided, through a series of experiments, evidence for sti-
mulus-dependent neuronal synchrony within and between cortical areas (Gray 
and Singer, 1989; Gray et al., 1990; Singer, 1999).  This is an important discovery 
because it suggests that the brain integrates various sensory through phase-syn-
chronisation of gamma-oscillations (~20-80 Hz) (Buzsáki, 2006). The role of 
coherent phase-synchronisation in large-scale networks is to facilitate the mutual 
communication and to modulate the strength of connectivity (Fries, 2015). 
Varela and colleagues provided evidence that large-scale networks are evident 
during meaningful perception as opposed to meaningless percepts (Rodriguez 
et al., 1999). Their experimental paradigm was to present their participants with 
either meaningful (Mooney) faces or meaningless shapes and to analyse the pha-
se-synchronisation in the measured EEG-data. Their analyses consisted of functi-
onal connectivity on a channel-level, i.e. phase-synchronisation amongst the EEG 
electrodes, and of time-frequency transforms. Their results indicate that during 
meaningless perception, there is close to none phase-synchronisation among dif-
ferent areas of the brain, whereas dring meaningful perception, a highly signifi-
cant increased number of areas start to synchronise from distinct and distanced 
areas of the brain. 
Varela suggests that the brain consists of reciprocal relations throughout the 
whole brain, which, through large-scale networks, allows distinct areas of the bra-
in to communicate and integrate. This theory strongly suggests that large-scale 
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integration unfolding through phase-synchronisation is a dynamic process pa-
ramount for cognitive and perceptual processes (Varela et al., 2001). However, 
the linear measures of functional connectivity is a static measure of large-scale 
networks, because it does not consider temporal evolution. 
Large-scale networks that emerge from phase-synchronisation are immediate 
networks—but networks that evoke other regions over time cannot be elucidated 
within that type of functional analysis (Friston, 2011). Instead, the effective connecti-
vity must be taken into account by analysing, for instance, the Granger causality 
between two neuronal hubs. Such analysis yields whether the activity of one neu-
ronal hub Granger-causes the activity of another.
C.3 Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity
Recall from Appendix B that a presynaptic neuron sends a signal while a 
post-synaptic neuron receives the signal. This means that over time, one should 
be able to measure one spike one moment, and the next moment measure another 
spike from the post-synaptic neuron if it chooses to fire. As explained in Chapter 
7 (2.3), Hebb’s rule clarifies the mechanism underlying synaptic firing. The rule 
can be distilled to neurons	that	fire	together,	wire	together—however, for the brain, it is 
not only a matter of which neurons connect, but also about the strength of the 
connection. It is not always that a post-synaptic neuron fires. Hebb emphasised 
that “when an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently 
takes	part	in	firing	it,	some	growth	process	or	metabolic	change	takes	place	in	one	or	both	cells	
such	that	A’s	efficiency,	as	one	of	the	cells	firing	B,	is	increased”	(Hebb as cited in Caporale 
and Dan, 2008). Hebb’s rule foreshadowed the process that adjusts the strength 
in connectivity named Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity (STDP) where causa-
tion is an important aspect. The temporal order of neuronal spikes may reveal a 
great deal regarding their connectivity relations, e.g. strength. 
Buonomano (2017, pp. 29–31) provide an excellent example that illustrates the 
asymmetry of cause and effect in neuronal activity. For the sake of the example, 
consider two neurons in a baby Zoe’s brain (Fig. C.2). Neuron A is linked to neu-
ron B, and vice versa, thus, there are two synapses. Neuron A is excited by the 
sound of the letter Z and neuron B of the sound of the letter O. Whenever Zoe 
hears her name, neuron A fires 25 milliseconds before neuron B. Here, the obje-
ctive of the synaptic rule is to strengthen, or weaken, the synapses according to 
the pattern of activity. In this case, neuron A to neuron B is strengthened, while 
neuron B to neuron A is weakened. At any rate, that neuron A fires before neuron 
B makes it likely that neuron A contributed to the firing of B. This simple rule 
allows the brain to learn cause-and-effect regarding neurons that are responsible 
for the stimulus-specific activity, i.e. external events in the world, like architectu-
re. This biological process ensures that Zoe responds to the sequence of Z-O-E 
instead of O-Z-E, where O is before Z.
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Figure C.2— Left. Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity (STDP) is electrically measured in neurons. A pre-syn-
aptic neuron can link to a post-synaptic neuron through its axons and the post-synaptic neuron’s dendrites (Appen-
dix B). An excitatory post-synaptic potential’s (ESPS) role is to either initiate or inhibit excitatory behaviour in a 
neuron	(the	inhibitory	version	of 	ESPS	is	the	ISPS).	If 	a	neuron	is	excited,	it	fires	a	considerably	stronger	action	
potential. However, the ESPS have an additive effect, which is what is measurable using EEG. Right. If  the 
neuron	A	fires	an	action	potential	consistently	before	the	ESPS,	then	the	connection	will	get	stronger	(long-term	
potentiation; LTP)—however, if  the output spike (ESPS) occurs prior to the input spike (action potential), then 
the connection will get weaker (long-term depression; LTD). 
C.4 Closure
In brief, segregation and integration are inevitable processes in cognition and 
behaviour that may be obscured by the reciprocal relations in the brain. Indeed, 
the dynamics of the brain are essential for cognitive and perceptual processes, 
because such processes require functional integration from distinct neuronal hubs 
that are distributed throughout the brain. Evident from the discussion above, the 
brain is inclined to be hierarchically structured with forward and backward proje-
ctions, operating through large-scale networks. This is indeed in line with a DST 
approach, and even further with a free energy principle (FEP) approach, which 
is presented in Chapter 10, Appendix D and E. In fact, the CDZ framework is 
an excellent biological forerunner to FEP and active inference as it is easier to 
understand the structure of CDZ—however, they are very reminiscent. 
STPD magnified the process of connectivity to a neuronal level and revisited 
Hebb’s rule to document the potential of neuronal wiring in strength, which is 
essential in both phase-synchrony and the CDZ framework.
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D.1 Introduction
This appendix serves to introduce Bayes’ rule, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) 
and discuss the darkroom problem. To this end, simplification of an experiential 
transition using architectural transition is demonstrated, using both Bayes’ rule 
and HMMs. Bayes’ theorem is the inverse probability that naturally leads to the 
process of inferring hidden states (Stone, 2013, pp. 27–28), which is how Bayes’ 
theorem links with HMMs. It is worth noting that this appendix is statistical and 
assumes basic probability theory and mathematical skills.
Furthermore, it is based on textbooks of machine learning (Jordan et al., 1999; 
Ghahramani, 2001; Jebara, 2004). The concepts to be discussed relative to Bayes’ 
rule are prior probability, likelihood function, marginal likelihood and posterior 
probability. For HMMs, it is transition probabilities, emission probabilities, maxi-
mum likelihood estimation and Viterbi’s algorithm. 
The idea here is to demonstrate how a combination of Bayes’ rule and HMMs 
can form intellectually informed guesses—however, the purpose of this demon-
stration is to apply the same underlying concepts not to the intellect, but to the pra-
ctical knowledge as it appears through action-perception. The process of inferring 
hidden states as modelled by HMMs is applicable to sensory states inferring the 
world. It is precisely an attractive method due to the SMC hypothesis regarding the 
structure of change in experience. Although the following example is not applied 
on a sensory level (Chapter 10), the same underlying concepts can be transferred 
to the action-perception process.
Bayes’ rule, Hidden Markov Models and 
the darkroom
APPENDIX D
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D.2 Bayes’ rule
Recall the architectural conundrum from Chapter 3. This time, the experien-
cing agent starts in space A walks through space B to finally reach space C. These 
three spaces could be any other three seemingly separate spaces, such as [outdo-
ors, entré and living room] or [living room, hallway and home office] etc., but for 
the sake of simplicity, the example sticks to [outdoors, entré and living room]. 
Coming home early from work, e.g. 2 pm, and observing that the lights are turned 
on inside, Bayes’ theorem can aid deciding the probability that your significant 
other (SO) is in the living room. The architectural transition is here composed 
of three spaces, where the task is to predict whether the SO is in the last space, 
which means that one can pick up sensory cues from space A to strengthen the 
guess regarding space C from space B. According to Bayes theorem (Eq. 1), sensory 
cues picked up in the current context, i.e. outside, evaluate prior experiences that 
are used to expect the next space. 
To add some numbers to the chances, say, what is the probability that the SO 
is home in general? Prior experiences indicate that the SO is home two out of 
five times at 2 pm—but only home five out of eight times when the lights are on. 
Besides, how often are the lights just randomly on? The kids might have come 
in earlier from school and turned the lights on, or the last person leaving forgot 
to turn them off. There are endless reasons that the lights could be on random-
ly—assume that out of twenty observations, the lights are on eight. Given these 
probabilities, it is possible to process the probability of whether the SO is home 
when the lights are on using Bayes theorem while still being outdoors:
(D.1) 
In Bayesian probability, the P(A) stands for prior probability, which is the pro-
bability that functions as a weight to the likelihood function, namely P(B|A). Note 
that the likelihood is a conditional probability so that it depends on a variable. 
The standard convention is that the probability of which is sought is named the 
parameter while the evidence is named the variable. The P(A|B), which is what the 
current example concerns, is referred to as the posterior probability. The posterior 
is the product of the likelihood and the prior. The P(B) is referred to as marginal 
likelihood and is often disregarded because a different value would change all com-
peting posterior probabilities by the same proportion. It simply does not affect 
the relative probability (Jebara, 2004, pp. 23–24; Stone, 2013, p. 15). Essentially, 
Bayes’ rule combines prior experience with observed data to generate a qualified 
guess, i.e. Bayesian inference. This approach is the best way of forming an infor-
med guess using prior experiences. It has many applications in decision-making, 
e.g. deciding between whether someone said “four candles” or “fork handles”, or 
a simple hypothesis comparing that the hypothesis is true versus false.
posterior =
prior · likelihood
marginal likelihoodP(A|B) =
P(A) · P(B|A)
P(B)
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(D.2) 
Applying Bayes’ theorem to the current example unfolds like this:
Before transitioning from outdoors to the entré and exclusively using light as 
a cue, yields a 63% probability that the SO is home—however, this probability is 
subject to change as the sensory cues update as one acts towards, and eventually 
enters, the entré. The new information that is gathered continuously either increa-
se or decrease the probability, e.g. in the entré one might not find the SO’s shoes, 
which severely decrease the probability for the SO to be present. Indeed, there is 
no computation of this kind explicitly happening in the brain or the body—yet, 
Bayes theorem seems to describe best (simulate) rational decision making in hu-
man behaviour.  
Using Bayes theorem in architectural transitions, there is an expectation re-
garding what to find in space or put in other words; an expectation to space. In 
the described example, there is a 63% expectation to find the SO at home, which 
brings with it a range of new expectations relative to the SO as one approach, e.g. 
loud music, the smell of dinner or cut grass. Indeed, it is not as static and discrete 
as in the example but instead takes form as a continuous and dynamic updating. 
Calculating the precise probability is close to impossible because there are in the-
ory an infinite amount of hidden states that needs to be inferred, but as shall be 
presented there is a solution to this otherwise intractable problem (Chapter 10).
To rehearse Bergson and Husserl; according to their phenomenology, the 
current moment is interpenetrated by retention and protention, so that any given 
moment is already constituted by past and future. On an intellectual level, the 
example of the SO and the light is likely to develop precisely as described, i.e. as 
a conscious contemplation—however, for architectural spaces, if not an architect, 
these expectations happen on a basic and intuitive level never reaching full con-
scious contemplation. It is comparable to background noise until there is a rela-
tive prediction error. Rarely does one have to bring to mind how to transit from 
one space to another; one transits with a task in mind that caused the transit in 
the first place. In Chapter 11 it is argued that space is much more significant than 
background noise because space takes the role as the platform and foundation 
for experience, and if this foundation of experience is mispredicted, it may cause 
significant physiological reactions. 
D.3 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
The strength of HMMs is that it guesses patterns when given observed states 
and transitional information. In other words, an HMM “is a tool for representing pro-
bability distributions over sequences of observations” (Ghahramani, 2001, p. 2). Sequences 
can be considered deterministic and indeterministic, i.e. the seasons form a de-
terministic system. Every time, after winter, comes spring, then summer, then 
=
P(SO) · P(Light|SO)
P(Light)
· 
2
5
5
8
8
20
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autumn and finally back to winter. The states, i.e. seasons, are easily inferred 
from the current state, i.e. season. Architectural transitions are undetermined, 
and HMMs are powerful in the context of the research question as it seeks to 
resolve undetermined sequences, which was stated in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 to be 
a characteristic of experiential transition. This is a critical notion relative to the 
example above as it aids guiding the sequences in experiential transitions, i.e. as 
one approaches the next space, new perceptual cues are informing the expectation 
regarding the next space. To demonstrate how a combination of Bayes’ rule and 
HMMs can be powerful, consider there the same example, first with a different 
approach and then an immediate approach. 
How were the probabilities found? The probabilities are based on prior know-
ledge about how often the SO is home at 2 pm (Fig. D.1). For the sake of simplici-
ty, coming home early at 2 pm has happened twenty times, from what is recallable. 
Out of these, the SO was home eight times. It is important to emphasise that the-
se probabilities only inform that if the current state is positive (the SO is home), 
then the probability for a positive next time one comes home early is eight out 
of twenty (two out of five). The HMM model is based on transition probabilities 
so that the transition from one state to either itself or another is what is impor-
tant. From the observations in Fig. D.1, it can be shown that if the SO is home, 
there is a 25% (two out of a total of eight) chance for another positive next time 
one gets off early, but 75% chance for a negative. However, if the SO is currently 
Figure D.1—The blue nodes designate when the SO is home (positive), while the red nodes designate when the 
SO is not home (negative). Out of  twenty days where one has come home earlier, the SO has been home eight 
times. Each of  these designates a single state; thus, the transition from one to another can be counted to establish 
transition probabilities. The number of  transitions sum to the total number of  observations minus 1, whereas the 
percentages must sum to 1 in each state. It can be shown that if  the current state is positive, there is a 25% chance 
that it stays positive, while 75% that it turns negative. If  the current state is negative, there is a 55% chance that 
it stays negative, while 45% that it turns positive.
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Figure D.2—The emission probabilities are found by calculating the distribution of  when the lights were on, or 
off,	given	a	specific	state.	When	the	SO	was	home,	the	lights	were	on	five	out	of 	eight	times,	where	when	the	SO	
was not home the lights were still on one out of  fourth. The lights were off  while the SO was home three out of  
eight times, while they were off  three out of  four time while the SO was not there. 
not home, there is a 55% chance for another negative the next time, while a 45% 
chance for a positive. These are the transition probabilities, i.e. the probability for a 
transition (Fig. D.1).
The transition probabilities belong not to the observations per se, but to the 
HMM in the sense that the lights have not entered the model yet. The observation 
of the light condition at home relates to the HMM through conditional probability. 
The condition of the light is the observation, while the state of the SO, being home 
or not, is the hidden state that needs to be inferred—therefore, it is vital to know 
a priori the emission probability that refers to the emitted states, namely whether the 
5 = .63
3 = .37
3 = .25
9 = .75
SO SO
day 1 day 4 day 9 day 10day 2 day 3 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8
day 11 day 14 day 19 day 20day 12 day 13 day 15 day 16 day 17 day 18
SO SO SOSOSO SO SO SO SO SO
SO SO SOSOSOSO SOSO SO SO
current state current state
ON
ON ON
ON
ON ON ON
ON ONOFF
OFF OFF
OFF
ON
OFF
OFF OFF OFF
OFF OFF OFF OFFOFF OFF
lights were on or off (Fig. D.2), and as this is an observation it can also be gathered 
from the data, i.e. prior experiences. To be clear, the transition probabilities refer 
to the transition of the state in the HMM, while the emission probability refers to 
the probability, given a state, a specific outcome is emitted.
When combining the transition probabilities and the emission probabilities, 
the total HMM emerges (Fig. D.3). From here, different expectations can be deri-
ved. For one, consider the question from the example above; standing outside, 
and the lights are on, what is the probability that the SO is, and is not, in the living 
room? It was demonstrated above that Bayes’ rule can estimate that probability, 
but it can also be shown using HMM. In the case of estimating the probability of a 
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single day, the transition probabilities can be disregarded, leaving only the emission 
probabilities. The prior probabilities are known, namely 2/5 (0.4), for when the 
SO was home, and 3/5 (0.6) for when the SO was not home. For a positive, there 
was a 63% chance of the lights being on, while only 37% being off. For a negative, 
there was a 25% chance of the lights being on, while 75% being off. To calculate 
the probability that the SO is home given the lights are on:
(D.3) 
(D.4) 
The SO is home 2/5, and when the SO is home, it was shown that 63% of the 
time, the lights were on and finally the probability that the lights were randomly 
on was 2/5. In sum, there is a 63% chance that the SO is home when the lights 
are on. In the case of the lights being on, but the SO not being home, there is a 
25%, using the same reasoning. Therefore, the HMM is inherently using Bayes’ 
theorem to infer the hidden state, which is precisely why HMMs are considered 
dynamic Bayesian networks.
As mentioned in the example, the probabilities change as one approaches the 
entrance because there are tons of perceptual cues available, revealing the hidden 
states better. In cases of transitions, there are by definition not a static calculation 
but rather a sequence of calculations and these can also be cast through HMM. As 
one is approaching the entrance, it is no longer the condition of the light alone, 
which informs the experiencing agent. Instead, several new perceptual cues can 
provide information, e.g. shoes outside the door, trash outside the door, jacket 
hanging in the entrance, keys on the table in the entrance and a workbag in the 
entrance. These cues are exemplified here through the Viterbi algorithm, which is 
a dynamic form of programming where likelihoods are not calculated to the end 
but where the maximum likelihood is estimated on the go—hence, maximum like-
lihood estimate. 
Figure D.3—The total HMM, including emission and transition probabilities. 
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To infer the sequence of the hidden states, it is necessary to estimate the like-
lihood of the transitions. As there are many transitions in this particular model, 
consider a single example of a transition (Fig. D.4). As it has been demonstrated 
how priors are found, so for simplicity, the new priors are mere assumptions to 
enable the example. In theory, the observation of lights being on followed by no 
shoes outside the door, which decreases the probability of the SO being home, 
can be sequences of [positive, positive], [positive, negative], [negative, positive] 
and [negative, negative], that is, a total of four different sequences of inferred hid-
den states. For the sake of the example, Fig. D.4 illustrates the probability of the 
sequences, where the model selected is the model that is most likely to make the 
observations happen—once again, maximum likelihood estimation. The model 
selected in Fig. D.4 states that the observation that the lights were on followed by 
the observation of missing shoes outside the door yield the sequence of believing 
the SO is home, then not believing it.
Figure D.4—Notice that all observations are the same and that the HMM attempts to infer the sequence of  the 
hidden states. Four different possibilities are considered where the model with the highest likelihood is selected—
hence, maximum likelihood estimation. Note that the probabilities for the missing shoes are assumed and not 
introduced until this diagram. The red numbers in the centre of  the sequences are the products of  the models, i.e. 
the likelihood. 
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The sequence (chain) of the hidden states can be considered virtual sequence as 
they are all just as real as one any other, but only a single model is selected, namely 
the one with the highest likelihood from which a path appears. In Viterbi’s algo-
rithm, the likelihood estimation is dynamic in the sense that the model is selected 
on the go. Examine the sequence of observing that the lights are on, the shoes 
are missing and so is the trash outside, and as one enters, the jacket is not there 
either, but the keys and the workbag are there. The HMM can aid the unfolding 
of inference of the hidden states as one transits from one space and expecting the 
next one (Fig. D.5).
The chain unfolds so that the initiate state is either that the SO is home, or 
not. In case of a positive, the transition from positive to positive continues but 
competes with the case that if the initiation was negative. Ultimately, the chains 
have two competing models as new cues accumulate, where the model with the 
highest likelihood is always continuing. Eventually, choosing the highest likeli-
hood yields a path (Fig. D.6), or sequence of beliefs that may describe the experi-
ential transition. According to the HMM, observing that the lights are on, there is 
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good reason to hold a positive belief, but the missing shoes tilt the belief towards 
a negative, and so does the missing trash and jacket. However, the keys on the 
table and the workbag in the entrance reassure that the SO is in fact home from 
work, but perhaps not in currently in the living room. This is how HMM can be 
applied to expect spaces.
In the case of active inference, the hidden state is the environment and the 
observations are all the sensory observations. The approach in the case of active 
inference is based on the free energy, i.e. the approximation of the posterior, and 
collects new evidence by informed actions, i.e. affordances, and given the current 
research question, this is precisely why active inference is attractive. Nonetheless, 
Viterbi’s approach and active inference are both Bayes’ optimal behaviour, which 
is criticisable for casting human behaviour as absolute rational at all times.
Figure D.5—The black nodes designates the fact that the object is missing. The dotted diagonal line would be 
the competing models, i.e. if  the prior state was different. The numbers inside the hidden states are the maximum 
likelihood probabilities for each observation. The chain is initiated by the product of  the P(SO) × P(SO|Light), 
which is the same as 0.4 × 0.63. The probability for the next state to be positive depends on the next observation, 
which in this case is the missing shoes that yields a mere 10% chance to continue believing that the SO is home. 
The probability for another positive is thus the product of  the selected model, the 25% known from Fig. D.3, and 
the new 10%. This model would compete against if  the initial state were negative.
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D.4 Darkroom problem
The darkroom problem refers to the criticism directed against a Bayes-optimal 
behaviour in human beings (Friston, Thornton and Clark, 2012). Applying Bayes’ 
theorem to the process of action-perception yields a system of inferences that are 
informed by affordances and virtual actions—however, these have neuronal and 
cellular costs, particularly if the environment is challenging the homeostatic balan-
ce. According to the Bayes-optimal framework on behaviour, whose objective is 
to minimise surprise over the states and outcomes, why should a human being not 
constrain its environment to a dark room, which is always perfectly predictable? A 
series of objections can be raised.
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Figure D.6—The	final	path	emerges	when	choosing	the	states	with	highest	likelihood.	
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Firstly, if the visual perception matters to the minimisation of expected free 
energy, then why does one not just close the eyes? This issue frames perfectly 
the darkroom problem in FEP. Although in the current context, FEP is utilised 
to describe intuitive processes rather than intellectual ones, it is clear that closing 
the eyes will not yield any minimisation of expected free energy—one might ar-
gue the opposite. The fact that one does not know what is going on in the world 
is a terrible position of the experiencing agent. Closing the eyes does not reduce 
uncertainty, but increase it. 
“More formally, there is a fundamental difference between the intuitive meaning of 
‘surprise’ in terms of unpredictable sensory input and surprise (in information theoretic 
terms) under a particular model of the world. Finding ourselves in a dark room (and 
being subject to a surprising sense of starvation and sensory deprivation) is a highly sur-
prising state, even though it represents an environment with maximally predictable sensory 
input.” (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013)
Bayes-optimal behaviour is limited. To predict the intellect by Bayes’ theorem, 
is arguably difficult, as the Bayes’ theorem supposes the individual to execute 
strictly action that minimises free energy, i.e. improve chances of living. However, 
it does not take much time to observe in the real world the number of people 
using their cell phones while driving despite knowing it increases chances for an 
accident. People behave irrationally regularly. In the example above, the rational 
estimation of the sequences of beliefs are estimated using HMM, but in reality, 
the sequence of beliefs could have unfolded in another virtual sequence due to 
picking up other perceptual cues that were not integrated into the HMM. Indeed, 
regarding intellectual processes, the Bayes-optimal estimation is criticisable—how-
ever, when applying it to the intuitive, practical processes, i.e. action-perception, 
it is reasonable to assume that the world is attempted at all times to be construc-
ted with the lowest uncertainty. No matter how hard one attempt (intellectually) 
to construct the sensory observations of Bergson in person, he will not show up, 
except when having an illusory experience (Chapter 11).
Secondly, the darkroom is not a predictable room—a light one is. The behavi-
our is naturally to seek how to turn on the lights, and once the lights have been 
PART I I I :  APPENDIX D
279
turned on, one is situated in a more certain world. This should arguably reduce un-
certainty about the world. Nevertheless, as one is then situated in the world, spa-
ce offers affordances and virtual actions that need to be considered. The process 
of actively inferring the hidden states of the world is thus immediately initiated. 
Thirdly, the absolute limit of FEP is the intention-barrier, i.e. it is not possible 
to simulate free will or intention. FEP attempts to predict the intentions by pre-
dicting action but is usually guided by a task that becomes the intention. For in-
stance, if an individual completes a task, it may be assumed that the task is within 
the intention of that individual. This issue is particularly visible in the discussion 
of adjusting virtual action and affordances. One offers all the virtual interaction 
that might take place, but the affordances reflect the goals of the agent that are 
generated by a will, an intention to act. The virtual actions may be easily given, 
but the affordances depend on the intention. To overcome this barrier is to de-
sign a brain and body beyond homeostatic balance. According to FEP, it may 
be hypothesised that the issue can be overcome with sufficient Markov blankets 
to initiate the emergent property of an intention, which in turn is based on prior 
experiences. For now, this is considered an intractable problem of consciousness.
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E.1 Introduction
This appendix provides a walkthrough of active inference as described in the 
free energy principle. The example demonstrates how action is inherently related 
to perception so that the prediction in perception is based on expected free energy 
stemming from the virtual actions. Once again, this appendix is highly statistical 
and assumes basic probability theory and mathematical skills. The equations used 
are based on Chapter 10 and several of Friston’s papers (Friston, 2010; Friston et 
al., 2010, 2015, 2016; Bogacz, 2017)
E.2 Walkthrough of  active inference
Appendix D demonstrates how HMMs function on an intellectual level—
however, it is here attempted to transfer the concepts to active inference and 
demonstrate how action-perception emerges on an intuitive level. Virtual actions 
are here ideal to discuss first because they guide perception relative to practical 
knowledge. When introducing the continuity of action as it immediately unfolds, it 
results in new ranges of virtual actions that interpenetrate temporally, so that each 
action generates a continuous range of new informing actions. In other words, 
pragmatic action as a whole sequence is a set of infinitesimal epistemic actions. 
This continuous development of virtual action has been approximated by Cisek 
(2007) as a hierarchical affordance competition (HAC), where TD sensorimotor 
trajectories inform the upcoming signals continuously as a sequence, or a set, of 
proprioceptive predictions. For instance, to perceive what is in the next room, 
one walks towards it without much effort in planning each step. These intuitive 
A walkthrough of  active inference
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steps, which continuously follow one another, constitute a single virtual action and 
is based on prior beliefs. Thus, virtual action is the equivalent of proprioceptive 
predictions packing motor trajectory, which in turn is an action policy, namely 
π. It is important to note that in the upcoming example, it is not a matter of a 
single action, but of a sequence of action understood as an action policy, which 
is continuously subject to change from moment to moment, e.g. given an unfore-
seen step one is able to adjust to the new encounter. During active inference, a 
number of virtual actions continuously compete forming a metastable dynamic 
system involving varying attractors. This has been coined as a winnerless competition 
(Afraimovich, Rabinovich and Varona, 2004; Afraimovich et al., 2008) where the 
attractors (the competing virtual actions) are used to generate new predictions as 
time goes (theoretically) to infinity. The path between virtual actions is thus sub-
ject to change dynamically. Consider the example below.
E.2.1 Virtual actions in active inference
While F refers to current free energy (Eq. 10.10 and 10.11 in Chapter 10), G 
refers to the expected free energy (Eq. 10.1), which is the about-to-become F. 
Tautologically, by selecting a virtual action that best minimises G means to have 
a minimised F in the next moment. First, the example illustrates how perception 
minimises F, and as perception minimise F, action and virtual action minimise 
the expected F, namely G. 
For simplicity, consider the conundrum posed in Chapter 3, and assume that 
the experiencing agent believes the environment can only have three environmen-
tal states for a transition from space A to space B, namely a wide, a mid-sized and 
narrow door width. Further, it is assumed the agent expects to be easily able to 
transit, i.e. higher priors of wide and mid-sized doors. P(s) designates these prior 
beliefs based on earlier experiences (Fig. E.1—and see Appendix D). The likeli-
hood, P(o|s), designates the probability of observations given a state, e.g. either in 
state wide/mid/narrow, and the likelihood given an observation, i.e. how likely the 
observation is given a state. Once the agent observes the door width, the likeli-
hood P(o|s) updates the prior P(s)—this is expressed by multiplication, namely 
as the joint probability P(s, o). The value of model evidence, P(o), reflects how 
likely the current observation is under this model, and as one keeps modelling the 
environment, using models instead of hidden states, one would eventually end 
up with priors over models generating posterior beliefs over models given the 
observation. This would be the ideal scenario (blue part of Fig. E.1)—however, 
because there may be an infinite amount of hidden states, active inference suggests 
that through inference one can approximate the joint probability by minimising a 
measure of divergence, namely free energy F (Eq. 10.8 in Chapter 10).
The approximation evaluates first the virtual actions as the predictions depend 
on the probabilities of all the virtual actions, P(π). Given three different types of 
door transitions, the agent has three different virtual actions where—when given 
a policy—yields three different approximate priors. Selecting, for instance, the se-
cond virtual action, the variational free energy includes the new priors the virtual 
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action offer (Fig. E.2) and further unpacks the posterior. As mentioned several 
times, in action there is sensory prediction, despite the sensory not being obser-
ved yet. Therefore, during t-1 (t minus one), the approximated probability consi-
ders a virtual action, so to minimise the expected free energy G through action. 
The prediction is the approximated priors multiplied with the transition matrix, 
which is usually referred to as matrix B in active inference papers (Bogacz, 2017). 
The transition matrix allows predicting the upcoming time step depending on the 
virtual actions’ minimisation of expected free energy. Note, one chooses not one 
single virtual action exclusively, but it is instead a looping process of a winnerless 
competition, offering multiple virtual actions on the roll, so that one may adapt 
to an unexpected event (such as that of an unexpected doorstep or unexpected 
space after a transition). Both action and perception are continuously updated with 
improved precision as the virtual actions compete against one another. Once a 
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Figure E.1—A practical example of  active inference and the generation of  virtual actions. Given a hidden state, 
Matrix A constitutes the parameters of  the likelihood and probability of  an outcome (probability sums to 1 of  
all possible outcomes). In an ideal scenario, the number of  hidden states is known (as shown in the dashed box 
labelled ‘Posterior’)—however, this is not the case in the real world. Instead, the approximation is used as a point 
of 	departure	for	an	upper	bound	on	the	surprise	(free	energy).	The	matrix	B	specifies	the	probabilistic	transition	
among hidden states functioning as virtual actions (action sequences/action policies). Adding the virtual action 
to the joint probability and the approximated posterior in the nominator integrates the virtual action into the free 
energy. Ultimately, this process yields a prior probability that an outcome will be observed. 
PART I I I :  APPENDIX E
285
virtual action is not minimising free energy, it increases uncertainty and thus low-
ering precision and lowering the probability of being enacted.
The product of the approximated prior (given a chosen virtual action) and the 
likelihood yields a new matrix A, namely the joint probability for each observation 
and state. Normalising the joint probability generates the evidence model, which 
in turn determines the posterior beliefs. The process of active inference is not 
self-erasing in the sense that any loop in active inference demands one to forget 
the link between posterior and prior; in fact, that is precisely what active inference 
does not. Prior preferences, P(o), is established over time as a mechanism of survi-
val and adaptation since the experiencing agent must have done sufficiently right 
to be in time where the agent is. Prior preferences are coloured by what is known 
(experienced earlier) to have been beneficial in a similar situation.  Therefore, prior 
preferences are multiplied with the posterior beliefs, yielding now a joint probabi-
lity of the future (expected free energy, or simply, G, i.e. Eq. E.1). This happens 
for each action policy, where the selection depends on which action policy best 
minimise the difference of what is expected to be perceived and the ambiguity of 
what one is to perceive if unfolding the action, i.e. the KL-D.
(E.1) 
As the virtual action become real action, a continuous loop of active inferen-
ce and winnerless competition is on a roll, adjusting precision of predictions and 
minimising free energy (Eq. E.4) while acquiring sensory observations (Friston, 
Mattout and Kilner, 2011, sec. 3).
Using the model evidence that is based on deeply subjective preferences, it can 
be seen that the outcome suggests a possible ambiguity between a mid-sized door 
and a wide door, where, at the current time, a narrow door is out of the question. 
The mid-sized door and wide door closely compete as one acts towards the door 
until precision increases or uncertainty decreases.
E.2.2 Precision, expected free energy and virtual action
Given Eq. 2 and Fig. E.2, while perception optimises predictions, then action 
minimises prediction errors, and this adds to the argument that action and per-
ception are hardly separable. They are moulded, intertwined and integrated into 
the very same process. Their sophisticated relation witnesses their contribution 
to the dynamic system inherently evident in the brain and body. Although rear-
rangements of the equations may be helpful, it is essential to note that active in-
ference holds a particular philosophy of self-evidencing (Fig. E.3), namely inter-
nal states are never directly in contact with the environment, but their relation is 
describable through inferences of hidden states. When translated to the research 
question, the architectural transition is the hidden state of the experiential transi-
tion, which is inferred using virtual action the architectural transition has to offer 
and prior experiences.
It comes down to minimising expected free energy through the selection of 
t
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Figure E.2—This is the continuation of  Fig. E., where the priors are approximated using a virtual action. The 
process is then identical to the ideal case in Fig. E.1 (the blue part), i.e. multiplied with the likelihood of  observa-
tions.	The	sum	of 	the	joint	probability	represents	the	model	evidence,	which	is	used	to	find	the	posterior	beliefs	given	
a virtual action. Prior preferences take the role of  the history of  the experiencing agent and are deeply subjective. 
The joint probability of  the expected free energy, G, will help ensure a lowered free energy, F, in the process. This 
is precisely how action guide perception and/or action manipulates perception, namely, through the selection process 
of 	virtual	action	relative	to	efficiency	in	minimising	expected	free	energy.	The	dashed	red	line	shows	what	π2 
suggests to be observed based on deeply subjective preferences.
virtual actions to uncover the architectural transition. In turn, the selection of 
virtual actions depends entirely on the expected free energy. A virtual action can 
thus be defined:
(E.3) 
(E.4) 
t
n
(E.2) 
Eq. E.3 states that the approximated probability of the hidden states considers 
all action policies, achieved by averaging states over policies using the softmax 
function. Because active inference treats selection among virtual actions (π) as a 
Bayes model selection problem, which is basically to select the virtual action that 
best minimises the expected free energy, G, one may apply a softmax function to 
convert G into a probability distribution and multiply it with a precision factor. 
This eventually yields:
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Eq. E.4 describes the prior belief over a specific policy where gamma, γ, de-
signates the precision, i.e. the confidence of the expected free energy under a 
specific policy, and sigma, σ, designates the softmax function (Parr and Friston, 
2017). The precision holds a critical role in the selection among virtual actions 
because it comes to take the role of an intention, i.e. practical intention. Thus, the 
precision may be changed depending on how the agent seeks to interact with the 
environment. Although the precision under a virtual action becomes the affor-
dance-value, it is worth noting that it is based on epistemic and pragmatic values 
in the expected free energy (Fig. E.4). The precision is an important character to 
evaluate in neurobiological terms, and thus a topic that is discussed in Chapter 
11. It is important to remember that active inference always involves distributi-
ons that can be displayed. Fig. E.4 display how the different virtual actions may 
affect the posterior.
The tautological, self-evidencing loop between internal states and the environ-
ment is a natural pattern that inevitably emerges from human nature. However, the 
limitations of active inference must equally be understood; active inference neatly 
Figure E.4—The dashed black distribution designates the likelihood of  sensory evidence of  a hidden state, and 
the solid black distribution designates prior beliefs relative to the hidden state. Regarding the coloured lines; the 
dashed yellow vertical line designates the approximated posterior expectation. The width designates the dispersion, 
which is the inverse of  precision. The precision can determine whether the posterior belief  is biased towards the 
prior (solid line) or the sensory evidence (dashed line). The density of  the approximated distribution is what refers 
to the affordances of  an action, whereas the set of  competing actions refer to the virtual actions. The approximated 
posterior	in	red	(π1)	designates	an	example	of 	a	bias	towards	priors,	whereas	the	posterior	in	blue	(π2) designates a 
bias towards sensory evidence.
Q(s|π1 ) Q(s|π2 )
Likelihood
Prior
Noise
Uncertainty
Approx. posterior, given π1
Approx. posterior, given π2
Posterior expectation Posterior expectation
s* s
o
u
Internal stateEnvironment
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Action
Figure E.3—The environment (s*) has a reciprocal relation with the sensory outcome (o), which in turn informs 
internal states (s). The internal states then guide action (u), or is manipulated by action by changing the observable 
environment. This is the general self-evidencing strategy for active inference.
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describes neurobiological mechanisms and exercise a correspondence between va-
riational Bayes optimal models and biological processes. Nevertheless, active infe-
rence must not be thought of as an explicit process theory unfolding in the brain, 
as if the brain and body were literally constituted by Kullback-Leibler divergence 
and softmax functions. Instead, active inference describes a statistical framework 
yielding a variational Bayes optimal model describing human cognitive processes.
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Supplementary Information to Chapter 12:
Sensorimotor brain dynamics reflect architectural
affordances
APPENDIX F
Figure F.1—ERP plots of  “Lights On” stimulus for all six channels (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz, and Oz). 
Narrow condition in yellow, Mid condition in blue, and Wide condition in red. N1-P1-complex are marked with 
arrows.
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Figure F.2—ERP plots of  the total six channels only for Go trials. ANOVA with repeated measures of  
time-locked	ERP,	where	the	increasing	darkness	behind	the	plots	indicates	the	increasing	level	of 	significance.	
The	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	Fz	(F2,	36	=	4.546,	p	=	0.0174),	FCz	(F2,	36	=	7.116,	p	=	
0.0025),	Cz	(F2,	36	=	4.116,	p	=	0.0236),	Pz	(F2,	36	=	0.089,	p	=	0.915),	POz	(F2,	36	=	1.708,	p	=	
0.196),	and	Oz	(F2,	36	=	14.39,	p	<	0.0001).	We	observed	no	difference	for	NoGo—however,	we	observed	a	
difference within fronto-central and occipital sites for Go trials.
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Figure F.3—Rain-cloud plot of  the mean amplitude of  selected six channels between 600 and 800 ms post-im-
perative stimulus – PINV component. Means are indicated by dashed line, while medians are a solid line. We 
compared	(Tukey	HSD)	the	Width	within	Go	and	NoGo	conditions,	and	observed	only	significant	differences	for	
the Go condition. We observed differences within fronto-central and occipital sites.
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